Two Between Theism and Atheism: a journey through Vi ś i ṣṭā dvaita Ved ā nta and M ī m āṃ s ā * _______________________________ ______________________ Elisa Freschi 1 Terminological Foreword The general purpose of this article is to show, through the case study of Ve ṅ ka ṭ an ā tha’s introduction of God into an atheistic system, that the commonly accepted notions of god, atheism, etc. are not as obvious as one might t hink. “God” is not a univocal term, as shown also by the fact that it translates different concepts in Sanskrit, from deva / devata ̄ to īś vara and to param ā tman or brahman Furthermore, theism and atheism are not two mutually exclusive alternatives (there might be philosophical positions which neither advocate the belief in a personal God nor support an explicit denial of it). Last, and more intriguingly, belief in God does not need to be configured as belief in the existence of an external, subject - independent entity. Within the precincts of this article, I conventionally adopt the term “deity” to translate devata ̄ ; “god” to cover the semantic realm of a superhuman being w ho has much in common with human beings (not least that they are both, ontologically speaking, “substances”, dravya ), and who is mostly the efficient cause of the universe, but not its creator ex nihilo; and “God” to denote a non - human being to whom one ha s a personal and devotional relationship, but who might have no ontological grounding at all. The second “god” is often referred to as īś vara , although one must be aware of the fact that the three levels I have distinguished here, and especially the seco nd and the third, are not strictly and explicitly distinguished in the sources, which often incorporate aspects I have associated with other levels here (so that, for instance, a God is also referred to as “creator of the world” or as bearing a conch). Ap art from these three levels there are the param ā tman and the brahman . The former might be a superior being who is to be imitated but who is not necessarily involved in worldly affairs (like the supreme puru ṣ a in Yoga and S āṅ khya, see Bronkhorst 1983). The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! * I am grateful to Katharina Apostle for reviewing my English. Research for this paper has been conducted within a FWF project, No. M 1437. ! Elisa Freschi ! ! 30 ! latter term is used for an all - encompassing principle which might resemble an impersonal god comparable to Spinoza’s. The distinction between the Judaic conception of a creation out of nothing and the Indian concept of an efficient cause intervening on pre - existing material elements must also be taken into account. 1 2 M ī m āṃ s ā , Anti - Realism and God The M ī m āṃ s ā is a philosophical school, born as a school of Vedic exegesis, and hence its main philosophical inquiries have developed out of Vedic exegetical themes. Its root text, the ( P ū rva ) M ī m āṃ s ā S ū tra , 2 attributed to Jaimini (perhaps 2nd c. BC) is probably the most ancient philosophical s ū tra (‘aphoristic work’). It has been commented on by Ś abara (dates uncertain, possibly 3rd – 5th c. AD). Ś abara’s Bh āṣ ya was again commented on by Kum ā rila and Prabh ā kara (7th c. AD?). The fact that within M ī m āṃ s ā philosophical thinking emerged out of exegetical concerns also means that the M ī m āṃ s ā is not primarily concerned with ontology. Contemporary Western readers generally tend to think of metaphysics and ontology as the first elements of philosophical thinking, and accordingly interpret pre - Socratic philosophy in Classical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! 1 The discussion on the concept of “god” could go on through many volumes. For a preliminary bibliography see Leftow 1998, which displays the following statement already in the first paragraph: “Views of God’s relation to the universe vary greatly. Pantheist s say that God is the universe. Panentheists assert that God includes the universe, or is related to it as soul to body. They ascribe to God the limitations associated with being a person — such as limited power and knowledge — but argue that being a perso n is nevertheless a state of perfection. Other philosophers, however, assert that God is wholly different from the universe. Some of these think that God created the universe ex nihilo , that is, from no pre - existing material. Some add that God conserves th e universe in being moment by moment, and is thus provident for his creatures. Still others think that God ‘found’ some pre - existing material and ‘creates’ by gradually improving this material – this view goes back to the myth of the Demiurge in Plato’s Ti maeus , and also entails that God is provident. By contrast, deists deny providence and think that once God made it, the universe ran on its own. Still others argue that God neither is nor has been involved in the world. The common thread lies in the concep t of perfection: thinkers relate God to the universe in the way that their thoughts about God’s perfection make most appropriate”. Similarly useful is Owen 2006 (1967), which starts with this passage: “It is very difficult — perhaps impossible — to give a de finition of ‘God’ that will cover all usages of the word and of equivalent words in other languages. Even to define God generally as ‘a superhuman or supernatural being that controls the world’ is inadequate. ‘Superhuman’ is contradicted by the worship of divinized Roman emperors, ‘supernatural’ by Benedict Spinoza’s equation of God with Nature, and ‘control’ by the Epicurean denial that the gods influence the lives of men. Therefore, while the above definition satisfies a wide range of usages, it is not un iversally applicable” (Owen 2006 (1967), p. 107). See also Morris 2002, pp. 27 – 35 for an overview of the difficulties of discussions among Christians, non - Christians and atheists in order to find a common ground for discussion. I also benefitted from Merri cks 2006 and its analysis of the Christian Trinity, another paradoxical kind of “god”. 2 As for the meaning of p ū rva , see Parpola 1981 and Parpola 1994, and, against these, Bronkhorst 2007. It is uncontroversial that the P ū rva M ī m āṃ s ā is the school which focuses on the ritual part of the Veda, i.e. the Br ā hma ṇ as, and that the Uttara M ī m āṃ s ā (also called Ved ā nta) is the one which focuses on the Upani ṣ ads. Between Theism and Atheism ! ! ! 31 ! Greece, for example, through th e lens of these later assumption s . However, for M ī m āṃ s ā the main focus was not on metaphysics, but on the Br ā hma ṇ a portion of the Veda. M ī m āṃ sakas looked at the Br ā hma ṇ as (and at all of the Vedas) as primarily prescriptive texts. Non - prescriptive passages of whatever nature we re considered as subsidiary to the prescriptive ones. Accordingly, for M ī m āṃ sakas the artha 3 of Vedic sentences is something to be done ( k ā rya or s ā dhya ). This means that the M ī m āṃ s ā theory of meaning cannot be direct realist. Thus, an interpreter of M ī m āṃ s ā should be aware of the need to avoid his/her tendency to use direct realism when reading M ī m āṃ s ā texts. The Veda also has a specific epistemic place and role, according to M ī m āṃ s ā thought. In fact, the Veda is the only source of tr anscendental knowledge accepted by M ī m āṃ sakas, and in all other fields of knowledge M ī m āṃ s ā authors stick to a strict empiricism. In Kum ā rila’s words: “Here like in any other case, M ī m āṃ sakas do not accept anything else beyond what is commonly e xperienced”. 4 It is perhaps noteworthy that this sentence is to be understood not in an ontological context, but rather in an epistemological one (discussing the epistemological value of the Buddha’s word). In other words, M ī m āṃ s ā authors aim to refrai n from postulating unrequired concepts, but this does not mean that they naïvely accept reality as independent of the human beings perceiving it. Its existence independent of a knowing subject just lies beyond question, given that the focus is on the Veda and the Veda presupposes the existence of human beings carrying out the sacrifices it prescribes. Out of the same refusal of unrequired postulations, M ī m āṃ sakas adopt atheism. The belief in god(s), they maintain, contradicts direct perception and logi cal thinking, since no god is ever seen and since this belief is fraught with contradictions (e.g. how could a bodiless god create the world? And how could an embodied god be worshipped simultaneously by different worshippers in different parts of the worl d?). It is noteworthy that atheism is neither a main nor a distinct topic of investigation for P ū rva M ī m āṃ sakas. Contemporary Western readers are accustomed to explicit discussions about theism and atheism; by contrast, the controversy over theism/athe ism is almost “hidden” within the P ū rva M ī m āṃ s ā S ū tra (in the devat ā dhikara ṇ a , P MS 9.1.4, s ū tra s 6 – 9, and within other technical discussions). Theism/atheism is not discussed as a preliminary topic within the theoretical introduction of the MS, na mely the tarkap ā da ( P MS 1.1). Rather, discussions related to the status of devata ̄ s are scattered throughout the whole of the PMS, just like discussions about any other element of the sacrifice. devata ̄ s are in fact regarded as nothing more than an elemen t of the sacrifice (the one to which the offering is dedicated), and their relation to the other elements is discussed within the broader perspective of the sacrifice. 2.1 The chapter on deities ( devat ā dhikara ṇ a ) in the PMS and its commentaries !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! 3 artha may mean (among other things) both ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’. Given the M ī m āṃ s ā approach to language as eminently prescriptive, these two senses are always simultaneously present in the M ī m āṃ s ā use of artha 4 m ī m āṃ sakai ḥ puna ḥ || id ā n ī m iva sarvatra d ṛṣṭā n n ā dhikam i ṣ yate ( Ś V 2.98d - 99ab). ! Elisa Freschi ! ! 32 ! 2.1.1 Jaimini Understanding Jaimini independently of his main commentator is always a complex task. However, in the case of the s ū tra s later grouped as devat ā dhikara ṇ a it can be seen with some clarity that they are part of a larger context in which th e centrality of the sacrificial action over and above the other elements of the sacrifice, such as ritual offerings and deities, is stated: yajñakarma pradh ā na ṃ tad dhi codan ā bh ū ta ṃ tasya dravye ṣ u sa ṃ sk ā ras tatprayuktas tadarthatv ā t || 9.1.1 || devat ā v ā prayojayed atithivad bhojanasya tadarthatv ā t || 6 || [...] tasm ā d yajñaprayojanam || 19 || The sacrificial action is the primary thing, because it has been brought into being by the injunctive word. Hence the preparation of its materials must be regarded as promoted by that [sacrifice], because they occur for its sake (PMS 9.1.1). [Obj.:] The d eity should promote [the sacrifice], because s/he is like a guest, for whose sake a meal is prepared (9.1.6). [R:] [...] Therefore, the sacrifice is the promoter (9.1.19). 5 There is no explicit denial of the existence of deities, although they are denied a principal role within the sacrifice, which is the culminating event of Jaimini’s system, the one around which everything else revolves. 2.1.2 Ś abara The objector who initiates the discussion in the devat ā dhikara ṇ a of the Ś Bh 6 starts with the ve ry mention of deities in the dative case in Vedic sacrificial prescriptions, which make the sacrifice look like an act of feeding the deities: bhojana ṃ h ī da ṃ devat ā y āḥ y ā go n ā ma bhojya ṃ dravya ṃ devat ā yai prad ī yate , [...]. devat ā sa ṃ prad ā nako hy aya ṃ y ā ga ḥ ś r ū yate sa ṃ prad ā na ṃ ca n ā ma karma ṇ o ’ p ī psitatam ā d abhipretataram tasm ā n na gu ṇ abh ū to devat ā , devat ā m prati gu ṇ abh ū te dravyakarma ṇī ( Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.6, p. 72). [Obj.:] For, the sacrifice to the dei ty is this feeding. The food, i.e. the ritual substance, is offered to the deity. [...] In fact, this sacrifice is found !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! 5 All these translation s have very much benefitted from Clooney’s translations and analysis in his wonderful work dedicated to “rediscovering the P ū rva M ī m āṃ s ā of Jaimini” (Clooney 1990, pp. 104 – 5, 147 – 149). 6 Clooney 1988 offers an insightful view into the devat ā dhikara ṇ a from the point of view of P ū rva M ī m āṃ s ā , Ś a ṅ kara and R ā m ā nuja. Between Theism and Atheism ! ! ! 33 ! in the Sacred Texts as including the deity as the recipient. And the recipient is even more intended than the syntactical object, altho ugh this is said to be the “most desired one” (A ṣṭ 1.4.49). Therefore, the deity is not a subordinate element, [rather], the ritual substance and the ritual action are subordinate to the deity. The objector then shifts to a different understanding of sa crifices and adds that sacrifices ( yajña ) are an instance of worship ( p ū j ā ) and that a p ū ja ̄ is instrumental to the worshipped person ( p ū jan ī ya ): api ca , y ā go n ā ma devat ā p ū j ā p ū j ā ca p ū jan ī ya ṃ prati gu ṇ abh ū t ā loke d ṛś yate ( Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.6, p. 72). [Obj.:] Moreover, the sacrifice is a worship of the deity. And the worship is commonly seen in worldly experience as being subordinate to the worshipped [person]. The later claim that the result of a sacrifice is given by th e deity, pleased by the offering ( tasm ā d dhavird ā nena gu ṇ avacanai ś ca devat ā r ā dhyate, s ā pr ī t ā sat ī phala ṃ prayacchati , Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.8, p. 74) is probably related to the p ū ja ̄ - argument. Beside these two, the opponent speaking in the devat ā dhikara ṇ a seems to have no other theological arguments, and to ground his position on the Sm ṛ ti texts about devata ̄ s, mythically described as eating, having bodies, etc. 7 Interestingly, Ś abara (and, seemingly, also Jaimini) starts his reply by putting t he Vedic sacrificial prescriptions at the centre, insofar as it is only through them that one knows about the result and is then prompted to act ( yajñakarma pradh ā na ṃ sy ā t. yajater j ā tam ap ū rvam. kuta ḥ ś abdap ū rvatv ā t. yad dhi phala ṃ dad ā ti, ta tprayojakam. ida ṃ phala ṃ dad ā t ī ty etajjñ ā na ṃ ś abdap ū rvaka ṃ , na pratyak ṣā dibhir avagamyate , Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 75). Next, the reply to the first objection is that deities are like ritual substances ( dravya ), namely ritual elements subordinate to the sacrifice itself ( nanu dravyadevat ā kriya ṃ yajatyartha ḥ satyam evan. ki ṃ tu gu ṇ atve devat āś rutih ̣ , Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 75). This subordination is grounded in the M ī m āṃ s ā thesis that the artha of the Veda (see fn. 3) is something to be done and that all established things mentioned are subordinate to it ( dravyadevata ṃ hi bh ū ta ṃ , bh ā vayitavyo yajatyarthah ̣ , Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 75). As an alternative strategy to the one stressing the centrality of the sacrifice, Ś abara introduces w ith atha a new focus, on the centrality of the human beings involved in the sacrifice, who care for the result, and not for the deities ( phala ṃ ca puru ṣā rtha ḥ . puru ṣā rth ā ca na ḥ prav ṛ tti ḥ . na c ā sau devat ā y āḥ . tasm ā n na devat ā prayukt āḥ pravarti ṣ y ā mahe Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 76). Against the second objection, the one stating that a sacrifice is like an act of worship ( p ū ja ̄ ), Ś abara says that one should not equate sacrifices with worldly acts of worship. In the latter, the worshipped person stands at the centre, whereas in the former the sacrificial act !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! 7 To the uttarapak ṣ in asking “How is this known?” the objector repeatedly answers with some variations of sm ṛ tyupac ā r ā bhy ā m ‘through recollected texts and throu gh figurative application’. ! Elisa Freschi ! ! 34 ! ( yajñakarman ) stands at the centre. This reasoning connects this sacrifice - centric view with the human - centric view discussed above: the sacrifice is at the centre, because it is throu gh that that one obtains the result ( yad dhi phalavat tatprayojakam. tasm ā d yajñakarma prayojakam , Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 76). The last objection, i.e. the reference to Sm ṛ ti passages pointing at deities, is refuted by Ś abara by saying that the se Sm ṛ t is are based on mantra s and arthav ā da s (and cannot, thus, contradict the Veda — rather, they must be understood as supplements of the prescriptive portion of the Veda, the Br ā hma ṇ as) ( tan na, sm ṛ ter mantr ā rthav ā dam ū latv ā t ). The objector counters tha t since these Sm ṛ tis do convey information about the deities they are surely not based on mantra s and arthav ā da s ( yadi naiva ṃ par ā na tarhi mantr ā rthav ā dam ū la ṃ tadvijñ ā nam ). Ś abara could have answered that if they are not based on mantra s and art hav ā da s they are simply invalid. Instead, he repeats that whoever observes carefully sees that they are based on them ( ye ā locanam ā tre ṇ a mantr ā rthav ā d ā n pa ś yanti, te ṣāṃ tatsm ṛ tim ū lam , Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 76). More generally, Ś abara (and pe rhaps Jaimini) seems to aim only at the refusal of Vedic deities, i.e. deities conceived as embodied personal beings, delivering the result of Vedic sacrifices. The objector arguing for the principal role of the deities explicitly says that they are embodi ed while answering to a counter - argument ( nanv eva ṃ bruvat ā , vigrahavat ī devat ā , bhu ṅ kte cety abhyupagata ṃ bhavati. ucyate. b āḍ ham. vigrahavat ī devat ā , bhu ṅ kte ca , Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.6, p. 73). And Ś abara repeats that “giving” and “feeding” are im possible in the case of a non - embodied deity ( na hy avigrah ā yai abhuñj ā n ā yai ca d ā na ṃ bhojana ṃ v ā sa ṃ bhavati , Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 76), and goes on to discuss Vedic quotes 8 in which Indra is said to have hands, a powerful neck, reddish brown eyes , etc. ( Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, pp. 73 – 79), with the objector urging that the quotes have to be understood literally ( asty asau hasto vaya ṃ ya ṃ g ṛ t ī tavantah ̣ , Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 77). Ś abara’s repeated reply is that there is no evidence ( pram āṇā bh ā v ā t , Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, twice on p. 77 , tasy ā pi bh ā ve na pram āṇ am asti , p. 78, gr ī v ā sattve n ā sti pram āṇ am , p. 78) and that these are only assumptions of unseen things ( ad ṛṣṭ akalpana ̄ , Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 77). In more detail, he points to the f act that the offered oblations should diminish if they were really eaten by a deity and that there is no evidence for the fact that the deity only eats the taste, like a bee. In fact, this behaviour of bees is seized by sense perception, whereas in the cas e of deities it is not: api ca , bhuñj ā n ā yai devat ā yai pratta ṃ have ḥ k ṣī yeta na ca madhukar ī vad annarasabhojinyo devat ā iti pram āṇ am asti madhukar īṣ u pratyak ṣ am na ca tadvad devat ā y ā m ( Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 79). Moreover, the oblation offered to a deity who [really] eats it should diminish [and this is apparently not the case]. Nor is there any instrument for knowing that the deities eat only the savour of the food, like bees. In !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! 8 I have not been able to trace all quotes. An untraced one ( ak ṣī te indra pi ṅ gale , p. 79) is found also in the Mah ā bh āṣ ya (ad A ṣṭ 3.268.16) and was thus probably commonly known as a way of describing Indra. Several oth ers come from the Ṛ V X ( sukha ṃ ratha ṃ yuyuje sindhur a ś vinam ̣ (p. 78), Ṛ V 10.075.09a; vi ṣṭ v ī gr ā v āṇ a ḥ suk ṛ ta ḥ suk ṛ tyay ā hotu ś cit p ū rve haviradyam āś ata (p. 78), Ṛ V 10.094.02c). Other textual passages about Indra ( tuvigr ī va indra , p. 78) could also be Vedic. Between Theism and Atheism ! ! ! 35 ! the case of [insects] like the bees, this is sense - percep tible, but it is not in the case of the deity. 9 The refusal of this sort of deity was — in my opinion — probably not understood as a real threat (see below, section 4.2) to theism by authors of Vi ś i ṣṭā dvaita Ved ā nta, who would not have supported the r eal existence of deities having bodies like ours, and who actually eat the offered ghee. 10 In fact, it appears that the theology of Y ā muna etc. was not conceived as an alternative mechanical explanation of the way sacrifices work, nor did it accept all myt hical narratives about deities (holding weapons, eating etc., Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.6 – 9, passim) at face value. 2.1.3 Kum ā rila In his short commentary on the devat ā dhikara ṇ a , Kum ā rila basically gives, much more concisely, some of the arguments used by Ś abara, showing that there is no linguistic evidence in favour of the fact that the deities are the principal element in Vedic prescriptions, and that the presence of the deities’ names in Vedic prescription does not require one to postulate the existence of deities in the world outside the Veda. The linguistic reality of the Veda, in other words, does not necessarily entail a corresponding outer world in order to work. 11 2.1.4 Conclusions about the refusal of devata ̄ s If one understands “theism” as it is usually employed in the West, i.e. as referring to the levels 2 and 3 discussed in the Terminological Foreword, devata ̄ s are beside the point when discussing atheism or theism in India. They are indeed found also in “at heist” religions such as Buddhism and Jainism, and they only represent a further class of sentient beings (in this sense they might be compared to mermaids, fairies etc.). Even Ś abara does not altogether deny their existence in other parts of the Ś Bh (e. g. ad PMS 6.1.5 where he explains that deities, along with plants and animals are not entitled to sacrifice). However, a different understanding of god(s) can find its way through the objector’s reference (possibly evoked in the s ū tra s by atithivat ‘like a guest’ and explicitly in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! 9 Ś abara also adds that, in fact, oblations may lose some taste but this is only due to the fact that they are left in the open air ( yad ukta ṃ devat ā yai havi ḥ pratta ṃ n ī rasa ṃ bhavat ī ti. nai ṣ a do ṣ a ḥ v ā topahata ṃ n ī rasa ṃ bhavat ī ti , Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.9, p. 79). 10 Cf. this passage, where a third person objecting to the objector states that deities do not actually eat and the objector replies that they do : ā ha. na devat ā bhu ṅ kte. yadi ca bhuñj ī ta, devat ā yai havi ḥ pr atta ṃ k ṣī yeta. ucyate. annarasabhojin ī devat ā madhukar ī vad avagamyate. katham. devat ā yai havi ḥ pratta ṃ n ī rasa ṃ bhavati. tasm ā d annarasa ṃ bhu ṅ kte devateti gamyate ( Ś Bh ad PMS 9.1.6, p. 73). 11 tatra ki ṃ vivak ṣ ita ṃ kim avivak ṣ itam iti vijñ eyam tatra lo ke ’rthak ṛ t ā vivak ṣā bhavati vede tu ś abdak ṛ t ā ( Ṭ up ṭī ka ̄ ad MS 9.1 adhikara ṇ a 5, p. 77). ! Elisa Freschi ! ! 36 ! Bh āṣ ya ) to the worship ( p ū ja ̄ ), since the same term is used also in theistic and devotional contexts. 2.2 Anti - theological arguments in Kum ā rila By the time of Ś abara’s commentator, Kum ā rila, the debate on g od(s) had also turned into a more philosophical topic, probably especially because of the impact on the debate of the Ny ā ya deism (see Krasser 1999 on the role of the Naiy ā yika Aviddhakar ṇ a). Thus, the debate evolved from the denial of the role of devat a ̄ s within sacrifice to the denial of an īś vara who created and preserved the world, created language and taught or even composed the Vedas. Kum ā rila’s refusal of this kind of god deeply influenced the Buddhist discussion on the same topic (see Krasser 1999 for Kum ā rila’s influence on Dharmak ī rti) in a way which became more and more philosophically engaged. The target of the criticism is a god/ īś vara as part of the ontology of a certain school (specifically of Ny ā ya and of Ny ā ya - Vai ś e ṣ ika). 12 Kum ā rila (and Dharmak ī rti) refutes the idea of using an īś vara as a solution to ontological or logical problems on the basis of the idea that S/He creates more difficulties than S/He can solve. For instance, karmic retribution does not need a divine Superv isor and the assumption of one is anti - economical: kasyacid dhetum ā tratva ṃ yady adhi ṣṭ h ā t ṛ te ṣ yate | karmabhi ḥ sarvaj ī v ā n āṃ tatsiddhe ḥ siddhas ā dhanam || Ś V, S Ā P, 75 If you assume that to govern something means being its general cause, the n you prove what is already established. For that (cause) is already established by the past karman of all beings. Ś abara’s arguments against the idea of an embodied deity are also expanded upon by Kum ā rila, who contends that god, in order to intervene in the world, must have a body. If he did not have one, how could unconscious entities like atoms obey him? kul ā lavac ca naitasya vy ā p ā ro yadi kalpyate | acetana ḥ katham bh ā vas tadicch ā m anurudhyate || 81 || tasm ā n na param āṇ v ā der ā rambha ḥ sy ā t tadicchay ā | And if his activity is not held to be like that of the potter, how could an insentient entity [like an atom] obey his will? Therefore, the atoms [and the other insentient elements in the world] do not start [clinging together or sepa rating] because of his will. ( Ś V, S Ā P, 81 – 82 ab) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! 12 See Bronkhorst 1996 on the “arrival” of a god in the Vai ś e ṣ ika system: it seems plausible that god was at least also a way to deal with philosophical problems, such as those concerning the creation and dissolution of the world. Between Theism and Atheism ! ! ! 37 ! However, the idea of a body of god is fraught with difficulties, since god’s body also needs to be created (else it would not be a body like ours), but in that case who created it, since god did not yet have a body at that time? In short, Kum ā rila rejects the idea of an īś vara which is involved in the creation and maintenance of the world, of language and of the Veda, but which is still very similar to other agents (a “superman” more than an altoge the r different entity). Specific attacks are reserved for the Buddha, not for Vi ṣṇ u or Ś iva and not even for a non - acting Brahman. 3 Vi ś i ṣṭā dvaita Ved ā nta When Ved ā nta entered the philosophical scene, the situation changed and the role of “god” was primarily occupied by the param ā tman or brahman , with lower deities being accepted only at a worldly ( vyavah ā rika ) level. Vi ś i ṣṭā dvaita Ved ā nta, by contr ast, is a philosophical school which became more and more closely connected to the so - called Ś r ī Vai ṣṇ avism. The latter is a general label used to group Vai ṣṇ ava beliefs which mostly circulated in and were elaborated on in South India, and which attr ibuted a role also to Vi ṣṇ u’s consort Ś r ī . On the one hand Ś r ī Vai ṣṇ avism is linked with the devotional songs of the Āḷ v ā rs and on the other with the P ā ñcar ā tra Sacred Texts, which are kind of “manuals” for personal and temple - worship. Vi ś i ṣ ṭā dvaita Ved ā nta adds to those beliefs and practices a philosophical, specifically Ved ā nta, frame. Thus, whereas Ś r ī Vai ṣṇ avism has Vi ṣṇ u as its central focus, Vi ś i ṣṭā dvaita Ved ā nta rather discusses His philosophical counterpart, called bra hman or param ā tman . In post - R ā m ā nuja (traditional dates 1017 - 1137 AD) times the two traditions merge more and more, and theological topics (such as the relation between Vi ṣṇ u and his consort Ś r ī , and that between Vi ṣṇ u and his body) are dealt with from a philosophical perspective. Thus, theism (here understood only as the opposite of atheism, in the sense of “belief in God”) is a required presupposition of Vi ś i ṣṭā dvaita Ved ā nta. However, this does not necessarily imply the belief in a personal God, nor in a saving, caring one. As far as I am aware, the latter characteristics are altogether absent from R ā m ā nuja’s contributions to Vi ś i ṣṭā dvaita Ved ā nta stricto sensu (e.g. in his Ś r ī Bh āṣ ya , although they might be present in his devotio nal and Vai ṣṇ ava works). 4 Can They be Reconciled? 4.1 Kum ā rila and vivak ṣā The problem of reconciling something we would call “god” with the authority of the Veda was already present among P ū rva M ī m āṃ sakas. Apart from Kum ā rila’s Ś V - ma ṅ gala which, as shown by Kum ā rila’s commentator P ā rthas ā rathi, is a double - entendre praising the Veda and Ś iva at the same time, similar devices are used also by other authors (see the concluding verse by the late M ī m āṃ saka R ā m ā nuj ā c ā rya in hi s Tantrarahasya , Freschi 2012b, p. 5). In a different context and work, Kum ā rila Bha ṭṭ a discussed what it means to speak of the Veda’s vivak ṣā ‘intention’ and refused to understand it only metaphorically. In a non - ! Elisa Freschi ! ! 38 ! metaphorical sense, vivak ṣ a ̄ implie s the desire of someone to communicate. Who could this “someone” be? Kiyotaka Yoshimizu (2007, 2008) explains by means of TV verses that it is the param ā tman which is embodied in the Veda: ś abdabrahmeti yac ceda ṃ śā stra ṃ ved ā khyam ucyate | tad apy adhi ṣṭ hita ṃ sarvam ekena param ā tman ā || (TV ad 3.1.13, Subb āśā str ī 1929 - 1934, p. 703, ll. 6 – 7, v. 11) This Sacred Text called “Veda” is referred to as the “ brahman consisting of language” | And this whole is superintended/inhabited ( adhi ṣṭ ha ̄ - ) by a single Supreme Self || Here, the key term ś abdabrahman and Kum ā rila’s mention in the same connection ( ibidem , v. 15) of a verse by Bhart ṛ hari about his concept of a ś abdabrahman (‘ brahman which consists of language’) should alert the reader. In fact, in what sense can the brahman be ‘superintended’ by a param ā tman ? In my understanding, the ś abdabrahman is not a subform of brahman (still in need of a higher governor), but the brahman itself (and Bhart ṛ hari’s metaphysics correspondingly sees the all - pervasiveness of language in epistemology and ontology). In this sense, Kum ā rila could look at the ś abdabrahman as tantamount to the Veda and connected to/identical with the param ā tman 13 What exactly should this connection (expressed by the verb adhi ṣṭ ha ̄ - ) be? Verse 12 speaks of the Ṛ gveda and of the other Sa ṃ hit ā s as “bodies” and as “always endowed with consciousness” ( tathargved ā dayo deh āḥ prokt ā ye ’pi p ṛ thak p ṛ thak | bhogy atven ā tman ā m te ’pi ca i tany ā nugat āḥ sada ̄ ||). This seems to hint at the idea of the Veda as the param ā tman ’s body, with “body” pointing at, as usual in P ū rva M ī m āṃ s ā tho ught (see Freschi forthcoming[a] ), a living body which is inseparable from the self, i.e. so that a corpse is no longer a “body”. This also means that such a conscious body is conceptually not separated from the self “inhabiting” it and that their relation cannot be comprehended as one of ultimate difference. At most, the body mi ght be seen as an inseparable quality of the self. 14 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! 13 According to the latte r interpretation, adhi ṣṭ hita would mean that the Veda is ‘inhabited’ by a param ā tman , which was previously declared to be no different from the Veda itself. I do not want to deal extensively with the interpretation of these verses, which is partly off - t opic for the present paper. Apart from Yoshimizu’s essays, one can read my opinion on the topic here: http://elisafreschi.com/2013/09/06/plurality - of - subjectsin - mima ṃ sa - kiyotaka - yoshimizu - 2007/ and here: http://elisafreschi.com/2013/09/13/is - theveda - the - b ody - of - god - yoshimizu - 2007 - ii - part/. Yoshimizu 2007 is also connected to the issue of Kum ā rila and Ved ā nta, on this see Mesquita 1994 and Taber 2007. 14 The concept of “body” especially when related to “god” is very problematic. As already described, Ś ab ara and Kum ā rila showed how a straightforward understanding of god’s body (as having e.g. a definite extension in space, and resembling the body of any other sentient being) leads to contradictions. However, Udayana and other thinkers (also within Buddhis m, with the doctrine of the k ā ya s) tried to imagine a different kind of “body” for the god. On this fascinating topic, see Colas 2009. Between Theism and Atheism ! ! ! 39 ! 4.2 Y ā muna etc. on the denial of deities as an instrumental move The idea of interpreting Jaimini’s devat ā dhikara ṇ a (although not Ś abara’s commentary thereon) as in fact not really aiming at a ref usal of the existence of deities, but rather at strengthening faith in the efficacy of sacrifice must have been already commonsensical at the time of Y ā muna, the fourth in the traditional line of teachers of the tradition later called Ś r ī Vai ṣṇ avism. In fact, Ve ṅ ka ṭ an ā tha puts forth this argument with almost the same words as Y ā muna, and Y ā muna himself mentions it en passant while discussing a different point of the alleged P ū rva M ī m āṃ s ā - P ā ñcar ā tra divergences. This cursory mention makes o ne think that Y ā muna’s readers were already acquainted with the argument: yathaiva hi bhagavato jaimine ḥ karmaphalopany ā sa ḥ karma ś raddh ā sa ṃ varddhan ā yeti Like indeed the revered Jaimini stated that the [rituals’] result comes from the sacrificia l action [and not from the deity to whom the sacrifice has been offered] for the sake of augmenting the faith in the sacrificial action. ( Ā gamapr ā m āṇ ya , Śā str ī 1937, p. 67). Should one think that Y ā muna dwelt on this topic longer in his lost works, one should explain why Ve ṅ ka ṭ an ā tha, while elaborating on this issue, only mentioned this same passage. R ā m ā nuja’s Ved ā rthasa ṃ graha repeats a similar point: In order to avo id the lack of faith in ritual action of people who have not heard the Upani ṣ ads ( a ś rutaved ā nta ), some excessive statements ( ativ ā da ) have been used in the devat ā dhikara ṇ a , in order for one to have faith in the mere ritual actions. The definitive con clusion of those who know the Veda is that all of this is a single treatise ( śā stra ). 15 Thus, rituals are praised by Jaimini for the sake of people who do not know the Upani ṣ ads. In fact, R ā m ā nuja emphasises that rituals lead even people who do not kno w the Upani ṣ ads to strive for liberation, thus it is good for them to keep on performing them. Ve ṅ ka ṭ an ā tha developed R ā m ā nuja’s idea insofar as he chose to distinguish Jaimini from his commentators and attributed all sorts of good intentions to the f ormer, but not to the latter. It might be that this move had also been anticipated by some earlier Vi ś i ṣṭā dvaita or Ś r ī Vai ṣṇ ava author, as Ve ṅ ka ṭ an ā tha took care to tell his readers in the SM and in the MP, where he tried hard to show that the acceptance of P ū rva M ī m āṃ s ā is perfectly legitimate from the point of view of Vi ś i ṣṭā dvaita Ved ā nta - Ś r ī Vai ṣṇ avism (see below, section 4.4). 4.3 The specificity of Ve ṅ ka ṭ an ā tha’s Se ś varam ī m āṃ s ā : ap ū rva R ā m ā nuja seems quite keen on re - establishing the idea that sacrifices work only insofar as they please Vi ṣṇ u, who then bestows on the sacrificer the expected result. This directly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! 15 a ś rutaved ā nt ā n āṃ karma ṇ y a ś raddh ā m ā bh ū d iti devat ā dhikara ṇ e ’tiv ā d āḥ k ṛ t āḥ karmam ā tre yath ā ś r addh ā sy ā d iti sarvam eka śā stram iti vedavitsiddh ā nta ḥ , Buitenen 1956, p. 157. ! Elisa Freschi ! ! 40 ! counters the P ū rva M ī m āṃ s ā stress on the centrality of s acrifice. R ā m ā nuja even goes so far as to reuse the model criticised by P ū rva M ī m āṃ s ā authors in the devat ā dhikara ṇ a and to affirm that the sacrifice is for the sake of the devata ̄ s but that, since the inner ruler ( antary ā min ) of the devata ̄ s is Vi ṣṇ u, it ultimately pleases him. Consider his commentary on BS 3.2.39 and 3.2.40: [Obj.:] For this very reason, the teacher Jaimini thinks that, out of congruity and because of the Sacred Texts [stating it], only dharma, in the form of sacrificing, gi ving, oblating and venerating ( up ā sana ) delivers the fruit. In fact, in worldly experience we commonly see that activities like agriculture and activities like massaging deliver their results by themselves, either immediately (as in the case of massaging and the pleasure it causes) or mediately (as in the case of agriculture, where a seed gives rise to a plant grows only after a certain period of time has elapsed). In the same way, also in the Veda, although sacrificing, giving, oblating do not immediately deliver a result, they can nonetheless deliver a result mediately, through an ap ū rva . [...] [R:] [...] The revered B ā dar ā ya ṇ a considers that it is only the supreme person ( paramapuru ṣ a ) who delivers the result. [...] Because it is indicated ( vyapadi ś - ) in several Vedic sentences that deities ( devat ā ) such as Agni or V ā yu, which have been propitiated ( ā r ā dhya ) by the sacrifice — which consists of a propitiation of the deities — are the cause of this or that result. [...] And in the form of V ā yu et c. only the supreme person ( paramapuru ṣ a ) remains as the one who delivers the result because of having been propitiated. 16 Thus, Ve ṅ ka ṭ an ā tha had in front of him a hard task as he tried to reconcile P ū rva M ī m āṃ s ā and Vi ś i ṣṭā dvaita Ved ā nta on this issue. 17 The fact that he managed to create a new synthesis is evidence of his genius as a systematiser, wherein the term “systematiser” does not entail a lower order of philosophising. On the contrary, Ve ṅ ka ṭ an ā tha had to find a higher synthesis of contradicto ry positions, one which could still look acceptable to his Vi ś i ṣṭā dvaita fellows. Ve ṅ ka ṭ an ā tha’s general strategy seems to be to accept the M ī m āṃ s ā approach (which is useful in order to keep Buddhist and other Sacred Texts out of the precinct o f validity) while adding to it an exception, namely God. Thus, Ve ṅ ka ṭ an ā tha agrees that bodies are created !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! 16 ata eva upapatte ḥ śā str ā c ca y ā gad ā nahomop ā sanar ū padharmam eva phalaprada ṃ jaiminir ā c ā ryo manyate loke hi k ṛṣ y ā dika ṃ mardan ā dika ṃ ca karma s ā k ṣā d v ā paramparay ā v ā svayam eva phalas ā dhana ṃ d ṛṣṭ am ; eva ṃ vede ’pi y ā gad ā nahom ā d ī n āṃ s ā k ṣā tphalas ā dhanatv ā bh ā ve ’pi paramparay ā ap ū rvadv ā re ṇ a phalas ā dhanatvam upapadyate [...] paramapuru ṣ asyaiva phalapradatva ṃ bhagav ā n b ā dar ā ya ṇ o manyate . [...] devat ā r ā dhanabh ū tay ā g ā dy ā r ā dhyabh ū t ā gni - v ā yv ā didevat ā n ā m eva tattatphalahetutay ā tasmi ṃ s tasminn api v ā kye vyapade śā t . [...] v ā yv ā dy ā tman ā ca paramapuru ṣ a ev ā r ā dhyatay ā phalaprad ā yitvena c ā vati ṣṭ hate [...]. 17 Just like on many other issues, see Neevel 1977 and the long discussion in Mesquita 1980 about Y ā muna’s vehement opposition to P ū rva M ī m āṃ s ā Between Theism and Atheism ! ! ! 41 ! except for God’s body, which is nitya 18 Similarly, direct perception cannot grasp dharma (so that it is impossible that the Buddha knew dharma) ex cept for God’s perception. In fact, throughout SM ad PMS 1.1.4, Ve ṅ ka ṭ an ā tha shares the P ū rva M ī m āṃ s ā arguments against the possibility of yogipratyak ṣ a , and only in the concluding verses does he, surprisingly, add that these arguments do not appl y to God. “God” (referred to with the adjective ai ś a in the verse) is thus clearly different from a devata ̄ but also from the god Kum ā rila attacks, since He does not belong to the same categories human beings ( puru ṣ a ) belong to; He can have an eternal b ody, although eternal bodies are inconceivable for us, and can perceptually see dharma, although this is also a priori impossible for other sentient beings. In this way, Ve ṅ ka ṭ an ā tha can avoid refuting the M ī m āṃ s ā stance, while embedding it in a lar ger frame w