‘Everywhere Taksim’ P R O T E S T A N D S O C I A L M O V E M E N T S Edited by Isabel David and Kumru F. Toktamış Sowing the Seeds for a New Turkey at Gezi ‘Everywhere Taksim’ Protest and Social Movements Recent years have seen an explosion of protest movements around the world, and academic theories are racing to catch up with them. This series aims to further our understanding of the origins, dealings, decisions, and outcomes of social movements by fostering dialogue among many traditions of thought, across European nations and across continents. All theoretical perspectives are welcome. Books in the series typically combine theory with empirical research, dealing with various types of mobilization, from neighborhood groups to revolutions. We especially welcome work that synthesizes or compares different approaches to social movements, such as cultural and structural traditions, micro- and macro-social, economic and ideal, or qualitative and quantitative. Books in the series will be published in English. One goal is to encourage non- native speakers to introduce their work to Anglophone audiences. Another is to maximize accessibility: all books will be available in open access within a year after printed publication. ‘Everywhere Taksim’ Sowing the Seeds for a New Turkey at Gezi Edited by Isabel David and Kumru F. Toktamış Amsterdam University Press Cover illustration: Street stencil on walls in Istanbul. The defiant penguin who wears a gas mask symbolizes the resistance against AKP rule and police brutality amidst media corruption. Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden Lay-out: Crius Group, Hulshout Amsterdam University Press English-language titles are distributed in the US and Canada by the University of Chicago Press. isbn 978 90 8964 807 5 e-isbn 978 90 4852 639 0 nur 697 © Isabel David and Kumru F. Toktamış / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2015 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book. Every effort has been made to obtain permission to use all copyrighted illustrations reproduced in this book. Nonetheless, whosoever believes to have rights to this material is advised to contact the publisher. Contents Acknowledgements 11 List of Acronyms 13 Introduction 15 Gezi in Retrospect Isabel David and Kumru F. Toktamış Bibliography 25 Section I Gezi Protests and Democratisation 1 Evoking and Invoking Nationhood as Contentious Democratisation 29 Kumru F. Toktamış 2007 – Nation-Evoking Demonstrations 34 Gezi – Summer 2013 37 Conclusion 40 Bibliography 42 2 ‘Everyday I’m Çapulling !’ 45 Global Flows and Local Frictions of Gezi Jeremy F. Walton Introduction: Gezi and Rumi’s Elephant in the Dark 45 The Politics of Public Space in Urban Turkey: Taksim Square, Proscenium of the Nation 46 The Carnivalesque Citizenship of the Çapulcu 50 Gezi and the Discontents of Neoliberal Globalisation 52 Conclusion: Gezi and the Decoupling of Liberalism and Democracy in Turkey 54 Bibliography 55 3 The Incentives and Actors of Protests in Turkey and Bosnia- Herzegovina in 2013 59 Ana Dević and Marija Krstić Introduction 59 Turkish Case: Political Change and Gezi Park Protests 59 The Common Denominator of the Protests in Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina 68 Conclusion 72 Bibliography 72 Section II The Political Economy of Protests 4 AKP Rule in the Aftermath of the Gezi Protests 77 From Expanded to Limited Hegemony? Umut Bozkurt Understanding the AKP’s Hegemony 79 Neoliberal Populism and the AKP Rule 79 The Explosion of Social Assistance Programmes 81 The Symbolic/Ideological Sources of the Party’s Hegemony 83 The AKP’s Hegemony after the Gezi Protests 84 Conclusion 86 Bibliography 87 5 Rebelling against Neoliberal Populist Regimes 89 Barış Alp Özden and Ahmet Bekmen Neoliberal Populism, AKP and PT 90 Depoliticising the Question of Poverty 92 Deradicalising Labour 94 Preliminary Reflections on the Protests 97 Bibliography 101 6 Enough is Enough 105 What do the Gezi Protestors Want to Tell Us? A Political Economy Perspective İlke Civelekoğlu Re-thinking Neoliberalism in Turkey under AKP Rule 105 Re-thinking the Gezi Park Protests: What did the Protestors Actually Protest? 111 Conclusion 116 Bibliography 117 Section III Protesters and Repertoires of Protests 7 ‘We are more than Alliances between Groups’ 121 A Social Psychological Perspective on the Gezi Park Protesters and Negotiating Levels of Identity Özden Melis Uluğ and Yasemin Gülsüm Acar Background to the Gezi Park Protests 121 Social Psychological Perspectives on Collective Action 122 Antecedents to Collective Action 124 Creating a Group from the Crowd 124 ‘We Are More than Alliances between Groups’: An Identity- based Analysis of the Gezi Park Protest Activists 126 Conclusion 132 Bibliography 134 8 Istanbul United 137 Football Fans Entering the ‘Political Field’ Dağhan Irak Introduction 137 Methodology 139 The Political Context of Turkish Football 141 The Hyper-Commodification of Turkish Football 142 Politicisation of Football Fans in Turkey 144 Fans’ Reasons for Joining the Gezi Protests 146 Discussion 147 Bibliography 150 9 Humour as Resistance? 153 A Brief Analysis of the Gezi Park Protest Graffiti Lerna K. Yanık Background 153 What is a Graffito? The Features of the Graffiti Collected around Gezi Park 154 The Role and the Function of Graffiti and Humour: A Short Conceptual Overview 156 The Graffiti in Gezi Park: Humour or Resistance, or Humour as Resistance? 158 Delivering Messages through Humour 159 Erdoğan in Graffiti 160 Counterstatement or Intertextual Graffiti 164 Conclusion 179 Bibliography 182 10 Where did Gezi Come from? 185 Exploring the Links between Youth Political Activism before and during the Gezi Protests Pınar Gümüş and Volkan Yılmaz Introduction 185 Social Movement Communities and Social Movement Spillover 186 New Social Movements in Turkey 187 Methodology 188 Five Cross-cutting Themes 189 Aversive Attitude towards Conventional Political Organisations 189 Ability to Organise Horizontally and to Accommodate Individual Differences 190 Ability to Work with Diverse Political Groups and Cooperate with Strangers 191 Ability to Transfer Protest Skills 193 The Gezi Protests as a Paradigm-Shifting Event with Respect to the Older Generation’s Perception of the Relationship between Youth and Politics 194 Conclusion 195 Bibliography 196 Section IV The Politics of Space and Identity at Gezi 11 ‘We May Be Lessees, but the Neighbourhood is Ours’ 201 Gezi Resistances and Spatial Claims Ahu Karasulu ‘Essentials Are Thus Cast Up’: Space and Contention 203 ‘(New Elements) Become Briefly Visible in Luminous Transparency’: Spatial Claims 206 ‘Events Belie Forecasts’: Concluding Remarks 210 Bibliography 212 12 Negotiating Religion at the Gezi Park Protests 215 Emrah Çelik Introduction 215 The Objects of the Protests 216 The Place of Religion in the Protests 218 The Position of Religious People in the Protests 222 Democratisation vs. Polarisation 225 Conclusion 227 Bibliography 229 13 Gezi Park 231 A Revindication of Public Space Clara Rivas Alonso Introduction 231 The Turkish Institutional Approach to Intervention in the Urban Environment 232 AKP’s Neoliberal Project: Taming the Commons by Taming the City 233 AKP’s Reliance on the Construction Sector 234 Commodification of Culture and Monopolization of Narratives: Branding the City 236 Rewriting History 238 Gezi: Mapping the Space Reclaimed and the Victory of the Commons 239 Gezi Protests as a Reaction against AKP Policies 240 The Value of Resistance in and for a Park: Creating New Senses of Belonging 240 Responses to the Militarisation of Space: The Return of the Commons 242 Conclusion 246 Bibliography 247 Section V Gezi in an International Context 14 Gezi Spirit in the Diaspora 251 Diffusion of Turkish Politics to Europe Bahar Baser Diffusion of Gezi Spirit to the Transnational Space 252 Creating ‘Gezi Parks’ in Europe 260 Conclusion 264 Bibliography 265 15 Turkey’s EU Membership Process in the Aftermath of the Gezi Protests 267 Beken Saatçioğlu Introduction 267 The Normative Meaning of Gezi 268 Implications for Turkey-EU Relations 269 Postponing Negotiations on Chapter 22 269 Negotiations on Chapter 22 and beyond 274 Conclusion 279 Bibliography 280 List of Contributors 283 Index 285 Acknowledgements This book is the product of an amazing group of people with whom we had the privilege of working. We would like to express our gratitude to the School of Social and Politi- cal Sciences (Universidade de Lisboa – University of Lisbon), Portugal, and Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, New York, for enabling us to bring together these articles that explore a critical moment in contemporary Turkish history. We would like to thank the contributors, for all their hard work and patience throughout this process. We would also like to thank the Amsterdam University Press for accept- ing to publish this book and for their support and diligent work. We would like to thank Larissa Hertzberg, Nuno Zimas and João Pedro Gonçalves for their precious help with technical issues. Jim Jasper’s guidance has been invaluable in preparation of this volume. This book is dedicated to the memory of the young people who lost their lives during and in the aftermath of the Taksim/Gezi protests in the summer of 2013. Isabel David, PhD Kumru F. Toktamış, PhD List of Acronyms ADD Association for Ataturkist Thought ( Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği ) AKP Justice and Development Party ( Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi ) ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats BDP Peace and Democracy Party ( Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi ) CHP Republican People’s Party ( Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi ) DİDF Federation of Democratic Workers’ Organisations ( Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu ) DİSK Confederation of Progressive Trades Unions of Turkey ( Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu ) EC European Commission EP European Parliament EU European Union GAC EU General Affairs Council HSYK High Council of Judges and Prosecutors ( Hâkimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu ) IMF International Monetary Fund İP Workers’ Party ( İşçi Partisi ) KESK Confederation of Public Workers’ Union ( Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu ) LGBTI Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex MEP Member of the European Parliament MHP Nationalist Movement Party ( Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi ) NGO Non-governmental Organisation OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party ( Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan ) PT Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party) SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprises TGB Youth Union of Turkey ( Türkiye Gençlik Birliği ) TKP Communist Party of Turkey ( Türkiye Komünist Partisi ) TMMOB Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects ( Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği ) TOKİ Prime Ministry Housing Development Administration of Turkey ( Toplu Konut İdaresi ) UK United Kingdom US United States of America Introduction Gezi in Retrospect Isabel David and Kumru F. Toktamış In late May and June of 2013, an encampment protesting the privatisation of the historic Gezi Park, in the public and commercially vibrant Taksim Square, in Istanbul, began as a typical urban social movement for defending individual rights and freedoms and public space, with no particular political affiliation. Thanks to a brutal police response and a brazen reaction by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the mobilisation soon snowballed into nationwide anti-government protests (79 out of 81 cities, mobilising 2.5 to 3 million people) (İnsan Hakları Derneği 2013). A coali- tion of the urban, educated, working- and middle classes was crafted with varying social and cultural concerns about both perceived and actual social encroachments as well as the policies of the ruling Justice and Development Party ( Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi , AKP). The moderately Islamist AKP party has now been in power for more than a decade and has achieved three national and three local landslide victories in elections since 2002. 1 It has reorganized wealth within the capitalist classes while shifting political and social hierarchies of urban populations by rearranging (i.e. simultaneously expanding and limiting) rights and freedoms. It has liberalized the display of religious symbols like headscarves in public spaces such as universities, established non-violent, albeit still patronizing, civic communication channels with minorities such as Kurds and Armenians, all of which have shaken the state-secular elites’ sense of cultural and political dominance. Yet, growing informal and arbitrary control over freedom of the press, occasional limitations on social media outlets such as YouTube and Twitter, non-responsive and evasive actions by government officials at times of public disasters and other social crises have also caused widespread insolence and insubordination among the public. The AKP regime in Turkey has been a paradoxical one with increasing political and social polarisation. This is largely caused by the growing authoritarian and micro-managing attitudes of the prime 1 The percentage of AKP votes was 34.63% in 2002, 41.67% in 2007 and 50% in the 2011 national elections, and 41.67% in 2004, 38.8% in 2007 and 45.5% in the 2014 local elections. See http:// www.genelsecim.org/GenelSecimSonuclari.asp?SY=2002. Accessed 27 May 2014. 16 IsabEl DavID anD Kumru F. ToK TamIş minister, galvanizing the sentiments of former elites who had enveloped their lives with the certainties of a Republican regime guarded by the military establishment; an establishment now effectively muzzled. The Gezi protests and ensuing popular uprisings in many corners of the country may be a threshold, marking a cultural shift away from authoritar- ian forms of political activism in Turkey. The opposition has certainly been shedding its authoritarian uniformity and elite exclusivity and is becoming more democratic, multicultural, and inclusive. The slogan ‘Everywhere Taksim,’ which emerged in the days of the protests, marked the convergence of the rallying point of all demonstrations and uprisings outside Istanbul, signalling the spirit of frustration, resistance and indignation expressed at Gezi Park. Gezi is a nine-acre urban park built over an ancient Armenian grave- yard and an Ottoman Artillery Barracks in Taksim Square in the heart of Istanbul. Taksim has been a site of student protests and labour mobilisation since the 1960s. During the ‘Bloody Sunday’ of February 1969, demonstra- tors, protesting against the US 6 th Fleet’s visit to Istanbul, were attacked by right-wing militia; two were killed and 150 were injured (Ahmad 1977). Taksim has also been the site of 1 May rallies since 1975. The Labour Day Massacre of May 1977 took place there too, when half a million demon- strators were indiscriminately fired upon by unidentified snipers from a municipal building. The official, albeit contested, number of deaths was 34 and the unofficial number of wounded reached 250. 2 Since then, there have been occasional peaceful, but often intensely negotiated, May Day rallies at Taksim Square, whenever the authorities grant permission. A project to construct a shopping centre on this location is among the multiple urban commercialisation and redevelopment projects under- taken by the Metropolitan Istanbul Municipality, controlled by elected pro-Islamic officials since the mayoral tenure of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan between 1994 and 1998. The reorganisation and redevelopment plan for Taksim was initiated in 2009 by the government and in September 2011 the Istanbul Municipality Council, including the members of the opposition parties, unanimously approved the pedestrianisation part of the project, which was partially contracted in 2012. Almost immediately, the project was challenged by the Istanbul Chamber of Architects and the Istanbul Chamber of City Planners (both affiliated to the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects, Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği , TMMOB), who petitioned courts in May 2012. They were seeking a cessation 2 http://www.sendika.org/2007/04/30-yil-sonra-kanli-1-mayis-ertugrul-mavioglu-radikal/. InTr oDu cTIon 17 of all the projects on the grounds that the plans for commercialisation were inconsistent with the principles of urban planning and violated the regulations of urban historical preservation. 3 Consequently, the project was rejected in two separate courts in 2013, just around the time the clashes started. An administrative court stayed the redevelopment plans on 31 May and an appeal to another administrative court upheld this verdict on 6 June. 4 These efforts by the professional chamber associations were closely supported by neighbourhood groups, united under the umbrella initiative Taksim Solidarity ( Taksim Dayanışması ). 2012 had already been a year full of activism for Taksim Solidarity. Prior to 2013, there were at least three large-scale demonstrations organised by the professional chambers and local community organisations, protesting the redevelopment and com- mercialisation projects. At a demonstration in early March, the second largest labour federation in the country, the Confederation of Progressive Trades Unions of Turkey ( Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu , DİSK), joined forces with the professional chambers and local community organisations as the union president declared the symbolic and historical significance of this particular urban square for the labour and socialist movement. He suggested that Prime Minister Erdoğan was acting like an Ot- toman Sultan and ignoring the opposition. 5 At the same protest, representa- tives of the Taksim Solidarity movement were determined to prevent a fait accompli, defining the renewal project as the elimination of human beings, the erection of concrete structures and the loss of the square’s authenticity. 6 As the official bidding process to identify and appoint the contractors started, a second large-scale demonstration was called in late June of 2012. During an uneventful summer, the parties continued their court battles and by October 2012, some cafes on the square started receiving their evic- tion papers. The coalition of groups resisting the project started petition campaigns and called for another mass demonstration on 14 October. By early November, members of coalition groups were taking turns to ‘guard the park’ as the preparations for construction were underway. As the construction work was starting in January 2013, Taksim Solidarity, together with the students of the Faculty of Architecture of Istanbul Techni- cal University, called for common breakfasts at the park every Sunday, 3 http://www.mimarist.org/2012-08-13-16-09-05.html. 4 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/23644273.asp. See also http://www.radikal.com.tr/ turkiye/gezi_parki_raporu_dokunamazsiniz-1135658. 5 http://www.etha.com.tr/Haber/2012/03/03/guncel/taksim-ayaklarin-bas-oldugu-yerdir/. 6 http://www.etha.com.tr/Haber/2012/03/03/guncel/taksim-ayaklarin-bas-oldugu-yerdir/. 18 IsabEl DavID anD Kumru F. ToK TamIş starting on 26 January. They initiated another large-scale demonstration with the professional chambers on 15 February. A neighbourhood organisa- tion called the Association for the Protection and Improvement of Taksim was officially created in March, collecting more than 80,000 signatures against the development and organising a music and dance festival on 14 April, which was attended by hundreds of citizens and a few officials of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party ( Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi , CHP). By May 2013, Taksim Solidarity was still organising vigils at the park every Saturday between 3 pm and 6 pm. 7 By 27 May, when police forces started to evacuate the park, hundreds of civic organisations were already in coordination, using social media to make public calls for the space to be defended. The brutal eviction of around fifty young people occupying the park to save approximately 600 trees in late May turned into nationwide protests and clashes throughout the month of June, exacerbated by the excessive use of police force against peaceful demonstrators. Gezi was re-opened to the public on 1 June and immediately re-occupied by an increasing number of groups from all walks of life; thousands of people marched, some displaying Turkish flags. Taking the streets and even the bridges, denizens of Istanbul reached out to Gezi from different districts of the city, throughout the night, determined to support and shelter young people from further police brutal- ity. The popularity of the occupiers among the city dwellers became clear with the march of more than 10,000 football fans, in an uncharacteristic display of fraternity on 8 June. For almost two weeks, the park turned into a forum for public festivities with makeshift libraries, kitchens, seminars, concerts, classes from maths to yoga, as well as ongoing clashes with the police force, as the world’s attention turned to Istanbul and other cities in Turkey where demonstrators expressed support for the Gezi protestors and vocalized a wide scope of grievances, ranging from freedom of expression to defence of state secularist principles. Forums developed in several cities. These public forums have now become a constitutive part of localized protests and negotiations, mostly related to issues of neighbourhood redevelopment and democratic participation. 7 Interviews with Taksim Solidarity representatives. For the vigils, see http://www.sendika. org/2012/11/taksim-nobeti-gunlugu-taksim-dayanismasi/. InTr oDu cTIon 19 In early June, Prime Minister Erdoğan dismissed the protestors in his now famous ‘a few çapulcus ’ speech. 8 This labelling of the protesters as ‘looters’ was immediately re-appropriated by the protesters with an irreverent twist and developed into an anglicized neologism, ‘ chapulling ,’ loosely referring to ‘fighting for one’s rights.’ Penguins were to constitute another symbol of resistance, irreverence and cognitive disconnect of the media eager to support the government, when CNN Türk chose to air a documentary on the lives of these polar birds instead of broadcasting the protests. The two weeks of encampment at Gezi Park was a fresh yet exhilarating moment in Turkey’s political history. During the intensification of these political confrontations, the government’s responses to the protests were not uniform. Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, who had categorically denied the protestors’ list of demands, apologised for the ‘excessive use of police force’ on 4 June. 9 President Abdullah Gül, who had called for modera- tion in early June, also took it upon himself to announce the suspension of the redevelopment plans in mid-July. 10 Throughout this period, the prime minister was the only political figure who was unwavering in his defence of the redevelopment project and condemnation of the protests as conspiracies against his rule. His supporters staged a midnight welcoming demonstration upon his return from a North African visit on 7 June, asking for his permission ‘to crash Gezi.’ 11 Banking on a form of majoritarianism that has replaced any democratic treatment of his opposition, Erdoğan insinuated that 50 per cent of the population in Turkey was ready to attack and destroy ‘Everywhere Taksim’ protests across the country. Following a series of impatient and brusque warnings to end the protests and the encampments, the prime minister held a meeting with the representatives of the protestors during the early hours of 14 June, during which he declared that the future of the project would be decided by a referendum. 12 At his subsequent counter rallies in Ankara and Istanbul on 15 and 16 June, he reiterated his support for the redevelopment project and called for ‘respect 8 http://haber.sol.org.tr/devlet-ve-siyaset/erdogan-onbinleri-birkac-capulcu-ilan-etti- diktatorluk-kanimda-yok-dedi-haberi-739. 9 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/06/20136551212442132.html. 10 http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/gezi-parki-projesi-askiya-alindi/gundem/ydetay/1724812/ default.htm. 11 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-calls-for-immediate-end-to-gezi- park-protests-.aspx?PageID=238&NID=48381&NewsCatID=338. 12 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22898228.