Journal of Classical Sociology 2015, Vol. 15(1) 73–95 © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1468795X14531695 jcs.sagepub.com Substantive-rational authority: The missing fourth pure type in Weber’s typology of legitimate domination Sebastián G Guzmán Universidad Andrés Bello, Chile Abstract Many scholars have questioned the thoroughness of Max Weber’s typology of authority. The key problem has been that some empirical cases, such as doctors and Soviet leaders, cannot be accounted for by combining Weber’s three pure types of authority. I propose a new solution to this problem by reconstructing Weber’s conceptualization of authority – stressing the doxic (Bourdieu) backup of authority – and modifying his typology – adding a “substantive-rational” type. Unlike previous attempts, this solution meets three important criteria: (1) thoroughly accounting for a variety of anomalous cases; (2) overcoming the limitations of the theory of action by acknowledging the developments of contemporary social theory; and (3) still serving Weber’s ambitious purposes, such as understanding broad rationalization processes and the stabilization of charisma. The usefulness of the typology is illustrated with various empirical cases that represent transformations of charisma in a substantive-rational direction or combinations of formal-rational and substantive-rational grounds for legitimacy. Keywords Authority, authorization of authority, Bourdieu, charisma, formal rationality, legitimacy, legitimate domination, substantive rationality, Weber Among Max Weber’s most influential contributions are his concept of legitimate domi- nation – when a command is obeyed because of a “belief in legitimacy” (Weber, 1978: 213, hereafter ES ) – and his tripartite typology of legitimate domination or authority Weber (1946) distinguished traditional, charismatic, and legal authority, depending on whether the grounds for the validity of the legitimacy claims are the “eternal yesterday,” Corresponding author: Sebastián G Guzmán, Profesor Investigador, Facultad de Educación, Universidad Andrés Bello, Chile. Email: guzmas31@newschool.edu;sebastian.guzman.r@unab.cl 531695JCS 0010.1177/1468795X14531695Journal of Classical SociologyJournal of Classical Sociology Guzmán research-article 2014 Article at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from 74 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) the extraordinary and personal “gift of grace,” or formally rational legality, respectively (pp. 78–80, see also ES : 215). This typology continues to be used by social scientists to interpret the legitimacy claims and problems of dozens of authorities, covering cases as diverse as Madonna and Fidel Castro (e.g. Turner, 2003). Yet, for six decades, there has also been wide discussion about whether or not Weber’s famous typology is as thorough as he claimed it to be (Breuer, 1992; Matheson, 1987; Nass, 1986; Parsons, 1947; Rigby, 1982; Satow, 1975; Schluchter, 1981, 1989; Spencer, 1970; Turner, 2008; Willer, 1967; Wrong, 1988; Zhao, 2009). The key problem has been that some empirical cases of authority, such as doctors and Soviet leaders, cannot be accounted for by combining Weber’s three pure types of authority. A new type seems necessary. This article proposes a new solution to this problem, by tackling three issues that have not yet been addressed simultaneously. First, finding a fourth type of authority that does not only account for a single anomalous case, as others have done, but for the variety of cases that have been claimed to be blind spots of the Weberian typology. 1 Second, refor- mulating the typology in a way that it can still serve Weber’s objectives of illuminating broader processes such as the role of the extraordinary (charisma) in triggering change, the rationalization of domination, and how this relates to changes in other spheres, such as law and religion (Schluchter, 1981; ES : 33–38, 237–241, 439–467, 809, 976–980, 1146–1148). 2 Finally, addressing the problems raised by major contemporary critiques of Weber’s concept of authority without abandoning the Weberian project. Merely correcting Weber’s typology of authority with a similar typology that incorpo- rates the anomalies and serves Weber’s original purposes does not seem adequate enough today. Schluchter (1981, 1989), perhaps the most systematic analyst of Weber’s Sociology of Domination , did this. Yet, his reconstructions of Weber’s typologies do not acknowl- edge receipt of major contemporary critiques of Weber’s concept of authority, and thus remain trapped within the limits of the philosophy of the subject or sociology of action (e.g. Bourdieu, 1987: 129–130; Schluchter, 1981: 128 n. 31). To overcome this limitation of Schluchter’s and other Weberian scholars’ work, in what follows, I begin by reformulating Weber’s concept of authority to account for contempo- rary developments, especially those of Bourdieu. I argue that Bourdieu’s concept of doxa helps us understand the unproblematic backup of Weber’s authority types. After such refor- mulation, I modify the typology of authority in a way that both accounts for various anoma- lies and serves its original purposes in a way that is relevant to contemporary sociology. Specifically, I do this by introducing a fourth type, substantive-rational authority, which also accounts for previously identified anomalous cases. Because the value of a typology ultimately lies in its capacity to illuminate empirical cases, I then discuss some notable non-pure types that are better understood in the light of the new typology. I conclude by drawing some implications of the new conceptualization and typology for the contempo- rary study of authority, rationality claims, and rationalization processes. Rethinking legitimate domination: the doxic bases of authority and the authorization of authority Weber defined domination ( Herrschaft ) as “the probability that a command with a spe- cific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons” ( ES : 53). 3 Domination can be at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from Guzmán 75 based on custom, personal advantage, or purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity, but these grounds “do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination” ( ES : 213). As Weber claimed and many scholars have shown empirically, a more stable and effective basis to secure compliance is the frequent “ belief in legitimacy ” ( ES : 213), which systems of domination attempt to establish (cf. Levi et al., 2009; Tyler, 2006, for reviews of the extensive research supporting this claim). In this case, that is, when the claim of legitimacy is taken as valid, we may talk of “legitimate domination” or “author- ity” – used interchangeably ( ES : 61–62 n. 31). The validity of the claims to legitimacy can be based on traditional, charismatic, or rational grounds. In the latter case, claims to legitimacy rest “on belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)” ( ES : 215). Weber also stressed the importance of the legitimacy of social orders for their stabil- ity. An order exists when conduct is oriented toward a maxim ( ES : 31) – thus, it is not simply as obedience to an actors’ command ( ES : 53). Some authors have asked whether legality can legitimize an authority without requiring the legitimacy of the legal order (e.g. Habermas, 1984: 265–267, also citing Winckelmann). 4 Weber is somewhat ambiguous on this. A “soft” interpretation of Weber would be that the grounds for validity of the authority are analytically distinguished from the principles that legitimize the legal order, even though this does not happen in reality. In fact, Weber implies that legitimacy of an authority is linked to, rather than independent of, the legiti- macy of an order. For instance, he defines charismatic authority as that whose claims to legitimacy rest “on devotion to exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” ( ES : 215, author’s emphasis). 5 A “stronger” interpretation would add something else: from the perspective of the dominated subject , the principle that validates the authority can often be legality of rules and legal offices, without much regard for whether or not the legal order is legitimate. Yet, how is it that the subject can be concerned with the legality without concern for the legitimacy of the legal order? Weber does not have an answer for this, because his concept of legitimate domination is, as Bourdieu (1987) puts it, a psycho-sociological one, that regards authority as “the lived relation of a public” to the leader (p. 129). 6 This leaves unanswered the question about “the original accumulation of the capital of sym- bolic power” (p. 130). Bourdieu only briefly hints an answer to this question for the case of charisma. He argues that the prophet’s authority comes from a crisis of the established social order, the work of his followers, and previous struggles with the priestly body resolved by force (pp. 130–131). 7 The interesting corollary here is that the struggles solved by force must be misrecognized by the followers. There is another concept in the Bourdieuian toolbox that can help us understand this misrecognition in other cases. This is the concept of doxa : the rules that have been settled, becoming unproblematic or unconsciously taken for granted (Bourdieu, 1993: 72-77). This concept suggests that, quite frequently, there is no question about the validity of the underlying principle of legitimacy or taken-for-granted norms. Thus, we can distinguish between the direct prin- ciple of legitimacy and the blurred or doxic foundations of legitimacy. This distinction becomes clearer and more relevant if we look at the complementary and often mixed mechanisms by which the foundations of legitimacy are blurred, namely, at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from 76 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) 1. Traditionalizing contested orders or authorities. This refers to a process by which norms that emerge as commands uttered by an authority become taken for granted, normalized through routinization and habituation, force, affection, and so on (see Habermas, 1984: 266, for a similar idea). In Bourdieuian terms, the “schemes of interpretation” of norms slowly become part of the habitus . For instance, the legitimacy of an originally contested electoral order often becomes unproblematic with time. When this occurs, the ruled will often be unable to explain why their country’s specific electoral mechanism is just or if it actually fits the abstract concept of fair elections, it is simply pre-reflexively taken for granted. Whether or not the electoral system is legitimate becomes irrelevant for the subjects; what matters is that rulers must be elected by the established rules to be considered valid. 8 Auyero (2001) has shown how poor Argentines defend or question the legitimacy of a clientelist broker and patron, but cannot question the clientelist order, which has become part of their habitus through routinization. When a patron or broker becomes illegitimate, they change patrons but never question clientelism as the legitimate way of doing politics. 2. “Blackboxing” contested legitimation processes. This involves treating the mak- ing of the enabling authority as a blackbox that need not be understood, thus obscuring the controversies that existed in the making of the enabling authority (the concept comes from Latour, 1987: 3–4). Thus, when scriptures are canon- ized ( ES : 458–459), the legitimacy of the scriptures as revelation by prophets becomes taken for granted because the process by which canonical texts were created becomes a blackbox that cannot be questioned. Controversies among Christians about the authorities of their pastors will focus on their relationship to scriptures, leaving the validity of scriptures as a “blackboxed” backup. 3. Increasing the transfers of authority. This involves increasing the steps between the originally enabling authorities or orders and the ultimately enabled authority or order, displacing attention from the original sources of legitimacy. Thus, in the cultural field, an author’s authority comes from the authority granted by critics and a recognized publisher; reciprocally, the publisher’s authority comes from the authority of the authors it publishes and of their critics. This leads to the blur- ring and misrecognition of the sources of legitimacy and of the fact that authority does not come from an intrinsic quality of a person but from transfers of symbolic capital or authority (Bourdieu, 1980). The fact that original grounds of legitimacy remain in the background for many peo- ple is important because it works as a non-problematic backup of legitimacy that stabi- lizes the legitimacy of the authority or, most often, of the order. It would take much more energy from authorities if, in addition to legitimizing themselves, they constantly had to be legitimizing the electoral order, the clientelist order, or the Christian order. It also works to blur the arbitrary origin of authority (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 119). We must further note that, while the question about the validity of authorizing authori- ties or orders is not relevant to the subjects when these blurring processes occur, the original principle of authority is still sociologically relevant. Its importance becomes evident when the blurring processes are reversed by the contestation of the original grounds for legitimacy. at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from Guzmán 77 A fourth type of legitimate domination: Substantive- rational authority As mentioned above, only one of Weber’s three pure types of authority bases the validity of its claims to legitimacy on rational grounds. Weber called this type legal or rational authority, which specifically claims to be formal -rational. Yet, a significant number of commentators agree that Weber’s typology is missing a non-formal rational authority. They have typically added a fourth type: “professional” (Parsons, 1947), “competent” (Wrong, 1988), “goal-rational” (Rigby, 1982), “value- rational” (Satow, 1975; Spencer, 1970), “ideological” (Turner, 2008; Willer, 1967), “per- formance” (Zhao, 2009) and “charisma of reason” (Breuer, 1992, 1996). 9 As is shown in Table 1, almost all of them point to the legitimating role of instrumental and value ration- ality in empirical cases not accounted for by Weber’s tripartite typology – most notably, communist leaders and professionals. While these authors’ arguments leave hardly any doubt that Weber’s typology is not thorough, the new types they add do not consistently fill the lacuna left by Weber. The problem in most of these authors’ methods is that by focusing on one empirical case, they do not seek logical thoroughness of the typology. The result is a fourth type that accounts for one of many possible unexplained cases. As an alternative route, I propose that we first look at the rational aspect that is missing in Weber’s legal type and see whether any empirical cases include elements of the “missing” pure type. Some authors have suggested that the missing type of authority can be defined by finding a logical correspondence between the basis of legitimacy of a social order and the basis of legitimacy of domination (Satow, 1975; Spencer, 1970; Willer, 1967). Weber defined four bases of legitimacy for a social order – tradition, affectual faith, value- rational faith, and legal enactment ( ES : 36). However, while the first, second, and fourth bases correspond with traditional, charismatic, and legal authority, Weber left no corre- sponding type of authority for the third type of legitimate order, namely, natural law, based on value rationality ( ES : 37). Thus, some of Weber’s critics suggest adding a fourth type of authority based on value-rational grounds, called “value-rational” authority (Satow, Spencer) or “ideological” authority (Willer). This solution has two major problems. First, if we start from the philosophy of the subject or sociology of action – as Weber, Willer, Spencer, and Satow do – value- rationality cannot constitute grounds to legitimize authority. Willer (1967) defined the fourth type as “faith in the absolute value of a rationalised set of norms,” where “obedience is not owed to anyone personally, but to the ends of the ideology” and “the content of com- mands is legitimated by its relation to the ends of the ideology” (p. 236). Albrow (1972) rightly critiques this as non-domination, since accepting orders on the basis that they are morally justified “only would amount to acting in accord with personal values” (p. 485). Thus, “agreement on values does not in itself establish authority relations” (p. 485). However, if we move from the philosophy of the subject to the philosophy of language, we should not think of values as ideas carried in the subjects’ head, but as ideas that are com- municated and interpreted by others. From this paradigm, something like value-rational authority should be defined differently: a value-rational authority is that which rests on the belief that his or her commands are the rationally correct interpretation of how abstract ultimate values – for example, communism – should translate into concrete practices – for at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from 78 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) Table 1. Summary of various authors’ modifications to Weber’s typology of domination. Author Anomalous case or analytical vacuum to account for Missing dimension stressed New type(s) Maintain Weber’s typology’s purpose Maintain Weber’s concept of legitimate domination Stressing value rationality, instrumental rationality, or both Willer (1967) Abstract a /Soviet leaders; Social Democratic Parties Value rationality Ideological authority Y Y Satow (1975) Professionals Value rationality Value-rational authority Y Y Spencer (1970) US President Value rationality Value-rational authority Y Y Thomas (1984) Direct democracy Value rationality Non-authority Y Y Parsons (1947) Doctor Instrumental rationality Professional authority Y Y Rigby (1982) Soviet leaders Instrumental rationality Goal rational authority Y Y Wrong (1988) Experts, especially doctors Instrumental rationality Competent authority Y Y Zhao (2009) Chinese communists Instrumental rationality Performance authority N Y Turner (2008) Chinese literati Rational knowledge Non-specialized expert [ideological] authority N Y Blau (1963) Abstract a /professional Value/instrumental rationality Professional Y Y This article Abstract a /many Substantive rationality (value and instrumental) Substantive-rational authority Y N Stressing rational charisma Schluchter (1989) Abstract Impersonal/extraordinariness Office charisma Y Y Breuer (1992) Soviet leaders Value rationality/ extraordinariness Charisma of reason Y Y Breuer (1996) Leaders of French Revolution Non-religious/Non-personal/ extraordinariness Charisma of reason Y Y Stressing other missing dimension/problem Weber (2005) Modern city Will of the ruled No name Y Y Nass (1986) Professionals Formality Second type of legal authority Y Y Matheson (1987) Abstract Various Five new types N Y Hamilton (1984) Chinese Xiao Moral roles Xiao N N Habermas (1984) Origin of legal authority Legal order None N N Bourdieu (1987) Prophet Symbolic capital in the field None N N a Abstract indicates that author begins analyzing logical thoroughness of the typology rather than an anomalous case. at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from Guzmán 79 example, sending an astronaut to outer space. 10 In sum, value-rationality cannot constitute grounds to legitimize authority if we assume the philosophy of the subject, but could poten- tially constitute such grounds if we work within the philosophy of language. The second problem is that even this reformulated version of value-rational authority does not account for the type of rational element that is behind concepts such as “profes- sional authority” (Parsons, 1947), “competent authority” (Wrong, 1988), “goal-rational authority” (Rigby, 1982) or “performance legitimacy” (Zhao, 2009). In these cases, the authors are referring to claims and beliefs in the legitimacy of professionals (Parsons and Wrong) and communist leaders (Rigby and Zhao) on instrumental-rational grounds. This is interested obedience, but it is not the type of obedience granted when seeking to avoid jail or to receive patronage, since obedience in the latter cases of domination does not need legitimacy. Neither is obedience to such “instrumental rational” authority an autonomous decision resulting from non-authoritative persuasion, since the subject is not convinced by arguments but suspends his or her own judgment (Blau, 1963: 307) and may not even understand the arguments (Wrong, 1988). The patient must take the doctor’s recommenda- tion or orders “on authority” (Parsons, 1947: 49). Thus, legitimate domination on instru- mental-rational grounds exists when the subjects obey because they see the authority as a good rational interpreter of the concrete means to realize their interests or a common good. This type of authority has been demonstrated by psychologists’ experiments about how people often accept policy recommendations because of the belief in the expertise of the source rather than because of arguments (e.g. DeBono and Klein, 1993; Petty et al., 1981). Thus, both value- and instrumental-rational grounds for legitimacy are missing in Weber’s typology of authority. Yet, both types of rationality have something in common, if we look at them from the perspective of Weber’s Sociology of Law . Weber defined formal rationality not only in contrast with irrationality, but also in contrast with substan- tive rationality. In law, substantive rationality means that the decision of legal problems is influenced by norms different from those obtained through logical generalization of abstract interpretations of meaning [i.e., the norms of formal law]. The norms to which substantive rationality accords predominance include ethical imperatives , utilitarian and other expediential rules , and political maxims, all of which diverge from ... formalism. ( ES : 657, author’s emphasis) In other words, law-finding or law-making are substantive rational if they are claimed to derive from norms that have a rational content , in turn derived from ethical ultimate values (value-rational) or expediency rules (instrumental-rational). In fact, in law, value- and instrumental-rational justifications can hardly be separated, as Weber argued: Many other institutions of the prevailing system could not be legitimated except on practical utilitarian grounds. By “justifying” them, natural law “reason” easily slipped into utilitarian thinking, and this shift expresses itself in the change of meaning of the concept of “reasonableness.” In purely formal natural law, the reasonable is that which is derivable from the eternal order of nature and logic, both being readily blended with one another. But from the very beginning, the English concept of reasonable contained by implication the meaning of rational in the sense of at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from 80 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) “practically appropriate” ... This signified the express introduction of substantive presuppositions into the concept of reason which had in fact always been implicit in it. ( ES : 870) Thus, there are two variations of a single missing type, which I call substantive-rational authority : ( a ) legitimacy based on the belief that an authority is a correct mediator between abstract ultimate values and concrete practical norms and ( b ) and legitimacy based on the belief that an authority is a correct mediator between ultimate goals and concrete means. Just as formal-rational law may be of two varieties that are in tension – “external characteristics formalism” and “logical abstraction formalism” ( ES : 657) – substantive-rational authority may be of an instrumental-rational or a value-rational variety. Thus, it is the basis of authority of both the philosopher king who deduces value- rational law through reason and the doctor who offers instrumental medical treatment. More generally, it includes those solutions mentioned above as competent, professional, goal-rational, ideological, and value-rational authority. Of course, the fact that most empirical cases contain elements of other types of ration- ality should not distract us from identifying the basis of the “ideal type,” which may not look like any empirical case. The doctor may use credentials that endorse his or her capacities on formal grounds. However, the patient takes the doctor’s advice as authori- tative because of a claim of substantive-rational capacities, and the credentials only serve as a backup. This authority contrasts with that of the bureaucrat, whose stamp is valid not because of a substantive-rational capacity but because he or she is legally authorized to stamp a form – that the bureaucrat has the instrumental knowledge to identify whether or not a form should be stamped is implied, but it remains in the background. Thus, “sub- stantive rationality” can be easily understood as a fourth pure type of authority even if empirical cases often combine substantive rationality with sources of authority. This definition of substantive rationality as a fourth pure type of authority adds a third dimension to Weber’s typology. The original typology was limited to the tension between the ordinary and the extraordinary and between the rational and the non- rational (Figure 1, left). 11 The new third dimension deals with the distinction between formal and substantive rationality (Figure 1, right) – since formal-rational grounds need not always be legal, as in the formal element in priesthood offices, I have renamed Weber’s “legal” type as “formal-rational.” We must note that not all of the space in the schemes can be filled with logically possible mixed types. Since pure rational authority is necessarily ordinary and, similarly, pure extraordinary authority is non-rational, all mixed types must be located somewhere in the gray area of the two-dimensional (2D) scheme, leaving the upper-right area of this scheme empty. 12 The same is true in my three-dimensional (3D) scheme. Yet, in addition, the formal/substantive dimension only applies as authority becomes rational. Thus, the triangular area at the bottom of the cube shows that non-rational authority types are neither formal nor substantive. In sum, the gray pyramid in the 3D scheme represents all logically possible mixed types. This new scheme includes those “fourth types” that stress either a value-rational or an instrumental-rational element, since both elements are variants of substantive rationality, at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from Guzmán 81 Non- Rational Ordinary Extra- Ordinary Charismatic Traditional Legal Rational Figure 1. Two-dimensional (left) and three-dimensional (right) typologies of legitimate domination. the more general rational type missing in Weber’s typology. The new scheme also accounts for the “fourth types” that stress rational charisma (Table 1); yet, instead of interpreting them as a fourth type, I interpret them as non-pure types, specifically, as substantive-rational and formal-rational transformations of charisma (Breuer, 1992, 1996; Schluchter, 1989, respectively). 13 Putting the new typology to work: Notable non-pure types involving substantive-rational authority How does the proposed scheme help us understand the notable combined types to which Weber dedicated much attention, such as the transformations of charisma? Since the pos- sible combinations are many, I will only briefly discuss some of the most notable varia- tions that illustrate the contributions of the substantive-rational type of authority suggested above. Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of various transformations of charisma according to the combined bases of authority of these non-pure types as explained below. Charisma of reason One of the important transformations of charisma that Weber mentions is the “charis- matic glorification of ‘Reason,’” the last stage of the historical course of charisma, exem- plified by Robespierre ( ES : 1209). However, Weber’s discussion is all too brief, and the type deserves further analysis. In the case of the “charisma of reason,” the transformation of charisma occurs through an interpretation of reason as extraordinary, breaking the separation between that which is controlled by the human intellect and God’s will. This quality is a somewhat mystical substantive reasonableness that, unlike in the case of the prophet or magician, does not need recourse to supernatural events to be validated. 14 at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from 82 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) Table 2. Bases of legitimacy of notable transformations of charisma and some specific examples. Notable type Historical example Previous classification Current classification Weber Others Primary Example Secondary Example Charisma of reason Solomon – C and R (Breuer) C and SR Wisdom to judge C God-given power Trusted recommendation, authoritative variant Dr Phil – – C and SR Expert instrumental capacity C Charismatic endorsement Educated charisma a Chinese literati, trained rainmaker C&FR C&IR&VR (Turner) C and SR Magical capacity to realize interests and values FR Formal examination, formal training Credentialed technocrat PhD Economics in Latin American politics – – C and SR Exceptional instrumental capacity to govern FR Formally recognized experience Experienced technocrat Hillary Clinton – – C and SR Exceptional instrumental capacity to govern SR Non-formal experience Secular saint “Che” Guevara – – C and SR Exceptional selfless commitment to SR mission N – Substantive-rational preacher Luther C&FR – SR Rational interpretation of scriptures RO Valid scriptures Rational-religious healer Chiropractors – – SR Releasing God’s healing powers through “scientific” reasoning RO God’s laws Professional Doctors – IR/VR (Parsons, Wrong, Satow, Blau) SR Instrumental knowledge and value orientations FR Formal credential proving training Philosopher king, acclaimed Some Soviet leaders – IR/VR/C (Breuer, Rigby, Spencer, Willer, Zhao) SR Reasonableness to interpret the party’s ideology SR Acclamation by ideological virtuosi at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from Guzmán 83 Notable type Historical example Previous classification Current classification Weber Others Primary Example Secondary Example Scientist Scientists – – SR Capacity to produce knowledge SR Non-formal peer recognition Craftsman Craftsmen – – SR Capacity to make crafts SR Non-formal experience Trusted recommendation, less authoritative variant Doctor recommended by friend – – SR Expert instrumental capacity N – Philosopher king, misrecognized accumulation Lenin – C and R (Breuer) SR Reasonableness to interpret the party’s ideology N Organizational capacity behind scenes C: charisma; R: rationality; SR: substantive rationality; IR: instrumental rationality; VR: value rationality; FR: formal rationality; RO: revealed order; N: non. a For the Chinese literati the traditional order was also a secondary source of authority. Table 2. (Continued) at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from 84 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) Robespierre’s Cult of the Supreme Being 15 was an unsuccessful attempt to legitimize his personalized power and thus may not be the best case to illustrate this type of legiti- macy, even if it may fit the type. A more successful example of this type of authority is found in the biblical story of King Solomon. Weber (1952) talked about Solomon’s endeavor to legitimize his rule in a struggle for succession before the establishment of “lineage charisma” as a form of routinization of charisma in a formal-rational direction (pp. 104–105). However, Weber explains the legitimation of Solomon by a prophet promising good fortune for Solomon and the eternalness of the Davidian throne (pp. 104–105), leading back to a purely charismatic endorsement. 16 Curiously, while Weber mentions the novelty of Solomon’s claim to judicial wisdom (p. 86), he did not notice its relevance as a source of political legitimacy, something clearly illustrated in the biblical passage Weber cites: “And all Israel heard of the judgment that the king had rendered, and they stood in awe of the king , because they perceived that the wisdom of God was in him to do justice” (1 Kings 3:28, author’s emphasis). Yet Solomon was not a charismatic prophet: his wisdom was an extraordinary gift (1 Kings 3:12) that brought together God’s will and substantive justice that is not revealed but controlled by the intellect – even if not yet fully rationalized. Thus, Solomon – as well as Robespierre – represents a substan- tive-rational transformation of charisma – notably, of the warlord’s charisma, based on previously accumulated politico–military power, and of the ethical prophet’s charisma, which validates demands for obedience as ethical duty. Philosopher king Appeals to legitimacy by the charisma of reason can be further transformed in a substan- tive-rational way, so as not to rely on the extraordinary. Perhaps the oldest call for this kind of rule was suggested by Plato, with the figure of the philosopher king, but other variants can be found today – which, of course, we must interpret sociologically, not form a Platonic philosophy. Leaders further rationalizing charisma deal with a tension: on the one hand, their rational capacity is not extraordinary, and thus, in principle, available to anyone; on the other hand, they must justify their monopoly on reasonableness. There are two highly complementary solutions to this tension, best illustrated by the basis of legitimacy of some Soviet leaders as explained by Breuer (1992), although with different terminol- ogy. The first solution is a pseudo-antiauthoritarian interpretation of reasonableness based on acclamation of arguments by the ideological virtuosi – substantive-rational endorsement. In the case of Soviet leaders, this means acclamation by other party lead- ers who have previously accumulated authority as interpreters of the party’s ideology. However, this may also be the source of authority of public intellectuals, such as in the case of Jean Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault, whose recognition by the public is built upon their previous high recognition in academia. The second mechanism is the pro- duction of doxic misrecognition of original – often illegitimate – accumulation of authority (Bourdieu, 1987), including violence, economic resources, and political favors. This is true in the case of Lenin, whose power came from his organizational capacity behind the scenes rather than from being a man of the masses like Trotsky was (Breuer, 1992: 277). at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from Guzmán 85 “Secular” saint The secular saint represents one of the ways in which the prophet’s authority is rational- ized. Weber distinguished between ethical and exemplary prophets. The former demand obedience as an ethical duty, while the latter demonstrate the way to religious salvation through his example, as in the case of the saint ( ES : 447–450). The modern and rational- ized version of the exemplary prophet is the “secular” saint, typically an ascetic revolu- tionary leader. This leader does not appeal to the extraordinary to sanctify his mission or to endorse his personal, exceptional character. Instead, his exceptional behavior is sim- ply recognized by his followers on emotional grounds, by admiration of his – apparently – selfless commitment to the substantively rational mission – often exemplified by an ascetic rejection of the glory of office. Famous examples of these leaders are Ernesto “Che” Guevara and “Subcomandante” Marcos. A more typical variant of the secular saint are political leaders who are believed to serve their followers because of their nota- ble honesty and selflessness, as opposed to the corruption of their competitors. Substantive-rational preacher The substantive-rational preacher is perhaps best illustrated by the figure of Luther and perhaps also by other “teachers of ethics” ( ES : 444–446) such as Calvin or Shankara. Weber ( ES : 1198) mentions in passing Luther’s authority as a case of “office charisma” – that is, charisma based on the belief in “the specific state of grace of a social institu- tion” ( ES : 1140) – yet without any argumentation. I propose revising this interpretation as a substantive-rational preacher. Luther, a professor of theology, disputed the official interpretation of the value of indulgences, and thus, the pope’s authority as the sole legitimate interpreter of scriptures, with rational arguments to be discussed in a public scholarly debate. Unlike purely char- ismatic prophets, he lacked emotional preaching ( ES : 445) and did “not claim to be offer- ing a substantively new revelation or to be speaking in the name of special divine injunction” ( ES : 446). Yet unlike the pope, his office as theologian in the university was not endowed with any divine inspiration to interpret scriptures. For his followers, the validity of his interpretation depended only on his claimed capacity to offer a logical interpretation of the scriptures that could realize the values revealed in them – while he said the Bible was open to anyone, his own interpretation had to appear as valid to grant him authority instead of diluting authority into every single devout. This is a substantive- rational capacity that, while relying on the validity of a revealed order, was not granted to him by that order in the way that the modern charisma of the pope’s office is granted by the “inspired” council. On the other hand, some elements of his personal leadership resembled revolutionary charisma, notably, his embracement of a mission to confront orthodoxy that he took personally. However, this personal mission was rationalized by an intellectual justification of his interpretation of the scriptures as better than that of the Pope, which contrasts with the prophet’s demand for non-rational submission. In conclusion, the substantive-rational preacher represents a transformation of the charisma of the ethical prophet. His authority is based on claims to a substantive-rational interpretation of the scriptures, typically a new one that justifies breaking with estab- lished authorities and their means to legitimize preachers. Their revolutionary character at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 jcs.sagepub.com Downloaded from 86 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) comes not from extraordinary personal qualities but from their capacity to use their pre- vious recognition to validate their rational mission. While their primary source of author- ity is rationalized as intellectual interpretation, their authority still rests on a secondary source: the belief in the validity of a divine order, a belief which must remain unques- tioned in the background for the interpretation to be relevant. Rational-religious healer If Luther illustrates a transformation of prophetic charisma in a substantive-rational direction, then early chiropractors illustrate a similar transformation of magicians’ cha- risma in a substantive-rational direction. Unlike medic