Communication Quarterly ISSN: 0146-3373 (Print) 1746-4102 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcqu20 ValuJet flight 592: Crisis communication theory blended and extended Donald A. Fishman To cite this article: Donald A. Fishman (1999) ValuJet flight 592: Crisis communication theory blended and extended, Communication Quarterly, 47:4, 345-375, DOI: 10.1080/01463379909385567 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01463379909385567 Published online: 21 May 2009. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 773 View related articles Citing articles: 34 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcqu20 Download by: [Gothenburg University Library] Date: 08 October 2017, At: 12:50 ValuJet Flight 592: Crisis Communication Theory Blended and Extended Donald A. Fishman This article investigates the integration of three crisis communication approaches as it analyzes the crash of ValuJet Flight 592. The article is divided into four parts. Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 Part One of the article defines crisis communication and examines the scope of the concept. Part Two discusses theory-building and explains the three leading theoretical approaches to understanding a crisis communication event. Part Three applies elements from Fink's stage theory and Benoit's image restoration strategies to the crisis involving the crash of Valujet Flight 592. Part Four evaluates the "crisis communication situation" in the Valujet crash and demonstrates haw a "focusing events" approach adds a useful perspective to the case. The conclusion contends that a blended methodological orientation, integrating the recent work done in studying "focusing events" along with the stage and strategies models, provides a superior methodology for analyzing a complex crisis event rather than relying upon any one theory in isolation from the others. This article also emphasizes the pivotal role of the media in triggering an investigation into the lapse of safety standards and enforcement procedures in the Valujet Flight 592 crash. KEY CONCEPTS crisis communication, crisis management, image restoration, focusing event, ValuJet Donald A. Fishman (Ph.D. Northwestern, 1978) is an Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at Boston College. He wishes to thank Richard A. Kalian, California State Polytechnic-Pomona, W. Tim Coombs, Clemson University, Bonnie S. Jefferson, Boston College, and the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and assistance with this manuscript S hortly after 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, 11 May 1996, Valujet Flight 592 lifted off from Miami for Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport. Approximately six minutes after departure, the crew noticed an electrical disturbance on the plane, and Captain Candalyn Kubeck's apprehension was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder. Kubeck said that "We're losing everything," referring to the loss of complete electrical power on the airplane. First Officer Richard Hazen quickly informed the air traffic controllers that the plane needed to return to Miami. A senior flight attendant came forward to the flight deck to tell the crew that there was a fire in the main cabin, and that oxygen was needed immediately for the passengers (Bryant, 1996c, p. A16). Communication Quarterly, Vol. 47, No 4 Fall 1999, Pages 345-375 Meanwhile, as Hazen continued to query air controllers in Miami, the plane plunged into the Florida Everglades. The high-impact crash broke the plane into hundreds of pieces and scorched the sawgrass surrounding the water where the plane went down. The swamp quickly swallowed up the entire airplane. "If s not the usual crash scene where you see seats or windows or metal," reported Metro-Dade Police Detective Pat Brickman. "What you see is nothing" (Booth, 1996b, p. 1A). One fireman on the scene described the wreckage as looking like "confetti strewn across the swamps" (Booth, 1996a, p. 1). On the morning after the crash of Valujet Flight 592, United States Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena appeared on television to re-affirm the safety of flying on Valujet "I've flown Valujet Valujet is a safe airline, as is our entire aviation system" (Navarro, 1996, p. Al). Pena also added a strong endorsement for Valujef s management team: "Whenever we have found any issues, Valujet has been responsive, Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 they have been cooperative, they have in some cases even exceeded the safety standards that we have" (Navarro, 1996, p. Al). Senior Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officer David Hinson echoed Pena's sentiments about the safety of flying Valujet Three days later, a preliminary inquiry by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that oxygen canisters being shipped in the cargo hold ignited a fire that brought the plane down shortly after its take off (Wald, 1996a, p. Al). Vincent, Crow, and Davis (1997) contend that an airline crash provides a compelling and visually powerful news story. Vincent et al. maintain that "the events which surround air crashes are inherently dramatic, involving life and death situations, heroic actions, fatal and fateful decisions, and unforgettable visual images" (p. 354). Part of the appeal of a crash occurs because it involves ordinary people. Part of the appeal of a crash occurs because of the very randomness of the act, and the potential for a similar random act to affect millions of other air travelers. Vincent et al. perceive an airline crash to constitute a rich text with three overarching story lines: (1) "The tragic intervention of fate into everyday life" (2) "The mystery of what caused the crash" and (3) "The work of legitimate authority to restore normalcy" (p. 357). In the case of Valujet Flight 592, these themes were altered slightly by the recurrent suspicion that legitimate authorities had failed to safeguard the public welfare, and that the efforts to restore "normalcy" were being compromised by the FAA's desire to promote the low-cost, no frills segment of the aviation industry. The purpose of this article is to examine the crisis surrounding the crash of Valujet Flight 592. The paper is divided into four parts. Part One of the article defines crisis communication and examines the scope of the concept Part Two discusses theory building and explains the three leading theoretical approaches to understanding a crisis communication event. Part Three applies elements from Fink's stage theory and Benoif s image restoration strategies to the crisis involving the crash of Valujet Flight 592. Part Four evaluates the crisis communication situation in the Valujet crash and demonstrates how a "focusing events" approach adds a useful perspective to the case. The conclusion contends that a blended methodological orientation, integrating the recent work done by Birkland along with the stage and strategies models, provides a superior methodology for analyzing a complex crisis event rather than relying upon any one theory in isolation from the others. DEFINITIONAL PROPERTIES AND SCOPE OF CRISIS COMMUNICATION There has been an on-going and wide-ranging discussion within the literature of 346 Fishman crisis communication about the meaning of the term "crisis." The word "crisis" unfortunately has become an overused and imprecise term among journalists and broadcasters who cover day-to-day news events. As a result, the word "crisis" has become a convenient synonym for an "accident," "disruption," "catastrophe," or "disaster" with no attempt to delineate the scope or severity of a given problem. Within the sub-field of crisis communication, however, the word "crisis" has been defined in more restrictive terms. Barton (1993) has defined a crisis as a situation characterized by (1) a surprise (2) a high threat to important values and (3) requiring a short decision time (p. 50). Fern-Banks (1996) views a crisis as "a major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome affecting an organization, company, or industry, as well as its publics, products, or good name" (p. 1). Fink (1986) defines a crisis as an "unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending" (p. 15). These definitions contain different points of emphasis, but they suggest five Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 common characteristics of a crisis communication situation. First, an unpredictable event occurs. For instance, although natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes have an actuarial degree of predictability, the scope or severity of their impact remains completely unpredictable. In addition, technological innovations increase rather than decrease the level of unpredictability. Perrow (1999) argues that technological and industrial crises will likely increase in the next decade because the multi-factored safety devices and engineering systems within organizations interact in ways that managers, designers, and operators fail to predict. Perrow contends that the failed interactions of complex modern technology create the paradoxical situation of "normal accidents" (p. 5). Vaughn (1996) views "technological uncertainty" as a major characteristic of organizational decision-making, and she insists that "risk assessment" and calculating the degree of risk are a vital "factor of life" in examining the interaction of an organization with modern technology (pp. 79-80). Coombs (1999) maintains that "A crisis is unpredictable but not unexpected. Wise organizations know crises will befall them; they just do not know when" (pp. 2-3). Collectively, these observations underscore the lack of predictability facing the modern organization as it attempts to control events and anticipate changes. Second, important values for an individual or institution must be threatened in order for a crisis communication situation to exist An event or an "incident" like a flat tire on the way to work does not constitute a threat to important values. The flat tire may be a disruption, a distraction, or even a nuisance, but one can change the tire or call one of the emergency road service providers for assistance. Essential values are not threatened by a flat tire, although in common parlance someone typically may describe the situation as a "crisis" or "traumatic event" Coombs (1999) distinguishes an "incident" from a "crisis" by classifying the former as a "minor localized disruption," e.g., a water valve at a plant breaks, but the water spill is confined to one room and quickly repaired (p. 3). Thus, the damage is local, small in scope, and the incident does not disrupt the operations of the entire plant. On the other hand, the 1999 scandal in the basketball program at the University of Minnesota, where term papers allegedly were written for several players on the team, raised serious questions about the academic mission and values of the university, even though fewer than thirty individuals out of the school's fifty thousand registered students were involved in the incident The basketball scandal directly threatened important values of the institution and called into question its core mission. The resulting allegations of wrongdoing acquired a symbolic significance that Crisis Communication 347 overshadowed the actual numbers of people involved in the incident, and the perceived wrongdoing appeared symptomatic of the problems affecting Division I college athletics ("University of Minnesota," 1999, p. A 52). Third, the "intention" of an actor or an organization plays a minor, if negligible, role in analyzing a crisis communication situation. The term "accident" typically is defined as an unforeseen event and encompasses a wide range of misfortunes. Harm or injury may result, but blame is mitigated because of the lack of intent or motivation on the part of an actor or agency in planning for the event to occur (Green, 1997). The word "accidents thus commonly suggests that no one should be blamed for the event because it was "unintentional." In every day language, unintentional acts are distinguished from willful or deliberate actions, and there seemingly is an all- encompassing blanket of immunity extended to unintentional behavior. This conception of an "accident" however, is at odds with a crisis communication Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 perspective that seeks to assign responsibility or blame for an event, and that raises the frequently overlooked question of whether "due diligence" or "pro-active measures" should have been undertaken to prevent the occurrence of the ill-fated activity. "Ideal accidents" may be blameless and unpredictable events, but most accidents represent an opportunity to apportion blame, define a situation favorably or unfavorably, and mobilize a constituency to adopt a particular viewpoint From a crisis communication perspective, events are rarely, if ever, "accidental," "benign," or "incomprehensible," and thus the underlying causes are discernible. There also is a basic assumption within crisis communication that pro-active measures and preventive steps should had been undertaken to avert the crisis, to minimize its impact, or to accelerate the recovery process (Dougherty, 1992; Gottschalk, 1993). Fourth, a crisis communication occurrence represents a time-sensitive situation. An actor or organization does not have an infinite amount of time to respond. Rather, a crisis situation is one that is imbued with a sense of urgency. A crisis communication situation typically creates pressure for an immediate explanation to reassure the media, relevant stakeholders, and the public at large. The issuance of a timely response is often "critical in reducing, offsetting, and containing harm" (Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 1998, p. 234). Correspondingly, the level and extent of media coverage directly influences the degree of "urgency" placed upon an organization to provide a coherent explanation or to undertake corrective action (Ogrizek & Gullery, 1999, p. xiv). Fifth, a crisis communication situation involves a dynamic or multi-dimensional set of relationships within a rapidly-changing environment. Effective communication is essential to maintaining a positive relationship with key stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, and shareholders. At the same time, each of these stakeholders seeks to maximize its own welfare during a crisis. Thus, an organization may be torn between making trade-offs to satisfy customers at the expense of shareholders or between issuing a simple apology for an error and protecting itself against civil and criminal liability. Other actors in the situation such as government regulators, public interest watchdog groups, or the media may seek to justify their own existence as guardians of the "public good." As a result, the context in which a crisis situation takes place may best be described as "dynamic" and "fluid" rather than "static" and "one-dimensional" (Sturges, 1994). Tyler (1997), for instance, argues convincingly that the fear of legal liability may prevent a company from making a "heartfelt apology" for serious infractions such as a chemical or oil spill while permitting the same organization more latitude to 348 Fishman apologize for temporary problems such as a brief disruption of service or a minor problem. Tyler argues that an inability to express heartfelt remorse or to apologize effectively occurs because a "company has multiple goals and multiple audiences," and that the organization operates in a multi-dimensional world where "reputational strategies" can be separated from financial and legal strategies (p. 58). For Tyler, the results are that a company may speak with "a mixed strategy" or "strategic ambiguity" after a crisis (p. 62). Much of the early research in crisis communication has focused upon individual case studies. The Tylenol case has come to represent crisis communication at its best; the Exxon Valdez oil spill has become the benchmark for crisis management at its worst 1 But other examples of crisis situations are plentiful: the Union-Carbide Bhopal chemical spill, the Pepsi syringe hoax case, allegations of racism at Texaco, the 1992 Oklahoma City bombing, and the recent outburst of school violence at Columbine Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 High School in Littleton, Colorado. Moreover, as the field of crisis communication has matured, the concentration on isolated cases has been replaced by a concern for developing analytical constructs or methodological approaches that will be useful in examining a series of crisis events rather than dissecting one particular crisis in a step- by-step fashion. In turn, this macro perspective has led to an emphasis on developing integrative approaches to synthesize various ideas and constructs concerning crisis communication. THEORY-BUILDING IN CRISIS COMMUNICATION Theory building in the field of crisis communication has emerged slowly. The initial research focused heavily upon high-profile instances of success or failure such as the Tylenol product tampering case or the Challenger disaster. But research that attempts to integrate concepts, constructs, and theories has been rare (Coombs, 1999, p. ix). Seeger et al. (1998) recently have summarized the varied concepts, research contributions, and themes in the study of crisis communication. They acknowledge that studies of crisis communication events have become a very popular and fertile field of investigation during the past two decades. However, they concluded that there has been very little synthesis of constructs and theories within the domain of crisis communication, and they view the research as being fragmentary (Seeger et, al. 1998). Three major theoretical orientations have evolved to analyze aspects of a crisis communication situation. The first major approach is stage analysis; the second is strategies analysis; and the third is the "focusing events" perspective. Here, I would like to summarize briefly the ideas of the key theorists within each category: Steven Fink, the major theorist of stage analysis; William Benoit, the chief theorist representing the strategies approach, and Thomas Birkland, the originator of the focusing events perspective.2 Fink's Natural History Approach Steven Fink (1986) posits a four-stage pattern for a crisis communication event. Fink's first stage is called the prodromal phase, which is a Greek term meaning "running before" or "providing warning signs" (p. 7). During this stage, a manager should attempt to detect early warning signs (or prodromes) of a crisis because the safest assumption for a decision-maker within an organization is to acknowledge "that a crisis looms on the horizon" (p. 1). This is the time when it is easiest to manage a crisis, and a decision-maker should be willing to ask difficult "what i f questions in Crisis Communication 349 order to anticipate and detect potential signs of trouble. The second stage in Fink's natural history is called the "acute crisis phase." This stage is characterized as a period where events unfold with great "speed and intensity." This is the shortest of the four stages, but it often feels as if it were the longest, and, psychologically, it may have the most severe impact on key decision- makers within an organization. According to Fink, one of the major drawbacks in managing a crisis during the acute phase "is the avalanchelike speed and intensity that often accompany and characterize this stage" (p. 23). The acute phase is the peak point of pressure or "what most people have in mind when they speak of a crisis" (p. 22). The acute crisis phase typically is characterized by five elements that may individually or collectively surface as the crisis evolves: (1) the situation escalates in intensity from an undisclosed problem to a receptacle of public attention; (2) the situation attracts increased media attention; (3) critical distractions interfere with normal business Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 activities; (4) the situation affects the positive image of the company and the reputation of its management team; and (5) the situation affects the financial well- being of the organization (Fink, 1986, pp. 15-16). The third stage in Fink's system is called the "chronic crisis" phase. This stage involves undertaking steps to correct whatever difficulties have surfaced during the acute phase. This is a period of recovery, but it also may involve "self-doubt" and "self- analysis" among the members of the board of directors within the company. In this stage, an organization is likely to conduct external and internal investigations of the operations of the company and to perform major managerial changes. An attempt will be made to explain how the organization functions and what elements within the organizational culture may be dysfunctional, or at odds with maximizing profitability or fostering the public's trust For a company, the chronic crisis stage is the longest of the four phases. Fink argues that the "chronic stage can linger indefinitely. But crisis management plans can and do shorten this phase" (p. 24). Fink contends that those organizations without a crisis communication plan typically "suffer lingering effects of a crisis as much as two and a half times longer than companies that were prepared with a crisis management plan" (p. 24). Fink's fourth stage is called the "crisis resolution stage." This is a period when the company makes a full recovery from the crisis. In Fink's words, the company has been made "well and whole again" (p. 25). This is also a surprisingly vigilant stage because a crisis occurs in a cyclical fashion, and managers should immediately become alert to the development of new prodromes. The overriding advantage of a natural history approach is that it offers a comprehensive and cyclical characterization of a crisis. Metaphorically, a crisis evolves from the prodromal stage where the "water is boiling," to the acute stage where the "pot blows up," to the chronic crisis stage where a "massive clean-up effort is undertaken," to the finality of the crisis resolution stage where a manager "learns from his or her mistakes and looks again toward the future." While the proposed stages lack intricate detail and seem overly linear or deterministic, Fink's model provides a complete cycle for examining the origins, development, maturation, and resolution of a crisis. Benoit's Image Restoration Approach William L. Benoit has been the most influential theorist in developing a "strategies" model to utilize in crisis communication research. Benoifs theory is based 350 Fishman upon the assumption that an individual's or organization's most important asset is its reputation. Benoit asserts that a reputation or public image, like other valuable assets, should be managed strategically to obtain the best results. Benoit (1995b) contends that an individual or organization innately will seek behaviors that maximize its reputation or image. Even when a particular goal is unclear or ill-formed, or when there is more than one way to express a message, an actor will select those messages that have the highest utility, i.e., provide the most benefits to its reputation or image with the fewest costs (pp. 66-71). At the same time, an organization is inherently vulnerable to a crisis because events are likely to occur that are beyond its control, or are caused by human error and misjudgment, or that involve decisions between conflicting but equally admirable goals. Thus, harmful, counterproductive, and offensive behaviors occur, leaving an organization "vulnerable to attack" (p. 67). In Benoif s scheme, reputation or image Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 maximizing behavior occurs within a fluid and ever-changing context. For Benoit, reputation is both context-specific and stakeholder-specific. Individuals or organizations do not micro-manage each utterance or message, but they do seek actions that maximize their overall reputation and image. Benoifs theory fits most comfortably into Fink's acute or chronic stages of the natural history of a crisis, although Benoifs work has implications that can be directly incorporated within several areas of Fink's theory. Benoit's approach is actually a series of rhetorical strategies that an individual or company should adopt to maximize its reputation or image in light of an attack. The approach is based upon the dynamics of an attack-defend, stimulus-response condition. An attack has two major components: (A) The accused is held responsible for an action and (B) The action is considered offensive (Benoit, 1995b). Benoit (1995b) divides his model into five broad categories of strategies to be employed during a crisis event Many of the strategies are further sub-divided into distinct tactical variations. Benoifs first strategy is denial. Denial manifests itself in two variations: simple denial and shifting the blame to another party as the actual source of the offensive action. The advantage of such a shift is that it allows an organization or individual to portray itself as a "victim" of unfair allegations or circumstances, a n d / o r to direct attention to a scapegoat. Benoifs second strategy is evasion of responsibility. This is the most complicated of his categories. There are four variations of this strategy: (1) Defeasability: a lack of information or control over elements within the crisis communication situation occurs; (2) Provocation: the action occurs in response to the initiation of a detrimental step, and thus the behavior is defensive in nature; (3) Accidental: the action occurs inadvertently, and there are factors that mitigate the occurrence of the offensive behavior; and (4) Good intentions: the wrongful activity occurs, but it was premised upon good and sincere intentions. What complicates Category Two is Benoifs (1995b) underlying assumption that "Communication generally is best understood as intentional activity" (p. 65). This assumption places a heavy barrier on the effectiveness of arguments derived from "defeasibility" and "accidental occur- rences," and it is similar to the strong presumption against "accidental activities" that exists within the general theory of crisis communication. Benoifs third category is reduction of offensiveness. Benoit develops six tactical variations to allow an individual or organization to reduce its responsibility for an offensive action and consequently protect its reputation and image. The six tactical Crisis Communication 351 variants are bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, attacking one's accuser, and compensation. Bolstering refers to stressing positive traits in order to offset any negative accusations against an individual's or organization's reputation. Minimization involves reducing or downplaying the negative aspects of a wrongful act Differentiation refers to distinguishing the alleged wrongful act from other actions that involve deep-rooted harms and negative effects. Transcendence involves placing the act into favorable context or new frame of reference, such as utilizing an argument about "providing educational opportunities to those who otherwise would be locked out of the system" as a response to hostile claims against Division I athletes who fail to attend classes. A counter-attack refers to actions and messages designed to reduce the credibility of the source of the allegations about wrongful conduct This strategy may involve the use of counter-charges or diversionary sub-tactics. Finally, compensation involves providing a gift or tribute to directly aid the victims and to Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 mitigate the negative aspects of an offensive act. All in all, Category Three strategies provide a series of tactical steps to minimize the scope and severity of the alleged wrongful action. Benoif s fourth strategy is corrective action. This is a strategy designed to remedy any future occurrences of the act by enacting changes to eliminate the offensive behavior. Corrective action differs from the tactic of "compensation" because the former is aimed at future activities while the latter is designed to provide a gift to offset the "current" harm (Benoit, 1995b, p. 79). Sellnow, Ulmer & Snider (1998) contend that utilizing the strategy of corrective action may function in conjunction with other image restoration strategies such as denial and bolstering, and that the taking of corrective action steps "can expedite the organization's effort to rebuild its legitimacy" (pp. 60-61). Benoifs fifth strategy is mortification. This strategy involves the use of apologies, expressions of regret, and admissions of guilt in seeking public forgiveness for the offensive behavior. Benoit recommends that it may be most productive to couple this strategy with a pledge of corrective action, but variations of mortification can be implemented independently from the other major strategies (Benoit, 1995b, p. 79). Overall, Benoifs typology of image restoration actions consists of fourteen strategies and tactics: the five major strategies plus the tactical variations within each category. The first two categories address the concept of "blame" or "perceived responsibility"; the second two categories are concerned with the question of "offensiveness"; and the final category (mortification) expresses remorse for wrongful action and seeks forgiveness (Benoit & Nill, 1998, p. 129). Benoit assumes that individuals and organizations are reputation-maximizing entities, and that they will engage in actions designed to increase the favorable aspects of their image and minimize or offset negative allegations. For Benoit, reputation is measured by image, and that image is both audience-specific as well as context- specific. All members of an audience, or all customers, suppliers, shareholders, and regulators may not be interested in the same allegations of wrong-doing. As Benoit (1995b) observes, "All aspects of the accusation may not be equally important to an audience" (p. 84). The strength of Benoifs typology is in the details that it provides, and that the model can be adapted to cover virtually every attack-defend situation from a celebrity crisis such as the Tonya Harding case (Benoit & Hanczor, 1994) to a company defending its actions and promising reforms for overcharging its customers for 352 Fishman automobile services (Benoit, 1995a). At its core, Benoif s approach requires that a commentator evaluate the persuasiveness of the discourse set forth by an individual or organization. This assessment involves highlighting strategies from the model that were applied productively while identifying the strategies and tactics that lack persuasive appeal. Benoit and his associates have had noteworthy successes in applying the model to a variety of different crisis situations, including case studies of an airplane crash, faulty breast implants, product tampering, and presidential leadership (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Benoit, Gullifor & Panici, 1991; Benoit & Lindsey, 1987). Once an attack or implied attack has occurred, the model provides a self-executing mechanism, anchored in an attack-defense dichotomy although "image restoration" is only a fraction of what Fink includes within a complete natural history of a crisis communication event Fink's approach also is more overtly Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 concerned with the financial and business recovery of an organization, while Benoit subsumes these categories under his all-encompassing emphasis on maximizing reputation through image restoration strategies.3 Birkland's Focusing Events Approach Thomas Birkland (1997) has proposed another perspective to examine crisis communication events. His approach is based upon the agenda-setting function and public policy implications of a crisis communication event Birkland believes that "sudden, unpredictable events" play an important role in promoting public-policy discussions. Birkland contends that, "Whereas long term social change is often the result of the ebb and flow of broader social and economic conditions, social change and conflict are often punctuated by sharp, sudden events" (p. 2). Birkland calls these events "focusing events" (p. 22). A focusing event serves as an impetus for bringing an important issue to the public's attention and in creating acceptance for the issue in the public-policy arena. Examples of such focusing events are the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 leading to the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and the 1999 shootings in Littleton, Colorado, that focused the public's attention on domestic and school violence. Birkland contends that focusing events have the ability to play a major role in setting the public agenda because public policy is often based upon, or spearheaded by, a dramatic news event, and the media's coverage of that event creates an urgency to take action to correct a "problem." Birkland (1997) argues that "agenda-setting is the process by which problems and alternative solutions gain or lose public and elite attention" (p. 8). A "focusing event" does not necessarily lead to a policy change, but it focuses attention for a sufficient amount of time to provide a "window of opportunity" for new legislation to be enacted. For Birkland a "focusing event" differs from the "normal" and "routine" nature of "everyday political news" because "focusing events" compel policy makers and the public at large to react immediately to an unanticipated occurrence without the pre-screened filters provided by special interest groups to control an issue amidst an atmosphere of widespread public indifference (p. 27). Birkland identifies two major types of focusing events. The first type is a "normal" focusing event, such as a hurricane, tornado, flash flood, or earthquake. These events are basically "natural disasters." There is an actuarial predictability to Type One focusing events; they happened in the same place and create similar, although not identical, conditions. As Birkland observes, "These events occur sufficiently often to Crisis Communication 353 allow us to isolate events and model their influence on the agenda" (p. 145). The second type of "focusing event" is a "new" event As Birkland explains, "A new focusing event is an event that has never happened before or, alternatively, happened so long ago as to have faded from memory. New focusing events happen because of changes in technology and changes in society" (p. 145). Examples of Type Two focusing events are the 1982 Tylenol product tampering case, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and the freezing of appropriations and budgetary restrictions placed upon the Navy in the aftermath of the 1991 Tailhook sex harassment crisis. A Type Two "focusing event" violates expectations, upsets norms, and creates uncertainty and unpredictability. These "new" events represent a striking departure from the routine and pre-planned activities that are disseminated by the media. The pre-planned events generally are managed and guided by their originators, and the media typically draw upon a packaged press release, a staged press conference, or a Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 photo opportunity session as the raw data for such a news story. By contrast, a Type Two focusing event is neither routine nor pre-planned, and it opens a symbolic arena where various groups struggle about the interpretation and construction of social reality. In this respect, Type Two events are "novel" or "almost novel" occurrences, and they force the public to react to them either with a new attitude, new standards of conduct, or new legislation. The 1999 shootings at Littleton, for example, have prompted widespread congressional debate on gun control and have re-opened the issue of workplace and school violence. Local school boards have enacted a variety of regulations to protect their students ranging from requiring clear-coated or mesh backpacks to enhanced metal detectors at the doors of a school building. Type Two focusing events illustrate the role of a crisis situation to influence public policy. Birkland provides another important distinction to distinguish between Type One and Type Two "focusing events." Birkland contends that "When society seems to have formed a consensus that the event was an 'act of God/ such as a natural disaster or a freak accident, our attention turns to what we can do to help the victims" (p. 2). But when the public perceives the situation as a Type Two focusing event, "our attention turns to the voluntary acceptance of responsibility for an event or to the more coercive process of fixing blame" (p. 2). Type Two focusing events center upon blame and responsibility, and they, in turn, trigger the taxonomy of crisis strategies that Benoit has identified. To date, however, the utility or uniqueness of the "focusing event" approach has remained under-developed. Type One focusing events have long been considered a staple in the crisis communication literature. Lerbinger (1997) contends that the public tends to accept natural disasters fatalistically as opposed to a man-made or technology-generated crisis. But the degree of predictability surrounding the event is a misleading index because the extent and scope of the damage and the magnitude of the disruption upon the lives of ordinary people in a natural disaster is completely unpredictable. So, too, is the speed and skill of the response in containing a natural disaster. In a Type One event, the response becomes the focal point, and the public views the government as having a special mandate to intervene to safeguard property and lives during a natural disaster (Lerbinger, 1997, pp. 57-65).4 On the other hand, Type Two focusing events are linked together because they generate legislative action and influence the public agenda. A "focusing event" is not only an attractive term, but it provides a useful vehicle 354 Fishman to discuss a sub-set within the category of crisis communication events that specifically are connected to the agenda-setting function for legislation or public discussion. The agenda-setting process deserves more attention, and how the public agenda is created, acted upon, and influenced by the media and public opinion should not be assumed to be a one-dimensional process, or that there is only one theory of how to conceptualize the "public agenda." Birkland relies heavily upon the work of Stone (1997) and Edelman (1964) in providing the methodological apparatus for a focusing events study. Stone (1997), for instance, contends that symbols are an important form of persuasion in a collective decision-making process, and that a dramatic news event can be crystallized to represent a symbol. Consequently, the symbolic representation of the event becomes a vital part of the political reasoning employed to justify a decision or policy outcome. In addition, the public often relies extensively upon these "symbols" and "narrative Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 stories" to explain complex ideas and to dramatize a cause. In this sense, policy decisions can be viewed as a form of symbolic enactment, where individuals and groups utilize symbols and images to obtain "specific" and "tangible benefits" (Edelman, 1964, p. 5). Because Fink, Benoit, and Birkland's approaches were conceived independently, they understandably offer different strengths. To date, there has been a failure, however, to recognize the limitations that accrue in employing the models in isolation from each other. Despite the steady outpouring of articles on image restoration strategies, and the widespread acceptance of Fink's work in business circles, there has been no attempt to blend the different theoretical orientations into a more nuanced model or theoretical framework. Unfortunately, this insularity in theory development is a drawback that affects every area of crisis communication scholarship, and it helps to explain the lack of integrative studies within the wide-ranging area of crisis communication (Seeger et al, 1998; Coombs, 1999). However, the use of one model should not exclude commentators from drawing upon the other approaches. Instead, the integration or blending of the three models offers a stronger and more resilient approach to studying a crisis communication event. Fink's model, for instance, offers less detail than Benoif s, but it provides a broader scope in identifying the characteristics of a crisis. Benoif s approach offers more nuances and details about image restoration strategies, but it lacks a comprehensive picture to depict the entire cycle of a crisis. Birkland's model is useful when a crisis becomes a focusing event for a public policy discussion. An integrated or blended approach, drawing upon germane elements from each model, ultimately provides a more comprehensive approach to examining a complex crisis communication event My contention, therefore, is that the models used in conjunction strengthen rather than undermine the claims that each approach offers, and that each model provides insights that reinforce constructs that the other model ignores or undervalues. THE INTEGRATION OF STAGE AND STRATEGIES ANALYSIS The crisis surrounding the crash of Valujet Flight 592 can best be constructed by delineating the major stages of the crisis and by examining the strategies that Valujet employed to defend its reputation. A crisis communication situation, however, involves more than the image or reputation of the party perceived as causing the offensive behavior. The crisis communication situation includes the disruption of Crisis Communication 355 normal business operations, financial harm, intense media scrutiny, and frequently governmental scrutiny. The Valujet crisis communication situation is further complicated because the FAA at first tried to buffer the criticisms against Valujet Then, acting in its role as the chief regulatory agency supervising aviation and responding to widespread media and political pressures, the FAA became a vigorous and outspoken critic of Valujet The FAA subsequently grounded Valujet for three months, requiring the airline to implement major changes in order to demonstrate its commitment to public safety. Prodromal Stage of the Crisis Because an accusation or event must occur to trigger Benoif s theory of image restoration strategies, the background and antecedents to a crisis event are best analyzed by utilizing Fink's natural history approach. Fink's prodromal stage focuses Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 upon the warning signs that an organization should detect to identify an unacceptable level of risk or, alternately, behavior that crosses a "danger threshold" within a particular industry. An accurate description of the prodromal stage also should explain how an organization began and developed. Valujet quickly became an overnight success story because of its creation of a specialty niche for itself as a low-budget alternative within the airline industry. In March of 1993, Robert Priddy, Maurice Gallagher, and Tim Flynn began the process of starting a cheap, no-frills airline called Valujet Each of the founders invested a million dollars into this start-up venture, and they persuaded Lewis Jordan, a colleague of Priddy at Southern Airways, to join them as a co-founder and CEO of the airline. The name "Valujet" was a strategically selected compound word: It implied high value to the customer but at an extremely affordable price. As Beiden, Matz & Copeland (1996) observe, Valujet, "by finding dozens of ways to cut costs and lower prices, tapped into the public's appetite for bargain travel, offering air fares as low as bus fares and succeeding sensationally where other discounters had failed" (p. 1). Langewiesche (1998) argues that from its inception "Valujet was helping the entire industry to understand just how far cost-cutting could be pushed" (p. 83). Valujet began operations on 26 October 1993, using eighteen D C ^ s purchased from Delta Airlines. The planes within Valujef s fleet were used or reconditioned aircrafts. Valujef s central objective was to offer fares at fifty to sixty percent less than the major carriers and to outsource maintenance to the lowest bidding repair services, thereby eliminating the need for costly repair facilities, expensive parts bins, and mechanics of its own. By and large, Valujet completely cut out frills across the board: Passengers were offered no meals, no seat reservations, no printed tickets or city-ticket offices, no frequent flyer programs, and discounted prices were not even available to the airline's employees (Schiavo, 1997b, p. 7). Valujef s market niche was based strictly upon offering a cost-sensitive flight; its customers were not promised quality, service, or convenience. Moreover, Valujet placed a heavy emphasis on cost containment in order to maximize its profits. Valujef s maintenance programs were scattered among fifty different contractors at eighteen companies until eventually the airline began to postpone critical repairs in order to keep its busy schedule afloat (Schiavo, 1997b, p. 12). Valujet unfortunately failed to heed the multiple warning signs during the prodromal stage. Instead, it continued to expand at a dangerous rate while relying exclusively upon older and reconditioned planes. Accidents occurred, and the 356 Fishman numbers were extremely high by industry standards. The company's pilots made fifteen emergency landings in 1994, fifty-seven in 1995, and fifty-nine in the first few months of 1996 (McFadden, 1996, p. 1A). Mary Schiavo (1997a), the Transportation Inspector General, reports that from February through May of 1996, a Valujet airplane was forced down almost every other day (p. 56). The NTSB indicated that "Valujef s accident reports were four times greater than other airlines including United, Delta, or American" (Ho, 1996, p. A13). Just as Valujef s management team ignored the early warning signs of major problems, the FAA failed to monitor Valujef s performance during the prodromal stage. Thus, the public's regulatory net designed to ensure optimal safety measures was compromised from the outset. The FAA's 1958 mandate was to "promote" and "police" aviation. But the FAA, when faced with a conflict of interest, tended to emphasize the former goal while ignoring the latter. The FAA had a self-serving policy Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 objective in promoting Valujet as an exemplar to prove that deregulation actually was fostering competition within the airline industry. That goal overshadowed its obligation to police the safety violations and accident records of Valujet Schiavo (1997a) reports that "The FAA looked at Valujet planes nearly 5,000 times in the three years that it had been flying yet had never reported any significant problems or concerns" (p. 56). Fink contends that the prodromal stage is the beginning or the "pre-crisis" stage when a manager should be alert to possible warning signs and should be willing to ask "what if" questions to determine where possible dangers could occur. There were numerous danger signs at Valujet, but managers chose to ignore them: planes missing landing runways, low cabin pressure, injured flight attendants due to mechanical failures, and emergency landings for repairs. There also was a "parade of horribles" including planes skidding on icy runways; an emergency chute that inflated inside the cabin of a plane pinning a flight attendant to a wall; and a cockpit microphone that shorted out preventing the pilot from talking to the Air Traffic Control (Wald, 1996d, p. A10). Statistical evidence tends to confirm Valujef s high-risk orientation. According to Time, Valujet had an accident rate of 3.06 per 100,000 departures compared to the other fourteen low-cost airlines in the study who averaged 0.43 accidents per 100,000 departures (Gleick, 1996, p. 41). Valujet was involved in at least 150 accidents in the first three years of its existence, a record that far exceeded the problems at other low- cost discount airlines. Schavio (1997b) claims that Valujef s "safety record had deteriorated almost in direct proportion to its growth" (p. 12). Unfortunately, neither the management at Valujet nor the FAA wanted to disrupt an innovative business experiment in the airline industry. Moreover, because "no" fatalities had occurred in connection with the numerous accidents, it was possible to continue denying the seriousness of the problems. Both Valujet and the FAA chose to adopt a strategy of denial during the prodromal stage. Kuttner (1996) refers to a situation where a regulatory agency begins to share the same outlook and goals as the industry that it is empowered to regulate as "regulatory capture" (pp. 232-234). James E. Burnett, Jr., a former chairman of NTSB, contends that the "FAA was often too close to the airlines." He stated that "If s as if the FAA acts to protect the airline rather than the consumer until they just can't maintain that position any longer" (Wald, 1996c, p. Al). "Regulatory" or "industry capture" is an intriguing term. But it may not suitably Crisis Communication 357 convey the competing motives operating at a regulatory agency. At best the FAA's dual goals of promoting the airlines and regulating them led to a conflict of interests as an innovative segment of the airline industry began to evolve. The FAA seemed to have a soft spot for start-ups such as Valujet, believing that low cost airlines would foster a competitive balance on certain routes then dominated by major carriers. The FAA thus wanted to provide incentives for low-cost airlines to succeed, and Valujet became the showcase for this new business model of air transportation. This close, symbiotic relationship between the FAA and Valujet was one of the central elements of the "crisis communication situation." The Acute Stage of the Crisis The second stage in Fink's approach is the acute crisis stage. In the Valujet case, this refers to the crash itself and its immediate aftermath. Much of the media and public Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 attention during the acute stage was devoted to describing the crash site, viewing the reactions of the recovery team, speculating on what actually caused the crash, and expressing concerns for the families of the victims. By its very nature, an airline crash is a very visible, violent event, and it typically produces fatalities and graphic images of destruction. After such a crash, the public is inundated with massive news coverage (Vincent et al., 1997). Meanwhile, the airline under scrutiny follows an elaborate protocol: Personal apologies and expressions of mortification by the company president, assistance for bereaved relatives ranging from aid in filling out insurance forms to arranging funeral services and pledges by the airline to provide a full explanation on how such a tragedy could have occurred (Pinsdorf, 1991). Valujet CEO Lewis Jordan followed this elaborate ritual in a textbook fashion. Jordan employed the strategy of mortification immediately after the crash. Jordan declared that "It is impossible to put into words how devastating something like this is to humans who care" ("Jet Was Up-To-Date," 1996). Jordan observed that "Every human being is a life with loved ones, with places to go, with stories to tell. If s Mother's Day weekend. We know that Words are inadequate to express our grief (Phillips, 1996a, p. A7). When asked by the media about Valu Jet's questionable record of safety and lengthy list of accidents, Jordan refused to depart from his focus on the welfare of the victims and their families: "I don't have the facts, I will have the facts . . . I have spent the last number of days of my life dealing with human tragedy, and families and loved ones that lost their lives, and I ain't bothering with lots of statistics...." ("FAA Study," 1996). Valujet was not a passive participant during the acute stage of the crisis. After showing concern for the victims and their families, Jordan quickly launched a campaign to bolster Valujef s record in meeting FAA's standards. Jordan's discourse reveals the use of bolstering, denial, and minimization as his major strategies. Jordan's overall campaign of bolstering stressed three major themes: (1) Millions of Americans of modest means were able to fly due to the low-cost ticketing policy of Valujet; (2) Valujet was up-to-date on its safety checks from current FAA inspections; and that (3) Valujet would postpone temporarily answering the charges being leveled against it by its critics because it would be premature to respond in the aftermath of an emotional accident At the same time, Jordan strongly denied the allegation that his airline fleet was not safe, and he re-affirmed Valujef s commitment to safety. In the period immediately after the crash, Jordan continued to insist that "We've had incidents, and a tragic 358 Fishman accident and now we are looking forward to a high level of safety" (Gleick, 1996, p. 41). Jordan openly acknowledged that "It is clear we have not had a perfect safety record. But we are taking extraordinary steps to insure the highest level of safety" (Bryant, 1996b, p. BIO). Jordan also denied that the age of the planes in the Valujet fleet was a factor in the crash: "The DC-9 is a very common airplane operated by a lot of airlines" ("Jet Was Up-To-Date," 1996). On the day after the crash, Jordan insisted that the 1969 airplane utilized on Flight 592 was completely safe; otherwise it would have been grounded. One of Jordan's recurrent points of emphasis was that "Valujet was working closely with the FAA to maintain airline safety standards" ("Pena Says Valujet" 1996). In the post-crash environment, the media's scrutiny of Valujet was hostile. Members of the media immediately obtained copies of FAA evaluations showing that Valujef s accident rate was the highest among low-cost carriers. Collectively, these Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 reports implied that Valujet had operated flights without regard to the safety of its airplanes or had placed profits ahead of safety concerns. Meanwhile, Jordan warned the media against a "rush to judgment" and falsely stimulating hysteria among potential customers seeking discounted air fares (Gleick, 1996, p. 41). But the media coverage of the crash situation continued to intensify after the first seventy-two hours, forcing Jordan to promise concrete corrective actions. Six days after the crash, Jordan appointed retired Air Force General James B. Davis as Valujef s new "safety czar," and Davis was given an open mandate to launch an internal investigation on all aspects of Valujef s operations (Hamilton, 1996, p. A13). "Anything less than a perfect safety record is unacceptable," proclaimed Jordan (Wald, 1996b. p. A7). Unfortunately, Valujef s immediate post-crash media campaign was flawed. Valujet publicist Gregg Kenyon refused to comment when asked whether the airline wanted to send the oxygen generators back to Georgia to save money ("US Attorney's Office," 1999). And CEO Jordan declined to appear on ABC's Nightline with Ted Koppel to explain his views on the crash and Valujef s commitment to safety. Various spokespersons from the FAA served as surrogates for Valujet with the media, explaining the crash and accident rates among airline carriers but from an industry- based perspective. Jordan later recalled that the news stories during the first forty-eight hours of the crisis allowed the story to spiral out-of-control to the detriment of Valujef s reputation. The sheer number of inquiries from the media made it impossible to respond: It was physically impossible. We had people doing nothing but answering the phone. I had to expand my voice mail capability. I was getting 100 messages an hour. Twenty-four hours a day, we had someone manning the phones#.. . We knew we needed to have a central voice, a single voice so it wouldn't be confusing... But when you're the number one story around the world, on every wire in the world, and if s incorrect information—if s an overwhelming thing to deal with. (Scott, "Rebounding from Tragedy," 1997) Jordan claimed that he was never able to rebut the widespread negative information: "We were on a battlefield where we were going to take hits. And to the extent we could get a point of truth anywhere was at least helping us. And we began to understand that certain publications and certain producers weren't going to tell our side in the world of soundbites and quick quotes. They would get something negative Crisis Communication 359 and put it out there" (Scott, "Rebounding from Tragedy," 1997). A new development surfaced during the acute stage that would assist Valujef s efforts to improve its image with the American public. Three days after the crash, investigators discovered that the flight was carrying fifty to sixty oxygen generators in the cargo hold (Wald, 1996a, p. Al). This discovery opened the door for Valujet to re-position the arguments concerning blame and negligence to one of its sub- contractors, Sabretech. The discovery also allowed Valujet to bolster its image as a "victim of circumstances." Meanwhile, SabreTech's chief lawyer, Kenneth Quinn, maintained that whether or not the generators were mislabeled and mistakenly shipped, "Valujet was ultimately responsible for determining and approving what is loaded onto its airplanes" (Bryant, 1996a, p. A16). The acute stage of the crisis exhibited several of the transformations that Fink's model predicts. First, the situation attracted increased governmental scrutiny as the Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 FAA launched a belated but intensified review of the safety and maintenance records of Valujet At the White House, top presidential aides Harold Ickes and George Stephanopoulos berated Transportation Secretary Pena for reassuring the public about Valujet The Wall Street Journal reported on the White House's new "marching orders" for the FAA and Department of Transportation (DOT): "Nobody mentions 'Valujet' when talking about airline safety." The objective, the story continued, "was to stop the perception of boosterism" ("Transportation Chief Pena," 1996, p. 1). Second, media coverage of the event increased dramatically, moving the emergence of the discount segment of the airline industry from an "undisclosed problem to a receptacle of attention" (Fink, 1986, p. 23). This coverage tended to question the prevailing myth that all airlines were equally safe, and that the small-non-unionized carriers were as safe as the mainstream companies (Bryant, 1996b, p. BIO). Third, the credibility of Valujef s safety and maintenance records were open to dispute as various claimants emerged to contest Valujef s commitment to safety. Fourth, critical distractions occurred that disrupted Valujef s normal business activities. The FAA's intensive inspections forced Valujet to reduce its scheduled trips to only a handful a day, and flight cancellations and inspection-related delays further prompted customers to cancel future bookings (Wald, 1996b, p. AT). Fifth, the financial well-being of the company was placed in jeopardy as the stock dropped twenty-seven percent within a few days of the crash (Gleick, 1996, p. 42). The emerging image that the company was not being safety-conscious directly hurt its viability with analysts on Wall Street The acute and chronic phases of a crisis frequently do not have an easily recognizable, or conveniently available, dividing line. Instead, an arbitrary decision has to be made as to what activities should be placed in each stage. The passage of time typically is a useful factor in drawing a line between the two stages. Nevertheless, a subjective judgment often is required to segregate the activities from one stage or another. The best guideline to follow is that the acute phase occurs during the "high" point of the crisis, and it encompasses events that occur in the immediate aftermath of the "peak" point of activity. By 26 May 1999, the labor-intensive, physical search of the Florida crash site ended with only twenty percent of the human remains having been recovered. Four days later, three Valujet shareholders sued the airline claiming they were misled about safety. Valujet, once a glamour stock on Wall Street, continued its downward plunge. 360 Fishman The Chronic Stage of the Crisis According to Fink, the chronic stage is the longest period of the crisis with a tendency to "linger indefinitely" (p. 24). It is a period characterized by self-doubt and self-analysis within an organization, and it is likely to witness internal and external investigations and major changes among managerial personnel. This stage is also a period where the accusations and defenses that Benoit predicts are most likely to lead to significant changes among the parties in the situation. Accusations against Valujef s record of safety increased as the families of the victims and the critics within the media continued to claim that Valu Jet posed a serious threat to public safety. On 17 June 1996, the FAA grounded Valujet until the agency was satisfied that its operational difficulties had been corrected. Senior FAA administrator David Hinson admitted that the agency had failed to undercover serious infractions prior to the crash. But the agency now believed that Valujef s Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 problems were systemic, not isolated. In explaining the agency's dramatic change of view, Hinson said: "Circumstances change. Evidence has developed subsequent to the crash in Florida that Valujet is not in strict compliance with the FAA" ("FAA Chief Defends," 1996). In light of the FAA's grounding of Valujet, Jordan soon adopted a strategy of victimage and minimization. On 18 June 1996, Jordan reacted emotionally to the FAA's compulsory grounding: "As every day unfolds and as the NTSB continues its investigation it becomes more and more and more clear that this is an accident that could have happened to any airline in the world, and that Valujet is also a victim and Valujef s people [employees] are victims" ("Valujet Crash Prompts," 1996). Speaking before a Congressional subcommittee on 25 June 1996, Jordan reiterated his signature line that "This is an accident that could have happened to any airline. Valujet is the victim" ("Valujet Shares Plunge," 1996). Jordan also sought to downplay Valujef s accident-plagued record. Jordan instead claimed that "while having some problems," Valujet "has been micro-inspected" and that "inspectors would find similar problems with other airlines if they were to scrutinize them the way they investigated Valujef ("Changes Seen," 1996). Jordan's most disarming comment was the reminder that the employees at Valujet "are flying our family and friends on the these airplanes. It is the ultimate litmus test of confidence in the airline" (Wald, 1996c p. A20). Jordan's speech before the Aviation Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives in late-June 1996 resourcefully combined several image restoration strategies. Jordan began his presentation to Congress by citing the FAA and NTSB reports that neither "pilot error, equipment failure, or maintenance factors played any role in this tragic accidenf ' (Jordan, 1996a). Jordan also emphasized his credentials as having worked in the aviation industry for thirty-three years, and as having been trained as an aerospace engineer who previously had served as the president of three airlines, including the largest air cargo company, prior to co-founding Valujet Jordan (1996a) argued: "I would have grounded this fleet myself if I had had any reason to believe that the airplanes were not safe." Jordan (1996a) also denied the charge that "Valujet, its training, its aging aircraft and its maintenance practices" caused the accident. Jordan emphasized to Congress that both the NTSB and FAA have absolved Valujet of equipment and personnel errors, but he extended their reports to include a general statement about safety and that a concern for profits could never replace Valujef s commitment to safety: Crisis Communication 361 I can state without doubt Valujet is a safe airline. I will repeat ValuJet is a safe airline... The safety of our customers is our No. 1 priority and far and away ahead of any other priority. I simply do not understand the logic of those who think that running an unsafe airline could contribute to profitability, could ever contribute to marketing an airline in the public's eye. 0ordan, 1996a) Jordan continued the strategy of placing the blame for the crash unequivocally on Sabretech. He started this argument before Congress by noting that the NTSB has identified five boxes of oxygen generators that were packed, labeled, and delivered incorrectly. Jordan insisted that "Valujet does not permit the shipment of such generators on the aircraft and we never would have accepted them if they had the proper label" (Jordan, 1996a). Jordan continued to absolve Valujet of blame for the Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 crash. "And it is my simple and straightforward contention," remarked Jordan, "that had those boxes been so marked, Valujet simply would not have accepted them. They never would have been on the airplane, and those 110 people would not have lost their lives" 0ordan, 1996a). In summarizing his view on the crash, Jordan (1996a) emphasized that "Valujet had nothing to do with this, and we're sorry about the misunderstanding that has led up to the discussion of these items in the past" Jordan employed the strategy of evading responsibility by making Sabretech the villain in the crash and by arguing that there would not have been any crash had SabreTech performed its duties responsibly. This position added credibility to Valujef s claim that the organization should not be held responsible for activities outside its control, a common image restoration tactic utilized by those seeking to evade responsibility (Benoit, 1995b, pp. 90-91). There also was an unexpected but highly credible source of opposition to protest the FAA's plan to re-certify Valujet Valujef s flight attendants. The union of Valujef s 600 flight attendants sought to capitalize on the crash by asking the DOT to remove the top officers from the company. Susan Clayton, president of the Local Association of Flight Attendants for Valujet, declared "We want Valujet to resume operations, but to do it with the highest degree of safety. We need a new management team that will make fundamental changes to the airline" ("Union Wants Changes," 1996). The union claimed that Priddy and Jordan had more than sixty years of combined experience to learn FAA safety regulations and what was required of an airline. The union asserted that they were not "disposed to comply with the rules and should not be given a second chance" (Bryant, 1996d, p. D 6). The DOT, however, rejected this argument The DOT was offended by the union's attempt to use the crash to better its own bargaining position in a labor negotiations situation. Instead, the DOT accepted Valujef s argument that, during its quick growth, safety had been "inadvertently" downgraded, and that top management did everything possible to correct the lapses in safety once the problems came to their attention. This is a position that acknowledges and accepts the "defeasibility," "accidental occurrence," and "good intentions" arguments that Jordan had relied heavily upon to explain the lengthy accident record of Valujet. The DOT ruled that None of the information that we have received from the FAA indicates that the safety-related problems at Valujet were directly attributable to Messrs. Jordan and Priddy. Of course, those problems occurred while they were in control of 362 Fishman Valujet and they therefore share responsibility for the carrier's problems. However, it is important to point out that the evidence in the record indicates that Valujet itself discovered and voluntarily disclosed many of the problems that it has now fixed and took proactive steps in fixing those problems... There is no evidence that in expanding Valujef s services, Messrs. Priddy and Jordan intentionally disregarded safety or failed to establish what they believed to be policies designed to insure the carrier's safety and compliance with Federal safety regulations . . . The fact that an individual held a key position with an airline during a time when the carrier was experiencing regulatory compliance problems does not in and of itself make him or her unfit for their position. (Bryant, 1996d, p. D6) The DOT instead argued that "Valujet has taken actions to eliminate the airline's Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 shortcomings both before and after Valujef s shutdown," and the DOT could foresee no reason to doubt that Valujet top managers would not comply fully with the FAA's requirements in the future (Bryant, 1996d, p. D 6). After three months of being grounded, Valujet was given permission to resume flights on 26 September 1996. But the company did not return to full force because only fifteen planes were allowed to fly (Schiavo, 1997b, p. 30). Valujet knew that to gain governmental approval and win back its market share of customers, its first priority was to assure the American public and Federal regulators of its genuine commitment to safety. As a result, Valujet followed a strategy of implementing highly visible corrective actions coupled with its all-encompassing strategy of bolstering the organization's commitment to safety. As Sellnow et al. (1998) affirm, corrective action can be accompanied by or work in tandem with a strategy of bolstering. Three major corrective action measures were implemented as part of Valujef s image restoration plan. First, management made major changes in the company's top management team. Five weeks after the termination of its grounding, Valujet hired D. Joseph Corr, a former head of Continental Airlines, to run its daily operations. Corr was given the title of president and chief executive officer. Jordan was re-assigned to take over Robert Priddy's duties as chairman of Valujef s holding company and his new job description was to focus on the "carrier's finances and image." ("Valujet Airline Shuffles," 1996, p. D4). Valujet also hired Jim Jensen to a newly created post as senior vice-president for in-house maintenance and engineering to create "the strongest possible team" of maintenance professionals "that will be the best in the airline industry" ("Valujet Taps Veteran," 1996, p. B5). By developing an in-house maintenance staff, Valujet also pledged to reduce the number of outside contractors employed to assist with the maintenance of its aircrafts. Second, new procedures were introduced, such as assigned seating and a nationwide system of distribution of seats through travel agents, to encourage customers to book flights on Valujet Third, Valujet entered into an agreement with the FAA to correct all serious deficiencies, and Valujet volunteered to launch a systematic review of each of its fifty-one aircrafts. In order to conduct this review, the airline halted fifty percent of its flying schedule, dropping its daily flights from 320 to 160 trips. From the forced grounding period onwards, Valujet thus revised its growth policy. The organization focused less on expansion and more on ensuring the safety of its operations. Strategically, all of the changes were implemented to persuade the "flying public" that Valujet was a safe, dependable, and responsible airline. Crisis Communication 363 There was one additional corrective action step that was designed to foster the re- birth of the organization. In November of 1997, Valujet changed its name to AirTran Airways to put distance between the desirable concept of a discount airline and the specific embodiment of that concept in the form of Valujet Unfortunately, the word "Valujet" had become a pretext for offering a "cheap" and "untrustworthy" approach to airline security and maintenance. Thus, the name change was based upon a strategy of differentiating an admirable concept from a flawed approach to executing that idea. The trademark "Valujet" had not acquired sufficient good will during its three years of existence to overcome the bad associations that the mark subsequently had generated ("Ailing Valujet," 1997, p. Bl). By becoming a born-again company, Valujet was able to dismiss questions about its early history and the crash itself as "ancient history." The re-invention of Valujet as a born-again company was buttressed by still Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 another major factor. In November of 1996, Assistant U.S. Attorney Carol Miller Heck began to prosecute SabreTech and three of its employees for mislabeling the oxygen canisters, filing false shipping records, and transporting hazardous materials as part of criminal felony indictment in Florida state court The FAA also conducted a separate investigation of SabreTech. On 1 May 1998, the FAA levied a record $2.25 million dollar fine against SabreTech for knowingly shipping hazardous materials aboard Valujet Flight 592. This was the largest fine that the agency had ever levied for a hazardous materials violation. According to The New York Times, "The FAA also claimed that the SabreTech employees responsible for the handling of hazardous materials had not been trained in accordance with hazardous-materials regulations" (Swoboda, 1998, p A10). This penalty strengthened the claim made by Valujet that SabreTech was the real villain in the crash, and it also enhanced the airline's strategy of evading responsibility by pinning the culpable actions on a scapegoat Sabretech. But there were limits to Valujef s ability (1) to evade responsibility for its actions, (2) to diminish its tainted flight record, and (3) to employ a strategy designed to reduce the offensiveness of the crash. Valujet's credibility has been severely damaged during the acute stage of the crisis, and that damage persisted as the airline struggled to make changes during the chronic stage. The end of the chronic stage of the crisis occurred in mid-August 1997, when the NTSB promulgated its findings after a lengthy investigation. The NTSB apportioned blame for the crash to several parties. NTSB's chairman Jim Hall contended that "The Valujet accident resulted from failures all up and down the line, from Federal regulators to airline executives in the board room to workers on the shop room floor" (Wald, 1997, p. A16). The NTSB concluded that the canisters were indeed responsible for the fire that disabled the plane's electric control and brought it crashing down. Moreover, the absence of a back-up system of check-off steps, and the sloppy sign-off procedures used by Valujet employees to approve work by outside subcontractors created a flawed and dangerous operational system. The NTSB report also faulted the FAA for its laxness in making Valujet prove the air worthiness of its individual planes. As The New York Times concluded: "[T]he board's main finding was that the system of self checking within the industry, and of Government surveillance to insure that quality controls were in place, had fallen apart in the case of Valujet" (Wald, 1997, p. A16). The Crisis Resolution Stage The crisis resolution stage is a time when the company is made "well and whole 364 Fishman again." As Valujet restructured itself, changed its name to AirTran Airways, and sought to comply with the more demanding FAA safety standards, the company encountered a major credibility problem in reassuring the American public about its commitment to safety. AirTrans Airways' "legitimacy" as a safety-conscious airline carrier was still unproven; its previous record as Valujet implied that "low cost" air travel was equivalent to "high risk." Understandably, AirTran Airways adopted a low profile as the SabreTech case lingered in the courts and as the families of the victims sought monetary damages for their loss. Nevertheless, the 1999 trial of the SabreTech employees served as a constant reminder of the problems with Valujet Several of the partners Gallagher, Flynn, and Priddy who founded Valujet sold their stock and disassociated themselves from AirTran. At the same time, AirTran's recurrent emphasis on low prices continued to present an attractive incentive to the price-sensitive segment of the flying public. Kim Darby, Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 president of Air Inc., an Atlanta based information service for pilots, contends that "Historically people don't think about safety. They want to go when they want to go at a cheap price" (Gleick, 1996, p. 42). This may be a statement of wishful thinking rather than an accurate prediction. But whether the low-ticket prices will overshadow the flying public's past concerns about safety on AirTran Airways is a story that will be written in the decade ahead. EVALUATION OF THE CRISIS COMMUNICATION SITUATION This section of the article analyzes the "crisis communication situation" surrounding the Valujet Flight 592 crash. The point of view adopted in examining a crisis communication situation is extremely important Benoit and Fink offer different starting points from which to conduct studies in crisis communication. Benoif s image restoration theory focuses upon the image and strategies that an individual or company employs to protect itself from harmful and offensive accusations. An accusation, or implied accusation, is the starting point for the crisis to unfold. When the accusation become a serious threat to the viability or the reputation of the recipient, then a crisis condition is said to have been established. Benoif s approach is the most internally consistent of the crisis methodologies: It focuses only on issues dealing with image or reputation. In addition, Benoifs theory clearly makes the "accused entity" the focal point of analysis so that there is no co-mingling of third or fourth parties in examining a crisis situation. A crisis situation, however, may involve multi-parties, and the crisis may occur as a result of the "contributory blame" or "contributory negligence" of a third, or fourth, or even fifth party. Unless the role of all the parties in a crisis are examined, the crisis situation remains difficult to comprehend. Existing approaches on crisis theory offer some assistance, but they do not deal with a "crisis communication situation" i.e., multi-partied problems with varied levels of strategic options and multi-dimensional harms. Benoifs image restoration theory was not designed specifically to handle a "crisis situation" or to respond to gaps in the crisis communication literature. Initially, Benoifs approach was developed to explain attacks upon an individual or organization and the resulting defenses that develop. Benoifs theory is anchored strongly in the dynamics of an attack-defense dichotomy, and its versatility allows it to be applied to a crisis, depicting a crisis as the most extreme form of an "attack." Thus, Benoifs work has proven to be extremely useful in understanding the message options and strategies of an organization as it Crisis Communication 365 undergoes a crisis. But Benoifs approach is not synonymous with a "crisis communication situation." Moreover, his theory focuses primarily on "reputational harm" and "image." It does not acknowledge the significant "gap" that Tyler (1997) identifies between "reputational strategies" and strategies based upon maximizing financial well-being and minimizing legal liability. Meanwhile, Fink's theory focuses solely upon an organization and implicitly assumes that organizations are more complex entities than individuals. Fink's theory prescribes a four-stage life cycle to a crisis, and Fink considers financial harm, loss of sales, personnel changes, and the emergence of a public policy issue along with reputational damage as key elements in a "crisis communication situation." Fink's approach is strongest in identifying antecedents to a crisis situation, or prodromes, and in considering the multiple dimensions of a crisis. Yet, Fink's crisis resolution stage is only sketchingly described, and his stages provide wide-open templates from which to Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 examine a crisis. This is a plus as well as a drawback to his approach. By contrast, Myers's (1986) stage analysis theory prescribed more pivotal turning points and more clearly defined recognizable sub-phases to explain the activities within a given stage or sub-stage. But Fink's theoretical parsimony and the ability to synthesize intelligently the various dimensions of a crisis add to the utility of his approach. Nonetheless, Fink's work lacks the kind of detailed strategizing that Benoifs model offers. Neither theory by itself provides the level of details and strategies necessary to describe the multi-dimensional aspects of a crisis communication situation. The Valujet crash represents a compelling example of a "crisis communication situation." Valujet is the key organization in the crisis, but the crisis communication situation includes an understanding of the FAA, the emergence of de-regulation as a political and economic trend, SabreTech's role as a subcontractor, and the role of the media in pursuing a news story and creating an "urgency" that prompted Congressional and regulatory actions. A crisis communication situation requires examining more than the strategies and behavior of Valujet, and thus it goes beyond the boundaries of what Benoifs theory officially sanctions. Moreover, an understanding of the crisis communication situation in the Valujet case is helped considerably by Birkland's perspective that some events become "focusing events," i.e., a dramatic news story that becomes intertwined with a public policy issue, and the event spearheads further discussion and legislative action. Airplane crashes automatically become widely disseminated news stories. They involve multiple deaths, the random intervention of fate into the lives of ordinary people, and a mysterious but-yet-to-be-determined cause (Vincent et al., 1998, p. 357). But most airplane crash stories disappear from public attention within two weeks. From the start, however, the Valujet story continued to grow in intensity. While sincere, Valujef s expressions of grief and sympathy for the families of the victims did not appear persuasive within the context of its bare-bones maintenance and service policies and its staggering profit margins. At the same time, Valujet was never able voluntarily to accept meaningful responsibility for the crash itself. There may have been legal reasons for not admitting too much guilt But the company could not look inwardly and accept blame for the accident in a way that would have persuaded the American public that the company was "transformed" or "changed" by the crash. Valujet was unable to make a "heartfelt apology" (Tyler, 1997, p. 54). Instead, Valujet offered what Tyler (1997) has called an 366 Fishman "equivocal apology," expressing regret and grief but carefully watching out to protect itself against legal liability (p. 61). The "equivocal apology" appeared as if Valujef s spokespersons were dissembling to protect the organization against any legal liability. Nor could Jordan and Valujef s top management explain the crash as a "freak accident" or a "unique event" Both of these depictions would have lessened or negated Valujef s blame. But Valujet was too implicated in the crash because of its prior service and maintenance policies that it could not speak with an unambiguous or unequivocal voice. Thus, instead of containing the story during the first seventy- two hours after the crash, Valujef s defensive posturing permitted the story to grow. Jordan's unwillingness to speak on Ted Koppel's Nightline, but his accepting an appearance on the Larry King show, appeared evasive and dissembling. The media also played a crucial role in the Valujet crisis. The intense media scrutiny after the crash jump-started a chain of events leading to an investigation of Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 Valujet, the entire discount segment of the aviation, and the systemic failure of the regulatory network for aviation to safeguard the public welfare. In the aftermath of the Valujet crash, the media caught onto a larger and more compelling story line: How could a discount airline with the highest profit margins among all the airlines and the highest accident rates be allowed to operate if the public safety was being optimally protected? Unfortunately, Valujet could not provide a persuasive answer to this question. Valujef s responses for its economic success such as cutting frills, cost containment on salaries, and efficient booking procedures were unpersuasive as the evidence mounted of the company's shoddy repairs, unacceptable levels of risk, and a pay scale that rewarded only completed flights irrespective of the flying conditions on any given route. The media also began to question whether legitimate government authorities were attempting to restore normalcy and protect the public welfare. According to Vincent et al. (1997), this is a recurrent question that is posed after an airline crash. But the responses that the media received in the Valujet case were unsettling. At first, Secretary of Transportation Pena and the FAA tried to shield Valujet from criticism. The White House and Congress soon forced the FAA to reassess its position, sensing more quickly than the FAA the public's mood of uneasiness about the lax safety standards created by de-regulation. Unwittingly, the FAA became an integral party to the crash, and it was forced to accept "contributory blame" for the crisis situation. The FAA had given preferential treatment to Valujet and to the entire discount segment of the aviation industry at the expense of insuring rigorous safety standards. As The Washington Post editorialized in its assessment of the FAA's lackluster performance in the Valujet case: "Safety improvements that in the past may have been considered too expensive must also be reassessed... Stonewalling, hedging and statistics about the relative safety of aviation won't wash with a public that now relies on air travel as another form of mass transif ' ("Valujet: The Alarming Truth," 1997, p. A18). The post-ciash media frenzy had extensive ramifications. It prompted the grounding of Valujet for three months; it forced top level resignations and retirements at the FAA; it led to Federico Pena's departure as Secretary of Transportation; and it created a major upheaval in the ranks of Valujef s top management team. In addition, Valujef s stock plummeted quickly, and the company was even forced to abandon its "name" if it wanted to stay in business. During the acute and chronic stages of the crisis, one of the key problems that Crisis Communication 367 Valu Jet faced was its inability to display a genuine commitment to safety. Safety is still the overarching value to which all parties in the aviation system defer and must affirm in their varied accounts of how the overall system should function (Perrow, 1999, pp. 382-383). Valujef s concern with profits and efficiency made the organization appear as if it had downgraded safety in favor of other goals. After the crash, Jordan's varied rhetorical strategies unfailingly paid homage to the central value of safety as Valujef s number one priority, but neither the public nor the media were persuaded of Valujefs actual commitment to safety. Valujet seemed to be only paying lip service to the "god-term" of aviation while attempting to restore its positive image. The most favorable response to Valujef s strategy came from the DOT, which accepted Valujef s argument that it needed to keep the planes in constant use to meet its demanding schedule, and thus safety "unwittingly" was downgraded as a top priority. This was an argument based upon Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 what Benoit (1995b) has called "defeasibility" and "accidental occurrences." But it was not an argument that the media or the public treated sympathetically. Valujet also attempted to find a scapegoat for the crash. In the immediate aftermath of the crash, Valujet claimed that there was considerable evidence of negligence by several of SabreTech's employees.5 On 13 July 1999, SabreTech was indicted on state criminal charges for third-degree murder and on Federal charges for fraud, falsifying documents, and mishandling hazardous materials. This was the first- ever criminal homicide indictment involving a passenger airplane crash in the United States. The public and media, however, were not persuaded by the distinction between legal and moral negligence. Moreover, the fact that Valujet had approved the work of SabreTech's employees, and that the FAA had signed-off on the readiness of the aircrafte, seemed as damaging as SabreTech's legal negligence. The finger-pointing among Valujet, SabreTech, and the FAA during the chronic stage of the crisis became an eighteen-month debate on how to apportion blame. However, the NTSB's final report concluded that there was sufficient blame to be distributed among all parties in the crisis. In effect, "contributory blame" for creating the crisis communication situation was officially assigned by the NTSB to "secondary" and "third" parties in the crash. As a focusing event, the Valujet Flight 592 crash directs attention to three major issues. First, after the crash, the FAA enacted regulations to require that all passenger airlines put smoke detectors in their cargo hold by the year 2001. President Qinton announced the decision at the end of 1996 as a way to reduce unnecessary risk and to affirm a revitalized regulatory system for aviation (Wald, 1996d, p. B18). Second, in the summer of 1996, Secretary of Transportation Pena asked Congress to delete the provision in the FAA's enabling charter dealing with "promoting" commercial air traffic. The FAA had been created by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1958 to replace the Civil Aeronautics Administration, but the FAA's dual mandate had become problematic because it seemed to allow trade-offs between safety and growth. Congress accepted Secretary Pena's proposal to amend the FAA's charter as a way to show that the regulatory agency's commitment to "safety" was unambiguous. As a result of a revised charter and the intense media pressure, the FAA was pushed from a state of inactivity into a state of hyper-vigilance in order to reclaim its credibility to safeguard the "public good" on aviation issues.6 Third, Valujet and the entire discount segment of the aviation industry had relied heavily on "outsourcing" as a way to maximize their profits and contain costs. But the 368 Fishman crash of Valujet Flight 592 focused attention on the role of these sub-contractors. The results were unsettling. As Langeweische (1998) points out, three-fourths of SabreTech's staff were temporary workers with little training or understanding of the seriousness of the operations that they were asked to perform (p. 88). The media and public attention directed at the use of part-time and unqualified personnel servicing airplanes became part of the FAA's renewed scrutiny of airline operations and quality control. Overall, the crash of Valujet Flight 592 served as a major focusing event in attracting media attention to the development of the discount segment of the aviation industry. The resulting media scrutiny compelled the FAA to reverse its original position about the safety of flying on an airplane in the Valujet fleet In the aftermath of the crash, the intense media scrutiny served to dispel the central myth of aviation that all airlines were equally safe, and that the small, non-unionized, discount airlines Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 were as carefully monitored and as safe as the larger mainline carriers. This was a myth that Congress and the FAA had constructed and disseminated widely, and it was a myth designed to protect the flying public from the fears and apprehensions that arose from aviation accidents. The myth included the reassuring notion "that really bad accidents are rare and their causes are knowable," frequently explainable by the reference to a single cause (Miller, 1999, p. A19). The myth, therefore, simplified the issue of blame and responsibility for aviation accidents, and it actually created a presumption against the competing notion of "contributory blame" as a possible interpretation to characterize an airline disaster. As a focusing event, therefore, the crash of Valujet Flight 592 marks an important turning point within the aviation industry. CONCLUSION Of all the areas in public relations, none has grown faster than "crisis communication." Crisis communication began in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile conflict when game theory and "what-if scenarios" were first applied to predict the outcome of a series of hypothetical political situations. The overriding objective of this type of strategic theorizing was to prevent the occurrence of a crisis and to measure the costs of a particular course of action. The 1982 Tylenol case re- directed research on crisis communication situations from the political to the commercial and corporate domains. The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill legitimized the widespread use of crisis communication planning among businesses and corporation; and gave credibility to the sub-discipline of crisis communication. During the 1990s, research on crisis communication began to mushroom. Reinsch & Reinsch (1996) aptlj characterize the scholarship in crisis and organizational communication as a "diverse and evolving field" (p. 41). Most of the early research in crisis communication dealt with narrow but pragmatic questions. Chief among these questions were whether to promote or protect a CEO during a crisis; what, if any, were the advantages of creating a crisis communication plan, crisis teams, and a crisis center; what were the benefits of a simulation or walk-through exercise; and what were the attributes of an effective post- crisis message (Seeger et al., 1998; Barton, 1993). Burnett (1998) notes that most of the interest and research in crisis communication historically has been conducted by management and public relations professionals and scholars (p. 476). Recently, a more mature view of crisis communication has evolved centering on Crisis Communication 369 the assumption that crisis communication is an exercise in strategic planning, and that an organization's top management team including representatives from production, distribution, security, legal, media relations, and information technology should be involved in the decision-making before a crisis surfaces if a favorable outcome is likely to occur.7 The major approaches and theories on crisis communication also are of recent vintage. These approaches come from theorists with backgrounds in management operations, rhetorical theory, and political science. But these theories have remained insular and isolated, and there has been an "opportunity cost" to the lack of integration of these ideas. The Valujet case demonstrates the utility of using an integrated or blended methodological approach to crisis events. The combination of using Fink, Benoit, and Birkland provides a more nuanced model to understanding a "crisis communication situation" as a dynamic and multi-dimensional set of relationships that Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 occurs in a rapidly changing environment. The combination of all three approaches may not be applicable in every instance of a crisis situation. Nevertheless, an attempt to mix and match concepts and constructs from different approaches eventually may lead to more sophisticated and useful models. Such theorizing is a way of blending and extending current conceptions of crisis communication events and incorporating the work now being done on agenda setting, policy making, argumentation, and symbolic enactments with innovations being developed in communication theory. This is an area of theorizing where there is much room for growth, elaboration, and refinement of theoretical concerns. Reichers and Schneider (1990) maintain that construct conceptualization passes through three distinct stages of development (1) Introduction and elaboration, (2) Evaluation and development, and (3) Consolidation and accommodation. For the term "crisis communication," we are in the midst of the second stage of development that involves synthesizing and testing the parameters of a construct. The first phase involved getting key ideas on the table and circulating them among scholars in various fields. Almost two decades of scholarship has arisen around the notions of crisis communication and crisis management (Seeger et al., 1998). The second phase involves blending and extending varied theoretical concepts and drawing upon interdisciplinary work to test the validity of those constructs. That "crisis communication" is now being considered from vastly different perspectives by researchers in divergent fields is a healthy and encouraging sign in the development and maturation of a meaningful theoretical construct NOTES 1 The best argument that Tylenol does not deserve its "paradigmatic" stature as the leading crisis communication can be found in Berg and Robb (1992). Tyler (1997) also contends that "The Tylenol case was atypical. Rarely are a company's hands so clean and rarely is a corpo- ration so patently a victim. Johnson and Johnson clearly handled a very difficult situation well, but the Tylenol case should not stand as a model for crisis communication" (p. 52). Fearn-Banks (1996) provides an interesting argument that Exxon Valdez oil spill was victim- ized by unusual circumstances, and that the local media had an undue influence on how the national media framed the issues in the case. Fearn-Banks identifies several compelling issues that raise questions about the almost-universal indictment of Exxon's behavior in the Valdez oil spill (pp. 150-153). 2 There are other theorists who are associated with a natural history or strategies approach. 370 Fishman For instance, Myers (1986) has developed a useful stage analysis approach, while Coombs (1995; 1999) provides a resourceful variation on the basic strategies approach. Sturges (1994) develops a stage model on "crisis communication content" and the efficacy of messages dur- ing the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis stages. 3 Benoit's approach to image and reputation is supported by the work of Van Riel (1997), who defines reputation in the following terms: "Reputation assessments indicate levels of esteem in the eyes of external stakeholders, based on the combined evaluations of separate images attributed to the firm's activities in areas including finance, human resources, social responsi- bility or product quality" (p. 295). But the controversy about this claim is whether reputation "will always" subsume these other areas, or whether the other areas such as legal and finan- cial can be distinguished from reputational concerns. See Tyler (1997). 4 Studies on Type One focusing events have been more prevalent in the literature of public relations and political science than in Communication. In a Type One Focusing Event, the Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 speed of a recovery involves communication and coordination between the Federal Emer- gency Management Agency (FEMA), state emergency management agencies, and local au- thorities. FEMA is not allowed to act until invited in by state and local authorities. Lerbinger (1997) identifies Hurricane Andrew (1992) as an example where FEMA was "unprepared to handle a large-scale disaster" (p. 60). In this instance, FEMA was criticized for responding slowly and in a disorganized manner. Much of emergency operations planning and success- ful execution depends directly on effective communication. 5 One of the anonymous reviewers of this article raised the question about the media's role in not focusing upon SabreTech's negligence earlier. The reviewer asked: "Did the media mis- cast blame in much of its earlier reporting, even given ValuJet's poor safety record?" This is an excellent question, and it is one that has to do with the crucial role of the media in "framing" the news. Had the media framed the issue from the start as the lack of quality work from subcontractors, and had it focused on SabreTech's role in the crash, ValuJet would have had an easier time. But the media from the outset framed the story in terms of safety standards within the discount segment of the aviation industry, and this made Valujet the poster child for high-risk flights. 6 This aggressive stance was part of the FAA's attempt to restore its own credibility and it raises a separate topic: The image-restoration strategies employed by the FAA in the aftermath of the Valujet crash. For the analysis presented in this article, it is useful to depict the FAA as an agency with "contributory blame" for the crisis communication situation in the Valujet crash. 7 Benoit's theory of image restoration has attracted widespread attention and generated many applications partially because it characterizes a crisis in terms of strategic planning and in setting forth persuasive arguments. REFERENCES Ailing Valujet buys AirTran, drops name. (1997, July 11). USA Today, p. B1. Ban made permanent for transporting oxygen generators. (1996). CNN Interactive Online. Re- trieved November 11, 1999 from the World Wide Web: http://cnn.com/US 9612/30/ oxygen.generator/.index. html Barr, S. (1996, May 20). Crash comments sharpen focus on internal inspectors. Washington Post, p. A19. Barton, L. (1993). Crisis in organizations. Cincinnati: Southwestern Publishing Company. Beiden, T., Matz, M. & Copeland, L. (1996, May 24). ValuJet's accident rate is 10 times higher. The News-Times (online). 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