Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcqu20 Download by: [Gothenburg University Library] Date: 08 October 2017, At: 12:50 Communication Quarterly ISSN: 0146-3373 (Print) 1746-4102 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcqu20 ValuJet flight 592: Crisis communication theory blended and extended Donald A. Fishman To cite this article: Donald A. Fishman (1999) ValuJet flight 592: Crisis communication theory blended and extended, Communication Quarterly, 47:4, 345-375, DOI: 10.1080/01463379909385567 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01463379909385567 Published online: 21 May 2009. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 773 View related articles Citing articles: 34 View citing articles ValuJet Flight 592: Crisis Communication Theory Blended and Extended Donald A. Fishman This article investigates the integration of three crisis communication approaches as it analyzes the crash of ValuJet Flight 592. The article is divided into four parts. Part One of the article defines crisis communication and examines the scope of the concept. Part Two discusses theory-building and explains the three leading theoretical approaches to understanding a crisis communication event. Part Three applies elements from Fink's stage theory and Benoit's image restoration strategies to the crisis involving the crash of Valujet Flight 592. Part Four evaluates the "crisis communication situation" in the Valujet crash and demonstrates haw a "focusing events" approach adds a useful perspective to the case. The conclusion contends that a blended methodological orientation, integrating the recent work done in studying "focusing events" along with the stage and strategies models, provides a superior methodology for analyzing a complex crisis event rather than relying upon any one theory in isolation from the others. This article also emphasizes the pivotal role of the media in triggering an investigation into the lapse of safety standards and enforcement procedures in the Valujet Flight 592 crash. KEY CONCEPTS crisis communication, crisis management, image restoration, focusing event, ValuJet Donald A. Fishman (Ph.D. Northwestern, 1978) is an Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at Boston College. He wishes to thank Richard A. Kalian, California State Polytechnic-Pomona, W. Tim Coombs, Clemson University, Bonnie S. Jefferson, Boston College, and the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and assistance with this manuscript S hortly after 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, 11 May 1996, Valujet Flight 592 lifted off from Miami for Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport. Approximately six minutes after departure, the crew noticed an electrical disturbance on the plane, and Captain Candalyn Kubeck's apprehension was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder. Kubeck said that "We're losing everything," referring to the loss of complete electrical power on the airplane. First Officer Richard Hazen quickly informed the air traffic controllers that the plane needed to return to Miami. A senior flight attendant came forward to the flight deck to tell the crew that there was a fire in the main cabin, and that oxygen was needed immediately for the passengers (Bryant, 1996c, p. A16). Communication Quarterly, Vol. 47, No 4 Fall 1999, Pages 345-375 Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 Meanwhile, as Hazen continued to query air controllers in Miami, the plane plunged into the Florida Everglades. The high-impact crash broke the plane into hundreds of pieces and scorched the sawgrass surrounding the water where the plane went down. The swamp quickly swallowed up the entire airplane. "If s not the usual crash scene where you see seats or windows or metal," reported Metro-Dade Police Detective Pat Brickman. "What you see is nothing" (Booth, 1996b, p. 1A). One fireman on the scene described the wreckage as looking like "confetti strewn across the swamps" (Booth, 1996a, p. 1). On the morning after the crash of Valujet Flight 592, United States Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena appeared on television to re-affirm the safety of flying on Valujet "I've flown Valujet Valujet is a safe airline, as is our entire aviation system" (Navarro, 1996, p. Al). Pena also added a strong endorsement for Valujef s management team: "Whenever we have found any issues, Valujet has been responsive, they have been cooperative, they have in some cases even exceeded the safety standards that we have" (Navarro, 1996, p. Al). Senior Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officer David Hinson echoed Pena's sentiments about the safety of flying Valujet Three days later, a preliminary inquiry by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that oxygen canisters being shipped in the cargo hold ignited a fire that brought the plane down shortly after its take off (Wald, 1996a, p. Al). Vincent, Crow, and Davis (1997) contend that an airline crash provides a compelling and visually powerful news story. Vincent et al. maintain that "the events which surround air crashes are inherently dramatic, involving life and death situations, heroic actions, fatal and fateful decisions, and unforgettable visual images" (p. 354). Part of the appeal of a crash occurs because it involves ordinary people. Part of the appeal of a crash occurs because of the very randomness of the act, and the potential for a similar random act to affect millions of other air travelers. Vincent et al. perceive an airline crash to constitute a rich text with three overarching story lines: (1) "The tragic intervention of fate into everyday life" (2) "The mystery of what caused the crash" and (3) "The work of legitimate authority to restore normalcy" (p. 357). In the case of Valujet Flight 592, these themes were altered slightly by the recurrent suspicion that legitimate authorities had failed to safeguard the public welfare, and that the efforts to restore "normalcy" were being compromised by the FAA's desire to promote the low-cost, no frills segment of the aviation industry. The purpose of this article is to examine the crisis surrounding the crash of Valujet Flight 592. The paper is divided into four parts. Part One of the article defines crisis communication and examines the scope of the concept Part Two discusses theory building and explains the three leading theoretical approaches to understanding a crisis communication event. Part Three applies elements from Fink's stage theory and Benoif s image restoration strategies to the crisis involving the crash of Valujet Flight 592. Part Four evaluates the crisis communication situation in the Valujet crash and demonstrates how a "focusing events" approach adds a useful perspective to the case. The conclusion contends that a blended methodological orientation, integrating the recent work done by Birkland along with the stage and strategies models, provides a superior methodology for analyzing a complex crisis event rather than relying upon any one theory in isolation from the others. DEFINITIONAL PROPERTIES AND SCOPE OF CRISIS COMMUNICATION There has been an on-going and wide-ranging discussion within the literature of 346 Fishman Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 crisis communication about the meaning of the term "crisis." The word "crisis" unfortunately has become an overused and imprecise term among journalists and broadcasters who cover day-to-day news events. As a result, the word "crisis" has become a convenient synonym for an "accident," "disruption," "catastrophe," or "disaster" with no attempt to delineate the scope or severity of a given problem. Within the sub-field of crisis communication, however, the word "crisis" has been defined in more restrictive terms. Barton (1993) has defined a crisis as a situation characterized by (1) a surprise (2) a high threat to important values and (3) requiring a short decision time (p. 50). Fern-Banks (1996) views a crisis as "a major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome affecting an organization, company, or industry, as well as its publics, products, or good name" (p. 1). Fink (1986) defines a crisis as an "unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending" (p. 15). These definitions contain different points of emphasis, but they suggest five common characteristics of a crisis communication situation. First, an unpredictable event occurs. For instance, although natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes have an actuarial degree of predictability, the scope or severity of their impact remains completely unpredictable. In addition, technological innovations increase rather than decrease the level of unpredictability. Perrow (1999) argues that technological and industrial crises will likely increase in the next decade because the multi-factored safety devices and engineering systems within organizations interact in ways that managers, designers, and operators fail to predict. Perrow contends that the failed interactions of complex modern technology create the paradoxical situation of "normal accidents" (p. 5). Vaughn (1996) views "technological uncertainty" as a major characteristic of organizational decision-making, and she insists that "risk assessment" and calculating the degree of risk are a vital "factor of life" in examining the interaction of an organization with modern technology (pp. 79-80). Coombs (1999) maintains that "A crisis is unpredictable but not unexpected. Wise organizations know crises will befall them; they just do not know when" (pp. 2-3). Collectively, these observations underscore the lack of predictability facing the modern organization as it attempts to control events and anticipate changes. Second, important values for an individual or institution must be threatened in order for a crisis communication situation to exist An event or an "incident" like a flat tire on the way to work does not constitute a threat to important values. The flat tire may be a disruption, a distraction, or even a nuisance, but one can change the tire or call one of the emergency road service providers for assistance. Essential values are not threatened by a flat tire, although in common parlance someone typically may describe the situation as a "crisis" or "traumatic event" Coombs (1999) distinguishes an "incident" from a "crisis" by classifying the former as a "minor localized disruption," e.g., a water valve at a plant breaks, but the water spill is confined to one room and quickly repaired (p. 3). Thus, the damage is local, small in scope, and the incident does not disrupt the operations of the entire plant. On the other hand, the 1999 scandal in the basketball program at the University of Minnesota, where term papers allegedly were written for several players on the team, raised serious questions about the academic mission and values of the university, even though fewer than thirty individuals out of the school's fifty thousand registered students were involved in the incident The basketball scandal directly threatened important values of the institution and called into question its core mission. The resulting allegations of wrongdoing acquired a symbolic significance that Crisis Communication 347 Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 overshadowed the actual numbers of people involved in the incident, and the perceived wrongdoing appeared symptomatic of the problems affecting Division I college athletics ("University of Minnesota," 1999, p. A 52). Third, the "intention" of an actor or an organization plays a minor, if negligible, role in analyzing a crisis communication situation. The term "accident" typically is defined as an unforeseen event and encompasses a wide range of misfortunes. Harm or injury may result, but blame is mitigated because of the lack of intent or motivation on the part of an actor or agency in planning for the event to occur (Green, 1997). The word "accidents thus commonly suggests that no one should be blamed for the event because it was "unintentional." In every day language, unintentional acts are distinguished from willful or deliberate actions, and there seemingly is an all- encompassing blanket of immunity extended to unintentional behavior. This conception of an "accident" however, is at odds with a crisis communication perspective that seeks to assign responsibility or blame for an event, and that raises the frequently overlooked question of whether "due diligence" or "pro-active measures" should have been undertaken to prevent the occurrence of the ill-fated activity. "Ideal accidents" may be blameless and unpredictable events, but most accidents represent an opportunity to apportion blame, define a situation favorably or unfavorably, and mobilize a constituency to adopt a particular viewpoint From a crisis communication perspective, events are rarely, if ever, "accidental," "benign," or "incomprehensible," and thus the underlying causes are discernible. There also is a basic assumption within crisis communication that pro-active measures and preventive steps should had been undertaken to avert the crisis, to minimize its impact, or to accelerate the recovery process (Dougherty, 1992; Gottschalk, 1993). Fourth, a crisis communication occurrence represents a time-sensitive situation. An actor or organization does not have an infinite amount of time to respond. Rather, a crisis situation is one that is imbued with a sense of urgency. A crisis communication situation typically creates pressure for an immediate explanation to reassure the media, relevant stakeholders, and the public at large. The issuance of a timely response is often "critical in reducing, offsetting, and containing harm" (Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 1998, p. 234). Correspondingly, the level and extent of media coverage directly influences the degree of "urgency" placed upon an organization to provide a coherent explanation or to undertake corrective action (Ogrizek & Gullery, 1999, p. xiv). Fifth, a crisis communication situation involves a dynamic or multi-dimensional set of relationships within a rapidly-changing environment. Effective communication is essential to maintaining a positive relationship with key stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, and shareholders. At the same time, each of these stakeholders seeks to maximize its own welfare during a crisis. Thus, an organization may be torn between making trade-offs to satisfy customers at the expense of shareholders or between issuing a simple apology for an error and protecting itself against civil and criminal liability. Other actors in the situation such as government regulators, public interest watchdog groups, or the media may seek to justify their own existence as guardians of the "public good." As a result, the context in which a crisis situation takes place may best be described as "dynamic" and "fluid" rather than "static" and "one-dimensional" (Sturges, 1994). Tyler (1997), for instance, argues convincingly that the fear of legal liability may prevent a company from making a "heartfelt apology" for serious infractions such as a chemical or oil spill while permitting the same organization more latitude to 348 Fishman Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 apologize for temporary problems such as a brief disruption of service or a minor problem. Tyler argues that an inability to express heartfelt remorse or to apologize effectively occurs because a "company has multiple goals and multiple audiences," and that the organization operates in a multi-dimensional world where "reputational strategies" can be separated from financial and legal strategies (p. 58). For Tyler, the results are that a company may speak with "a mixed strategy" or "strategic ambiguity" after a crisis (p. 62). Much of the early research in crisis communication has focused upon individual case studies. The Tylenol case has come to represent crisis communication at its best; the Exxon Valdez oil spill has become the benchmark for crisis management at its worst 1 But other examples of crisis situations are plentiful: the Union-Carbide Bhopal chemical spill, the Pepsi syringe hoax case, allegations of racism at Texaco, the 1992 Oklahoma City bombing, and the recent outburst of school violence at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado. Moreover, as the field of crisis communication has matured, the concentration on isolated cases has been replaced by a concern for developing analytical constructs or methodological approaches that will be useful in examining a series of crisis events rather than dissecting one particular crisis in a step- by-step fashion. In turn, this macro perspective has led to an emphasis on developing integrative approaches to synthesize various ideas and constructs concerning crisis communication. THEORY-BUILDING IN CRISIS COMMUNICATION Theory building in the field of crisis communication has emerged slowly. The initial research focused heavily upon high-profile instances of success or failure such as the Tylenol product tampering case or the Challenger disaster. But research that attempts to integrate concepts, constructs, and theories has been rare (Coombs, 1999, p. ix). Seeger et al. (1998) recently have summarized the varied concepts, research contributions, and themes in the study of crisis communication. They acknowledge that studies of crisis communication events have become a very popular and fertile field of investigation during the past two decades. However, they concluded that there has been very little synthesis of constructs and theories within the domain of crisis communication, and they view the research as being fragmentary (Seeger et, al. 1998). Three major theoretical orientations have evolved to analyze aspects of a crisis communication situation. The first major approach is stage analysis; the second is strategies analysis; and the third is the "focusing events" perspective. Here, I would like to summarize briefly the ideas of the key theorists within each category: Steven Fink, the major theorist of stage analysis; William Benoit, the chief theorist representing the strategies approach, and Thomas Birkland, the originator of the focusing events perspective. 2 Fink's Natural History Approach Steven Fink (1986) posits a four-stage pattern for a crisis communication event. Fink's first stage is called the prodromal phase, which is a Greek term meaning "running before" or "providing warning signs" (p. 7). During this stage, a manager should attempt to detect early warning signs (or prodromes) of a crisis because the safest assumption for a decision-maker within an organization is to acknowledge "that a crisis looms on the horizon" (p. 1). This is the time when it is easiest to manage a crisis, and a decision-maker should be willing to ask difficult "what i f questions in Crisis Communication 349 Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 order to anticipate and detect potential signs of trouble. The second stage in Fink's natural history is called the "acute crisis phase." This stage is characterized as a period where events unfold with great "speed and intensity." This is the shortest of the four stages, but it often feels as if it were the longest, and, psychologically, it may have the most severe impact on key decision- makers within an organization. According to Fink, one of the major drawbacks in managing a crisis during the acute phase "is the avalanchelike speed and intensity that often accompany and characterize this stage" (p. 23). The acute phase is the peak point of pressure or "what most people have in mind when they speak of a crisis" (p. 22). The acute crisis phase typically is characterized by five elements that may individually or collectively surface as the crisis evolves: (1) the situation escalates in intensity from an undisclosed problem to a receptacle of public attention; (2) the situation attracts increased media attention; (3) critical distractions interfere with normal business activities; (4) the situation affects the positive image of the company and the reputation of its management team; and (5) the situation affects the financial well- being of the organization (Fink, 1986, pp. 15-16). The third stage in Fink's system is called the "chronic crisis" phase. This stage involves undertaking steps to correct whatever difficulties have surfaced during the acute phase. This is a period of recovery, but it also may involve "self-doubt" and "self- analysis" among the members of the board of directors within the company. In this stage, an organization is likely to conduct external and internal investigations of the operations of the company and to perform major managerial changes. An attempt will be made to explain how the organization functions and what elements within the organizational culture may be dysfunctional, or at odds with maximizing profitability or fostering the public's trust For a company, the chronic crisis stage is the longest of the four phases. Fink argues that the "chronic stage can linger indefinitely. But crisis management plans can and do shorten this phase" (p. 24). Fink contends that those organizations without a crisis communication plan typically "suffer lingering effects of a crisis as much as two and a half times longer than companies that were prepared with a crisis management plan" (p. 24). Fink's fourth stage is called the "crisis resolution stage." This is a period when the company makes a full recovery from the crisis. In Fink's words, the company has been made "well and whole again" (p. 25). This is also a surprisingly vigilant stage because a crisis occurs in a cyclical fashion, and managers should immediately become alert to the development of new prodromes. The overriding advantage of a natural history approach is that it offers a comprehensive and cyclical characterization of a crisis. Metaphorically, a crisis evolves from the prodromal stage where the "water is boiling," to the acute stage where the "pot blows up," to the chronic crisis stage where a "massive clean-up effort is undertaken," to the finality of the crisis resolution stage where a manager "learns from his or her mistakes and looks again toward the future." While the proposed stages lack intricate detail and seem overly linear or deterministic, Fink's model provides a complete cycle for examining the origins, development, maturation, and resolution of a crisis. Benoit's Image Restoration Approach William L. Benoit has been the most influential theorist in developing a "strategies" model to utilize in crisis communication research. Benoifs theory is based 350 Fishman Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 upon the assumption that an individual's or organization's most important asset is its reputation. Benoit asserts that a reputation or public image, like other valuable assets, should be managed strategically to obtain the best results. Benoit (1995b) contends that an individual or organization innately will seek behaviors that maximize its reputation or image. Even when a particular goal is unclear or ill-formed, or when there is more than one way to express a message, an actor will select those messages that have the highest utility, i.e., provide the most benefits to its reputation or image with the fewest costs (pp. 66-71). At the same time, an organization is inherently vulnerable to a crisis because events are likely to occur that are beyond its control, or are caused by human error and misjudgment, or that involve decisions between conflicting but equally admirable goals. Thus, harmful, counterproductive, and offensive behaviors occur, leaving an organization "vulnerable to attack" (p. 67). In Benoif s scheme, reputation or image maximizing behavior occurs within a fluid and ever-changing context. For Benoit, reputation is both context-specific and stakeholder-specific. Individuals or organizations do not micro-manage each utterance or message, but they do seek actions that maximize their overall reputation and image. Benoifs theory fits most comfortably into Fink's acute or chronic stages of the natural history of a crisis, although Benoifs work has implications that can be directly incorporated within several areas of Fink's theory. Benoit's approach is actually a series of rhetorical strategies that an individual or company should adopt to maximize its reputation or image in light of an attack. The approach is based upon the dynamics of an attack-defend, stimulus-response condition. An attack has two major components: (A) The accused is held responsible for an action and (B) The action is considered offensive (Benoit, 1995b). Benoit (1995b) divides his model into five broad categories of strategies to be employed during a crisis event Many of the strategies are further sub-divided into distinct tactical variations. Benoifs first strategy is denial. Denial manifests itself in two variations: simple denial and shifting the blame to another party as the actual source of the offensive action. The advantage of such a shift is that it allows an organization or individual to portray itself as a "victim" of unfair allegations or circumstances, a n d / o r to direct attention to a scapegoat. Benoifs second strategy is evasion of responsibility. This is the most complicated of his categories. There are four variations of this strategy: (1) Defeasability: a lack of information or control over elements within the crisis communication situation occurs; (2) Provocation: the action occurs in response to the initiation of a detrimental step, and thus the behavior is defensive in nature; (3) Accidental: the action occurs inadvertently, and there are factors that mitigate the occurrence of the offensive behavior; and (4) Good intentions: the wrongful activity occurs, but it was premised upon good and sincere intentions. What complicates Category Two is Benoifs (1995b) underlying assumption that "Communication generally is best understood as intentional activity" (p. 65). This assumption places a heavy barrier on the effectiveness of arguments derived from "defeasibility" and "accidental occur- rences," and it is similar to the strong presumption against "accidental activities" that exists within the general theory of crisis communication. Benoifs third category is reduction of offensiveness. Benoit develops six tactical variations to allow an individual or organization to reduce its responsibility for an offensive action and consequently protect its reputation and image. The six tactical Crisis Communication 351 Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 variants are bolstering, minimization, differentiation, transcendence, attacking one's accuser, and compensation. Bolstering refers to stressing positive traits in order to offset any negative accusations against an individual's or organization's reputation. Minimization involves reducing or downplaying the negative aspects of a wrongful act Differentiation refers to distinguishing the alleged wrongful act from other actions that involve deep-rooted harms and negative effects. Transcendence involves placing the act into favorable context or new frame of reference, such as utilizing an argument about "providing educational opportunities to those who otherwise would be locked out of the system" as a response to hostile claims against Division I athletes who fail to attend classes. A counter-attack refers to actions and messages designed to reduce the credibility of the source of the allegations about wrongful conduct This strategy may involve the use of counter-charges or diversionary sub-tactics. Finally, compensation involves providing a gift or tribute to directly aid the victims and to mitigate the negative aspects of an offensive act. All in all, Category Three strategies provide a series of tactical steps to minimize the scope and severity of the alleged wrongful action. Benoif s fourth strategy is corrective action. This is a strategy designed to remedy any future occurrences of the act by enacting changes to eliminate the offensive behavior. Corrective action differs from the tactic of "compensation" because the former is aimed at future activities while the latter is designed to provide a gift to offset the "current" harm (Benoit, 1995b, p. 79). Sellnow, Ulmer & Snider (1998) contend that utilizing the strategy of corrective action may function in conjunction with other image restoration strategies such as denial and bolstering, and that the taking of corrective action steps "can expedite the organization's effort to rebuild its legitimacy" (pp. 60-61). Benoifs fifth strategy is mortification. This strategy involves the use of apologies, expressions of regret, and admissions of guilt in seeking public forgiveness for the offensive behavior. Benoit recommends that it may be most productive to couple this strategy with a pledge of corrective action, but variations of mortification can be implemented independently from the other major strategies (Benoit, 1995b, p. 79). Overall, Benoifs typology of image restoration actions consists of fourteen strategies and tactics: the five major strategies plus the tactical variations within each category. The first two categories address the concept of "blame" or "perceived responsibility"; the second two categories are concerned with the question of "offensiveness"; and the final category (mortification) expresses remorse for wrongful action and seeks forgiveness (Benoit & Nill, 1998, p. 129). Benoit assumes that individuals and organizations are reputation-maximizing entities, and that they will engage in actions designed to increase the favorable aspects of their image and minimize or offset negative allegations. For Benoit, reputation is measured by image, and that image is both audience-specific as well as context- specific. All members of an audience, or all customers, suppliers, shareholders, and regulators may not be interested in the same allegations of wrong-doing. As Benoit (1995b) observes, "All aspects of the accusation may not be equally important to an audience" (p. 84). The strength of Benoifs typology is in the details that it provides, and that the model can be adapted to cover virtually every attack-defend situation from a celebrity crisis such as the Tonya Harding case (Benoit & Hanczor, 1994) to a company defending its actions and promising reforms for overcharging its customers for 352 Fishman Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 automobile services (Benoit, 1995a). At its core, Benoif s approach requires that a commentator evaluate the persuasiveness of the discourse set forth by an individual or organization. This assessment involves highlighting strategies from the model that were applied productively while identifying the strategies and tactics that lack persuasive appeal. Benoit and his associates have had noteworthy successes in applying the model to a variety of different crisis situations, including case studies of an airplane crash, faulty breast implants, product tampering, and presidential leadership (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Brinson & Benoit, 1996; Benoit, Gullifor & Panici, 1991; Benoit & Lindsey, 1987). Once an attack or implied attack has occurred, the model provides a self-executing mechanism, anchored in an attack-defense dichotomy although "image restoration" is only a fraction of what Fink includes within a complete natural history of a crisis communication event Fink's approach also is more overtly concerned with the financial and business recovery of an organization, while Benoit subsumes these categories under his all-encompassing emphasis on maximizing reputation through image restoration strategies. 3 Birkland's Focusing Events Approach Thomas Birkland (1997) has proposed another perspective to examine crisis communication events. His approach is based upon the agenda-setting function and public policy implications of a crisis communication event Birkland believes that "sudden, unpredictable events" play an important role in promoting public-policy discussions. Birkland contends that, "Whereas long term social change is often the result of the ebb and flow of broader social and economic conditions, social change and conflict are often punctuated by sharp, sudden events" (p. 2). Birkland calls these events "focusing events" (p. 22). A focusing event serves as an impetus for bringing an important issue to the public's attention and in creating acceptance for the issue in the public-policy arena. Examples of such focusing events are the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 leading to the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and the 1999 shootings in Littleton, Colorado, that focused the public's attention on domestic and school violence. Birkland contends that focusing events have the ability to play a major role in setting the public agenda because public policy is often based upon, or spearheaded by, a dramatic news event, and the media's coverage of that event creates an urgency to take action to correct a "problem." Birkland (1997) argues that "agenda-setting is the process by which problems and alternative solutions gain or lose public and elite attention" (p. 8). A "focusing event" does not necessarily lead to a policy change, but it focuses attention for a sufficient amount of time to provide a "window of opportunity" for new legislation to be enacted. For Birkland a "focusing event" differs from the "normal" and "routine" nature of "everyday political news" because "focusing events" compel policy makers and the public at large to react immediately to an unanticipated occurrence without the pre-screened filters provided by special interest groups to control an issue amidst an atmosphere of widespread public indifference (p. 27). Birkland identifies two major types of focusing events. The first type is a "normal" focusing event, such as a hurricane, tornado, flash flood, or earthquake. These events are basically "natural disasters." There is an actuarial predictability to Type One focusing events; they happened in the same place and create similar, although not identical, conditions. As Birkland observes, "These events occur sufficiently often to Crisis Communication 353 Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 allow us to isolate events and model their influence on the agenda" (p. 145). The second type of "focusing event" is a "new" event As Birkland explains, "A new focusing event is an event that has never happened before or, alternatively, happened so long ago as to have faded from memory. New focusing events happen because of changes in technology and changes in society" (p. 145). Examples of Type Two focusing events are the 1982 Tylenol product tampering case, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and the freezing of appropriations and budgetary restrictions placed upon the Navy in the aftermath of the 1991 Tailhook sex harassment crisis. A Type Two "focusing event" violates expectations, upsets norms, and creates uncertainty and unpredictability. These "new" events represent a striking departure from the routine and pre-planned activities that are disseminated by the media. The pre-planned events generally are managed and guided by their originators, and the media typically draw upon a packaged press release, a staged press conference, or a photo opportunity session as the raw data for such a news story. By contrast, a Type Two focusing event is neither routine nor pre-planned, and it opens a symbolic arena where various groups struggle about the interpretation and construction of social reality. In this respect, Type Two events are "novel" or "almost novel" occurrences, and they force the public to react to them either with a new attitude, new standards of conduct, or new legislation. The 1999 shootings at Littleton, for example, have prompted widespread congressional debate on gun control and have re-opened the issue of workplace and school violence. Local school boards have enacted a variety of regulations to protect their students ranging from requiring clear-coated or mesh backpacks to enhanced metal detectors at the doors of a school building. Type Two focusing events illustrate the role of a crisis situation to influence public policy. Birkland provides another important distinction to distinguish between Type One and Type Two "focusing events." Birkland contends that "When society seems to have formed a consensus that the event was an 'act of God/ such as a natural disaster or a freak accident, our attention turns to what we can do to help the victims" (p. 2). But when the public perceives the situation as a Type Two focusing event, "our attention turns to the voluntary acceptance of responsibility for an event or to the more coercive process of fixing blame" (p. 2). Type Two focusing events center upon blame and responsibility, and they, in turn, trigger the taxonomy of crisis strategies that Benoit has identified. To date, however, the utility or uniqueness of the "focusing event" approach has remained under-developed. Type One focusing events have long been considered a staple in the crisis communication literature. Lerbinger (1997) contends that the public tends to accept natural disasters fatalistically as opposed to a man-made or technology-generated crisis. But the degree of predictability surrounding the event is a misleading index because the extent and scope of the damage and the magnitude of the disruption upon the lives of ordinary people in a natural disaster is completely unpredictable. So, too, is the speed and skill of the response in containing a natural disaster. In a Type One event, the response becomes the focal point, and the public views the government as having a special mandate to intervene to safeguard property and lives during a natural disaster (Lerbinger, 1997, pp. 57-65). 4 On the other hand, Type Two focusing events are linked together because they generate legislative action and influence the public agenda. A "focusing event" is not only an attractive term, but it provides a useful vehicle 354 Fishman Downloaded by [Gothenburg University Library] at 12:50 08 October 2017 to discuss a sub-set within the category of crisis communication events that specifically are connected to the agenda-setting function for legislation or public discussion. The agenda-setting process deserves more attention, and how the public agenda is created, acted upon, and influenced by the media and public opinion should not be assumed to be a one-dimensional process, or that there is only one theory of how to conceptualize the "public agenda." Birkland relies heavily upon the work of Stone (1997) and Edelman (1964) in providing the methodological apparatus for a focusing events study. Stone (1997), for instance, contends that symbols are an important form of persuasion in a collective decision-making process, and that a dramatic news event can be crystallized to represent a symbol. Consequently, the symbolic representation of the event becomes a vital part of the political reasoning employed to justify a decision or policy outcome. In addition, the public often relies extensively upon these "symbols" and "narrative stories" to explain complex ideas and to dramatize a cause. In this sense, policy decisions can be viewed as a form of symbolic enactment, where individuals and groups utilize symbols and images to obtain "specific" and "tangible benefits" (Edelman, 1964, p. 5). Because Fink, Benoit, and Birkland's approaches were conceived independently, they understandably offer different strengths. To date, there has been a failure, however, to recognize the limitations that accrue in employing the models in isolation