Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal 04/11/2026 Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal Executive Summary According to the Office for Budget Responsibility: “The post-Brexit trading relationship between the UK and EU, as set out in the ‘Trade and Cooperation Agreement’ (TCA) that came into effect on 1 January 2021, will reduce long-run productivity by 4 per cent relative to remaining in the EU. This largely reflects our view that the increase in non-tariff barriers on UK-EU trade acts as an additional impediment to the exploitation of comparative advantage. Both exports and imports will be around 15 per cent lower in the long run than if the UK had remained in the EU.” 1 The OBR adds: “There remains significant uncertainty both around some of the outstanding elements of our future economic relationship with the EU”. Polling suggests that the British people are divided on the question of the EU, with one poll 2 suggesting 52% of British people think the UK should apply to join the European Union, while exactly a third (33%) think the UK should stay out. Other polls indicate that 50% of Britons are not satisfied with the UK’s current relationship with the EU, while 55% support Britain re-joining the European Union. 3 In short, our current relationship with the EU is both costly to the UK and unpopular with the public. However, full membership of the European Union is neither politically realistic in the near term nor necessary to reverse the bulk of the economic damage. A more pragmatic and achievable course is for the United Kingdom to rejoin the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 4 and, through it, the European Economic Area (EEA). Membership of the EEA would restore frictionless access to the Single Market for goods, services, capital and people, thereby removing the non-tariff barriers that the Office for Budget Responsibility identifies as the principal cause of the projected 4 per cent long-run productivity loss and the 15 per cent reduction in UK–EU trade. At the same time, EEA membership would leave the United Kingdom outside the EU’s customs union, Common Agricultural Policy, Common Fisheries Policy and political institutions. Crucially, it would not require the United Kingdom to adopt the euro or give up the pound sterling. The UK would retain the freedom to strike independent trade agreements with third countries and would escape the full budgetary and regulatory obligations of EU membership. This arrangement—often described as the “Norway model”—offers a proven framework that reconciles economic openness with national autonomy. It would address the clear public dissatisfaction with the current Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) while respecting the deeply held concerns about sovereignty that remain among a substantial portion of the electorate. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal In short, re-joining EFTA and the EEA provides the most direct, least contentious route to repairing the economic relationship with our closest neighbours and restoring the prosperity that the present settlement continues to erode. _______________________________________________________________ “I will take the opportunity to lay out to the country, what I believe the different options are for Britain’s long term relationship with our European partners. There are different options and I will see if we can find consensus around one, which will give us clarity about our position and the future of the continent that we live in.” 5 - The RT. Hon. Andy Burnham MP, UK Prime Minister, September 2026 “There are useful precedents. In 1992, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein – the EFTA countries, bar Switzerland – concluded negotiations with the EU which established a European Economic Area (EEA). These countries now enjoy free trade with the European Union. But they remain outside the customs union, the CAP, the CFP, the common foreign and security policy and the rest of the legal/bureaucratic tangle of EU institutions. The EFTA model is perhaps not ideal: but it is certainly an acceptable option. The Single Market was very much a British initiative...” -Baroness Margaret Thatcher, Former UK Prime Minister - from her book Statecraft “Of course, Britain could survive outside the EU... We could probably get access to the Single Market as Norway and Switzerland do...” -The RT. Hon. Tony Blair, Former UK Prime Minister, speech in Ghent, 23rd February 2000 “I think we’re probably headed towards a Norway-type situation...Norway is better than where we are now. 6 It would be ghastly if this country was like Norway. Can you imagine it? Rich, free, catching your own fish, and with a seat at the World Trade Organisation! Wouldn't it be terrible if we were like Norway and Switzerland? - Really? They're rich. They're happy. They're self-governing.” 7 - Nigel Farage Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal Introduction In the years since the United Kingdom left the European Union, successive governments have sought to redefine Britain’s economic and political relationship with its closest neighbours. The result has been a more distant and friction-heavy trading arrangement that has imposed additional costs on businesses, disrupted supply chains, and complicated the lives of British citizens living, working or owning property across Europe. The election of a Labour Government and a new Prime Minister in Andy Burnham presents a timely opportunity to reassess this settlement with pragmatism and national interest at the forefront. The Prime Minister recently stated: “Our focus at the moment is on a UK/EU summit which we hope will take place later this year. My immediate priority is to build on the good work that Keir did in rebuilding bridges. Because those bridges were broken in the early part of this decade. And Keir did a good job in re-establishing that relationship. What we have got to do now is go to the next level in terms of reaching practical agreement that will further boost the British economy.” 8 This paper urges the Government to explore membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and participation in the European Economic Area (EEA) – this is an approach that has sometimes been referred to as the ‘Norway model’. Such an arrangement would restore frictionless access to the Single Market for goods and services, delivering clear benefits for British exporters, importers and consumers alike. It would also improve mobility and legal certainty for the many British citizens who live, work or maintain homes across Europe. Critically, EFTA/EEA membership would achieve these gains while preserving the United Kingdom’s freedom to pursue an independent trade policy with partners beyond Europe and remain outside the political structures of the European Union. The UK would be exempt from many of the most contentious EU policies: Common agriculture and fisheries policies; customs union; common trade policy; common foreign and security policy; justice and home affairs; direct and indirect taxation; economic and monetary union (EMU). By combining the economic advantages of deep Single Market integration with the policy flexibility of EFTA, the United Kingdom can secure a more prosperous and practical relationship with Europe—one that serves British businesses, citizens and long-term national interests without requiring a return to full EU membership. While some critics may argue that this type of relationship with the EU is either too close to; or too far away from, EU membership; it is worth bearing in mind the following. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal Iceland already has Single Market access through EFTA/EEA. In August 2026, its voters were given the opportunity to restart the process of joining the EU — and they voted not to 9 “My takeaway from this is that a majority of the country is happy with the situation we have right now,” Kristrún Frostadóttir - Iceland’s prime minister said, after the vote. 10 Norway made essentially the same choice in 1994, and has continued with the EEA for more than three decades. EEA membership is not simply an inferior waiting room for EU membership. The EFTA countries have had several opportunities to pursue EU membership and chosen to remain outside. The UK should seriously consider this approach. More freedom, more opportunity, closer to Europe Rejoining the EEA via EFTA would give British people back the freedoms and opportunities lost through Brexit. It would make it much easier to live, work and retire anywhere across the EEA, whether that's moving to Spain, taking a job in Germany or enjoying retirement in France. It would open doors for young people to travel, study and build careers across Europe, without the barriers we face today. British businesses would find it easier to trade with European customers, while closer cooperation would benefit our universities, research and economy. In short, it offers a way to reconnect Britain with Europe, restore opportunities for ordinary people and enjoy many of the practical benefits of European cooperation, while remaining an independent country. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal Single Market or Customs Union? When the UK was a member of the European Union (EU), we were in both the Single Market (EEA) and within the EU’s Customs Union. Post Brexit, the UK is currently outside of both. Analysis by the Best for Britain campaign group has stated: “Labour moving to support a policy of either joining a Customs Union or the EU Single Market was found to substantially increase the party’s national vote share. Labour moving to support either a Customs Union or Single Market policy would likely increase its [Parliamentary] seat haul, compared to if it maintained its red lines on EU relations.” 11 Liberal Democrat leader Sir Ed Davey has urged the Government to urgently negotiate entry into the EU Customs Union - saying it would be the best way to tear down trade barriers and "turbocharge our economy in the medium and long term". 12 Sadly, on this topic Sir Ed is almost entirely incorrect. As the Centre for European Reform (CER) stated in a report in June 2026 13 : “Brexit has substantially reduced the UK’s trade with the EU, both in goods and services. We find that a customs union with the EU would do little to recover those losses...and depending on the form of a customs agreement, it would likely constrain the UK’s ability to set its own trade policy with non-EU countries, including China and the US. Our analysis suggests that the economic case for a customs union is weaker than its proponents imply.” So if the case for a UK-EU customs union is weak, what does the CER say about the single market (EEA)? The same report explains: “We find that the UK’s decision to leave the customs union accounts for only a small fraction of those losses – which means that negotiating a new customs union with the EU would do little to recover the costs of Brexit. The overwhelming majority of the estimated trade impacts (from Brexit) stem from leaving the Single Market... our estimates suggest that the decision to leave the single market accounted for the overwhelming majority of Brexit’s trade impact on UK-EU trade. The regulatory costs related to Brexit – such as new certification procedures and checks for compliance with EU standards – have had a much more significant impact on UK-EU trade than customs-related barriers.” A 2026 report 14 by the British Chambers of Commerce spells it out plainly: “A customs union would not by itself remove requirements for customs declarations, origin certification, import VAT red tape nor regulatory checks. It would provide no benefits on lower trade barriers in relation to services trade with the EU Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal as services exports are not subject to tariffs or rules of origin...this option would not deliver reciprocal friction-free access to the EU Single Market.” So would re-joining the Single Market (EEA) be good for the UK economy? An independent report 15 by Frontier Economics , commissioned by Best for Britain stated: “A Single Market scenario could grow UK GDP by 1.5-2.1%. One-year growth in the UK’s global exports would be around £7.9 billion, with the highest gains in industrial goods but also strong gains in services. The modelling suggests that a Single Market scenario would recover around half of the OBR’s estimated 4% hit to UK GDP as a result of Brexit.” Best for Britain suggests this could eventually lead to a: “£39-£54 billion uplift to the UK economy”. Goldman Sachs stated in 2026 that they believed a UK-EU customs union similar to Turkey’s arrangement could provide roughly an extra 1% of GDP (one media report on the story equates this to about £30bn). By comparison, the option of the UK rejoining the Single Market could benefit the UK 2–5% (or “as much as 5%”), equivalent to roughly £61bn–£152bn by the start of the next decade (often rounded in newspaper headlines to a £150bn boost at the upper end). 16 The House of Commons Business and Trade Committee report states that: “EFTA is an intergovernmental organisation consisting of Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. It promotes trade and economic integration between the four states, the EU, and other global partners via the EFTA Convention, acting to reduce some trade barriers like that of a standard free trade agreement. The EEA Agreement with the EU is adjacent to the EFTA Convention, which extends the EU’s single market beyond the 27 EU Member States, to include Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein, known as the EEA-EFTA states. Neither EFTA nor the EEA Agreements create a customs union. Members are therefore free to operate an independent trade policy, and sign trade deals which reduce or eliminate import tariffs.” EFTA and the EEA are both arrangements with which the United Kingdom has a long- established history. The UK was a founding member of EFTA in 1960 and remained a member until1973. Later, from 1994 until the end of the Brexit transition period in 2020, the UK participated in the European Economic Area (EEA) through its membership of the EU. In other words, neither arrangement represents an entirely new model for the UK; both have previously formed part of Britain's relationship with Europe, and could again. The 2026 British Chamber of Commerce report cited earlier states: “Membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), which includes Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein as well as EU states, would provide broad Single Market access for the UK in goods and services. This option would mean financial services would enjoy free movement within the UK/EU markets.” It is also highly likely that a future EFTA/EEA UK would be exempt from the potential trade impacts of the EU’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act (often called the “Made in Europe” or “Made in EU” rules) whereas a UK remaining under the existing EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, or even a hypothetical EU-UK customs union, would not receive this exemption and would instead face conditional or negotiated access at best. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal Would EFTA let us rejoin? EFTA comprises Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland (the UK was a founder member). Membership requires consensus in the EFTA Council. That said, there would be immense benefit to the bloc should the UK re-join. EFTA’s current members (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland) have a combined population of roughly 14 million. Adding the UK (~67 million people and a much larger economy) would dramatically increase the association’s market size and attractiveness to third countries. EFTA already maintains a network of free-trade agreements. A larger EFTA including the UK would present a more valuable market, potentially making it easier to negotiate or improve deals with partners and giving the group greater collective clout in those talks. A larger EFTA pillar that included the UK could also give the non-EU side a stronger collective voice in EEA Joint Committee discussions and consultations. Norway Erna Solberg (Prime Minister 2013–2021): said in November 2018 that if Britain really wanted to re-join EFTA, “we will find solutions in the future.” Earlier that year she indicated Norway would cope well with UK membership, that it would give bargaining power and ease Norwegian access to the UK market. She explicitly noted in 2018 that UK membership “will give bargaining power on our side too”. Svein Roald Hansen (Labour MP and Norwegian Parliament’s chief representative to EFTA/EEA): stated in 2018 it would be “politically very difficult to say no” if Britain wanted to rejoin EFTA and the EEA, and that a majority of MPs would likely back it. Switzerland Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal Johann Schneider-Ammann (Federal Councillor and Economy Minister; President of the Confederation in 2016): said in November 2016 that Switzerland would be open to discussions if the UK approached EFTA about joining: “I told my colleagues if the U.K. approaches EFTA to explore the possibility of joining EFTA, Switzerland would be open to discussions.” The Norway option: what the criticisms get wrong The EFTA/EEA model is often dismissed as an impractical halfway house: supposedly giving Britain the obligations of EU membership without the benefits, which would leave us as a “rule taker”, tied to strict free movement rules and unable to make our own trade policy. Critics also frequently describe the EEA approach as if it were simply EU membership without a British seat at the decision-making table. It is not. The European Economic Area is a different legal and political arrangement. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein participate in the EU Single Market while remaining outside the EU, outside the EU Customs Union and outside the EU's Common Agricultural and Common Fisheries Policies. The EEA also excludes areas such as the EU's common foreign and security policy and monetary union. These distinctions are highly significant. In the following section we will examine the common criticisms and how grounded in reality or not they might be for the UK. 1. “We would have to accept EU rules without having a vote”/Fax Democracy claims The criticism: The most serious criticism of the EEA model is that the UK would have to accept a substantial body of Single Market rules while no longer having British ministers and MEPs participating in the EU's formal legislative process. This is because EEA EFTA countries can contribute (and are encouraged to) during the preparation of EU legislation through expert groups and committees, but they do not have a vote when EU legislation is finally adopted. New EEA-relevant legislation is subsequently incorporated into the EEA Agreement. This is a genuine difference from EU membership and has been described as a ‘democratic deficit’. The facts: Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal The first point to establish is that “EU rules” does not mean all EU rules. The EEA Agreement covers a defined range of policies principally connected with the Single Market. Large areas of EU integration — including the Common Agricultural Policy, Common Fisheries Policy, customs union, common commercial policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy and monetary union — fall outside the EEA framework . An EFTA/EEA UK would therefore not simply be obliged to adopt every rule produced by the EU. Only legislation falling within the scope of the EEA Agreement would potentially need to be incorporated into UK law. There is also an important difference between being an EU Member State and being an EFTA/EEA state that is often overlooked. As an *EU* Member State, Britain would be subject to the obligations imposed on Member States by the EU Treaties, including Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Article 34 requires Member States to coordinate their actions in international organisations and at international conferences and, where the EU has established a position, to uphold the Union's position. It also contains specific obligations concerning Member States that sit on the United Nations Security Council. An EFTA/EEA UK would *not* be an EU Member State and would therefore not be bound by Article 34 TEU. This would leave Britain free to maintain its own positions and act independently in international organisations and international conferences, subject of course to any other international obligations it had separately undertaken. This distinction becomes particularly significant when considering international standard-setting. Many technical standards developed by international organisations and standard-setting bodies subsequently influence European legislation and, where relevant, the rules applied within the Single Market. An EFTA/EEA UK could therefore participate independently in those international bodies, argue for standards that reflected British interests and seek to influence the rules ‘upstream’ at the international level before they reached the EU legislative process. It would not give Britain a vote over the EU's subsequent legislation, but it would give Britain an independent voice at an earlier stage in the chain through which many technical rules are developed. If the United Kingdom were an EFTA/EEA member and faced a piece of EU legislation it regarded as particularly undesirable, it would not be obliged to accept it automatically. Under the EEA Agreement, only measures judged to be “EEA-relevant”—that is, those falling within the scope of the four freedoms and related horizontal policies—are incorporated into the Agreement. The United Kingdom could therefore argue, through established procedures, that a particular act lies outside that scope and should not apply. Where an act is considered potentially EEA-relevant, the formal route for its adoption is the EEA Joint Committee , a body in which EFTA states and the EU sit as equal partners and decisions are taken by consensus. In that forum the United Kingdom would be able to raise objections, request technical adaptations, seek temporary derogations, or negotiate delays in the timetable for incorporation and domestic implementation. While these mechanisms stop short of a unilateral veto, they afford a structured and legally recognised means of protecting national interests, securing modifications, or buying time for domestic adjustment. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal The final safeguard? If a piece of legislation from the EU managed to get through that the UK still found acceptable and refused to implement, the final safeguard is the Article 102 (EEA Agreement) clause. It states that: “...where a serious problem arises...the EEA Joint Committee shall examine all further possibilities to maintain the good functioning of this Agreement and take any decision necessary to this effect, including the possibility to take notice of the equivalence of legislation . Such a decision shall be taken at the latest at the expiry of a period of six months from the date of referral to the EEA Joint Committee or, if that date is later, on the date of entry into force of the corresponding Community legislation.” “The EEA Joint Committee shall, in particular, make every effort to find a mutually acceptable solution.” 17 [N.B. It is doubtful that the UK would ever even need to consider utilising this ‘failsafe’ as many avenues exist within the EEA system to raise concerns before things ever got to this stage.] The result is therefore much more complicated than the phrase “we would accept EU rules without a vote” suggests. Yes, an EFTA/EEA UK would surrender a formal vote over the final adoption of EEA-relevant EU legislation. But it would also avoid the wider obligations of EU membership, would not have to adopt EU legislation outside the EEA's scope, would retain opportunities to influence EEA-relevant legislation during its preparation, and — crucially — would retain a truly independent foreign-policy and international-standard-setting role rather than being bound by the EU Member State obligations contained in Article 34 TEU. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal 2. “We would have to accept unlimited free movement of people.” The criticism: The EEA's Single Market framework includes the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. An EEA arrangement would therefore not provide the same immigration framework as the UK's current position outside the EU. The facts: The principle of free movement does form part of the EEA Agreement. But it is worth looking at the actual wording rather than reducing the entire system to the phrase “free movement of people”. Article 28 provides that “freedom of movement for workers” shall be secured between the EU Member States and EFTA States. It gives workers the right to accept genuine offers of employment, move for that purpose, reside for the purpose of employment and remain after employment. The article also expressly permits limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. The EEA Agreement's core provision is explicitly headed “Workers and Self-Employed Persons”, and Article 28 itself is framed around the movement of workers. The agreement separately deals with establishment, services and capital. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal That distinction does not mean that an EEA country can simply abolish free movement for people who are not working. The EEA framework also incorporates EU legislation concerning the rights of citizens and their family members to move and reside freely, including Directive 2004/38. Nevertheless, it does mean that there is considerably more legal detail here than the simple statement that “Norway has completely open borders”. The rights, conditions and limitations are set out in a substantial body of EEA law, and the precise way in which those rules are implemented matters. That creates an important question for any future UK-EFTA/EEA settlement: what scope would Britain have to operate the existing EEA rules in a way that reflects British circumstances, particularly in relation to employment, residence, social-security entitlements and enforcement? This is an area where the UK could seek to negotiate and clarify the practical application of the rules rather than assuming that the only choices are unrestricted movement on one side or no European labour mobility on the other. There is also an important economic consideration. Free movement is not simply a one-way immigration arrangement. It gives British citizens reciprocal rights to live and work elsewhere in the EEA and gives British businesses access to a much larger labour market. The EEA Agreement itself is designed around the movement of workers and economic operators throughout the Single Market. So the honest position is that an EFTA/EEA UK would have to accept a degree of free movement that does not exist under the UK's present arrangements. That is a real trade-off. But the actual legal framework is considerably more specific than the slogan “open borders”, and the wording of Article 28 provides a useful starting point for examining what can and cannot be regulated within the EEA system. The question therefore should not simply be whether Britain would have free movement. It would. The more useful question is how the existing EEA rules could be applied, administered and potentially adapted to British circumstances while preserving the reciprocal access to the European labour market that the agreement is designed to provide. N.B. In October 2026 18 the UK Government suggested it would be open to considering free movement as part of a future UK-EU relationship. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal 3. “We would still have to pay lots of money to the EU.” The criticism: EEA participation does not mean that the UK would make no financial contributions to European programmes or institutions. The EEA EFTA states make financial contributions through mechanisms including the EEA and Norway Grants and contribute to certain EU programmes in which they participate. The facts: There would certainly be some financial contributions. An EFTA/EEA arrangement is not cost-free. But it would be a fundamentally different financial relationship from EU membership, and there is a reasonable basis for expecting that the UK's overall contribution would be lower than it would be as a full EU Member State. The EEA EFTA states do not make the same general contribution to the EU budget as EU Member States. Instead, their financial contributions principally relate to the EU programmes and agencies in which they participate, together with the separate EEA and Norway Grants. Contributions to EU programmes are calculated according to the relative size of the EEA EFTA states' economies and are made specifically in connection with their participation in those programmes. By contrast, EU Member States make broad contributions to the EU budget, principally through GNI- and VAT-based resources, regardless of whether a particular country makes use of every individual EU programme. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal The UK was historically a significant net contributor to that budget: between 2016 and 2019, its average net contribution was around £7–7.5 billion a year after taking account of EU funding received directly by UK organisations. This is why it is reasonable to expect an EFTA/EEA UK to make a smaller overall financial contribution than an equivalent UK as an EU Member State, although the precise saving would depend on the terms of any future agreement and the programmes in which Britain chose to participate. There is also an important difference in what the money buys. The EEA EFTA states participate in a range of EU programmes and contribute financially towards those programmes. In return, their universities, researchers, businesses, students, organisations and other institutions can participate alongside their counterparts from EU Member States. EFTA specifically notes that participants from the EEA EFTA countries have the same rights and obligations as participants from EU Member States within programmes in which they participate. Norway, for example, currently participates in programmes including Horizon Europe, Erasmus+ and the EU Space Programme and contributes to the budgets of the programmes it participates in. So it would be misleading to describe the arrangement simply as “paying money to the EU.” A significant part of the contribution would effectively be the price of participating in specific areas of European cooperation from which Britain could itself benefit. There would also be the separate EEA and Norway Grants, through which the EEA EFTA states contribute towards reducing economic and social disparities in Europe. These are genuine financial contributions and should be acknowledged, but they are distinct from the general EU budget contribution made by Member States. The important point, therefore, is that Britain would still contribute financially, but it would not be paying for the full package of EU membership. It would instead be contributing to the programmes and arrangements in which it participated. That potentially offers a significant financial saving compared with full EU membership, while still allowing Britain to participate in programmes such as research, education and other areas of European cooperation where doing so provides a direct benefit. The precise saving could only be established once the terms of a future UK-EFTA/EEA settlement were negotiated. But the financial model itself provides a clear distinction: EU membership involves a broad contribution to the EU budget; EEA participation involves more targeted contributions linked to participation in particular programmes and mechanisms. 4. “We would lose the ability to make our own trade deals.” The criticism: This criticism often arises because EFTA/EEA proposals are sometimes conflated with proposals for a customs union. A customs union would indeed constrain an independent trade policy. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal The facts: EEA membership does not itself create a customs union. The EEA EFTA countries remain outside the EU customs union and common commercial policy and conduct their own external trade relationships. An EFTA/EEA arrangement could therefore preserve an independent UK trade policy. The four EFTA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) normally negotiate and conclude free trade agreements jointly as a group. This gives them greater collective bargaining power. These are usually referred to as “EFTA–[partner] Free Trade Agreements.” EFTA currently has around 30–35 such agreements covering 40+ partner countries/territories outside the EU. Despite this, EFTA is not a customs union, so member countries retain full autonomy over their external trade policy. They are free to negotiate and conclude bilateral free trade agreements independently of the other EFTA states. 5. “We would be back under the jurisdiction of a foreign court.” The criticism: Critics argue that EEA membership would effectively return the UK to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and therefore undo one of the major legal changes brought about by Brexit. The facts: This is not how the EEA's legal system is structured. The EEA operates through a two-pillar system. EU Member States are supervised by the EU institutions and the CJEU, while the EEA EFTA states are supervised by the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court. The EFTA Court is a separate court from the CJEU and forms part of the EFTA, rather than EU, institutional structure. The relationship between the two courts is also more nuanced than simply saying that the EFTA Court has to follow whatever the CJEU decides. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal The Surveillance and Court Agreement makes an important distinction between older and newer CJEU case law. For relevant rulings given before the signing of the EEA Agreement, the EEA rules are to be interpreted in conformity with those rulings. But for relevant CJEU rulings given after the signing of the EEA Agreement, the EFTA Court is required to “pay due account” to the principles established by those rulings. That distinction matters. “Pay due account” does not mean that the EFTA Court is simply subordinate to the CJEU or automatically bound by every subsequent judgment it produces. The EFTA Court has its own jurisdiction and develops its own case law within the EEA legal framework. The EFTA Court currently consists of three judges, appointed by common accord of the EEA EFTA governments. In the event that the UK joined EFTA and the EEA, it would be highly likely that the institutional arrangements would provide for a British judge on the court, giving Britain direct representation within the body responsible for interpreting EEA law on the EFTA side. This means that an EFTA/EEA Britain would have a British legal voice within the EFTA pillar. Under EU membership, UK courts ultimately operated within the EU judicial system, with the CJEU having the final authority on the interpretation of EU law. Under the EEA model, Britain would instead be part of the EFTA judicial pillar, with its own court and its own judge. None of this means that an EFTA/EEA arrangement would remove European judicial oversight altogether. It would not. The whole purpose of the EEA legal system is to maintain common rules and consistent application across the Single Market. Some degree of alignment with CJEU case law is therefore inherent and is realistically to be expected in the system. But there is a considerable difference between “being subject to the European Court of Justice” and “being subject to an EFTA Court which operates within the EEA system and pays due account to relevant CJEU jurisprudence.” The latter is the actual institutional arrangement. It would give Britain a separate judicial pillar, a direct role in that pillar and, subject to the terms negotiated for UK participation, a highly likely opportunity to have a British judge sitting on the EFTA Court. So the criticism contains a genuine point — an EFTA/EEA UK would still operate within a European legal framework and would have to take CJEU jurisprudence seriously. But saying that Britain would simply be “back under the ECJ” misses the fundamental institutional distinction between EU membership and the EEA's two-pillar system. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal 6. “It wouldn't solve all of the UK's problems with the EU.” The criticism: An EFTA/EEA arrangement would not eliminate all trade barriers between Britain and the EU or confer all the benefits of Union membership. The facts: That is not what the EEA is designed to do. Its central purpose is participation in the Single Market . It would therefore address many of the barriers associated with being outside the Single Market while leaving Britain outside other areas of EU integration. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal The argument for EFTA/EEA does not need to be that it is identical to EU membership or that it solves every problem. The argument is that it represents a different balance between economic integration, regulatory autonomy and political independence While the EEA Agreement would not provide a customs union, it would require the UK and EU to work together to simplify and streamline customs procedures to minimise cross border disruption. Article 21 of the EEA Agreement (which would be binding on both the EU and UK if we rejoined the EEA) states: “In order to facilitate trade between them, the Contracting Parties shall simplify border controls and formalities. The Contracting Parties shall strengthen and broaden cooperation with the aim of simplifying the procedures for trade in goods.” Combined with the World Trade Organisation’s Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which came into force on 22 February 2017, the picture for UK importers and exporters would improve dramatically. 7. “If the UK joins EFTA/EEA we would be forced to adopt the Euro.” The criticism: If we join EFTA/EEA we would be forced to join the Euro currency. The facts: This is incorrect. Membership of EFTA or the EEA does not require adoption of the euro (or any other shared currency). The euro is an obligation only for EU member states that choose (or are required under the Treaty) to join the Economic and Monetary Union. Britain’s New Deal with Europe - a policy proposal The current EEA-EFTA states — Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein — all retain their own independent currencies (Norwegian krone, Icelandic króna and Swiss franc respectively). Switzerland (EFTA but outside the EEA) also keeps the Swiss franc. The EEA Agreement covers the single market (free movement of goods, services, capital and persons, plus related rules) but explicitly excludes monetary union, the common agricultural and fisheries policies, the customs union, and the euro. Joining EFTA/EEA would leave the UK free to keep sterling under its own monetary policy, just as the existing EEA-EFTA countries do. 8. “But we need to have a seat at the table when decisions are made” The oft-heard argument that Britain needs to be back “at the table” as a full EU member confuses having a voice with having control Britain’s strongest EU advocates treat formal Union membership itself as synonymous with effective rule-making power. The institutional facts do not support the claim that only full membership confers meaningful influence over the rules that govern the single market; nor do they support the claim that EEA participation confers none.