Karwansaray BV Treacherous auxiliaries Author(s): Filippo Donvito Source: Medieval Warfare , 2015 , Vol. 5, No. 1, Theme - Traitors in the Middle Ages (2015), pp. 22-27 Published by: Karwansaray BV Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48578413 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Karwansaray BV is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Medieval Warfare This content downloaded from 130.63.180.147 on Thu, 10 Dec 2020 01:22:29 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Traitors in the Middle Ages 22 Medieval Warfare V-1 Treacherous auxiliaries The Battle of the River Talas at the beginning of the seventh century, the three empires of Byz- antium, persia and china were the most powerful and advanced states of eurasia. less than a century later, the striking conquests of the arabs had overrun sassanid persia and forced the Byz- antine empire to fight for its very survival. china, ruled by the mighty Tang dynasty, seemed safe for the time being, but even they would get a taste of what the arabs were capable of. By filippo donvito D uring Late Antiquity, Sogdiana, also called Transoxiana (‘the Land beyond the [river] Oxus’), was a wealthy region. The local princes, some of whom bore the title of Ikhshidh (or ‘king’), enriched themselves through the silk- trade with China and by trading furs from Siberia. The region’s strategic location at the crossroads of China, India and Persia, con- trolling the main routes of the Silk Road, had made the Sogdian merchants the most influ - ential tradesmen of inner Asia. Transoxiana was also an advanced agricultural area at the time. Thanks to a whole network of irrigation canals, which directed the waters of great rivers and mountain streams, an otherwise steppe-like environment had become a fertile plain dotted with farms and vineyards. The Sogdians were originally an Iranian people, but from the sixth century onwards, groups of nomadic Turkic speakers had begun to settle among them. In AD 552, the first pre - dominantly Turkic Khaganate recorded in his- tory was established. Conquering lands from central Asia to eastern Mongolia, the Turks soon added Transoxiana to their western marches. However, within a year, the great empire was divided into a Western (centred in the Altai) and Eastern Khaganate (based in Mongolia). Throughout the next century, the Eastern Turks waged many successful wars against the north- ern Chinese dynasties. But then, in 624, they were utterly defeated by a Chinese prince. The latter would later assume the imperial title un- der the name of T’ai-tsung (a.k.a. Taizong; r. 627-649), starting a new dynasty: the Tang. chinese expansionism westward In a deliberate effort to emulate the great central Asian conquests of the ancient Han dynasty, T’ai- tsung committed himself to the submission of the two Turkic Khaganates. While the Eastern Turks were crushed within three years, the Emperor spent the remaining twenty years of his eventful reign taming their western cousins, who were much more powerful and unified. Their defeat was achieved by slowly conquering the rich Indo- European oasis cities of the Tarim basin (modern Xinjiang), the wealthiest allies and main com- mercial partners of the Western Turks. Splendid city-states like Turfan, Kucha and Khotan fell after years of epic battles and rebellions, finally allow - ing the Chinese to bring their Empire’s border to This small statuette displayed at the Cernuschi Museum of Paris depicts a Chinese officer of the Middle Tang Era (eight century). His elaborate armour shows some distinctive Turkic influ - ences, especially the dragon’s heads decorating the warrior’s espaliers (armour covering the shoulder), knees and belt. Note the armour reinforcement at chest height, and the strange headgear, possibly a helmet in the form of an animal’s head. © User ‘Guillaume Jacquet’, via Wiki - media Commons (CC-by-SA) mw_5-1.indd 22 20/01/15 16:09 This content downloaded from 130.63.180.147 on Thu, 10 Dec 2020 01:22:29 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Medieval Warfare V-1 23 Traitors in the Middle Ages the Pamir Mountains, the eastern border of Transoxiana. Kao- tsung (650-683), T’ai- tsung’s son and suc- cessor, continued his father’s work, defeat- ing the last Western Turkic chief opposed to China in 657. However, from 665 onwards, the Western Turkic tribes started a se- ries of revolts. Around the same time, the Tarim basin was overrun by the Tibet- ans. Even worse, in 682 the Eastern Turkic Khaganate was revived by a descend- ant of the old Turkic royal clan, who immediately reopened hostilities against the Chinese. The follow- ing decades, the Chinese were forced to stay on the defensive, suffering many humiliating defeats. The Chinese had received a beating, but around the middle of Em- peror Hsüan-tsung’s reign (713-755), they slowly began to recover their for- mer position. Around 734, the Turkic tribes, deprived of a strong leader, started quarrelling among themselves, thus making them easy prey for a revived Chinese power. The Tibetans were expelled from the Tarim region in the 30s and 40s. After the original borders of the empire forged by his ancestor T’ai-tsung had been restored, Hsüan-tsung turned his mind to other and ‘more glorious’ conquests. The Tang court’s eyes focused on the Pamirs, whereby passed the routes followed by Buddhist pil- grims heading for the Indian sanctuaries. Petty mountain chiefs had managed to seize the fortress of Gilgit, threatening the trade route for the small kingdom of Kashmir, an ally of the Chinese. Hsüan-tsung did not miss this great opportunity to expand his influence up to the gates of India, and duly sent one of his best generals, the Korean Kao Sien-chih, to defeat the last Tibetan partisans in AD 750. This persuaded even the prince of Tokharistan (present-day northern Afghanistan) to declare himself a faithful ally of the Chinese Emperor. The campaigns between northern Afghani - stan and the upper Indus valley symbolize the apex of Tang expansionism. The incredible pro- gresses through such a huge territory must have made the Chinese seem almost unstoppable. But by crossing the Pamirs, they had now en- tered the eastern border of Transoxiana, a land that, during the preceding fifty years, had gradu - ally come under the control of another dynamic and expansionistic power: the Umayyad Arab Caliphate. This made a struggle for supremacy over the area only a matter of time. Both sides must have been equally determined not to give ground, seeing that any sign of weakness would likely have sparked the seeds of rebellion among the recently conquered peoples. © Julia Lillo mw_5-1.indd 23 20/01/15 16:10 This content downloaded from 130.63.180.147 on Thu, 10 Dec 2020 01:22:29 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Traitors in the Middle Ages 24 Medieval Warfare V-1 The arabs in central asia Arab raids beyond the Oxus started after the middle of the seventh century, but a serious ef- fort to conquer Transoxiania was never under- taken before the start of the next century. This was substantially the work of a single resolute man: Qutayba ibn Muslim. Qutayba held the province of Khorasan (north-eastern Persia) in the name of the Umayy- ad caliph from 705 to 715. Immediately before leaving for the conquest of Transoxiana, he was wise enough to develop friendly relations with the Persian population of his province, a choice probably dictated by the need to protect his sup- ply lines and increase his sources of manpower. He subsequently spent the whole length of his governorship waging war in Khwarazm and in Sogdiana up to the Ferghana valley. After the first Arab victories, the Sogdian princes recognized the danger and tried to counter the new threat by summoning the Western Turks to their aid. Against all odds, Qutayba was able to beat the Turko-Iranian coalition on several occasions. So resourceful and determined was this Arab gen - eral, that when he eventually fell out of favour and was murdered by his soldiers, all the major principalities of Transoxiana as far north as Tash- kent had declared themselves as his vassals. The Sogdian rulers were perfectly aware that the Arabs were there to stay. If they want - ed to win back their freedom and wealth, then they had to act quickly, before another Umayyad governor could consolidate Qutay- ba’s successes. Thus, while continuing to seek help from the Turkic tribes, they also looked for a more powerful patron. Already in 712, the king of Ferghana had fled to the Chinese governor of the ‘Four Garrisons’, in the Tarim Basin. His example was soon followed by oth- ers, including the kings of Bukhara and Samar- kand and the prince of Tokharistan. Emperor Hsüan-tsung, though usually eager for new conquests, was still uncertain whether to enter into open conflict with the Umayyads. For the moment, he was content to bestow patents of nobility on the Sogdian princ- es and stirring up rebellions. In the 660s the Chinese had already welcomed the sons and nephews of the last Sassanid king at their court, and provided them with financial and military aid in order to rouse a great Persian insurgency against Arab rule. Now that the neighbouring Sogdians were in a similar predicament, a fi - nal showdown between Chinese East and Arab West was ever more likely, and Chinese support surely hastened the course of events. In 747, Umayyad rule over Khorasan was shaken by the outbreak of the Abbasid Revo - lution. Headed by the legendary Abu Muslim, the revolutionaries captured the great provin- cial capital of Merv (Marv) in December 747 or January 748. Having secured control over the east, the Abbasid insurrectionary army moved westward to challenge the Umayyads on the battlefield. The final encounter was fought some three years later in Mesopota- mia, at the confluence of the Zab and Tigris rivers. The army of the Umayyad Caliph was utterly defeated, and the Abbasids lay the foundations of their new dynasty. Those final months of 750, when the new Abbasid Caliphate managed to successfully de - feat the Umayyads, provided the Chinese with an ideal opportunity to launch an attack against Transoxiana. Arab presence in the area probably greatly decreased during the revolution, and it would have been likely that the newly instated Abbasids were still occupied with conquering the last Umayyad strongholds and securing their recent gains. Emboldened by recent events, gen- eral Kao Sien-chih (either on his own initiative or by order of the Emperor) felt confident enough to assist the King of Ferghana against his rival the King of Shash (Tashkent). The latter was brutally beheaded by the Chinese general, but his son fled to Samarkand, where he sent a request for help to Abu Muslim. This would turn out to be the pretext for an outbreak of hostilities between Tang China and the Abbasid Caliphate. The opposing armies The mainstay of the early Abbasid military was the Ahl Khurasan , the ‘Army of Khorasan’. Its foundation can be traced back to the year 671, when fifty thousand Arab families from Basra and Kufa were sent to colonize and gar- rison this newly conquered province. Over time, the Arab military settlers began to mix with the local Persian population, developing some distinct Iranian military traditions – in particular, the emphasis on cavalry warfare. The elite corps of the Army of Khorasan was indeed the heavy cavalry of the Khurasaniyya , principally modelled after the late Sassanid sa- varan knights. These horsemen are described as wearing metal armour – most likely a coat of mail, like the Sassanids – and carrying lances, swords, axes and maces. Even their warhorses (Opposite page) The final phase of the Battle of the River Talas. With the Abbasid vanguard at their heels, the survivors of the Chinese army retreated from the battlefield towards the otherwise unknown White Stone Mountains pass. However, their former Fer- ghanese (Sogdian) allies had got- ten there first, blocking the pass with their soldiers and beasts of burden. This might have been another deliberate act of trea- son – possibly instigated by the Muslims in return for some re- ward – but it could also simply be the result of the confusion and the overcrowding of retreating troops. Either way, the Chinese commanders immediately real- ized they were walking into a death trap. Li Su-yeh, command- er of the Tang cavalry, took the in- itiative and charged the Sogdians, slaughtering them without mercy until he was able to open an es- cape route for his companions. This artwork shows the moment when the Tang armoured cavalry crashes into the Sogdian horse- men blockading the pass. © Fabrice Weiss mw_5-1.indd 24 20/01/15 16:10 This content downloaded from 130.63.180.147 on Thu, 10 Dec 2020 01:22:29 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms mw_5-1.indd 25 20/01/15 16:10 This content downloaded from 130.63.180.147 on Thu, 10 Dec 2020 01:22:29 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Traitors in the Middle Ages 26 Medieval Warfare V-1 were armoured, though mostly with bards of felt, since lamellar armour was very expensive and probably limited to wealthy officials and the most experienced champions. The use of stirrups was already quite common, as they had began to spread among Muslim horsemen from the 680s onwards. Some very distinctive features of the khurasaniyya were its fearful war drums and the huge flags, mounted on poles of up to 6 or 7 meters long. Beside the heavy cavalry, the Army of Khorasan fielded regular Arab infantrymen in great numbers. Their standard equipment included an egg- shaped helmet, a round or oval shield of me- dium size, a 3m-long thrusting spear and a short sword or dagger. The Arab infantry was also often mounted on horses or camels, so as to move faster across the deserts and the wide plains of eastern Iran. Once battle was forth- coming, these soldiers dismounted and ar- ranged themselves in combat formation. The use of defensive armour was originally limited to the men of the first ranks, but following a great victory, many generals allowed their warriors to equip themselves with the armour stripped from the enemy corpses. The Army of Khorasan was backed also by the mawali , non-Arab Muslims. Mostly Persians and Sog - dians, these warriors were much appreciated for their archery skills. The Tang imperial army was composed of provincial conscripts and professional soldiers stationed on the border garrisons. It was divided between three tactical units: ar- moured cavalry, foot-archers and spearmen equipped with tall rectangular shields. The most common body protection, both for men and horses, was lamellar armour. Sometimes the scales were coloured in red or gold and sent in horizontal lines. Helmets and horse headboards of the senior units were also adorned with peacock feathers. As the Tang defeated and subjugated the nomad Turkic tribes one at a time, an increasing number of auxiliary horse-archers was incorporated into the imperial army. As a consequence, some Turkic warrior customs began to influence the equipment of the Tang soldiers, including the adoption of dragon-head-shaped espaliers and helmets by Chinese officers. The Battle of Talas To repel the Chinese from Transoxiana, Abu Muslim dispatched an army at the command of the capable Ziyad ibn Salih. Kao Sien- chih, the Tang general, had already begun the crossing of the Pamirs, back to China. How- ever, when news of the advancing Arab army reached him, he turned back in order to face this opponent, confident he would impress his emperor with yet another victory. The Chinese would finally catch up with the Arabs at the southern bank of the river Ta - las, near the city of Taraz, presently located at the Kazakhstan border with Kyrgyzstan. The Chinese army comprised around 10,000 Chi- nese soldiers, plus 20,000 allied Karluk Turks and a minority of Ferghanese Sogdians. A com - paratively objective estimation of the Abbasid forces is quite difficult, since the sources pro - vide us with insufficient evidence. Nonethe - less, it is estimated that no more than 30,000 men would meet the Chinese in battle. An ad - ditional c. 20,000 Khorasanian troops were probably left behind to garrison the many cit- ies of northeastern Iran and Transoxiana. The first clash occurred in the last week of July 751, when the Abbasid advance guard spotted the Tang army on open ground. The numerically inferior Arabs opted to stay on the defensive, digging a Khandaq (‘trench’), and forming a phalanx with the spear-and- shield armed infantrymen closely packed together. In this way, they managed to hold out until the arrival of the main army under the command of Ziyad, which forced Kao to suspend the attack and fall back on Taraz. There, he deployed his army for a pitched battle. For the next five days Arabs and Chi - nese would engage each other in continuous fighting, hoping to wear out their opponent and take advantage of a first breach along the enemy line. This stalemate was caused by the similarity of tactics employed: both ar- mies formed a shield-wall with their infantry, behind which the archers unleashed volleys of arrows, while the cavalry made occasional sorties in an attempt to force a breakthrough. During the fifth day of fighting, when fatigue was beginning to take its toll, an un- expected event interrupted this carousel. The Chinese army’s main auxiliaries, the Karluk Turks, deserted en masse to the Arabs and attacked their former allies in the rear. In an impressive feat of arms, Kao’s troops held on until nightfall, when they managed to ex- tricate themselves from the death trap and reach the relative safety of their camp. There, This bas-relief comes from the tomb of Emperor T’ai-tsung at Xi’an, in the modern Chinese province of Shanxi, dated around AD 650. It shows T’ai-tsung, the founder of the Tang dynas- ty, pulling an arrow out of the chest of one of his six favourite horses, ‘Autumn Dew’, who was wounded during a battle outside a besieged city. Armoured horse- archers, also equipped with lances and swords, formed the bulk of the Tang cavalry, flanked by an elite of cataphracts riding armoured horses and swarms of auxiliary Turkic horse-archers. It is interesting to note the use of stirrups, at a time when they were still largely unknown in Eu- rope and the Near East. The Chi- nese seem to have adopted them during the course of the fourth century AD, but they began to spread among Muslim cavalry- men only in the last decades of the seventh century. Now in the Penn Museum, Philadelphia. © Public domain mw_5-1.indd 26 20/01/15 16:10 This content downloaded from 130.63.180.147 on Thu, 10 Dec 2020 01:22:29 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Medieval Warfare V-1 27 Traitors in the Middle Ages Kao called for a war council with his senior officials. Despite their extremely dangerous situation, the general was determined to re- sume the fight on the next day. However, his lieutenant, Li Su-yeh, managed to persuade him that such a decision would inevitably lead to the total destruction of their expedi- tionary force. Consequently, the only way to save their soldiers was to withdraw before it was too late. Thus, the next morning, the Chi- nese began the retreat eastward, along the narrow paths of what they called the ‘White Stone Mountains’ (the Kyrgyz-Alatau range, an offshoot of the Tian-Shan mountains). However, the surprises were not yet over. When the Tang troops were still busy crossing the mountains, they were suddenly attacked by their Ferghanese allies. Li Su-yeh, having taken command of what remained of the armoured cavalry, led a final and desperate charge against his former allies, cutting them to pieces and finally opening a gap for his fellow soldiers. Thanks to this daring action, Kao Sien-chih and many of his officers escaped, but the majority of Chinese infantry was taken captive. Now, the account just given matches with the ‘official’ Tang account of the battle. The thirteenth-century Syrian historian al-Dhahabi, however, presents a rather different version of events. According to his sources, the Kar - luk Turks did not desert the Tang. Instead, they were simply putting into play a plan agreed upon before the two armies met. In this ver- sion, they were entering the fight on the side of the Arab general Ziyad ibn Salih from the start. Indeed, Muslim historiography has al- ways stressed that the triumph at Talas was the consequence of the alliance with the Turks; certainly not a victory stolen from the Chinese through a shameful act of treachery. Of course, even today many Chinese his- torians continue to believe that the Turks be- trayed their oaths to the Tang generals. The fact that the Turks’ behaviour shocked the Tang, and was interpreted as treacherous, leads us to think that at least some sort of military co- operation existed between the two parties. The Karluks were a relatively small coalition of Tur- kic nomads who were subjugated by the Tang in the 730s. Furthermore, we have seen how many such Turkic tribes were bound by the vic- tors to provide contingents of auxiliary cavalry. All these things considered, it seems rather like - ly that the Karluks were amongst those Nomad- ic Turkic tribes who were forced to recognize Tang supremacy and furnish military support. On the other hand, this doesn’t imply that all those Turkic tribes were actually will- ing to serve the Chinese. On the contrary, we should rightfully expect a certain amount of discontent and thirst for revenge from the no- mads. Under these circumstances, it seems quite understandable that the Karluks, while still under Tang suzerainty, looked to the Arabs as a means to rid themselves of the Chinese joke. After all, by the eighth century, the Chinese already had a long tradition of conquests in central Asia, while the Arabs were newcomers in the game for supremacy over Transoxiana. It seems likely, then, that Ziyad ibn Salih had some sort of agreement with the Turks, whether secret or not. It is highly probable that the Turks just tested the ground, playing for time in order to catch the right moment to regain independence. The disastrous defeat at the Battle of Ta- las, principally due to the betrayal of the Tur- kic and Sogdian auxiliaries, marked the end of Chinese expansionism toward central Asia once and for all. Furthermore, in 755, the Tang Empire was shaken by the outbreak of another massive rebellion and began its slow but steady decline. As a result, central Asia became one of the most important provinces of the Abbasid Caliphate, never risking an - other serious external threat before the Mon- gol invasion in the thirteenth century. MW Filippo Donvito is a regular contributor to Me - dieval Warfare magazine. further reading • H. A. R. Gibb, The Arab Conquests in Central Asia . London 1923. • R. N. Frye, The Heritage of Central Asia. From the Antiquity to the Turk- ish Expansion . Princeton 1996. • R. Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes, a History of Central Asia London 1970. • H. Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State . London 2001. • C. Peers, Battles of Ancient China Barnsley 2013. A splendid fresco from the Sog- dian city of Penjikent (modern Tajikistan), often interpreted as portraying the deeds of Rostam, a popular hero from an Iranian epic. The cavalryman is depicted in the traditional costume of the Sogdian nobility, and his lack of armour probably suggests that this was a hunting scene. The quivers, with two unstrung com- posite bows and a set of arrows, are clearly visible suspended at both sides of his hips. Sogdian al- lied troops were often welcomed to join Arab armies. In fact, some- times they were even entrusted to protect generals. Their archery skills were highly regarded. This fresco dates to the seventh cen- tury, now in the Museum of the Hermitage, St. Petersburg. © Public domain mw_5-1.indd 27 20/01/15 16:10 This content downloaded from 130.63.180.147 on Thu, 10 Dec 2020 01:22:29 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms