De-Shelving Apartheid, Re-Imagining Resistance: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions and the Palestinian National Movement - Jonas X. Caballero

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De-Shelving Apartheid, Re-Imagining Resistance: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions and the Palestinian National Movement by Jonas Xavier Caballero Sidney Sussex College 12 August 2012 This dissertation is submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Middle Eastern Studies University of Cambridge 2012 Copyright © by Jonas X. Caballero 2012 ii De-Shelving Apartheid, Re-Imagining Resistance: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions and the Palestinian National Movement Jonas X. Caballero University of Cambridge, 2012 ABSTRACT The boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement entered the Palestinian political landscape in 2005 amidst the absence of a unified national liberation strategy and a truly representative Palestinian political body. By channeling extant energies through a three-tiered platform enshrined in the Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS, the movement has reinvigorated the Palestinian national movement. It has done so by mobilizing around principles that seek to unite Palestinians in their scattered communities in the occupied Palestinian territores, Israel, and the Diaspora. Further, BDS provides access to previously marginalized groups, most notably to Palestinian queer and Israeli activists, and has also drawn to the movement Palestinians disenchanted by prior forms of resistance. Due to the history of failures of the Palestinian leadership, Palestinian BDS activists have come to cherish the leaderless-ness of the movement. Although this may sustain Palestinian involvement in BDS, it may also be what prevents it from becoming a complete liberation strategy. At the same time, Palestinians within the movement have criticized it for engaging in antidemocratic and unfair practices. Thirty-six Palestinian BDS activists were interviewed for this study. The data analysis builds upon the existing literature on the history and development of Palestinian nationalism and iii political participation and explains how the BDS movement has emerged as an important factor in the development of the Palestinian national movement. This study also highlights the parallels and distinctions between BDS and prior forms of Palestinian nationalism and calls attention to the pitfalls and possibilities of BDS as a nascent strategy in the resistance to Israeli settler colonialism and apartheid. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................ IX   ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ X   1.0   CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1   1.1   BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY ........................................................................... 2   1.2   WHY FOCUS ON BDS? ............................................................................................. 5   1.3   RESEARCH QUESTIONS......................................................................................... 7   1.4   PREVIEW OF DISSERTATION CHAPTERS ....................................................... 7   2.0   CHAPTER TWO- REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ................................................... 9   2.1   BACKGROUND ON PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY ........ 10   2.2   THE 1936-1939 ARAB REVOLT IN PALESTINE ............................................... 13   2.3   FIRST INTIFADA..................................................................................................... 20   2.4   SECOND INTIFADA ................................................................................................ 26   3.0   CHAPTER THREE – METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS ....................................... 34   3.1   PARTICIPANT SELECTION ................................................................................. 34   3.2   DELIMITATIONS AND LIMITATIONS .............................................................. 35   3.3   METHOD ................................................................................................................... 37   4.0   CHAPTER FOUR- INTERVIEWS AND ANALYSIS .................................................. 39   4.1   ARRIVAL OF BDS ................................................................................................... 40   v 4.2   THE ACTIVISTS: WHO ARE THEY AND WHAT DROVE THEM TO BDS? 41   4.2.1   Before the BDS Call: Lifelong activism ....................................................... 42   4.2.2   After the BDS Call: Campuses and Cast Lead............................................ 43   4.2.3   BDS’s geographical specificity ...................................................................... 48   4.3   STAYING THE COURSE: FACTORS THAT SUSTAIN BDS ACTIVISM ..... 49   4.3.1   The legacy of the first Intifada ...................................................................... 50   4.3.2   The desire to return ....................................................................................... 52   4.3.3   Symbolic and economic impact of mounting BDS victories ....................... 55   4.4   PARALLELING A DISAPPOINTING PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP ........... 59   4.5   LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD? BDS POSSIBILITIES ............................. 63   4.5.1   Engaging the international ............................................................................ 66   4.5.2   Engaging the Israelis ...................................................................................... 70   4.5.3   Engaging the queers ....................................................................................... 72   4.6   DIRTY LAUNDARY: BDS PITFALLS .................................................................. 76   4.6.1   Speak for yourself! The issue of representation .......................................... 76   4.6.2   Witch-hunts and intimidation: the issue of accountability ........................ 80   4.6.2.1   The case of Sari Hanafi ...................................................................... 82   4.7   BDS REBUTTAL: INCONSISTENCIES IN THE LOGIC OF BDS................... 83   4.7.1   A smokescreen for the one-state solution? ................................................... 84   4.7.2   A compass without a destination: on the absence of a national liberation strategy ........................................................................................................................ 86   5.0   CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 88   vi 5.1   SUMMARY OF THE STUDY ................................................................................. 88   5.2   DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS ........................................................................ 89   5.3   IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE........................................................................ 93   BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 95   vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and the burning of Israeli settlement products. Photo by Nasser Ishtayeh, AP. Source: www.csmonitor.com 61   Figure 2. Meeting with Palestinian Minister of Health. Photo source: http://www.moh.ps ......... 62   viii DEDICATION “Your heart is a muscle the size of your fist.” -Unknown This study is dedicated to all those who have their fists held high. ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This project would not have been possible without the generous support from the US-UK Fulbright Commission, and I thank Michael Scott-Kline, Lauren Jacobs, Penny Egan, Monique Aronsohn, and the whole Fulbright team for their amazing work and dedication. My appreciation also goes to Suzannah Horner and Dr. Iain Black of Cambridge’s Sidney Sussex College for the special care and attention they have given me. I also thank the North American Foundation Fund for an additional research grant that allowed me to conduct my fieldwork in Palestine and the UK. Special thanks goes to my supervisor, Dr. Lori Allen, for the deep insight and encouragement given to me throughout the year that this study was undertaken. I also want to thank Tash Sabbah of the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies for her quick responses and kind words when times were rough. I want to acknowledge my rock, my buddy, my mother, Muffin Peluso. Without you none of this would have been possible. Thank you for the endless support! Enormous gratitude goes to Kate Daher, Courtney Nasser, Loubna El-Abbadi, Omar Hejleh, Bob Ross, Sarah Moawad, Ryan Branagan, Saleh Al Amer, Elaine Linn, Judy Zang, Neta Golan, Katie Miranda, David Caballero, Joey Edgar, John Nathan Jones, Billie Peluso, Mary Mack, Edgar Um, Koko Roberts, Andalusia, Etta Cetera, and all of my friends who encouraged me throughout this journey. To my lovely friends who left us too soon, Cristian x Cártes and Edith Wilson, you both hold special places in my heart and I know we will share coffee and Bloody Mary’s again one day! I want to especially thank Diana Buttu for giving that lecture on that fateful day in 2002. I dread thinking about where I would be had I not stumbled upon your words that day! Last but surely not least I would like to send my sincerest heartfelt gratitude to the Palestinians who took part in this study. For some, opening old wounds was painful. For others, speaking about sensitive topics was challenging. Thank you for your trust, your time, and your friendship. One of these days we will sip on some sweet shai bi na3na3 and watch those walls come crumbling down! Goddess willing. xi 1.0 CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION “Can three simple letters spell liberation for one of the world’s most polemic conflicts?” -Ben White, 2012 The boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement entered the Palestinian political landscape in 2005 amidst the absence of a unified national liberation strategy and a truly representative Palestinian political body. By channeling extant energies through a three-tiered platform enshrined in the Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS, the movement has reinvigorated the Palestinian national movement. It has done so by mobilizing around principles that seek to unite Palestinians in their scattered communities in the occupied Palestinian territores (OPT), Israel, and the Diaspora. Further, BDS provides access to previously marginalized groups, most notably to Palestinian queer and Israeli activists, and has also drawn to the movement Palestinians disenchanted by prior forms of resistance. Due to the history of failures of the Palestinian leadership, Palestinian BDS activists have come to cherish the leaderless-ness of the movement. Although this may sustain Palestinian involvement in BDS, it may also be what prevents it from becoming a complete liberation strategy. At the same time, Palestinians within the movement have criticized it for engaging in antidemocratic and unfair practices. Thirty-six Palestinian BDS activists were interviewed for this study. The data analysis builds upon the existing literature on the history and development of Palestinian nationalism and 1 political participation and explains how the BDS movement has emerged as an important factor in the development of the Palestinian national movement. This study also highlights the parallels and distinctions between BDS and prior forms of Palestinian nationalism and calls attention to the pitfalls and possibilities of BDS as a nascent strategy in the resistance to Israeli settler colonialism and apartheid. 1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY Over the past century, Palestinians have been confronted with an array of drawbacks preventing them from attaining liberation from settler colonialism or political rights enshrined in international law, let alone a state to call their own (Hammami and Tamari 2001; Khalidi 2006; Khalili 2007; Y. Sayigh 1997). These drawbacks have included collapsed negotiations and neglected agreements1 to unsuccessful armed and unarmed struggles, and a corrupt leadership claiming to represent the whole of the scattered Palestinian populations across the Middle East and throughout the world. Furthermore, the absence of any semblance of Palestinian societal cohesion both historically and more recently has rendered a solid and unified national liberation strategy illusory (Khalidi 1997). Struggling to stymie the rising apathy and frustration of a new generation of Palestinians who are all too aware of these failures, Palestinians have been left to ask themselves, “What else can we do?” 1 Such as the Madrid Conference (1991), Oslo Accords (1993), Oslo II (1995), Camp David (2000), and the Taba Summit (2001)). 2 On July 9, 2005, more than 170 Palestinian civil society organizations (CSOs)2 enacted a call for boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel “until it complies with international law and universal principles of human rights” (“Palestinian Call” 2005). Since the Call was enacted from within the walls of the OPT, political parties, human rights organizations, religious groups, and politicians across the globe have endorsed the united appeal for BDS. International student groups, trade unions, concerned consumers, academic institutions, and medical practitioners have also taken action against Israel by adopting BDS (Abu-Laban and Bakan 2009; Barghouti 2011; Qumsiyeh 2011). The Palestinian national movement has, in effect, been globalized, as Palestinians in their scattered locales and Palestine solidarity activists across the world can now easily engage in challenging Israel’s occupation and apartheid policies. The BDS Call3 was initiated by Palestinian refugees, Palestinians living in Israel, and Palestinians living in the OPT, and is supported by Palestinian political parties, women’s unions, refugee rights associations, trade unions, and others.4 The BDS Call urges economic, cultural, and academic boycotts, divestment, and sanctions against Israel until it adheres to its responsibilities under international law by: 1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands occupied in June 1967 and dismantling the Wall; 2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and 3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194 (“Introducing the BDS Movement”). 2 This paper uses the terms CSOs and NGOs (non-governmental institutions) interchangeably. 3 See “Palestinian Call for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions” for the full Call. 4 For a full a list of the civil society organizations that signed the Call, see “Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS.” 3 Palestinians BDS activists in this study believe that through broad boycott and divestment initiatives and the implementation of sanctions, Israel can be damaged both morally and economically. BDS, they believe, can eventually lead to the recognition of full Palestinian rights compliant within international law, similar to the way in which the antiapartheid movement against South Africa helped to bring down the apartheid regime there (Abu-Laban and Bakan 2009; Barghouti 2012; Clark and Worger 2004). It was through antiapartheid victories that “elite white South Africans realized that they could not continue with the apartheid system in the face of world anger” (Qumsiyeh 2011: 207). BDS activists believe similar activism will advance the demise of Israeli apartheid5 (Abu-Lana and Bakan 2009; Hijab 2011; Qumsiyeh 2011). Through boycotts, activists target Israeli and multinational companies that profit from the Israeli military occupation. Through economic boycotts, any person across the globe can engage in BDS, simply by refusing to purchase a product produced in Israel or in illegal Israeli colonies in the West Bank (“Introducing the BDS Movement”). BDS also targets all Israeli academic and 5 The 1973 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid defined apartheid as a crime against humanity and that “inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination” are defined as international crimes. The Apartheid Convention defines apartheid as “similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in southern Africa,” – including “inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them” (Dugard 2008). These acts include “murder, torture, inhuman treatment and arbitrary arrest of members of a racial group; deliberate imposition on a racial group of living conditions calculated to cause its physical destruction; legislative measures that discriminate in the political, social, economic and cultural fields; measures that divide the population along racial lines by the creation of separate residential areas for racial groups; the prohibition of interracial marriages; and the persecution of persons opposed to apartheid” (Dugard 2008). In 2011, the Russell Tribunal on Palestine found that Israel is engaged in an institutionalized regime of apartheid as defined by international law (“Russell Tribunal”). Former South African President Nelson Mandela, US President Jimmy Carter, Palestinian-American author Ali Abunimah, and Israeli historian Ilan Pappé have all stated that Israel is not only engaged in a system of apartheid but that its system is worse than the one practiced in South Africa (Lembede 2012, “Jimmy Carter” 2006, Abunimah 2006, Barat 2012). 4 cultural institutions on the grounds that these institutions either directly maintain or defend Israeli apartheid policies or have been complacent with Israeli human rights violations through their silence (“Call for Academic and Cultural Boycott” 2004). Through divestment, BDS activists target corporations that are complicit in Palestinian human rights violations. By focusing on investment portfolios and pension funds, activists promote divestment from targeted companies and reinvestment in alternative and socially responsible companies (“Introducing the BDS Movement”). Sanctions is arguably the hardest level for BDS activists to achieve due to Israel’s political ties to international governments, specifically the United States. In calling for sanctions against Israel, BDS hope to end international governments’ complicity in the Israeli occupation and apartheid policies (“Introducing the BDS Movement”). 1.2 WHY FOCUS ON BDS? Extensive research has been conducted on the history of Palestinian nationalism and political participation (Abraham 1984; Antonius 2000; Hammami and Tamari 2000; Khalidi 1997, 2006; Khalili 2007; Peteet 2000; Qumsiyeh 2011; R. Sayigh 2007a; Y. Sayigh 1997; Swedenburg 1990, 1995; Tamari 2009). However, due to the nascency of the movement, none of the literature positions BDS within the history and development of Palestinian nationalism. The purpose of this study is to expand upon the rather large body of research on the history and development of Palestinian nationalism by (1) situating the BDS movement and the biographies of Palestinian BDS activists within it and (2) assessing the parallels and comparisons of BDS as they pertain to prior assertions of Palestinian nationalism. By “assertions” of Palestinian nationalism I am referring to periods of sustained Palestinian resistance against 5 colonial and settler colonial rule in Palestine. Although many articles and analyses exist of BDS in newspapers, on websites, and occasionally in scholarly journals, none that I have found examine BDS within the broader history of Palestinian activism or Palestinian nationalism. Nor has BDS been viewed through an ethnographic lens centered on Palestinian BDS activists in order to discern how Palestinians view BDS with regard to the trajectory of Palestinian activism. It is important to consider this trajectory within the theory of new social movements, which serves as an appropriate framework of analysis for this study. As Nash points out, today’s historic metamorphoses in the Middle East warrant analyses of the previously underestimated power of social movements with their capability of altering the future (Nash 2005). The existing literature on new social movements will benefit by incorporating analyses of of the current BDS movement6 while simultaneously securing a place for BDS (and the recent wave of revolutionary movements across the Middle East). Furthermore, new social movements tend to incorporate new tactics that help to amplify their message in the global market of human rights activism (Nash 2005). The transnational dimension of BDS connects the movement to broader human rights struggles and social movements. For example, in February 2012, the Oakland chapter of the Occupy Wall Street movement voted to back the BDS movement.7 In September 2012, BDS will be a key focus of the “World Social Forum Free Palestine,” which will convene in Sao Paolo, Brazil. According to its website, the World Social Forum Free Palestine: is an expression of the human instinct to unite for justice and freedom and an echo of the World Social Forum’s opposition to neo-liberal hegemony, colonialism, and 6 In this essay I am concerned with what I call the current BDS movement as there have been actions related to boycott, divestment, and sanctions in Palestine as early as the 1880s. For example, Palestinians during this time petitioned the Ottoman government to sanction “the onward drive of Zionism” (Qumsiyeh 2011: 207). 7 The proposal passed with 135 “yes” votes, 1 “no” vote, and 12 abstentions (Barrows-Friedman 2012a). 6 racism through struggles for social, political and economic alternatives to promote justice, equality, and the sovereignty of peoples (“Call for the World Social Forum” 2012). This kind of networking, coupled with the effects of international social movements and protest groups on transnational movements, is crucial to understanding new social movements (Abdelrahman 2011). With this is mind, we can begin to probe the following research questions that have guided this study. 1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS By examining BDS within the history and development of the Palestinian national movement, we can begin to answer the following research questions that guided my study: Is the BDS movement an important development in the Palestinian national movement? What draws previously marginalized and disenchanted Palestinians to and sustains their involvement in BDS; who is part of Palestinian BDS politics that underlie BDS efforts and how do Palestinian activists view BDS in relation to other forms of Palestinian activism? What are the parallels, distinctions, and drawbacks of BDS with regard to prior assertions of Palestinian nationalism? 1.4 PREVIEW OF DISSERTATION CHAPTERS Chapter Two investigates the major tropes of the Palestine national movement extracted from the existing literature. Reviewed in this literature are three assertions of Palestinian nationalism that have emerged since the beginning of the Zionist movement in the late nineteenth century. They 7 include the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine and the first and second Intifadas. In Chapter Three I describe the methodology used in this study including the relevance and significance of conducting ethnographic interviews as a methodology for data collection. The chapter explains my process for participant selection and addresses the limitations and ethical considerations of this study. In Chapter Four, I present and analyze the data obtained through the interview process and highlight the primary themes that arose with regard to this study’s research questions. Chapter Five summarizes the findings and emphasizes the study’s implications. 8 2.0 CHAPTER TWO- REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE “In the long run, the settlements and walls that are built to confine the Palestinians can only provoke further humiliation, which will lead to further resistance, and perhaps stimulate different political forms and political leadership.” -Rashid Khalidi, 2006 The quest to define what is Palestinian, Palestinian nationalism, and indeed to define who or what speaks for the Palestinian people, has been long and arduous. It has been a quest fraught with varying operations centers8 and opposing ideologies on what constitutes Palestinian nationalism or a national liberation strategy (Beinin 1990; Jabber, Lesch, and Quandt 1973; Khalidi 1997, 2006; Khalili 2007; Y. Sayigh 1997). This quest for representation, identity, and resistance strategies has continued in the absence of an internationally recognized state entity and often in opposition to what has typically been considered the sole representative body of the Palestinian people: the PLO. Recent literature on the Palestinian national movement “mirrors the dynamics of incoherent contemporary Palestinian politics,” much of which is guided by a statist or post-colonial framework9 (Qato, et al, 2012: 3). Although this may be partially true, evidence of an alternative framework exists, for example, in Adam Hanieh’s (2011) examination of 8  Including the West Bank, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt (Khalidi 1997, 2006; Y. Sayigh 1997). 9 Recent scholarship on Palestinian political history tends to focus on the occupation or theorizes about establishing Palestinian statehood under occupation, rather than focusing on an agenda based on liberation aimed at challenging the settler colonial structure (Qato, et al. 2012).     9 capitalism and class and its role in state building. One may also look to Beinin’s discussion of Marxist politics in the conflict, when in the 1930s the Palestine Communist Party explained the conflict as one between the indigenous Palestinians and the Zionist settler colonial program (1990: 7). Nevertheless, my study aims to redirect the focus into the framework of liberation and anti-settler colonial activism. This chapter examines the scholarly literature pertinent to the focus of this study. In this chapter, I examine the patterns, pitfalls, and possibilities of past assertions of Palestinian nationalism and highlight important themes that will allow us to examine the parallels and comparisons to the budding BDS movement. 2.1 BACKGROUND ON PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY When charting the development of nationalism or national identity, the primary question that arises is, “Where do I begin?” National movements, after all, are composed of a series of disconnected points and uneven edges through which finding the ideological and political relevance in today’s world can prove challenging (Chatterjee 1999). Brubaker writes that the “nation” should be seen as “a category of practice, not a category of analysis” (1996: 7). To properly understand “nationalism,” he continues, we must understand how “nation” has “come to structure perception, to inform thought and experience, and to organize discourse and political action” (1996: 7). With this in mind, the following paragraphs call attention to how the Palestinian “nation” and the perception and exploitation of it has been structured, organized, and politicized through various assertions of Palestinian nationalism. Khalidi (1997) proposes that Palestinian identity began its development long before the Nakba (catastrophe), which resulted in the expulsion and flight of over 700,000 Palestinian 10 Arabs and the destruction of over 500 villages (Khalidi 2006; Pappé 2006; R. Sayigh 2007a, 2007b; Y. Sayigh 1997). Palestinian resistance to Zionism began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries against the waves of Jewish immigration to historic Palestine and continued well into the British mandate period (Kayyali 1978; Khalidi 1997; Mandel 1976; Said 1979; Wolfe 2012). Although some scholars have charged that the Palestinian masses “were politically, socially and intellectually non-existent” (Khalidi 1997: 96), others have refuted that claim by chronicling the political and social activities of the Palestinians (Khalidi 1997; R. Sayigh 2007a; Swedenburg 1990, 1995). They call attention to the early undertakings against settler colonialism and the early formation of Palestinian identity and nationalism. Additionally, the Nakba serves as a universal topic of discussion among Palestinians across geographic and temporal spaces, playing an essential role in the creation and development of identity (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di 2007; R. Sayigh 2007a). However, it is important to look at the genesis of Palestinian identity and nationalism from an earlier point (Khalili 2007, Khalidi 1997; Neal 2005; Peteet 2000; Shafir 1996). Marginalizing pre-1948 confrontations against Jewish immigration to Palestine10 or the challenging of British decrees aimed at hindering the work of Arab farmers does an analysis on Palestinian nationalism a disservice. For it is these early acts of rebellion against a settler colonial program that served as the model for future Palestinian activism, such as the armed movements of the 1930s and 1960s (Gregory 2007, Khalidi 1997, Y. Sayigh 1997). The “existence of overlapping senses of identity” from the local and familial to the transnational and nation-state loyalties, has resulted in “the absence of even a minimal consensus 10 In 1918, the Arabs constituted 92.1 percent of the population while Jews constituted 7.9 percent (McCarthy 1990). 11 on national identity” (Khalidi 1997: 20). Though no nationalist movement is wholly unified and coherent, this disunity has rendered Palestinians powerless against their foes, namely the Zionists and the (mandate) British and (pro-Israel) American governments (Khalidi 1997: 25). The Palestinians’ lack of access to state structures, which their Arab neighbors and Zionist enemies possessed, only complicated matters further (Khalidi 1997, 2006). Even when those state (or pseudostate) structures existed, as we shall see, Palestinians have been confronted with an ineffective and disunited struggle against the settler colonial movement in their homeland (Peteet 1995). It is important to bear in mind this background on Palestinian nationalism and identity as many of these shared experiences and collective memories influence Palestinian involvement in political activism. Factors that have influenced these assertions include: worsening political and economic realities on the ground, debates over tactics and strategies, and Palestinian disillusionment with their leadership. In this section I call attention to common tropes within these assertions, such as the significance of the populist and leadership-less makeup of the movements and the response by the colonial and Palestinian authorities to undermine these assertions of nationalism. I also examine the impact of Palestinian apathy and frustration on the uprisings in this study, uprisings that have faced an array of internal and external challenges. These themes will help to explain why some Palestinians have chosen to engage in BDS as a present-day assertion of Palestinian nationalism. 12 2.2 THE 1936-1939 ARAB REVOLT IN PALESTINE The 1936-1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine is one of several key moments in the history of the Palestinian national movement that incorporates both popular mobilization and a degradation of the ensuing political unity due to a disjointed, untrustworthy, and uninspiring leadership. The revolt is one of several examples in which the relationship between the populace and its representatives has been plagued by fragmentation, which resulted in a collapse of the popular movement. In this section I examine the nature and relationship between the leadership and the populist character of the revolt and the organization of the leadership and mobilization of the people involved in the struggle on the ground. Copious works chronicle the 1936-39 revolt and offer analyses as to its causes and decline (Abu-Ghazaleh 1972; Antonius 2000; Bowden 1975; Khalidi 2006; Matthews 2006; Norris 2008; Porath 1977; Qumsiyeh 2011; R. Sayigh 2007a; Swedenburg 1990, 1995). Although initially targeting British and Zionist policies, the revolt would later become as much a battle against the Palestinian political leadership (Stein 1990: 17), a theme that would reemerge in subsequent uprisings (Allen 2005; Bishara 2008; Pearlman 2012; Tamari 1991). Rosemary Sayigh writes that the revolt served as the “backbone for Palestinian resistance” (2007a: 4) and was the “most sustained phase of militant anti-imperialist struggle in the Arab world” prior to the outbreak of the Algerian War of Independence (2007a: 43). In an effort to challenge British colonial rule, under which Jewish immigration to Palestine increased immensely,11 Palestinians engaged in a rebellion that entered onto the Palestinian political 11 In 1882, Jews numbered 24,000 and 85,000 by 1914 (Mandel 1976: xxix). In 1918, 7.9% of the population in Palestine was Jewish compared to 92.1% that was Arab (Wintemute 2012: 112). By 1935, the Jewish population rose to 29.6% (Himadeh 1939: 32). 13 landscape in 1936. In terms of its political cohesiveness, the first phase of the revolt appeared to offer the possibility of success. A general strike was almost fully observed by the whole of the Arab population in Palestine. Shopkeepers, merchants, and many others either voluntarily observed it or were coerced into observing it.12 The six-month strike proved successful in that Palestinians effectively initiated a nationwide and nationalistic resistance strategy (Porath 1997: 163). The revolt was led by the uneducated masses that expressed clear demands. Among these demands were the halting of Jewish immigration and land transfers and establishing a representative Palestinian government (Norris 2008; Porath 1977; Swedenburg 1990). The revolt saw the creation of a “Coalition of Parties,” which effectively enhanced cooperation among the various parties of the time. The Coalition became the supreme authority of the Palestinian national movement (Porath 1977: 166) in much the same way that the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) and the BDS National Committee (BNC) became the authorities in subsequent movements. Prior to 1936, there had never been such a lengthy strike anywhere in the world targeting a colonial regime (Khalidi 2006: 106). The spontaneous peasant-led rebellion operated independently and to the detriment of the elite Palestinian leadership, which hoped to call off the strike and promote alternative means to resolving the Palestinian predicament (Swedenburg 1995: xx). Nevertheless, the grassroots movement continued, targeting the greatest imperial power on the world stage at that time. The Palestinian people took matters into their own hands, 12 For example, Palestinian “strike forces” waged a campaign of murder and intimidation against some Palestinians who were either not observing the strike or who were considered to be collaborators (Matthews 2006; Swedenburg 1995). Similar tactics of intimidation were also employed in the first and second Intifadas (Khalidi 2006; Y. Sayigh 1997). 14 marking a pivotal moment in the Palestinian national movement and opening up a wave of possibilities for the resistance movement. The first phase of the revolt was politically cohesive for the first six months. But, as would be the case in subsequent mass mobilizations against colonial rule in Palestine, this unity would be short-lived. As Stein (1989) notes, the revolt ensued at a time before the creation of the state of Israel and before the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Palestinian Authority (PA) served as representative bodies for the Palestinian people. No United Nations resolutions regarding the conflict had been passed (for there was no UN) and the fact that the Nakba was more than a decade away meant that most Palestinians were still in Palestine. Without Palestinian parastate institutions, which would exist during the forthcoming uprisings, the ruling Palestinian elite dominated the political arena at the time of the revolt. These elite rulers considered themselves the heirs of Ottoman rule in Palestine and deemed their leadership a natural element in the trajectory of Palestinian politics (Swedenburg 1990). Historically, the Palestinian leadership has been preoccupied with maintaining political control. During the revolt, Palestinian leaders accommodated the British colonial powers to a certain extent in order to maintain this control (Khalidi 2006: 80-1). Meanwhile, rivalries played out between the al-Husaynis and the Nashashibis, the leading political families. Still, even as the notable families fought amongst themselves, almost all of the Palestinian leadership accommodated the colonial forces and remained relatively friendly to the colonial power (Khalidi 2006: 78). None dared to mobilize the Palestinian populace against the British because on the one hand the elite Palestinian families had political and economic ties to the British and on the other hand they did not want to relinquish their top-down approach of governance to which they were accustomed (Khalidi 2006: 81-2; Porath 1977: 169). Adel Samara refers to 15 these elite families as “comprador bourgeois” who, guided by personal interests related to political survival, have compromised with “the enemy” and serve as the “main vehicle for the realization of normalization” (2001: 63). Meanwhile, the divide between the ruling elite and the people was widening. The British and Zionists forces recognized this rural-elite disconnect and the leadership’s internal disputes, and pitted the Palestinian leaders against each other, exacerbating existing tensions within the leadership (Khalidi 2006: 69). This left Palestinians open to foreign exploitation and faced with increasingly inept Palestinian governance. Palestinians in the 1930s were frustrated by their leadership’s cooperation with the occupiers, the influx of Jewish immigration, and a degrading economic situation in Palestine (Stein 1990). Not only had their leaders not secured a government but also they had not secured basic human and political rights for the people. Frustration, impatience, and political mistrust permeated the Palestinian street (El-Hasan 2010; Stein 1991). The revolt was a ticking time bomb, the onset of which was sparked by the killing of the popular cleric ‘Izz-id-Din al-Qassam by British forces and the discovery of an illegal shipment of arms and ammunition intended for Jewish recipients (Porath 1997; Schleifer 1981). In April 1936, the disenchantment led to the spontaneous outbreak of the nationwide general strike (Khalidi 1997; Stein 1990, 1991). The traditional leadership, surprised by the uprising, was now confronted with a revolt sustained by massive grassroots and popular resistance (Khalidi 1997: 26-7). Widespread popular support raised the possibility for the Palestinian public that a sustained uprising could prove successful. The Palestinian leadership meanwhile was faced with an insurgency that it could not control. Fearing losing their power, the Palestinian leaders sought to control the uprising, a challenging feat considering the massive disconnect between the rulers and the people (Stein 1989: 14). 16 What began to take shape in 1936 was something new and auspicious. It was a grassroots initiative aimed at persuading all of the towns and cities to observe the strike, constituting an early campaign of anti-normalization with the occupation. National committees materialized to support the strike and the strikers, initiating the legacy and importance of civil society’s role in Palestinian resistance. This was also happening at a time before Palestinians were completely dependent on the Israeli economy, as discussed in the following section. During the 1930s, the Arab economy was growing respectably and the general strikes could have had a very real economic impact (Kaplan and Metzer 334). During the revolt, much of the Jewish building industry came to a halt and economic distress was surely inflicted upon the Jewish population. Nevertheless, the economic growth of the Jewish community ensured that the Jewish industry and economy would not collapse (Porath 1977: 174). At the same time, Palestinians were forming new strategies, demands, and further grassroots campaigns aimed at resisting British rule and the Palestinian leadership (Khalidi 2006; Swedenburg 1990). One such group committed to challenging the Palestinian elite and their normalization with the British and Zionist forces was the Palestinian Istiqlal (Independence) Party. The group was committed to mass public organization and was steadfast in its anticolonial, noncooperation ideology (Khalidi 2006; Porath 1977; Swedenburg 1995). At the time, this political faction was the most ardent in its drive for popular mobilization (Matthews 2006: 233). Another example of early Palestinian commitment to anti-normalization efforts can be seen in the Istiqlalis called for a nationwide boycott of the British and noncompliance with colonial laws. Khalidi writes that the formation of the Istiqlal Party signified the dissatisfaction of Palestinians of not only the uninspiring leadership but also of unsuccessful tactics of resistance (2006: 83-4). Although the Istiqlal Party survived for only two years, it marked the 17 beginning of a chain of rebellious acts by discontented Palestinians that would spring up during subsequent uprisings (Khalidi 2006: 86). In the early months of the second phase of the revolt, which began in autumn 1937, the Palestinian rank and file engaged in spontaneous acts of armed rebellion without any centralized command (Swedenburg 1995: 122-3). This is important with regard to the subsequent assertions of Palestinian nationalism and resistance, especially the BDS movement, for three reasons. First, it was imbued with a popular participation that was decentralized and localized, which was key to the rebellion’s success (Swedenburg 1995: 127). It presented Palestinians with the possibility that they could control their own movement without the coordination of the double-dealing elites. Second, the grassroots and populist nature of the revolt was considered to be militarily advantageous as it allowed Palestinians to organize according to local mastery of the land and communities, rather than by regional commanders who could either not be trusted or who knew little of the local geography (Swedenburg 1995: 126-7). Third, by remaining decentralized, the movement allowed for the guerillas to engage in constant attacks against the British and Zionist forces. It also allowed each community to rely on the local people for moral and domestic support. This saw the increase of a grassroots and decentralized mass mobilization, which expanded the anticolonial struggle to a point never before seen when headed by the urban leadership (Swedenburg 1995: 136). Common Palestinians were challenging the world’s greatest colonial power without the assistance of an institutionalized leadership. It was a good attempt and the Palestinians achieved some successes in challenging British control. For example, the colonial authorities lost control of several Palestinian cities and were forced to temporarily retreat (Khalidi 2006; Swedenburg 1995). However, the revolt was doomed to fail. This was due to a number of pitfalls, including 18 the absence of a unified resistance strategy, the absence of any Palestinian political apparatus, elite factionalism, and the revolt’s deficiency in articulating clear and achievable goals (Stein 1990; Swedenburg 1995). Swedenburg (1990) considers inadequate leadership as the chief contribution to the failure of the revolt. The lack of state structures and the divisions in the rural-urban arena also played a major role in splintering the Palestinians, weakening them internally and opening them up for defeat (Khalidi 1997: 26-7). The disagreement on what strategies to employ or how to mobilize the masses effectively was also a contributing factor (Khalidi 2006: 105-6). Tamari (1991) notes that the debate over strategies carried on into the first Intifada. But Khalidi (2005) and Norris (2008) question whether an advanced leadership or national resistance program would have advanced the movement in the 1930s. The Palestinians, after all, were up against the greatest imperial power and a strong Zionist movement that would only be given more credence with onset of the Holocaust. I have described some of the patterns, pitfalls, and possibilities of the early Palestinian movement against colonial rule in Palestine. What we have seen is that Palestinians in the revolt engaged in early forms of boycott, anti-normalization, strikes, and civil disobedience, against the wishes of their leaders. Frustrated by a self appointed leadership, which was not only unsuccessful in averting British control and Jewish immigration but also in securing any basic rights for the Palestinian population, major segments of society rebelled against the leadership and the occupying powers. Palestinian dissatisfaction with their leadership and disillusionment with unsuccessful means of resistance was not confined to the years of the revolt. Instead, this is part of a larger pattern of a grassroots perception and response to a leadership afflicted by internal discord. The Palestinian leadership tried futilely to control and direct the revolt, a pattern 19 that would continue throughout the subsequent uprisings, albeit with new parameters set by local and international developments. 2.3 FIRST INTIFADA The first Intifada constitutes a second example in the history of the Palestinian national movement that is characterized by mass mobilization and disillusionment with the traditional (PLO-led) Palestinian leadership. The first Intifada erupted at a time when a political stalemate existed between the two opposing forces: the Palestinian national movement and Israel (Hammami 2000: par. 3; Hammami and Tamari 2001: 6). Furthermore, the economic realities for both Palestinians and Israelis were also much different than during the time of the 1936-39 revolt. Israel’s military occupation of the OPT, which began in 1967, meant that Israel was in complete control of the economy of the OPT. Israel succeeded in the underdevelopment of the Palestinian economy while encouraging Palestinians to economically integrate themselves into the labor force in Israel.13 Sara Roy’s case study on the Gaza Strip, just prior to the outbreak of the Intifada, brings to light Israel’s role in the de-development of the coastal region. This was achieved through factors such as discriminatory tax laws, low levels of investment in Palestinian infrastructure, and restricted access to international markets due to Israel’s tight control over Gazan trade (Roy 1987: 83). The economic situation was further worsened by Israel’s appropriation of almost half of total Palestinian land in the West Bank and a third of Gaza’s by 1987 (Peretz 1990: 9). This had grave consequences for Palestinians in the agricultural sector. 13 Palestinian workers in Israel numbered 115,000 just prior to Oslo. In 2007, that number would drop to 68,000 (“Workers from the Territories” 2011: par. 2). 20 Up until 1987, all Palestinian produce marketed outside of the OPT had to be channeled through the Israeli Agricultural Export Company (Peretz 1990: 10). Furthermore, until the outbreak of the Intifada, roughly 40% of the Gaza and 30% of the West Bank labor forces were employed in Israel. The result was a heavy dependence on the Israeli economy and massive Palestinian trade deficits (Arnon and Weinblatt 2001: 293). Neve Gordon writes that this dependency on the Israeli economy, an intensifying disparity between Israelis and Palestinians, and the absence of economic opportunities for Palestinians in the OPT, were contributing factors to the outbreak of the Intifada (2008: 92). The deterioration of the economic situation and Israel’s continued annexation of Palestinian land ushered in the first Intifada in December 1987. As Said notes, the Palestinian will “had reached a threshold of pain it could no longer bear” (1989: 14). Although the objectives of the uprising were broad and unclear, the Intifada initially succeeded in mobilizing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians through direct actions and civil disobedience against the Israeli forces (Beinin and Lockman 1989; Hiltermann 1991; Khalidi 2006; Peretz 1990; Tamari 2009; Yiftachel 2002). Without this mass mobilization of women, youth, and laborers, the uprising would have been impossible (Tamari 1991: 67). Like the 1936-39 revolt, the grassroots uprising of 1987 took Israel and the traditional Palestinian leadership by surprise, a leadership that was itself composed of a myriad of often contesting voices14 (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Hiltermann 1991; Khalidi 1997, Kimmerling and Migdal 1993; Lockman and Beinin 1989; Y. Sayigh 1997; Schiff and Ya’Ari 1990; Tamari 2009). The Intifada effectively redefined the 14 This leadership included Fatah, the largest faction of the PLO, along with a number of other movements, including the Marxist-Leninist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the communist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the social-democratic Palestinian People’s Party, and others. 21 Palestinian national movement as a populist struggle and relocated and refocused it to the West Bank and Gaza and away from the absolute authority of the PLO residing in Tunis. The Intifada also saw the creation of a number of grassroots “leaderships,” as seen in the UNLU, which was “more responsive to the people’s needs” than the leadership of the 1936-39 revolt (Stein 1990: 74). The spontaneous unarmed uprising not only rallied the Palestinian people but also impressed itself upon international public opinion (Hammami and Tamari 2001; Khalidi 1997, 2006). The Palestinian civilian population, in effect, replaced the fighters with “a nonmilitaristic form nationalist activity” (Amireh 2003: 758). The number of monthly popular resistance activities leading up to the Intifada, such as demonstrations, rallies, and strikes, escalated from over 900 in 1985 to just under 3,000 in 1987 (Qumsiyeh 2011). The Palestinian people themselves, rather than nationalist groups abroad, took the reigns of the rebellion and in effect “pulled the urban leadership along” (Swedenburg 1990: 28). Palestinians in the OPT, incorporating student organizations, labor unions, and women’s groups, rather than the traditional leadership, now appeared as the active agents of Palestinian national liberation (Giacaman 1998; Hiltermann 1991; Khalidi 2006; Swedenburg 1990). Tamari (1991) notes that the populism that took root during the first Intifada was aimed at upsetting the status quo and challenging the balance of power. The aim of this new grassroots alternative was directed away from the traditional leadership and was considered an antidote to earlier limitations of the nationalist movement. Palestinians who were previously marginalized and reluctant to join the armed underground movement now found a place in the new populist framework of the struggle (Tamari 1991: 65). The Intifada, of a largely unarmed and youthful nature, was able to achieve “in weeks what years of costly armed struggle had failed to produce” (Y. Sayigh 1997: 614). For example, Israel was hard hit when between forty and sixty percent of 22 the Palestinian workforce refused to show up for their jobs in Israel in the first months of the Intifada, forcing Israel to utilize foreign laborers (Peretz 1990: 148). The Intifada also had harmful effects on Israeli commerce, agriculture, construction, and the textile and tourist industries.15 Although the tactics employed in the uprising (boycotts, strikes, refusal to pay taxes) were largely seen as political maneuvers aimed at mobilizing popular support for the uprising, they nevertheless were economically burdensome for Israel (Bishara 1989: 225). Boycott, as a popular tactic against normalization, replaced the absence of official anti-normalization and indicated that “the popular classes are able to find their way independently of the rulers” (Samara 2001: 63). Similar to the 1936-39 revolt, this increased confidence in the people that they themselves could direct their own struggle and get closer to achieving their goals (ending the occupation, securing self-determination, and implementing UN resolutions), rather than placing their trust in a disenchanting leadership based abroad. Two frameworks of Palestinian political participation and organization were at play. On the one hand was a political strategy based on grassroots and decentralized activism. On the other hand there existed a Palestinian bureaucracy based on the centralized leadership of the PLO fuelled by statist ambitions (Khalili 2007; Y. Sayigh 1997). To combat the former, the PLO leadership in exile sought to undermine the Intifada, considering it a challenge to its monopoly on Palestinian organizing (Qumsiyeh 2011; Schiff and Ya’Ari 1990). By shifting the notion of political struggle and placing the power of 15 The sale of Israeli products in the OPT dropped from $928 million to $650 million during the first year of the uprising; Israeli citrus farmers faced losing $20 million per week without the import of thousands of foreign workers; Israeli construction sales plummeted and companies faced bankruptcy; sales of Israeli textiles dropped by thirty percent (Peretz 1990: 148-50); and by the end of 1988, the hotel industry experienced a direct loss of over $100 million while the tourist industry as a whole lost an estimated $500 million (Bishara 1989: 228) 23 Palestinian activism in the hands of the Palestinians themselves, the ownership of the Palestinian national struggle was momentarily ripped from the hands of the PLO (Swedenburg 1990). Similar to the years prior to the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, the Palestinian leadership prior to the Intifada failed to secure any solid rights for the Palestinians. Now, Israel was in full military control of most Palestinian cities and villages. The Intifada was a wakeup call to Israel that colonial rule alone would no longer be able to govern the occupied16 (N. Gordon 2008; Hiltermann 1991; Khalidi 2006; Schiff and Ya’Ari 1990). It also raised the possibility for Palestinians that civil society and mass organization yet again yielded more power than the collective efforts of the self-appointed Palestinian leadership (Hammami 2000: par. 3). The exiled leadership, headed by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, endeavored meticulously to control the uprising (Khalidi 1997, 2006; Kimmerling and Migdal 1993; Y. Sayigh 1997). This pattern of co-opting the popular movement, as we have seen during the revolt, was a central component of the leadership’s aims and would continue throughout both Intifadas and into the BDS movement. The distinction between the 1936-39 revolt and the first Intifada, however, is that the Palestinian leadership attempted to do so while safeguarding the plan for achieving a two-state solution (Y. Sayigh 1997: 688). This was in stark contrast to what activists were calling for 16 From 1977-1981, there were 500 documented acts of resistance by Palestinians against the occupation annually; from 1982-1987 the annual rate was above 3,000. These acts included flag raising, rock throwing, burning tires, blocking roads, distributing leaflets, and incidents involving explosives, firearms, and stabbings (N. Gordon 2008: 149). In response, Israel altered its tactics at maintaining the occupation and quelling the resistance. The Israeli response to the Intifada included: the implementation of the Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s “Break the Bones” policy by which Israeli soldiers systematically beat thousands of Palestinians, breaking their ribs and joints; an increase in killings (1,042 Palestinians killed between 1987 and 1992); mass incarceration (13,000 Palestinians were imprisoned by 1990); torture (some 8,000 Palestinians tortured during the Intifada); the reintroduction of Israel’s deportation policy, which resulted in the expulsion of over 500 Palestinians; house demolitions; and restrictions on freedom of movement (including systems of curfew, entry-permit, and closure) (N. Gordon 2008: 156-64). 24 during the revolt and in the Intifada itself. The demands of the revolt included an immediate cessation to Jewish immigration, self-determination, and the establishment of a Palestinian government without any territorial concessions (Quinn 2002; Swedenburg 1995). The latter, on the other hand, as seen in the UNLU’s communiqués, included “recognition of the PLO, the refugee’s right of return, and the right to self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state” in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (McDowall 1989: 121). The latter demand marked a major shift from the non-state-based demands of the revolt and the early years of the Intifada, as the goals now began to be articulated from under the authority of the PLO (Gelvin 2007: 218). The PLO’s co-opting of the Intifada specifically and Palestinian nationalism generally succeeded. The signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords, which effectively ended the first Intifada, relayed to the scattered Palestinian communities, to Israel, and to the world, that the PLO was the sole legitimate representative body of the Palestinian people (Giacaman 1998; Khalidi 1997, Khalili 2006). For the Palestinian leaders, Oslo would serve as the main reference point while the newly created PA maintained jurisdiction over the two and a half million Palestinians residing in Gaza and the West Bank. But, as Giacaman points out, new questions arose with regard to the relationship between the populace and the leadership “from the throes of an agreement made in an atmosphere of resignation” (1998: 2). In essence, the PLO now controlled public representations of Palestinian political identity, the key to which was firmly replanted in the hands of the Palestinian elite, not the peasantry, not the grassroots, not the women and the youth. Although Oslo saw the creation of the PA as an administrative organization, Palestinians were left without a real national government, and the struggle for self-determination and independence from the occupation was 25 taken from the hands of Palestinians on the ground. Meanwhile, Israel remained superior on several levels, including military prowess, state structure, economy, and superpower alliance (Khalidi 1997). Palestinians, on the other hand, remained strong in maintaining a national identity, but would that be sufficient to gain liberation from a well-equipped settler colonial regime supported by the world’s only superpower? Palestinians attempted to answer this question with the forthcoming assertion of Palestinian nationalism. 2.4 SECOND INTIFADA The establishment of a Palestinian government prior to a Palestinian state was bound to have dire effects on the Palestinian national movement (Hilal 1991). Giacaman (1991) notes that this parastate entity would threaten Palestinian civil society on the one hand due to disarray within the PLO and on the other due to the agreements with Israel mandated by Oslo. This resulted in further straining the relationship between the state and civil society, especially now that many Palestinians were coming to regard the PA as a policing force for Israel (Giacaman 1991: 13). The PA’s five-year mandate put forth in Oslo has long since expired and Palestinians have come to realize that national liberation, as in the earlier uprisings, has again been upstaged by the PLO’s substitute motivation: political and financial survival (Khalidi 2006; Y. Sayigh 1997). Its marginalization of the refugees, 17 enforcement of Israeli policy, territorial compromises, 17 The PA’s authority over the 3.6 million Palestinians in the OPT excluded Palestinian refugees (the majority of Palestinians in total), leading to a sense of abandonment by the PA (Khalidi 2006). It was also clear to some Palestinian refugees that the Palestinian leadership in the post- Oslo environment was willing to bargain away the right of return in exchange for a Palestinian 26 political repression, and overall undermining of grassroots mobilization revealed the PLO’s corruptibility and incompetence. Furthermore, the Palestinian people were unable to direct a national strategy or engage in political participation (Hammami and Tamari 2001; Y. Sayigh 1997). The overall trend, according to Yezid Sayigh, was towards “statist political institutionalization” (1997: 671) rather than through armed or unarmed resistance to the occupation, and the PA was in control. The signing of the Oslo Accords signified, as Samara puts it, Palestinian “life as negotiations” rather than “life as resistance” (2011). Furthermore, the economic situation was further aggravated since Oslo. The standard of living and per capita incomes for Palestinians declined tremendously while unemployment and poverty increased (Fidler and Harb 2002: 342). Palestinian GDP per capita increased a mere six (US) dollars from $1,380 in 1995 to $1,386 in 2000 (Khalidi 2006: 203). This was largely due to a steep decline in the number of Palestinians employed in Israel. Prior to the outbreak of the first Intifada, 110,000 Palestinians worked inside Israel (“Workers” 2011: par. 6). Whereas Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank working in Israel were between 30-40% in the previous two decades, this number slumped to 14% in 1996 (Arnon and Weinblatt 2001: 298). In 2007, the number of Palestinian workers in Israel would slump to 68,000, a decline from 25% to 10% of the Palestinian workforce (“Workers” 2011: pars. 6-7). Since the beginning of the uprising, about 80,000 Palestinians were prevented from working in Israel or the Israeli settlements (Hanieh 2002). state (Khalili 2007). Also see Aruri (2003), Samara (2011), and Suleiman (2006) on PA compromises and corruption. 27 Israeli closures18 and the employing of foreign laborers also contributed to the decline of Palestinian labor in Israel (Arnon and Weinblatt 2001: 299). Closures would also have a dire effect on the sale of Palestinian goods to Israel, as exports were effectively cut in half between 1992 and 1995 (Arnon and Weinblatt 2001: 300). A number of other factors contributed to the undermining of the fragile Palestinian economy, including: obstructions to freedom of movement, increased checkpoints and roadblocks, Jewish settlement expansion, and the construction of the wall (Khalidi 2006). The effect could be seen in the Palestinian GDP per capita, which declined between 2000 and 2004, from $1,386 to $1,146 (Khalidi 2006: 203). At the same time, the Palestinian leadership operated amidst a system with no checks and balances, one “rife with cronyism,” which granted senior official VIP status, allowing for freedom of movement, while their children traveled abroad for education (Khalidi 2006: 204). This infuriated the Palestinian people and played a role in the defeat of Fateh in the 2006 elections (Khalidi 2006: 204). The failure of Oslo, the worsening economic situation, and the corrupt Palestinian leadership set the backdrop for a third assertion of Palestinian nationalism: the al-Aqsa Intifada. Roy writes that Oslo “enabled Israel to control the Palestinian territories through the Palestinian Authority with damaging results that built up into collective disillusionment and rage that finally exploded” into the Intifada (2001: 5). The second Intifada was a “product of Oslo’s failure” (Roy 2001: 6). Like the 1936-39 revolt and the first Intifada, the second Intifada was as much an uprising against Israel as it was against the comprador Palestinian leadership (Allen 2005; Norman 2010), which was unable to secure Palestinian rights or independence prior to, during, 18 The Israeli policies of closure included preventing freedom of movement for Palestinians and goods between the OPT and into Israel (“Closure” 2012; Farsakh 2000; World Bank 2003). 28 or after Oslo (Shikaki 2002: 89). Many Palestinians again called into question the ability of their leadership to get results or appropriately represent the Palestinian people (Bishara 2008: 491). The peace process, instead, created a new brand of elite leaders who were guided by narrow self- interests (Bishara 1998: 220-1; Samara 2009). Although two-thirds of the Palestinians initially supported Oslo and expectations were high that the leadership would bring an end to the occupation and improve living conditions, Palestinians grew resentful of their leadership and the reality on the ground caused expectations to sink dramatically (Shikaki 2002: 90). This resulted in a further division in the national movement, between a resistance camp, dedicated to the right of return, and a compromise camp, driven by the goal of establishing a mini-state in parts of Gaza and the West Bank (Samara 2009). Hammami and Tamari (2001) track the political and economic circumstances that led to the second Intifada. Israeli colonies effectively cut the West Bank into two units, north and south, and freedom of movement was greatly hindered for most Palestinians. These colonies created facts on the ground and are part of the continuing process of Israeli appropriation of Palestinian land.19 As a result of Israel’s colonies, checkpoints, and roadblocks,20 reaching Jerusalem and other areas of the OPT has become next to impossible save for small segments of the Palestinian population who can obtain permits. 19 Between 1993 and 2000, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank increased by 65% (Mansour 2001: 86). In East Jerusalem, the number of Israeli settlers increased from 124,000 in 1992 to 172,000 in 2000 (“Population and Dwellings”). Since Oslo, freedom of movement between Gaza and the West Bank became completely restricted for Palestinians while settlements and Israeli-only bypass roads effectively divided the West Bank while making Jerusalem unreachable for most Palestinians (Hammami 2000). Currently, more than half a million settlers live in occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank (“Land Expropriation” 2010). 20  Ninety-eight military checkpoints and 450 physical barriers (trenches, concrete obstructions, dirt mounds) currently restrict Palestinian freedom of movement in addition to flying checkpoints, which may appear at any time and place in the West Bank (“Background on the Restriction” 2012).   29