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The Sevenfold Reasoning “[Wheels, axle, carriage, shaft, and yoke.] A chariot is not (1) the same as its parts, nor (2) other than. It is not (3) in the parts, nor are (4) the parts in it. It does not (5) possess them, nor is it (6) their collection, nor (7) their shape.” —Chandrakirti 1 Introduction This is a practical guide of “analytical meditation” based on Chandrakirti’s “Sevenfold Reasoning”, compiled from various sources, especially “Seeing That Frees” by Rob Burbea. This was arranged to be relatively concise, yet comprehensive, and most importantly: practical. How to Use One might nd it helpful to print this out to use as a reference during meditation, and use a highlighter on parts which feel most relevant. If reading this for the rst time, it may be helpful to avoid being overwhelmed by rst sticking to reading the sections “The Goal of the Practice”, “Overview of the Analysis”, “3. (B) Pervasion of All Possibilities”, and then very brie y glancing through the seven sections in “4. (C) Search for the Self” to get the gist of how the Analysis is structured. The diagram in Figure 1 may help to visualize this. Then, on a second read, one may become more familiar with the logic of the Analysis by revisiting “Overview of the Reasoning”, and then reading “2. (A) Target the ‘Object to be Negated’”, revisiting “3. (B) Pervasion…”, brie y skimming through the arguments in “4. (C) Search…”, and reading “5. (D) Conclude”. Figure 2 depicts the Analysis visually. Later, when one has gained some familiarity and conviction with the Analysis, outside of formal meditation, one may easily incorporate the additional meditative steps by starting with reading “The Practice”. The Goal of the Practice “We’re actually going to be looking for this [inherently existing] self . . . And what we nd is we can’t nd it. We nd that the self is un ndable. . . . what we’re doing is we’re using . . . logical reasoning to refute, to disprove, the inherent existence of the self.”[MoE, 1-2] “‘Inherent existence’ [of the self] . . . means . . . the self exists in its own right, from its own side, independent of the way that the mind conceives or sees it.”[MoE, 2] “Without refuting the object, it is impossible to let go of it. [—Pramanavarttika]”[StF, 214] “All our emotions, . . . actions and su ering come from attachment to the self. . . . [So] he will uproot clinging to the self in its entirety.”[DK, 269] If the very notion of using concepts in meditation, itself, sounds foreign or unhelpful, Burbea addresses some common concerns in his talk “Concepts, Views, Reality”: https://dharmaseed.org/teacher/210/talk/9540/. fi fi fi fi fl fl fi ff fi fi 2 The Practice One begins by gaining a familiarity with the Analysis outside of meditation (perhaps beginning with the simpler example of a chariot or car), and then one takes it into meditation using these steps as a guideline: 1. Calm-passion 2. Target (A) 3. Pervasion (B) 4. Search (C) 5. Conclude (D) 6. Vacuity 7. Reappearance During meditation, one is free to re-order and revisit the steps and reasonings, as appropriate, and move at their own pace, varying the intensity of thinking, and balancing it with calm-passion, as it feels helpful. It may also be helpful to remember to keep the heart open, stay connected with the whole body, and use the feedback of the body-sense to gauge feelings of conviction and doubt to guide the analysis. “What matters is that it works for you . . . We want to make it our own . . . [it can] be a very uid process.”[StF, 233]. Figure 1: A Concept Map that presents a visual summary of the practice and its goals. fl 3 Overview of the Analysis The Analysis will proceed according to this logical structure: (A) The self seems to have inherent existence. (B) “If the self had inherent existence, it would have to exist in one of these seven ways [which will be enumerated later]. There is no other possibility.”[StF, 231] (C) It is determined that “the self is not ndable in any of these seven ways.”[StF, 231] (D) Since there are no other possibilities, the self is not ndable at all, and thus “cannot really [inherently] exist in the way that it seems to.”[StF, 231] Figure 2: A Concept Map that presents a visual overview of the Analysis. fi fi 4 1. Calm-passion “First, it is important that we tune our motivation . . . Mere . . . intellectual study will only give you a little bit of information, and without practice you cannot understand emptiness. . . . bodhicitta is very important . . . [so generate] the wish to listen to these teachings for the sake of all sentient beings, for their liberation.”[DK, 266] “It is . . . vital to protect the heart’s capability for sensitivity and aliveness, but it is de nitely not the case that analytical practices necessarily [have to] close the heart.”[StF, 215] “The sevenfold analysis meditation requires a certain amount of samadhi in order to be engaged in a fruitful way. . . . [but also, eventually,] it will itself lead to a deepening of concentration.”[StF, 233-234] “At rst one kind of does a bit of samadhi, then does a bit of kind of reasoning and analysis, and then does samadhi, and [etc.]”[MoE, 10] “[Then,] I start thinking about it[, the following analytical steps,] in a light way without disturbing the samadhi too much”[MoE, 4], “playing with it in the meditation with some degree of calmness”[MoE, 7]. Note: Burbea’s teachings on samadhi de-emphasize “one-pointed concentration”, and instead emphasize “energized calm”, “well-being”, “enjoyment”, and especially “whole-body awareness”. Especially for such a heady practice, it may be helpful to keep grounded in body-awareness, allowing the understanding to be embodied. The self is not on trial, but it is more like we are visiting a good friend and getting to know them (paraphrasing a teacher of Burbea’s training group). One way to apply the above suggestions into a single step might be to begin with metta, perhaps feeling it as a warm energy radiating from the heart throughout the body, and perhaps beginning with this verse (which could also serve to establish the target, or “object to be negated” in the 2nd instruction, Step (A)): “May I understand the emptiness of the self, so that I may be freed from self-clinging, for the bene t of myself, and for the bene t of all sentient beings.” Figure 3: Avalokiteśvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion fi fi fi fi 5 2. (A) Target the “Object to be Negated” “The rst step . . . [is] called ascertaining the object to be negated.”[MoE, 2] “[We are] identifying what exactly the reasoning is refuting, . . . taking aim at. . . . [which is] the appearance of the self as something real.”[StF, 231-232] Do this by “simply paying attention to the sense of self, . . . [and] recognize too how the self feels so obviously real”[StF, 232], “feeling that sense of inherent existence. . . . when we feel the self sense . . . we can have the sense of it as something that just exists by itself. . . . get a felt sense of that, I sense it, I feel it, I watch it. . . . it should be very clear. . . . It’s a totally intuitive, innate sense . . . totally palpable.”[MoE, 2] “Only a moment or two is in fact needed for this step.”[StF, 232] “[If] the yogi has no vivid sense of an I, he can fabricate one by recalling such incidents where the sense of I was strong”[JN, 18], or imagining someone suddenly barging in, pointing at you, and shouting “Thief!”, or imagining “walking in the dark and becoming frightened by bumping into an unknown object.”[JN, 18] Notice how the self feels like it’s a real thing, “existing in and of itself”. Does it feel like one thing? Does it feel continuous through time? Does it feel separate from the environment, or from experience? Does it feel independent from the mind’s act of perceiving it in this moment? “This process of summoning up the feelings [of self] is not dangerous, and the e ort does not make the sense of inherent existence stronger and more rmly entrenched. Rather, it allows the meditator to generate a clearer, more visceral image of what is to be negated.”[GG] Theory: What is NOT the Target “The sevenfold reasoning is not . . . aimed at refuting a speci c theory of self”[StF, 231], “is not applied to refute the conventional, everyday existence of things, such as . . . the self that goes to the grocery store”[GG], nor proving that “no self exists at all” or that “there is no self”. These positions correspond to the extreme of “nihilism”. “Rather, it is to negate inherent existence – the conception of which causes su ering.”[GG] “What it[, the Reasoning,] is saying, rather, is . . . That the self is not ndable . . . [which] implies that it cannot really [inherently] exist in the way that it seems to.”[StF, 231] “[However, ]That un ndability [of self] doesn’t mean that the [conventional] self doesn’t exist. It means that it doesn’t inherently exist. That’s a big . . . really important di erence.”[MoE, 10] “The way in which phenomena are established merely [as conventionally existing] . . . is like the way in which a snake is imputed to a rope [in the dark]. . . . there is no [inherently existing] snake which can be found . . . [in] the rope”.[JN, 17] “The root of samsara[, i.e. the perpetuation of delusion,] is not the self [itself], but attachment to the [idea of the] self. . . . The yogi knows that this [idea of] self is like a base for this attachment to the self, so the yogi begins by refuting this baseless idea of self.”[DK, 268-269] “The Sevenfold Reasonings work like this: once inherent existence[, i.e. the ‘object to be negated’] is deeply understood not to exist, then the [‘object to be abandoned’, i.e. the mistaken] conception of inherent existence (along with the grasping [at the self]) will be abandoned spontaneously.”[GG] Later, in the section “Vacuity”, it is explained that, also, as a result, “the self- sense begins to dissolve right then”.[StF, 232] fi fi ff fi fi fi ff ff 6 3. (B) Pervasion of All Possibilities “[Wheels, axle, carriage, shaft, and yoke.] A chariot is not (1) the same as its parts, nor (2) other than. It is not (3) in the parts, nor are (4) the parts in it. It does not (5) possess them, nor is it (6) their collection, nor (7) their shape.” —Chandrakirti “If the self had inherent existence, it would have to exist in one of these seven ways [in relation to the ve aggregates].”[StF, 231] Either it is (1) the same as the aggregates, or (2) other than, or it is (3) in the aggregates, or (4) the aggregates are in it, or it (5) possesses them, or it is (6) their collection, or (7) their shape. “The self, has to exist in one of those seven ways. There’s no other way they can exist. . . . you have to really grapple with this . . . intellectually . . . in your mind . . . the second step . . . it’s called, ascertaining the pervasion . . . we really need to be convinced, absolutely convinced.”[MoE, 3] “He must be convinced that all possibilities of inherent existence [of self] . . . are subsumed in these seven options”.[JN, 18] “The self must either be one entity with the mental and physical aggregates or it must be a di erent entity. There can be no third possibility. The remaining ve aspects of the Sevenfold Reasoning are elaborations on either one or the other of these or both. They are included for the sake of letting the mind become thoroughly imbued with a sense of the un ndability of an inherently existent [self].”[JN, 19] “It is the thoroughness of the search that makes it convincing. And this conviction is . . . critical for the meditative process.”[StF, 225] Figure 4: A Concept Map that depicts the seven con gurations with the ve aggregates. fi fi fi fi fi ff 7 4. (C) Search for the Self After the preliminaries of Steps (A) and (B) are established, “then considering each of the seven possibilities in turn, and seeing that none of them is a feasible way for the self to be . . . [one reaches] exhaustion of the possibilities.”[StF, 232] There will be some redundancies, and some of the arguments may feel more convincing to you than others. This is also not exhaustive; many arguments have been excluded for the sake of brevity. “It is not necessary for a yogi to do [or understand] all the reasonings . . . he need meditate only on the arguments that are e ective[, i.e. convincing for him].”[JN, 23] Theory: The Sense of Making Sense “Conviction” is a feeling, and it is the fuel that will allow “this analysis [to] be converted into a meditative practice with the power to liberate”[StF, 231], hence, why this preliminary section was included. Its opposite feeling, “doubt”, will be useful, serving as the compass that directs the analysis. Read this: “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.” Read that again. Makes sense? Yeah? Nod your head a little. Notice that “makes sense” has a feeling. And try this: “The cat is either in the living room, or somewhere else in the house. Otherwise, it’s not in the house.” Feel “convinced”? It’s also a bodily feeling. To sensitize to this, “Cats, dogs, and babies, it’s Tuesday!” That makes no sense! There’s a feeling associated with things “not making sense”. Notice that. If it's nonsense, the gut may tense. Try this: “Food is sitting while the weather is ying.” Feel the non- sense? Notice the contrast? Try to grok this sentence: “The washroom is either vacant, or occupied. There is no third option.” Now here’s one that’ll be especially relevant: “If . . . the cup is a ndable thing . . . then it ought to be either the same as . . ., or di erent from the parts of the cup.”[GG] ff ff fl fi 8 (1) Is the self exactly the same as the aggregates? Note: To reiterate Step (A), the “ rst [step is] to produce the strong feeling that a person and . . . the aggregates, are inherently one thing, that a person is there, appearing as if inseparably mixed with the aggregates [of body and mind,] or with some aggregate or aggregates”.[JN, 19] Is the self exactly the same as the aggregates? (General) …assuming the aggregates are pluralities? “Each aggregate . . . reveals itself as a plurality. . . . a heap, a collection — of material elements, or of momentary experiences of vedana, . . . of perceptions, etc. . . . there would be many selves. The usual feeling and intuitive sense of self, though, seems to be singular.”[StF, 226] “[If there were many selves,] which self should eat: should he let some go hungry and just feed one, or should he eat many meals? This may sound ridiculous, but it is necessary to challenge . . . ordinary thought just because [it] . . . is so embedded in the conception of inherent existence.”[JN, 19] Note: This assumption will hold for all remaining arguments. …what if the aggregates were taken individually? “The self would be equal to each body part or each thought individually. The self would be many just as the parts are many. But we don’t think of the self as many, so it cannot be found in all the parts taken individually.”[GG] …what if the aggregates were taken as a whole? “If the self is equal to the parts and the self is single, then the parts must be one single entity. This is clearly not the case. Also, if the self is [exactly] equal to all the parts [in their present form], we could never get our hair cut, or lose a nger or gain a new thought. For that newly missing or added element changes the overall parts. . . . [which] would mean that we have a new self. But our strong intuition is clearly that the self can undergo change. So the self cannot be [exactly] equal to all the parts.”[GG] But then either the label ‘self’ or ‘aggregate’ would lose its meaning. “It would be absurd to assert a person or self, since person or self would merely be synonyms of aggregates or of one of the aggregates. . . . [If] the yogi might think that this was indeed true [anyway,] . . . [he could then turn around and] ask himself whether [this aggregate] . . . is not just a synonym of [self!]”[JN, 19] However, if one asserts they are not merely synonyms, then they would be di erent, meaning the self is not the same as the aggregates. fi fi ff 9 But the ‘self’ is imputed. “When someone thinks, ‘Ah, this is my car’, the object of this kind of grasping mind is not these parts [of the car] . . . [but] the idea ‘car’ [itself.] . . . by looking at these parts, we create a new idea, ‘car’, and this idea then becomes the very base for our attachment to the car. . . . [Similarly,] the aggregates are not the direct object onto which self-grasping focuses.”[DK, 287] “Take the snake and rope example, when . . . the rope is there . . . you think it is a snake because you already know what snakes are, you have some kind of predisposition . . . The imputation made about the thing is not necessarily connected with the thing itself.”[DK, 290] “Just as there is no [inherently existing] snake which can be found . . . [in] the rope, . . . so with an I which is imputed to the aggregates or a chariot imputed to its parts.”[JN, 17] Is the self exactly the same as the aggregates? (Speci c) Try asking ‘Is that me?’ “It can also be helpful to sustain attention on anything that may be conceived of as part of the self . . . and ask: ‘Is that me’? Sometimes it quickly becomes obvious that it cannot be me. At other times a little re ection or imagination helps.”[StF, 226] Some of the following arguments in this block explore this. Is the self exactly the same as the body? But the body is di erent from the mind. “If the body was the self, that would mean the self is not conscious”.[MoE, 4] “[And] it wouldn’t really make sense . . . to say that ‘I am thinking’ because the body’s outside of [the mind]”. [MoE, 4] But the body is a plurality. “[Or] let’s split everything up into really small pieces, and I look at my liver, is that my self? My kidneys? . . . You could look at di erent body parts, you could go into the cells. . . . is that cell me? . . . Is the atom in the cell me?”[MoE, 5] “When we have a haircut or clip our toenails . . . [do] we somehow then have ‘less self’[?] So one may also consider a body part, . . . imagine being without it, and notice that the sense of self is not diminished. It cannot therefore be ‘me’.”[StF, 226] fl ff ff fi 10 Is the self exactly the same as the mental aggregates (or ‘the mind’)? “If the mind were the self, you couldn’t say like, ‘I ache all over’. . . . [or] ‘I kick the ball’ . . . [or] ‘he hit me’. . . . Because these are bodily things”.[MoE, 4-5] But the mind is a plurality. “[Or] we take vedana, is that me, this sense of experiencing pleasant/unpleasant? Are my perceptions me? I have a moment of perceiving the bell, a moment of perceiving sound, is that me?”[MoE, 5], “[Or] since the self is one, all these many perceptions are one also”.[StF, 226] “Are my intentions me? Or any one intention? Is a thought me? Is a mood? Or a consciousness, a knowing of this, a knowing of that, an awareness of this and that. When we look at each one individually we see that it can’t be, there’s nothing personal in any of those, in any of those at all . . . a thought blips into the mind, is it me? . . . which mind state is me? I go through so many during a day. Does that mean that there are many selves? Or does it mean that all mind states are somehow one because the sense of the self is one, is unitary?” [MoE, 5], “but clearly they are not one”.[StF, 226] “With the arising of a thought, . . . [do we] feel as if our self is all of a sudden di erent, although there now exists a part that did not exist before. . . . [so] parts can come and go without a ecting . . . self.”[StF, 226] But the mental aggregates are momentary. “If the self were equated with . . . perception . . . it obviously could not be . . . any single perception. Which perception would it be after all? And since all perceptions appear and disappear, such a self would only exist for an instant”[StF, 226], yet the self feels continuous through time. The same can be argued about moments of consciousness. But the aggregates, themselves, are empty. “[The aggregates] are actually empty of inherent existence themselves. . . . They can . . . be seen to be: fabricated and dependently arisen . . . neither one nor many . . . and not separable from . . . the rest of the universe . . . Empty in themselves, . . . [they] cannot possibly constitute a real basis for a real self”.[StF, 227] Note: The cited footnote references later chapters in the book containing elaborations on these points. What if the aggregates are substantial? “If the aggregates and the self are one, then the self will become a substance [or an object].”[DK, 280] “But [then] how can they be conscious if they are substantial? Then a stone would be conscious.”[DK, 289] And: who then would be the subject that knows the self as object? If one posits that the self-object is self-knowing, refer to (5). Therefore, there cannot be found a self that’s the same as the aggregates. “It is not just that we have not looked hard enough. We have looked at the possibility of the self being the [aggregates]. . . . [and] found the lack of inherent existence of the self. It cannot be there.”[GG] ff ff 11 (2) Is the self other than the aggregates? Note: To reiterate Step (A), in the “ rst [step, one] generates a strong sense of an inherently existent person[, especially as an entity independent from the aggregates].”[JN, 21] Is the self other than the aggregates, yet still related? No. “For two phenomena to be inextricably related they cannot be both simultaneous and di erent entities.”[JN, 21] Is the self other than the aggregates, and unrelated? But other than the aggregates, there is nothing else. “Imagine ‘clearing away’ the aggregates, or putting them to one side . . . is anything else left over[?] . . . there would be nothing remaining . . . [to] identify as self. If the self were separate from the aggregates, it should be apprehendable separately from them. But without . . . body and mind, there is no self found.”[StF, 227] But this self would not match our self-sense. “[Also] it would be an entity without form, consciousness, or perception. It could not do anything or have any experiences”[StF, 227], “or, if it did, its knowledge . . . would be unrelated.”[JN, 21] “That is not the self we feel attached to. . . . [and] the experiences of body and mind would have no relation with or relevance for the self, for ‘me’.”[StF, 227] “[Or] If there were a self . . . independent from aggregates, then . . . even by looking at a pillar, a vase or a ower, one might have this notion of self, ‘I’. But we never experience this; therefore, we may conclude that the self is dependent on the aggregates.”[DK, 278] But this self would not be knowable. “We could never perceive such a self . . . because it would be beyond perception, one of the aggregates. As consciousnesses, we can only perceive, see, and know the aggregates. They’re the totality of our experience. So, such a self would be completely unknowable. It would also in itself be . . . completely blank . . . [but] the kind of self that we care about . . . is one that we know and can know.”[MoE, 6] “A self is only perceived when perceiving the skandhas[, i.e. the aggregates], and there is no perception of a self apart from perceiving the skandhas.”[DK, 308] But this self could not be distinguished or located. “You would have to still be able to distinguish this partless self from someone else’s self. Where would this partless self be? It must be able to have a di erent location from the body.”[GG] Without even a location or distinguishing feature, there is no way for it to be found. fl fi ff ff 12 But this self would not share the characteristic of impermanence. “The [self] would not have the characteristics of the aggregates . . . [which are] production, cessation . . . attributes shared by all impermanent phenomena. In the gross sense . . . this would lead to the absurdity that the person would not be born and would not die [as the body and mind would].”[JN, 21] “In the subtle sense . . . the person would have to be a permanent phenomenon, a non-product. It would then follow that it would not be suitable to impute the [changeless] person to the [constantly changing] aggregates [of body and mind].”[JN, 21] “[Or,] these kinds of self do not exist . . . [because] they have never arisen[, come into existence,] . . . because they are permanent.”[DK, 277] …and neither could the aggregates refer to such a self. Furthermore, whatever perception of self we currently experience, or whatever conception of self we might be holding, both being aggregates, would have nothing to do with such a self that is unchanging, nor would they actually refer to one. Is the self just inexpressible? “If something is inexpressible, we cannot say that it exists, since then we have expressed something. . . . [Furthermore, if] we cannot express that they[, self and aggregates,] exist [either] separately or as one . . . [then] we also cannot express that the self exists [either]. . . . [Also,] it does not have any of the characteristics of an entity. . . . Entities such as consciousness and form do have characteristics, such as being one or di erent.”[DK, 299] Therefore, there cannot be found a self other than the aggregates. “Each of the remaining ve refutations . . . is actually a variation on one or other of the rst two. Logically, these rst two . . . that the self is not the same . . . and . . . not di erent — exhaust all the possibilities.”[StF, 227] “The remaining ve reasonings are for the sake of driving home the meaning of no inherent existence [of the self]”[JN, 21] fi fi fi ff ff fi 13 (3) Is the self in (or based on) the aggregates (somehow)? Is the self in the aggregates? “Here . . . the self is somehow among the aggregates, the way a person . . . [is] in a house. . . . [This] is just a version of the second . . . [If] self and the aggregates are di erent . . . [then] imagine removing the person from the house, or demolishing the house and being left with the person. However, . . . when we remove the aggregates . . . no self can be found to remain.”[StF, 228] Is the self just dependent upon the aggregates? But dependence entails di erence. “Sometimes the self appears as something above and beyond the parts, but somehow supported or buoyed up by the parts. This relation of dependence is another case of (2) above, the self being a di erent entity . . . which has been refuted.”[GG] Similarly, the self as di erent, yet related has been refuted in (2). Try inquiring into the nature of the dependency. “What is the link between the self . . . and this particular set of parts [of body and mind] such that this self is dependent upon the parts? Why isn’t another self dependent upon the parts? Conversely, why is the self in question dependent on these particular parts and not my next- door neighbor’s parts? . . . [Or] Why is there not more than one self dependent upon the same set of parts?”[GG] …and what if they were not di erent entities? “[If] the self is not a separate entity from the aggregates, . . . [then] there is no such thing as one being a container and the other being the contents.”[DK, 297] Therefore, there cannot be found a self in the aggregates. (4) Are the aggregates in (or based on) the self? Are the aggregates in the self? “Here . . . the self somehow contains the aggregates, the way . . . a bowl might contain . . . food. . . . [this] option is also essentially a variation on the second . . . [and] may be refuted just as before.”[StF, 228] Is the self the substratum of the aggregates? “This is another case of . . . (2) . . . the self being . . . di erent . . . [and] it is similar to . . . (3) . . . [but] with the [opposite] dependence.”[GG] The dependency can be questioned similarly as in (3), and also as follows: “Can more than one substratum support the same set of parts? Either simultaneously or in succession over time?”[GG] If one argues they are di erent entities, see (3). Therefore, there cannot be found a self the aggregates are in. ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 14 (5) Does the self possess the aggregates? Note: Step (A): generate a strong sense of being the possessor of the aggregates. Does the self possess the aggregates, like a person possessing a watch? “Then . . . [they] are two di erent entities . . . another instance of the second”[StF, 228-229], and so this can be similarly refuted. “Let’s take that example, the house has eleven rooms. What house is there that could possess the eleven rooms? All there is to this house . . . is just eleven rooms, but take away the eleven rooms, how is there a house that possesses eleven rooms?”[MoE, 7] So too with the self and the aggregates. “What, and where, actually, is the self that does the possessing . . . ? Other than the aggregates themselves, the possessing self cannot be found, since there is nothing else but the aggregates.” [StF, 229] Does the self possess the aggregates, like a tree possessing its trunk? But that is equivalent to asserting the self is the same as the aggregates. “[If] we choose to say . . . aggregates ‘possess themselves’, the notion . . . here is in fact just equivalent to . . . ‘being the same as’. As such, it is a variation of the rst . . . the self is identical with the aggregates — and can be similarly refuted.”[StF, 229] But the possessor cannot be the same as its possessions. “[Or] perhaps the self possesses its parts in the way that I possess my hand”[GG]. But, as in section (1), I ask: “Is my hand ‘me’?” No, I am di erent from my hand. And a hand is just a hand, it does not play an additional role of being a possessor of itself. Hence, “for me to be truly the same entity as the hand, I cannot possess the hand.”[GG] Does the self possess ‘perceptions’ (for example)? “I perceive the lamp, I perceive the carpet, I perceive the sound, I perceive this, that. And we have a sense like there’s a self somehow here that possesses these things, they are mine.”[MoE, 7-8] “Are the perceiver, the [process of] perceiving, and the perception [or the object perceived,] the same or di erent? . . . This particular strand . . . goes very, very deep if one can get . . . the mind around that in meditation. Very, very powerful.”[MoE, 8] ff ff ff fi 15 What if the self is di erent from perceptions? “[But that] means the self doesn’t perceive [if] . . . they’re separate . . . if the self doesn’t perceive, it means it’s some kind of mindless blank. Is that who I am?”[MoE, 8] “[Also] They[, the self and perceptions,] can’t be separate because then you could actually nd one without another, you could nd a perceiver without a thing being perceived. . . . Or you could nd a thing perceived without a perceiver . . . they’re actually not separatable . . . perceiver, perceiving, and perception, they’re un ndable [separately from one another] . . . [There is] No separate self perceiving a separate world.”[MoE, 8] What if the self is itself a perception, but di erent from the rst one? “Then there’s two perceptions.”[MoE, 8] …and what if the self is a second perception perceiving the rst? “Maybe the self is the same as the second perception . . . it’s the second perception that perceives the others. But then every time I perceive something di erent, [since perceptions are plural,] I’m going to have, again, many selves that perceive this, perceive that, and you have a self that’s actually many and not one”.[MoE, 8] …and what if the self possesses both of those perceptions? Then this self must be “di erent than the second perception[, the one perceiving the initial perception. And] . . . again . . . then the self doesn’t perceive”[MoE, 8] “[Also,] What makes that self my self? I would need another [second possessing] self to bind the parts[, aggregates,] and the [ rst perceived] self together under the auspices of “mine” but this second self does not exist[, as shown in section (2)]. [But] Even if it did, [then] there would need to be yet another [third] self to make that one[, the second self,] mine, and so on ad in nitum.”[GG] fi ff ff fi fi fi fi ff ff fi fi fi 16 What if the self is that perception perceiving itself? But then the self would change with the object perceived. “They[, the self and perception,] can’t be the same because every time I look at the bell, it would mean I’m a bell, I look at an elephant, I would be an elephant[, etc.]”[MoE, 8] But body and mind are di erent. “[Also,] There is no . . . possession if there is no . . . [separate] person who possesses. . . . [because] then [that would mean that] the one that thinks ‘this is my body’[, i.e. mind,] is the same as the body.”[DK, 286] But then the self would be double. “[Or,] for instance, if the self is felt to be . . . consciousness, then, . . . there would be . . . [this] consciousness which, as the self, possesses [and knows] . . . that same particular . . . consciousness, no other. [But then] that is to say, there would be two . . . consciousnesses. (This is tantamount to saying that one person would have two heads; one being the head that he is, the other the head that he possesses.)”[JN, 22] But a thing cannot be said to possess itself. Furthermore, the aggregates “are not separable from, nor independent of, the rest of the universe”.[StF, 227] Being inextricably interconnected, totally dependent on other aggregates, “a thing cannot possess itself”.[GG] Therefore, there cannot be found a self as a possessor of the aggregates. ff 17 (6) Is the self the collection of the aggregates? Note: Step (A): generate a strong sense of being the collection of the aggregates. “The ‘mere collection’ is just the un-arranged collection of all the [aggregates]”.[JN, 22] What if the collection of aggregates is the same as the aggregates? “If we took all the di erent parts of a car . . . and just dumped them on the ground in a pile, that collection of parts would not equate to the car . . . Similarly, a random heaping together of body parts and . . . unordered moments of vedana, thought, intention, etc. cannot be regarded as the self. This . . . [is also] an instance of the rst . . . and can also be refuted in similar ways.”[StF, 229] “[Also] then either (1) just as there are many aggregates there would be many collections [and hence, many selves] or (2) just as there is only one collection . . . [there] would be only one aggregate”[JN, 22] But the ‘collection’ is empty. “Just as [the name of] a chariot is spoken of [Only after pointing to, and,] In dependence on its parts, So, [only after pointing to, and,] in dependence on the aggregates, [Only then,] There is the convention [of naming] ‘sentient being’[ as a collection].”[JN, 22] “You can never utilise the forest. You can only utilise trees. A forest is just an idea: it is completely baseless.”[DK, 285] Hence, the label ‘collection’ is mentally fabricated, and there cannot be found a real ‘collection’ aside from the individual aggregates themselves. What if the collection of aggregates is di erent from the aggregates? “Then the collection would have a di erent character from the aggregates, a position refuted in [section (2)]”.[JN, 22] Therefore, there cannot be found a self as the collection of the aggregates. ff ff fi ff 18 (7) Is the self the shape of the aggregates? Note: Step (A): generate a strong sense of being the shape or continuum of the aggregates. Is the self the physical shape of the aggregates? But the body and mind are di erent. “Since the mental aggregates have no physical shape, it would be meaningless”.[StF, 229] “Further, if the person were both the shape of his body and his consciousness, there would be two persons.”[JN, 23] But the body has no xed shape. “Also, if the self is the shape, then this allows no change in shape without a corresponding change in identity of the self. . . . Over time the shape of the body changes. People grow, gain weight[, etc.] . . . [or] shape changes due to the angle from which the parts are viewed. From the left or the right, from near or far, the appearance of the shape changes.”[GG] But ‘shape’ is imputed to the body. “Imagine the body shape changing. So, imagine my nose slowly moving around to the side, and my ears slowly coming around to meet at the top of my head and fuse into one, and, I don’t know, my mouth coming out here, and my legs sticking out of my head up here - slowly morphing towards that. At what point would you say that’s not... That ain’t it anymore, at what point? Now, the key thing that helps there is this ‘at what point’. . . . the mind is imputing something . . . it’s arbitrary when the mind decides it is this or it isn’t this.”[MoE, 8] Also, since the individual body parts have the same shape whether disassembled or assembled, i.e. their shapes do not change when assembled, they can produce no new shape when assembled. “The idea of an assemblage is just an idea, shape cannot exist.”[DK, 303-304] fi ff 19 Is the self the continuum (temporal shape) of the aggregates in time? But then this continuum does not match our self-sense, because… …we feel ourselves as independent of when events happen. “A self that is a continuum would be changing as experiences and events are added and disappear in time. Intuitively though, we often feel that the self is essentially the same despite the coming and going . . . [or] whether or not some of these are left out of the continuum entirely. Furthermore, . . . its essence would e ectively be altered by the slightest reordering in time of even the most trivial experiences . . . I perceive the carpet one second before I hear a car go by . . . or vice versa, my essence feels unaltered.”[StF, 229-230] …we feel ourselves to exist independent of experience. “[Also] If I say the self is the continuum of the aggregates, . . . it means that this self is not independent of experience. [Since] The aggregates are [just] experience, experience, experience . . . [Yet,] we have a sense of the self existing as independent of the experience . . . separatable from . . . the world of experience . . . and [so] that’s not the felt sense”.[MoE, 10] Regardless, since the aggregates are just experiences, we could also say that the self as their continuum would have no inherent existence of its own, being just an experience or set of experiences. But then this continuum only barely exists at any one time. “Since the past is gone and the future has not yet come . . . most of the temporal continuum is not actually in existence at any time. Most of the self, therefore, would not exist at any time. . . . [Also] Since the present moment could be said to be in nitesimally small, . . . this self would . . . barely be in existence at all.”[StF, 230] But the continuum is neither-one-nor-many. “Since it is made up of a series of many moments, a continuum is not really ‘one’. But it cannot really be ‘many’ either. . . . [For] it would have to be made up of moments that are [each] truly one. No such moment can exist though, because a moment that is truly one [unit] would have no di erentiable times of beginning and ending. . . . its beginning needs to precede its ending: its beginning and ending need, e ectively, to be di erent moments in time. . . . Being neither truly one nor truly many, continua . . . have no inherent existence.”[StF, 230] Therefore, there cannot be found a self that is the shape of the aggregates. ff ff ff ff fi 20 5. (D) Conclude Having gone through steps (A), (B), and (C), now assert the logical conclusion: (D) Since there are no other possibilities, the self is not ndable at all, and thus “cannot really exist in the way that it seems to”. “What’s really important is the conviction . . . we really need to be convinced, absolutely convinced.” [MoE, 3] “Linger in and pay attention to the feeling that accompanies this conclusion.”[StF, 235] Theory: Reasoning it Out for Yourself “The sevenfold reasoning just given . . . represents only a skeleton . . . around which to base your own re ections. It is vital to think through each branch for yourself, and to nd reasons that convince you. Perhaps some reasons will be . . . added to, or replaced . . . develop some familiarity with them [outside of formal meditation], in order for this analysis to work well in meditation.”[StF, 231] For Step (C), “it is not necessary for a yogi to do all the reasonings or to expend the same amount of energy on each. He need only meditate on those . . . which are helpful . . . [and] are important to him and then, within those, he need meditate only on the arguments that are e ective. However, he would have to do at least the rst two reasonings . . . to establish the necessary pervasion [of all possibilities].”[JN, 23] “The order of the branches . . . is not . . . xed but may be varied at will. The pace at which they are moved through will vary greatly too. . . . [though] it should not be rushed. . . . With familiarity, the reasoning stage may be moved through very rapidly and still be very powerful.”[StF, 233] “Try to go beyond your normal way of thinking.”[DK, 302] Some arguments “may sound ridiculous, but it is necessary to challenge . . . ordinary thought just because [it] . . . is so embedded in the conception of inherent existence.”[JN, 19] The body-sense can o er feedback on the level of conviction-resolution vs. unresolved doubt to guide the analysis. Ask: “Do I feel convinced?” “Without this conviction, . . . the analysis will have very little power. Once the conviction is reached though, it can be re-established very quickly”.[StF, 231] When feeling lost, try feeling for doubt, voicing it, and exploring it like so: 1. “Could the self be like this…?” (Feeling of doubt is voiced as a thread to explore.) 2. “But this would mean that…” (Follow the thread to its logical conclusion: some absurdity.) 3. “That’s absurd, so it can’t be like that.” (Cutting o the loose end, when it feels resolved.) ff fl ff fi fi ff fi fi 21 6. Vacuity “I’m looking at the sense of . . . self at the time that I’m doing the reasoning. . . . [as] one nds that one can’t nd it . . . the sense of the self . . . begins to fade and get replaced with a sense of vacuity, emptiness, non-thing . . . [Then one] steadily focuses on that emptiness . . . and kind of concentrates on that, but it has to have a meaning to it. . . . it’s not just a kind of blank nothingness, it actually means there is no inherent existence to this [self] . . . it means I can’t nd this [self] . . . inherently existing. . . . it’s not taken to mean that nothing exists, a kind of nihilism. It’s also not a kind of agnosticism . . . ‘oh well, we can never really know how things exist anyway, oh well’. . . . It’s pregnant . . . with a very speci c meaning, which is I can’t nd this [self] as inherently existing”.[MoE, 4] “The self-sense begins to dissolve right then as we realize that the self is not ndable. . . . We need to focus the attention wholeheartedly on the sense and perception of the vacuity, and also on its implicit meaning”, which “usually . . . is obvious at this point”.[StF, 232] “If at any time the vacuity’s signi cance is no longer appreciated, then it is important for that sense to be resurrected, to keep deliberately remembering that this vacuity has the meaning of the emptiness of self. . . . let its meaning impress upon the citta[, i.e. heart-mind]. . . . just as we can get a feel for the seeming inherent existence of the self, we need to get a feeling for its emptiness. . . . [Perhaps] revisiting the steps of the reasoning — perhaps only very brie y or lightly, as appropriate — may help to maintain the perception of the vacuity, or . . . its meaning”.[StF, 232-233] Theory: More about Vacuity With time, “the sense of separation between the mind . . . and the vacuity . . . begins to gradually fade, and they move toward fusion . . . the appreciation of emptiness become[s] more direct and involve[s] less and less conceptualization”[StF, 232], like “water into water”.[MoE, 10] “[Vacuity] can be tested by turning the attention . . . to some other object; if a [vacuity] of that object is generated without . . . any further reasoning, then the yogi knows he has a valid cognition of emptiness.”[JN, 23] “It is important, however, not to grasp at the perception of a vacuity as the goal . . . Rather . . . the practice is . . . a search for the . . . self . . . [and] then the realization that it cannot be found . . . is what is fundamental.”[StF, 232] 7. Reappearance “When . . . the vacuity is relaxed, the self-sense reappears, and attention should be paid to how it feels . . . there is a knowing of its emptiness . . . and this sense of it as an empty appearance should be explored, and enjoyed. . . . [Also,] it is possible that, . . . the sense of emptiness will spread . . . to other phenomena, . . . they too can be seen and felt as empty . . . [as] an optional . . . step.”[StF, 233] fi fi fi fi fi fl fi fi 22 Other Practice Options “[Furthermore, the Reasoning] can take any phenomenon as its object. It is not restricted to the personal self. [Like] Any physical object or any of the aggregates”.[StF, 233] “You could also use it just a little bit re ecting on [the] reasonings as a way to shore up the anatta practice, [to] ll out the kind of certainty with which you can look at something and say ‘not me, not mine’.”[MoE, 11-12] Optional Tips Since this can be a rather heady practice, some of these little tricks might be helpful or not to stay grounded and sustain calm-passion: • Walking while going through the reasonings may be helpful for thinking clearly, and staying grounded, • Speaking out loud, or writing, may be helpful for organizing thoughts, • Relax the tongue and/or jaw to relax the linguistic mind, • A quick smile helps one to not take oneself too seriously :) Sources This practice was derived from the Madhyamaka tradition of Mahayana Buddhism. As many direct quotations were used as possible, with the editor’s additions in square brackets: [ ], and citations in this format: [source, page number]. Excuse the awkward formatting due to the use of ellipses ( . . . ) to indicate a break in the quote. These choices were made to allow the reader to enjoy these teachers’ original words, and to be able to consult the sources themselves, if they wish. Here are the sources, in the order of relevance for this guide: • StF: “Seeing That Frees” (Ch. 17) by Rob Burbea: • https://www.amazon.com/Seeing-That-Frees-Robert-Burbea/dp/0992848911 • MoE: Rob Burbea’s “Meditation on Emptiness (2009)” retreat talks (note 2009, not 2010) • Speci cally, the talk “Chandrakirti's Chariot and the Un ndable Self”: • https://dharmaseed.org/teacher/210/talk/11118 • See also the transcription at “The Rob Burbea Transcription Project” (cited page numbers correspond to the transcript) • GG: Greg Goode’s article “Chandrakirti’s Sevenfold Reasoning on Sel essness”: • https://www.nonduality.com/goode6.htm • JN: Anonymous commentary of a commentary on the MV (pages 17-24) • https://theinevitableecstasy. les.wordpress.com/2011/04/22334436-chandrakirti-the- sevenfold-reasoning.pdf • DK: Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche’s “Introduction to the Middle Way” (pdf pages 275-308): • http://siddharthasintent.org/assets/pubs/MadhyamakavataraDJKR.pdf • MV: Chandrakirti’s original Madhyamakāvatāra (6:120-167) fi fi fi fl fi fl