FOREWORD ............................................................................................................................................................................. 5 INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF STALIN ........................................................................................................ 6 S TALIN IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE IN THE FORMER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ................................................................................................ 9 S TALIN IS AT THE CENTER OF POLITICAL DEBATES IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ............................................................................................ 9 S TALIN ' S WORK IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE IN THE T HIRD W ORLD ..................................................................................................... 9 S TALIN ' S WORK TAKES ON NEW MEANING GIVEN THE SITUATION CREATED SINCE CAPITALIST RESTORATION IN C ENTRAL AND E ASTERN E UROPE .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 11 I N C OMMUNIST P ARTIES AROUND THE WORLD , THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE AROUND THE S TALIN QUESTION PRESENTS MANY COMMON CHARACTERISTICS ...................................................................................................................................................................... 11 THE YOUNG STALIN FORGES HIS ARMS ..................................................................................................................... 13 S TALIN ' S ACTIVITIES IN 1900—1917 .......................................................................................................................................... 15 T HE ` SOCIALISTS ' AND REVOLUTION ............................................................................................................................................. 20 S TALIN DURING THE C IVIL W AR .................................................................................................................................................. 22 L ENIN ' S `W ILL ' ........................................................................................................................................................................ 25 BUILDING SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY ................................................................................................................... 32 SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION .................................................................................................................................. 39 H EROISM AND ENTHUSIASM ......................................................................................................................................................... 40 C LASS WAR .............................................................................................................................................................................. 43 A N ECONOMIC MIRACLE ............................................................................................................................................................. 46 COLLECTIVIZATION .......................................................................................................................................................... 48 F ROM REBUILDING PRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CONFRONTATION ............................................................................................................. 48 Weakness of the party in the countryside ......................................................................................................................... 49 The character of the Russian peasant ............................................................................................................................. 50 New class differentiation ................................................................................................................................................. 51 Who controlled the market wheat? .................................................................................................................................. 52 Towards confrontation ..................................................................................................................................................... 52 Bukharin's position .......................................................................................................................................................... 53 Betting on the kolkhoz ... ................................................................................................................................................. 54 ... or betting on the individual peasant? .......................................................................................................................... 55 T HE FIRST WAVE OF COLLECTIVIZATION ......................................................................................................................................... 56 The kulak ......................................................................................................................................................................... 56 The kolkhozy surpass the kulaks ...................................................................................................................................... 57 A fiery mass movement .................................................................................................................................................... 58 The war against the kulak ............................................................................................................................................... 59 The essential rôle of the most oppressed masses ............................................................................................................. 60 T HE ORGANIZATIONAL LINE ON COLLECTIVIZATION .......................................................................................................................... 61 The Party apparatus in the countryside .......................................................................................................................... 61 Extraordinary organizational measures .......................................................................................................................... 62 The 25,000 ....................................................................................................................................................................... 63 The 25,000 against the bureaucracy ............................................................................................................................... 64 The 25,000 against the kulaks ......................................................................................................................................... 65 The 25,000 and the organization of agricultural production .......................................................................................... 65 T HE POLITICAL DIRECTION OF COLLECTIVIZATION ............................................................................................................................ 66 The November 1929 resolution ........................................................................................................................................ 68 Reject Bukharin's opportunism ........................................................................................................................................ 68 New difficulties, new tasks ............................................................................................................................................... 69 The January 5, 1930 resolution ....................................................................................................................................... 70 `D EKULAKIZATION ' .................................................................................................................................................................... 71 Kulak rumors and indoctrination .................................................................................................................................... 72 What should be done with the kulaks? ............................................................................................................................ 73 Struggle to the end ........................................................................................................................................................... 74 The resolution on dekulakization ..................................................................................................................................... 75 The kulak offensive picks up strength .............................................................................................................................. 76 Kautsky and the `kulak revolution' .................................................................................................................................. 77 `D IZZY WITH SUCCESS ' ............................................................................................................................................................... 78 Stalin corrects .................................................................................................................................................................. 79 Rectify and consolidate ................................................................................................................................................... 80 Right opportunism rears its head .................................................................................................................................... 81 The anti-Communists attack ............................................................................................................................................ 82 Retreats and advances ..................................................................................................................................................... 83 Remarkable results .......................................................................................................................................................... 83 T HE RISE OF SOCIALIST AGRICULTURE ........................................................................................................................................... 85 The second wave of collectivization ................................................................................................................................ 85 Economic and social creativity ........................................................................................................................................ 86 Investments in the countryside ........................................................................................................................................ 88 The breakthrough of socialist agriculture ....................................................................................................................... 89 `Colossal support' ............................................................................................................................................................ 90 T HE COLLECTIVIZATION ` GENOCIDE ' .............................................................................................................................................. 92 COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE `UKRAINIAN HOLOCAUST' .................................................................................. 95 A BOOK FROM H ITLER ............................................................................................................................................................... 97 A BOOK FROM M C C ARTHY ......................................................................................................................................................... 99 B ETWEEN 1 AND 15 M ILLION D EAD ........................................................................................................................................... 99 T WO PROFESSORS TO THE RESCUE OF U KRAINIAN N AZIS ............................................................................................................... 100 `S CIENTIFIC ' CALCULATIONS ...................................................................................................................................................... 101 B- MOVIES .............................................................................................................................................................................. 102 H ARVEST OF S ORROW : C ONQUEST AND THE RECONVERSION OF U KRAINIAN N AZI COLLABORATORS ..................................................... 103 C ONQUEST ' S FASCIST SOURCES ................................................................................................................................................... 107 T HE CAUSES OF FAMINE IN THE U KRAINE .................................................................................................................................... 108 U KRAINE UNDER N AZI OCCUPATION ............................................................................................................................................ 111 THE STRUGGLE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY .............................................................................................................. 112 A NTI -C OMMUNISTS AGAINST ` BUREAUCRACY ' .............................................................................................................................. 112 B OLSHEVIKS AGAINST BUREAUCRATIZATION ................................................................................................................................. 113 R EINFORCE PUBLIC EDUCATION .................................................................................................................................................. 114 R EGULARLY PURGE THE P ARTY .................................................................................................................................................. 115 T HE STRUGGLE FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY ........................................................................................................................ 116 T HE P ARTY ELECTIONS IN 1937: A ` REVOLUTION ' ........................................................................................................................ 117 THE GREAT PURGE ........................................................................................................................................................... 118 H OW DID THE CLASS ENEMY PROBLEM POSE ITSELF ? ..................................................................................................................... 121 Boris Bazhanov .............................................................................................................................................................. 121 George Solomon ............................................................................................................................................................ 122 Frunze ............................................................................................................................................................................ 124 Alexander Zinoviev ........................................................................................................................................................ 125 T HE STRUGGLE AGAINST OPPORTUNISM IN THE P ARTY ................................................................................................................... 126 T HE TRIALS AND STRUGGLE AGAINST REVISIONISM AND ENEMY INFILTRATION .................................................................................... 130 The trial of the Trotskyite-Zinovievist Centre ................................................................................................................ 130 Trotsky and counter-revolution .................................................................................................................................................. 131 `Destroy the communist movement' ...................................................................................................................................... 131 Capitalist restoration is impossible ....................................................................................................................................... 133 In support of terror and insurrection ..................................................................................................................................... 135 The Zinoviev--Kamenev--Smirnov counter-revolutionary group ............................................................................................... 136 The trial of Pyatakov and the Trotskyists ...................................................................................................................... 137 Sabotage in the Urals ................................................................................................................................................................. 138 Sabotage in Kazakhstan ............................................................................................................................................................. 141 Pyatakov in Berlin ..................................................................................................................................................................... 143 Sabotage in Magnitogorsk .......................................................................................................................................................... 144 The trial of the Bukharinist social-democratic group ................................................................................................... 145 The February 1937 decision to purge ......................................................................................................................................... 145 The Riutin affair ......................................................................................................................................................................... 148 Bukharin's revisionism ............................................................................................................................................................... 149 Bukharin and the enemies of Bolshevism .................................................................................................................................. 150 Bukharin and the military conspiracy ......................................................................................................................................... 153 Bukharin and the question of the coup d'état .............................................................................................................................. 154 Bukharin's confession ................................................................................................................................................................ 156 From Bukharin to Gorbachev ..................................................................................................................................................... 164 The Tukhachevsky trial and the anti-Communist conspiracy within the army .............................................................. 165 Plot? ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 166 The militarist and Bonapartist tendency ..................................................................................................................................... 170 Vlasov ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 171 Solzhenitsyn ............................................................................................................................................................................... 173 A clandestine anti-Communist organization in the Red Army .................................................................................................... 175 T HE 1937--1938 P URGE ........................................................................................................................................................ 183 T HE RECTIFICATION .................................................................................................................................................................. 187 T HE W ESTERN BOURGEOISIE AND THE P URGE .............................................................................................................................. 191 TROTSKY'S RÔLE ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR ........................................................................ 192 T HE ENEMY IS THE NEW ARISTOCRACY , THE NEW B OLSHEVIK BOURGEOISIE ...................................................................................... 193 B OLSHEVISM AND FASCISM ........................................................................................................................................................ 195 D EFEATISM AND CAPITULATION IN FRONT OF N AZI G ERMANY ........................................................................................................ 196 T ROTSKY AND THE T UKHACHEVSKY PLOT ................................................................................................................................... 197 P ROVOCATIONS IN THE SERVICE OF THE N AZIS ............................................................................................................................. 199 T ROTSKY ENCOURAGED TERRORISM AND ARMED INSURRECTION ...................................................................................................... 201 STALIN AND THE ANTI-FASCIST WAR ......................................................................................................................... 203 T HE G ERMANO -S OVIET P ACT ................................................................................................................................................... 203 D ID S TALIN POORLY PREPARE THE ANTI - FASCIST WAR ? .................................................................................................................. 209 T HE DAY OF THE G ERMAN ATTACK ............................................................................................................................................. 214 S TALIN AND THE N AZI WAR OF ANNIHILATION .............................................................................................................................. 224 S TALIN , HIS PERSONALITY AND HIS MILITARY CAPACITIES ............................................................................................................... 229 Stalin, the `dictator' ....................................................................................................................................................... 230 Stalin, the `hysteric' ....................................................................................................................................................... 234 Stalin, of `mediocre intelligence' ................................................................................................................................... 238 Stalin's military merits ................................................................................................................................................... 239 FROM STALIN TO KHRUSHCHEV ................................................................................................................................. 241 T HE U.S. TAKES UP WHERE N AZI G ERMANY LEFT OFF ................................................................................................................. 243 Gehlen, the Nazi, and the CIA ....................................................................................................................................... 243 The nuclear bomb against the Soviet Union ................................................................................................................. 244 Anti-imperialist struggle and the struggle for peace ..................................................................................................... 246 Tito's revisionism and the United States ........................................................................................................................ 249 S TALIN AGAINST OPPORTUNISM .................................................................................................................................................. 256 Bourgeois tendencies in the thirties ............................................................................................................................... 256 Weaknesses in the struggle against opportunism .......................................................................................................... 259 Beria's and Khrushchev's revisionist groups ................................................................................................................. 260 Stalin against the future Khrushchevism ....................................................................................................................... 263 K HRUSHCHEV ' S COUP D ' ÉTAT ..................................................................................................................................................... 268 Beria's intrigues ............................................................................................................................................................. 268 Stalin's death ................................................................................................................................................................. 270 Khrushchev's intrigues against Beria ............................................................................................................................ 271 The `rehabilitated' enemies ........................................................................................................................................... 272 Khrushchev and the pacific counter-revolution ............................................................................................................ 273 REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................................................... 275 F OREWORD ............................................................................................................................................................................. 275 I NTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................................ 275 C HAPTER 1 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 275 C HAPTER 2 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 278 C HAPTER 3 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 279 C HAPTER 4 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 280 C HAPTER 5 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 288 C HAPTER 6 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 289 C HAPTER 7 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 290 C HAPTER 8 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 295 C HAPTER 9 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 296 C HAPTER 10 .......................................................................................................................................................................... 298 Foreword That a famous Soviet dissident, now living in `reunited' Germany, a man who in his youth was so fanatically anti-Stalin that he planned a terrorist attack against him, who filled entire books with vehement denunciation of Stalin's political line in every possible way, that such a man would, in his old age, pay homage to Stalin is remarkable. Many who consider themselves Communist have not shown such courage. It is very difficult to raise one's feeble voice against the torrents of anti-Stalin propaganda. Unfortunately many Communists do not feel at ease on this battlefield. Everything that sworn enemies of Communism had claimed for thirty-five years was supposedly confirmed by Khrushchev in 1956. Since then, angry, unanimous condemnations of Stalin have come from the Nazis and the Trotskyists, from Kissinger and Brzezinski, from Khrushchev and Gorbachev, and many others, each adding to the `proof'. To defend the historic rôle of Stalin and the Bolshevik Party becomes unthinkable, even monstrous. And most people who firmly oppose the murderous anarchy of world capitalism have become intimidated. Today, for a man such as Zinoviev, seeing the destructive folly that has taken hold of the ex-Soviet Union, with its trail of famine, unemployment, criminality, misery, corruption and inter- ethnic wars, has led to the reassessment of prejudices firmly held since adolescence. It is clear that, throughout the world, those who wish to defend the ideals of Socialism and Communism must at least do the same. All Communist and revolutionary organizations across the globe must re-examine the opinions and judgments that they have formed since 1956 about Comrade Stalin's work. No one can deny the evidence: when Gorbachev succeeded in eradicating all of Stalin's achievements, crowning thirty-five years of virulent denunciations of `Stalinism', Lenin himself became persona non grata in the Soviet Union. With the burial of Stalinism, Leninism disappeared as well. Rediscovering the revolutionary truth about this pioneer period is a collective task that must be borne by all Communists, around the world. This revolutionary truth will arise by questioning sources, testimony and analyses. Clearly, the aid that might be offered by Soviet Marxist-Leninists, sometimes the only ones with direct access to sources and to witnesses, will be vital. But today they work under very difficult conditions. Our analyses and reflections on this subject are published in this work, Another view of Stalin. The view of Stalin that is imposed on us daily is that of the class that wants to maintain the existing system of exploitation and oppression. Adopting another view of Stalin means looking at the historic Stalin through the eyes of the oppressed class, through the eyes of the exploited and oppressed. This book is not designed to be a biography of Stalin. It is intended to directly confront the standard attacks made against Stalin: `Lenin's Will', forced collectivization, overbearing bureaucracy, extermination of the Old Bolshevik guard, the Great Purge, forced industrialization, collusion between Stalin and Hitler, his incompetency during World War II, etc. We have endeavored to deconstruct many `well-known truths' about Stalin, those that are summarized --- over and over --- in a few lines in newspapers, history books and interviews, and which have more or less become part of our unconscious. `But how is it possible', asked a friend, `to defend a man like Stalin?' There was astonishment and indignation in this question, which reminded me of what an old Communist worker once told me. He spoke to me of the year 1956, when Khrushchev read his famous Secret Report. Powerful debates took place within the Communist Party. During one of these confrontations, an elderly Communist woman, from a Jewish Communist family, who lost two children during the war and whose family in Poland was exterminated, cried out: `How can we not support Stalin, who built socialism, who defeated fascism, who incarnated all our hopes?' In the fiery ideological storm that was sweeping the world, where others had capitulated, this woman remained true to the Revolution. And for this reason, she had another view of Stalin. A new generation of Communists will share her view. Introduction: The importance of Stalin On August 20, 1991, Yanayev's ridiculous coup d'état was the last step in eliminating the remaining vestiges of Communism in the Soviet Union. Statues of Lenin were torn down and his ideas were attacked. This event provoked numerous debates in Communist and revolutionary movements. Some said it was completely unexpected. In April 1991, we published a book, L'URSS et la contre-révolution de velours (USSR: The velvet counter-revolution), Ludo Martens, L'URSS et la contre-révolution de velours (Antwerp: EPO, 1991). which essentially covers the political and ideological evolution of the USSR and of Eastern Europe since 1956. Now that Yeltsin has made his professional coup d'état and that he has vehemently proclaimed capitalist restoration, our analysis still stands. In fact, the last confused confrontations between Yanayev, Gorbachev and Yeltsin were mere convulsions, expressing decisions made during the Twenty-Eighth Congress in July 1990. We wrote at the time that this congress `clearly affirms a rupture with socialism and a return to capitalism'. Ibid. , p. 215. A Marxist analysis of the events that occurred in the Soviet Union had already led in 1989 to the following conclusion: `Gorbachev ... is implementing a slow and progressive, but systematic, evolution to capitalist restoration .... Gorbachev, his back to the wall, is seeking increasing political and economic support from the imperialist world. In return, he allows the West to do as it pleases in the Soviet Union.' Ibid. , p. 186. A year later, at the end of 1990, we concluded our analysis as follows: `Since 1985 Gorbachev has not firmly and consistenly defended any political position. In waves, the Right has attacked. Each new wave has dragged Gorbachev further to the Right. Confronted by further attacks by nationalists and fascists, supported by Yeltsin, it is not impossible that Gorbachev will again retreat, which will undoubtedly provoke the disintegration of the CPSU and the Soviet Union.' Ibid. , p. 253. `The Balkanization of Africa and of the Arab world has ensured ideal conditions for imperialist domination. The more far-seeing in the West are now dreaming beyond capitalist restoration in the USSR. They are dreaming of its political and economic subjugation.' Ibid. , p. 245. It is no accident that we recall these Marxist-Leninist conclusions from 1989 and 1990. The dynamiting of statues of Lenin was accompanied by an explosion of propaganda claiming victory over Marxism-Leninism. However, only the Marxist analysis was correct, was capable of clarifying the real social forces working under the demagogic slogans of `freedom and democracy' and `glastnost and perestroika'. In 1956, during the bloody counter-revolution in Hungary, statues of Stalin were destroyed. Thirty-five years later, statues of Lenin have been reduced to dust. The dismantling of statues of Stalin and Lenin marks the two basic breaks with Marxism. In 1956, Khrushchev attacked Stalin's achievements so that he could change the fundamental line of the Communist Party. The progressive disintegration of the political and economic system that followed led to the final break with socialism in 1990 by Gorbachev. Of course, the media hark on every day about the clear failure of Communism around the world. But we must reiterate that, if there was a failure in the Soviet Union, it was a failure of revisionism, introduced by Khrushchev thirty-five years ago. This revisionism led to complete political failure, to capitulation to imperialism and to economic catastrophe. The current eruption of savage capitalism and of fascism in the USSR shows clearly what happens when the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism are rejected. For thirty-five years, the revisionists worked to destroy Stalin. Once Stalin was demolished, Lenin was liquidated with a flick of the wrist. Khrushchev fought mercilessly against Stalin. Gorbachev carried on by leading, during his five years of glastnost, a crusade against `Stalinism'. Notice that the dismantling of Lenin's statues was not preceded by a political campaign against his work. The campaign against Stalin was sufficient. Once Stalin's ideas were attacked, vilified and destroyed, it became clear that Lenin's ideas had suffered the same fate. Khrushchev started his destructive work by criticizing Stalin's errors in order to `re-assert Leninism in its original form' and to improve the Communist system. Gorbachev made the same demagogic promises to confuse the forces of the Left. Today, things have been made crystal clear: under the pretext of `returning to Lenin', the Tsar returns; under the pretext of `improving Communism', savage capitalism has erupted. Most people on the Left have read a few books about the activities of the CIA and of Western secret services. They have learned that psychological and political warfare is a fundamental and extremely important part of modern total warfare. Slanders, brainwashing, provocation, manipulation of differences, exacerbation of contradictions, slandering of adversaries, and perpetration of crimes that are then blamed on the adversary are all normal tactics used by Western secret services in modern warfare. But the wars that imperialism has waged with the greatest energy and with the most colossal resources are the anti-Communist wars. Military wars, clandestine wars, political wars and psychological wars. Isn't it obvious that the anti-Stalin campaign was at the heart of all ideological battles against socialism and Communism? The official spokesmen for the U.S. war machine, Kissinger and Brzezinski, praised the works of Solzhenitsyn and Conquest, who were, by coïncidence, two authors favored by Social-Democrats, Trotskyists and Anarchists. Instead of `discovering the truth about Stalin' among those specialists of anti-Communism, wouldn't it have been better to look for the strings of psychological warfare by the CIA? It is truly not an accident that we can find today, in almost all stylish bourgeois and petit- bourgeois publications, the same slanders and lies about Stalin that were found in the Nazi press during the Second World War. This is a sign that the class struggle is becoming fierce throughout the world and that the world bourgeo