Substantive-rational authority: The missing fourth pure type in Weber’s typology of legitimate domination - Sebastián G Guzmán

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531695 research-article2014 JCS0010.1177/1468795X14531695Journal of Classical SociologyJournal of Classical SociologyGuzmán Article Journal of Classical Sociology Substantive-rational authority: 2015, Vol. 15(1) 73­–95 © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: The missing fourth pure type sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1468795X14531695 in Weber’s typology of jcs.sagepub.com legitimate domination Sebastián G Guzmán Universidad Andrés Bello, Chile Abstract Many scholars have questioned the thoroughness of Max Weber’s typology of authority. The key problem has been that some empirical cases, such as doctors and Soviet leaders, cannot be accounted for by combining Weber’s three pure types of authority. I propose a new solution to this problem by reconstructing Weber’s conceptualization of authority – stressing the doxic (Bourdieu) backup of authority – and modifying his typology – adding a “substantive-rational” type. Unlike previous attempts, this solution meets three important criteria: (1) thoroughly accounting for a variety of anomalous cases; (2) overcoming the limitations of the theory of action by acknowledging the developments of contemporary social theory; and (3) still serving Weber’s ambitious purposes, such as understanding broad rationalization processes and the stabilization of charisma. The usefulness of the typology is illustrated with various empirical cases that represent transformations of charisma in a substantive-rational direction or combinations of formal-rational and substantive-rational grounds for legitimacy. Keywords Authority, authorization of authority, Bourdieu, charisma, formal rationality, legitimacy, legitimate domination, substantive rationality, Weber Among Max Weber’s most influential contributions are his concept of legitimate domi- nation – when a command is obeyed because of a “belief in legitimacy” (Weber, 1978: 213, hereafter ES) – and his tripartite typology of legitimate domination or authority. Weber (1946) distinguished traditional, charismatic, and legal authority, depending on whether the grounds for the validity of the legitimacy claims are the “eternal yesterday,” Corresponding author: Sebastián G Guzmán, Profesor Investigador, Facultad de Educación, Universidad Andrés Bello, Chile. Email: [email protected];[email protected] Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 74 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) the extraordinary and personal “gift of grace,” or formally rational legality, respectively (pp. 78–80, see also ES: 215). This typology continues to be used by social scientists to interpret the legitimacy claims and problems of dozens of authorities, covering cases as diverse as Madonna and Fidel Castro (e.g. Turner, 2003). Yet, for six decades, there has also been wide discussion about whether or not Weber’s famous typology is as thorough as he claimed it to be (Breuer, 1992; Matheson, 1987; Nass, 1986; Parsons, 1947; Rigby, 1982; Satow, 1975; Schluchter, 1981, 1989; Spencer, 1970; Turner, 2008; Willer, 1967; Wrong, 1988; Zhao, 2009). The key problem has been that some empirical cases of authority, such as doctors and Soviet leaders, cannot be accounted for by combining Weber’s three pure types of authority. A new type seems necessary. This article proposes a new solution to this problem, by tackling three issues that have not yet been addressed simultaneously. First, finding a fourth type of authority that does not only account for a single anomalous case, as others have done, but for the variety of cases that have been claimed to be blind spots of the Weberian typology.1 Second, refor- mulating the typology in a way that it can still serve Weber’s objectives of illuminating broader processes such as the role of the extraordinary (charisma) in triggering change, the rationalization of domination, and how this relates to changes in other spheres, such as law and religion (Schluchter, 1981; ES: 33–38, 237–241, 439–467, 809, 976–980, 1146–1148).2 Finally, addressing the problems raised by major contemporary critiques of Weber’s concept of authority without abandoning the Weberian project. Merely correcting Weber’s typology of authority with a similar typology that incorpo- rates the anomalies and serves Weber’s original purposes does not seem adequate enough today. Schluchter (1981, 1989), perhaps the most systematic analyst of Weber’s Sociology of Domination, did this. Yet, his reconstructions of Weber’s typologies do not acknowl- edge receipt of major contemporary critiques of Weber’s concept of authority, and thus remain trapped within the limits of the philosophy of the subject or sociology of action (e.g. Bourdieu, 1987: 129–130; Schluchter, 1981: 128 n. 31). To overcome this limitation of Schluchter’s and other Weberian scholars’ work, in what follows, I begin by reformulating Weber’s concept of authority to account for contempo- rary developments, especially those of Bourdieu. I argue that Bourdieu’s concept of doxa helps us understand the unproblematic backup of Weber’s authority types. After such refor- mulation, I modify the typology of authority in a way that both accounts for various anoma- lies and serves its original purposes in a way that is relevant to contemporary sociology. Specifically, I do this by introducing a fourth type, substantive-rational authority, which also accounts for previously identified anomalous cases. Because the value of a typology ultimately lies in its capacity to illuminate empirical cases, I then discuss some notable non-pure types that are better understood in the light of the new typology. I conclude by drawing some implications of the new conceptualization and typology for the contempo- rary study of authority, rationality claims, and rationalization processes. Rethinking legitimate domination: the doxic bases of authority and the authorization of authority Weber defined domination (Herrschaft) as “the probability that a command with a spe- cific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons” (ES: 53).3 Domination can be Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Guzmán 75 based on custom, personal advantage, or purely affectual or ideal motives of solidarity, but these grounds “do not form a sufficiently reliable basis for a given domination” (ES: 213). As Weber claimed and many scholars have shown empirically, a more stable and effective basis to secure compliance is the frequent “belief in legitimacy” (ES: 213), which systems of domination attempt to establish (cf. Levi et al., 2009; Tyler, 2006, for reviews of the extensive research supporting this claim). In this case, that is, when the claim of legitimacy is taken as valid, we may talk of “legitimate domination” or “author- ity” – used interchangeably (ES: 61–62 n. 31). The validity of the claims to legitimacy can be based on traditional, charismatic, or rational grounds. In the latter case, claims to legitimacy rest “on belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)” (ES: 215). Weber also stressed the importance of the legitimacy of social orders for their stabil- ity. An order exists when conduct is oriented toward a maxim (ES: 31) – thus, it is not simply as obedience to an actors’ command (ES: 53). Some authors have asked whether legality can legitimize an authority without requiring the legitimacy of the legal order (e.g. Habermas, 1984: 265–267, also citing Winckelmann).4 Weber is somewhat ambiguous on this. A “soft” interpretation of Weber would be that the grounds for validity of the authority are analytically distinguished from the principles that legitimize the legal order, even though this does not happen in reality. In fact, Weber implies that legitimacy of an authority is linked to, rather than independent of, the legiti- macy of an order. For instance, he defines charismatic authority as that whose claims to legitimacy rest “on devotion to exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” (ES: 215, author’s emphasis).5 A “stronger” interpretation would add something else: from the perspective of the dominated subject, the principle that validates the authority can often be legality of rules and legal offices, without much regard for whether or not the legal order is legitimate. Yet, how is it that the subject can be concerned with the legality without concern for the legitimacy of the legal order? Weber does not have an answer for this, because his concept of legitimate domination is, as Bourdieu (1987) puts it, a psycho-sociological one, that regards authority as “the lived relation of a public” to the leader (p. 129).6 This leaves unanswered the question about “the original accumulation of the capital of sym- bolic power” (p. 130). Bourdieu only briefly hints an answer to this question for the case of charisma. He argues that the prophet’s authority comes from a crisis of the established social order, the work of his followers, and previous struggles with the priestly body resolved by force (pp. 130–131).7 The interesting corollary here is that the struggles solved by force must be misrecognized by the followers. There is another concept in the Bourdieuian toolbox that can help us understand this misrecognition in other cases. This is the concept of doxa: the rules that have been settled, becoming unproblematic or unconsciously taken for granted (Bourdieu, 1993: 72-77). This concept suggests that, quite frequently, there is no question about the validity of the underlying principle of legitimacy or taken-for-granted norms. Thus, we can distinguish between the direct prin- ciple of legitimacy and the blurred or doxic foundations of legitimacy. This distinction becomes clearer and more relevant if we look at the complementary and often mixed mechanisms by which the foundations of legitimacy are blurred, namely, Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 76 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) 1. Traditionalizing contested orders or authorities. This refers to a process by which norms that emerge as commands uttered by an authority become taken for granted, normalized through routinization and habituation, force, affection, and so on (see Habermas, 1984: 266, for a similar idea). In Bourdieuian terms, the “schemes of interpretation” of norms slowly become part of the habitus. For instance, the legitimacy of an originally contested electoral order often becomes unproblematic with time. When this occurs, the ruled will often be unable to explain why their country’s specific electoral mechanism is just or if it actually fits the abstract concept of fair elections, it is simply pre-reflexively taken for granted. Whether or not the electoral system is legitimate becomes irrelevant for the subjects; what matters is that rulers must be elected by the established rules to be considered valid.8 Auyero (2001) has shown how poor Argentines defend or question the legitimacy of a clientelist broker and patron, but cannot question the clientelist order, which has become part of their habitus through routinization. When a patron or broker becomes illegitimate, they change patrons but never question clientelism as the legitimate way of doing politics. 2. “Blackboxing” contested legitimation processes. This involves treating the mak- ing of the enabling authority as a blackbox that need not be understood, thus obscuring the controversies that existed in the making of the enabling authority (the concept comes from Latour, 1987: 3–4). Thus, when scriptures are canon- ized (ES: 458–459), the legitimacy of the scriptures as revelation by prophets becomes taken for granted because the process by which canonical texts were created becomes a blackbox that cannot be questioned. Controversies among Christians about the authorities of their pastors will focus on their relationship to scriptures, leaving the validity of scriptures as a “blackboxed” backup. 3. Increasing the transfers of authority. This involves increasing the steps between the originally enabling authorities or orders and the ultimately enabled authority or order, displacing attention from the original sources of legitimacy. Thus, in the cultural field, an author’s authority comes from the authority granted by critics and a recognized publisher; reciprocally, the publisher’s authority comes from the authority of the authors it publishes and of their critics. This leads to the blur- ring and misrecognition of the sources of legitimacy and of the fact that authority does not come from an intrinsic quality of a person but from transfers of symbolic capital or authority (Bourdieu, 1980). The fact that original grounds of legitimacy remain in the background for many peo- ple is important because it works as a non-problematic backup of legitimacy that stabi- lizes the legitimacy of the authority or, most often, of the order. It would take much more energy from authorities if, in addition to legitimizing themselves, they constantly had to be legitimizing the electoral order, the clientelist order, or the Christian order. It also works to blur the arbitrary origin of authority (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 119). We must further note that, while the question about the validity of authorizing authori- ties or orders is not relevant to the subjects when these blurring processes occur, the original principle of authority is still sociologically relevant. Its importance becomes evident when the blurring processes are reversed by the contestation of the original grounds for legitimacy. Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Guzmán 77 A fourth type of legitimate domination: Substantive- rational authority As mentioned above, only one of Weber’s three pure types of authority bases the validity of its claims to legitimacy on rational grounds. Weber called this type legal or rational authority, which specifically claims to be formal-rational. Yet, a significant number of commentators agree that Weber’s typology is missing a non-formal rational authority. They have typically added a fourth type: “professional” (Parsons, 1947), “competent” (Wrong, 1988), “goal-rational” (Rigby, 1982), “value- rational” (Satow, 1975; Spencer, 1970), “ideological” (Turner, 2008; Willer, 1967), “per- formance” (Zhao, 2009) and “charisma of reason” (Breuer, 1992, 1996).9 As is shown in Table 1, almost all of them point to the legitimating role of instrumental and value ration- ality in empirical cases not accounted for by Weber’s tripartite typology – most notably, communist leaders and professionals. While these authors’ arguments leave hardly any doubt that Weber’s typology is not thorough, the new types they add do not consistently fill the lacuna left by Weber. The problem in most of these authors’ methods is that by focusing on one empirical case, they do not seek logical thoroughness of the typology. The result is a fourth type that accounts for one of many possible unexplained cases. As an alternative route, I propose that we first look at the rational aspect that is missing in Weber’s legal type and see whether any empirical cases include elements of the “missing” pure type. Some authors have suggested that the missing type of authority can be defined by finding a logical correspondence between the basis of legitimacy of a social order and the basis of legitimacy of domination (Satow, 1975; Spencer, 1970; Willer, 1967). Weber defined four bases of legitimacy for a social order – tradition, affectual faith, value- rational faith, and legal enactment (ES: 36). However, while the first, second, and fourth bases correspond with traditional, charismatic, and legal authority, Weber left no corre- sponding type of authority for the third type of legitimate order, namely, natural law, based on value rationality (ES: 37). Thus, some of Weber’s critics suggest adding a fourth type of authority based on value-rational grounds, called “value-rational” authority (Satow, Spencer) or “ideological” authority (Willer). This solution has two major problems. First, if we start from the philosophy of the subject or sociology of action – as Weber, Willer, Spencer, and Satow do – value- rationality cannot constitute grounds to legitimize authority. Willer (1967) defined the fourth type as “faith in the absolute value of a rationalised set of norms,” where “obedience is not owed to anyone personally, but to the ends of the ideology” and “the content of com- mands is legitimated by its relation to the ends of the ideology” (p. 236). Albrow (1972) rightly critiques this as non-domination, since accepting orders on the basis that they are morally justified “only would amount to acting in accord with personal values” (p. 485). Thus, “agreement on values does not in itself establish authority relations” (p. 485). However, if we move from the philosophy of the subject to the philosophy of language, we should not think of values as ideas carried in the subjects’ head, but as ideas that are com- municated and interpreted by others. From this paradigm, something like value-rational authority should be defined differently: a value-rational authority is that which rests on the belief that his or her commands are the rationally correct interpretation of how abstract ultimate values – for example, communism – should translate into concrete practices – for Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Table 1. Summary of various authors’ modifications to Weber’s typology of domination. 78 Author Anomalous case or analytical Missing dimension stressed New type(s) Maintain Weber’s Maintain Weber’s vacuum to account for typology’s purpose concept of legitimate domination Stressing value rationality, instrumental rationality, or both Willer (1967) Abstracta/Soviet leaders; Social Value rationality Ideological authority Y Y Democratic Parties Satow (1975) Professionals Value rationality Value-rational authority Y Y Spencer (1970) US President Value rationality Value-rational authority Y Y Thomas (1984) Direct democracy Value rationality Non-authority Y Y Parsons (1947) Doctor Instrumental rationality Professional authority Y Y Rigby (1982) Soviet leaders Instrumental rationality Goal rational authority Y Y Wrong (1988) Experts, especially doctors Instrumental rationality Competent authority Y Y Zhao (2009) Chinese communists Instrumental rationality Performance authority N Y Turner (2008) Chinese literati Rational knowledge Non-specialized expert N Y [ideological] authority Blau (1963) Abstracta/professional Value/instrumental rationality Professional Y Y This article Abstracta/many Substantive rationality (value Substantive-rational authority Y N and instrumental) Stressing rational charisma Schluchter (1989) Abstract Impersonal/extraordinariness Office charisma Y Y Breuer (1992) Soviet leaders Value rationality/ Charisma of reason Y Y extraordinariness Breuer (1996) Leaders of French Revolution Non-religious/Non-personal/ Charisma of reason Y Y extraordinariness Stressing other missing dimension/problem Weber (2005) Modern city Will of the ruled No name Y Y Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Nass (1986) Professionals Formality Second type of legal Y Y authority Matheson (1987) Abstract Various Five new types N Y Hamilton (1984) Chinese Xiao Moral roles Xiao N N Habermas (1984) Origin of legal authority Legal order None N N Bourdieu (1987) Prophet Symbolic capital in the field None N N aAbstract indicates that author begins analyzing logical thoroughness of the typology rather than an anomalous case. Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) Guzmán 79 example, sending an astronaut to outer space.10 In sum, value-rationality cannot constitute grounds to legitimize authority if we assume the philosophy of the subject, but could poten- tially constitute such grounds if we work within the philosophy of language. The second problem is that even this reformulated version of value-rational authority does not account for the type of rational element that is behind concepts such as “profes- sional authority” (Parsons, 1947), “competent authority” (Wrong, 1988), “goal-rational authority” (Rigby, 1982) or “performance legitimacy” (Zhao, 2009). In these cases, the authors are referring to claims and beliefs in the legitimacy of professionals (Parsons and Wrong) and communist leaders (Rigby and Zhao) on instrumental-rational grounds. This is interested obedience, but it is not the type of obedience granted when seeking to avoid jail or to receive patronage, since obedience in the latter cases of domination does not need legitimacy. Neither is obedience to such “instrumental rational” authority an autonomous decision resulting from non-authoritative persuasion, since the subject is not convinced by arguments but suspends his or her own judgment (Blau, 1963: 307) and may not even understand the arguments (Wrong, 1988). The patient must take the doctor’s recommenda- tion or orders “on authority” (Parsons, 1947: 49). Thus, legitimate domination on instru- mental-rational grounds exists when the subjects obey because they see the authority as a good rational interpreter of the concrete means to realize their interests or a common good. This type of authority has been demonstrated by psychologists’ experiments about how people often accept policy recommendations because of the belief in the expertise of the source rather than because of arguments (e.g. DeBono and Klein, 1993; Petty et al., 1981). Thus, both value- and instrumental-rational grounds for legitimacy are missing in Weber’s typology of authority. Yet, both types of rationality have something in common, if we look at them from the perspective of Weber’s Sociology of Law. Weber defined formal rationality not only in contrast with irrationality, but also in contrast with substan- tive rationality. In law, substantive rationality means that the decision of legal problems is influenced by norms different from those obtained through logical generalization of abstract interpretations of meaning [i.e., the norms of formal law]. The norms to which substantive rationality accords predominance include ethical imperatives, utilitarian and other expediential rules, and political maxims, all of which diverge from … formalism. (ES: 657, author’s emphasis) In other words, law-finding or law-making are substantive rational if they are claimed to derive from norms that have a rational content, in turn derived from ethical ultimate values (value-rational) or expediency rules (instrumental-rational). In fact, in law, value- and instrumental-rational justifications can hardly be separated, as Weber argued: Many other institutions of the prevailing system could not be legitimated except on practical utilitarian grounds. By “justifying” them, natural law “reason” easily slipped into utilitarian thinking, and this shift expresses itself in the change of meaning of the concept of “reasonableness.” In purely formal natural law, the reasonable is that which is derivable from the eternal order of nature and logic, both being readily blended with one another. But from the very beginning, the English concept of reasonable contained by implication the meaning of rational in the sense of Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 80 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) “practically appropriate” … This signified the express introduction of substantive presuppositions into the concept of reason which had in fact always been implicit in it. (ES: 870) Thus, there are two variations of a single missing type, which I call substantive-rational authority: (a) legitimacy based on the belief that an authority is a correct mediator between abstract ultimate values and concrete practical norms and (b) and legitimacy based on the belief that an authority is a correct mediator between ultimate goals and concrete means. Just as formal-rational law may be of two varieties that are in tension – “external characteristics formalism” and “logical abstraction formalism” (ES: 657) – substantive-rational authority may be of an instrumental-rational or a value-rational variety. Thus, it is the basis of authority of both the philosopher king who deduces value- rational law through reason and the doctor who offers instrumental medical treatment. More generally, it includes those solutions mentioned above as competent, professional, goal-rational, ideological, and value-rational authority. Of course, the fact that most empirical cases contain elements of other types of ration- ality should not distract us from identifying the basis of the “ideal type,” which may not look like any empirical case. The doctor may use credentials that endorse his or her capacities on formal grounds. However, the patient takes the doctor’s advice as authori- tative because of a claim of substantive-rational capacities, and the credentials only serve as a backup. This authority contrasts with that of the bureaucrat, whose stamp is valid not because of a substantive-rational capacity but because he or she is legally authorized to stamp a form – that the bureaucrat has the instrumental knowledge to identify whether or not a form should be stamped is implied, but it remains in the background. Thus, “sub- stantive rationality” can be easily understood as a fourth pure type of authority even if empirical cases often combine substantive rationality with sources of authority. This definition of substantive rationality as a fourth pure type of authority adds a third dimension to Weber’s typology. The original typology was limited to the tension between the ordinary and the extraordinary and between the rational and the non- rational (Figure 1, left).11 The new third dimension deals with the distinction between formal and substantive rationality (Figure 1, right) – since formal-rational grounds need not always be legal, as in the formal element in priesthood offices, I have renamed Weber’s “legal” type as “formal-rational.” We must note that not all of the space in the schemes can be filled with logically possible mixed types. Since pure rational authority is necessarily ordinary and, similarly, pure extraordinary authority is non-rational, all mixed types must be located somewhere in the gray area of the two-dimensional (2D) scheme, leaving the upper-right area of this scheme empty.12 The same is true in my three-dimensional (3D) scheme. Yet, in addition, the formal/substantive dimension only applies as authority becomes rational. Thus, the triangular area at the bottom of the cube shows that non-rational authority types are neither formal nor substantive. In sum, the gray pyramid in the 3D scheme represents all logically possible mixed types. This new scheme includes those “fourth types” that stress either a value-rational or an instrumental-rational element, since both elements are variants of substantive rationality, Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Guzmán 81 Extra- Ordinary Charismatic Ordinary Traditional Legal Non- Rational Rational Figure 1. Two-dimensional (left) and three-dimensional (right) typologies of legitimate domination. the more general rational type missing in Weber’s typology. The new scheme also accounts for the “fourth types” that stress rational charisma (Table 1); yet, instead of interpreting them as a fourth type, I interpret them as non-pure types, specifically, as substantive-rational and formal-rational transformations of charisma (Breuer, 1992, 1996; Schluchter, 1989, respectively).13 Putting the new typology to work: Notable non-pure types involving substantive-rational authority How does the proposed scheme help us understand the notable combined types to which Weber dedicated much attention, such as the transformations of charisma? Since the pos- sible combinations are many, I will only briefly discuss some of the most notable varia- tions that illustrate the contributions of the substantive-rational type of authority suggested above. Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of various transformations of charisma according to the combined bases of authority of these non-pure types as explained below. Charisma of reason One of the important transformations of charisma that Weber mentions is the “charis- matic glorification of ‘Reason,’” the last stage of the historical course of charisma, exem- plified by Robespierre (ES: 1209). However, Weber’s discussion is all too brief, and the type deserves further analysis. In the case of the “charisma of reason,” the transformation of charisma occurs through an interpretation of reason as extraordinary, breaking the separation between that which is controlled by the human intellect and God’s will. This quality is a somewhat mystical substantive reasonableness that, unlike in the case of the prophet or magician, does not need recourse to supernatural events to be validated.14 Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Table 2. Bases of legitimacy of notable transformations of charisma and some specific examples. 82 Notable type Historical example Previous Current classification classification Weber Others Primary Example Secondary Example Charisma of reason Solomon – C and R (Breuer) C and SR Wisdom to judge C God-given power Trusted recommendation, Dr Phil – – C and SR Expert instrumental C Charismatic authoritative variant capacity endorsement Educated charismaa Chinese literati, trained C&FR C&IR&VR (Turner) C and SR Magical capacity to FR Formal examination, rainmaker realize interests and formal training values Credentialed technocrat PhD Economics in – – C and SR Exceptional FR Formally recognized Latin American politics instrumental capacity to experience govern Experienced technocrat Hillary Clinton – – C and SR Exceptional SR Non-formal instrumental capacity to experience govern Secular saint “Che” Guevara – – C and SR Exceptional selfless N – commitment to SR mission Substantive-rational preacher Luther C&FR – SR Rational interpretation RO Valid scriptures of scriptures Rational-religious healer Chiropractors – – SR Releasing God’s healing RO God’s laws powers through “scientific” reasoning Professional Doctors – IR/VR (Parsons, SR Instrumental knowledge FR Formal credential Wrong, Satow, Blau) and value orientations proving training Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Philosopher king, acclaimed Some Soviet leaders – IR/VR/C (Breuer, SR Reasonableness to SR Acclamation by Rigby, Spencer, interpret the party’s ideological virtuosi Willer, Zhao) ideology Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) Guzmán Table 2. (Continued) Notable type Historical example Previous Current classification classification Weber Others Primary Example Secondary Example Scientist Scientists – – SR Capacity to produce SR Non-formal peer knowledge recognition Craftsman Craftsmen – – SR Capacity to make crafts SR Non-formal experience Trusted recommendation, Doctor recommended – – SR Expert instrumental N – less authoritative variant by friend capacity Philosopher king, Lenin – C and R (Breuer) SR Reasonableness to N Organizational misrecognized accumulation interpret the party’s capacity behind scenes ideology C: charisma; R: rationality; SR: substantive rationality; IR: instrumental rationality; VR: value rationality; FR: formal rationality; RO: revealed order; N: non. aFor the Chinese literati the traditional order was also a secondary source of authority. Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 83 84 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) Robespierre’s Cult of the Supreme Being15 was an unsuccessful attempt to legitimize his personalized power and thus may not be the best case to illustrate this type of legiti- macy, even if it may fit the type. A more successful example of this type of authority is found in the biblical story of King Solomon. Weber (1952) talked about Solomon’s endeavor to legitimize his rule in a struggle for succession before the establishment of “lineage charisma” as a form of routinization of charisma in a formal-rational direction (pp. 104–105). However, Weber explains the legitimation of Solomon by a prophet promising good fortune for Solomon and the eternalness of the Davidian throne (pp. 104–105), leading back to a purely charismatic endorsement.16 Curiously, while Weber mentions the novelty of Solomon’s claim to judicial wisdom (p. 86), he did not notice its relevance as a source of political legitimacy, something clearly illustrated in the biblical passage Weber cites: “And all Israel heard of the judgment that the king had rendered, and they stood in awe of the king, because they perceived that the wisdom of God was in him to do justice” (1 Kings 3:28, author’s emphasis). Yet Solomon was not a charismatic prophet: his wisdom was an extraordinary gift (1 Kings 3:12) that brought together God’s will and substantive justice that is not revealed but controlled by the intellect – even if not yet fully rationalized. Thus, Solomon – as well as Robespierre – represents a substan- tive-rational transformation of charisma – notably, of the warlord’s charisma, based on previously accumulated politico–military power, and of the ethical prophet’s charisma, which validates demands for obedience as ethical duty. Philosopher king Appeals to legitimacy by the charisma of reason can be further transformed in a substan- tive-rational way, so as not to rely on the extraordinary. Perhaps the oldest call for this kind of rule was suggested by Plato, with the figure of the philosopher king, but other variants can be found today – which, of course, we must interpret sociologically, not form a Platonic philosophy. Leaders further rationalizing charisma deal with a tension: on the one hand, their rational capacity is not extraordinary, and thus, in principle, available to anyone; on the other hand, they must justify their monopoly on reasonableness. There are two highly complementary solutions to this tension, best illustrated by the basis of legitimacy of some Soviet leaders as explained by Breuer (1992), although with different terminol- ogy. The first solution is a pseudo-antiauthoritarian interpretation of reasonableness based on acclamation of arguments by the ideological virtuosi – substantive-rational endorsement. In the case of Soviet leaders, this means acclamation by other party lead- ers who have previously accumulated authority as interpreters of the party’s ideology. However, this may also be the source of authority of public intellectuals, such as in the case of Jean Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault, whose recognition by the public is built upon their previous high recognition in academia. The second mechanism is the pro- duction of doxic misrecognition of original – often illegitimate – accumulation of authority (Bourdieu, 1987), including violence, economic resources, and political favors. This is true in the case of Lenin, whose power came from his organizational capacity behind the scenes rather than from being a man of the masses like Trotsky was (Breuer, 1992: 277). Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Guzmán 85 “Secular” saint The secular saint represents one of the ways in which the prophet’s authority is rational- ized. Weber distinguished between ethical and exemplary prophets. The former demand obedience as an ethical duty, while the latter demonstrate the way to religious salvation through his example, as in the case of the saint (ES: 447–450). The modern and rational- ized version of the exemplary prophet is the “secular” saint, typically an ascetic revolu- tionary leader. This leader does not appeal to the extraordinary to sanctify his mission or to endorse his personal, exceptional character. Instead, his exceptional behavior is sim- ply recognized by his followers on emotional grounds, by admiration of his – apparently – selfless commitment to the substantively rational mission – often exemplified by an ascetic rejection of the glory of office. Famous examples of these leaders are Ernesto “Che” Guevara and “Subcomandante” Marcos. A more typical variant of the secular saint are political leaders who are believed to serve their followers because of their nota- ble honesty and selflessness, as opposed to the corruption of their competitors. Substantive-rational preacher The substantive-rational preacher is perhaps best illustrated by the figure of Luther and perhaps also by other “teachers of ethics” (ES: 444–446) such as Calvin or Shankara. Weber (ES: 1198) mentions in passing Luther’s authority as a case of “office charisma” – that is, charisma based on the belief in “the specific state of grace of a social institu- tion” (ES: 1140) – yet without any argumentation. I propose revising this interpretation as a substantive-rational preacher. Luther, a professor of theology, disputed the official interpretation of the value of indulgences, and thus, the pope’s authority as the sole legitimate interpreter of scriptures, with rational arguments to be discussed in a public scholarly debate. Unlike purely char- ismatic prophets, he lacked emotional preaching (ES: 445) and did “not claim to be offer- ing a substantively new revelation or to be speaking in the name of special divine injunction” (ES: 446). Yet unlike the pope, his office as theologian in the university was not endowed with any divine inspiration to interpret scriptures. For his followers, the validity of his interpretation depended only on his claimed capacity to offer a logical interpretation of the scriptures that could realize the values revealed in them – while he said the Bible was open to anyone, his own interpretation had to appear as valid to grant him authority instead of diluting authority into every single devout. This is a substantive- rational capacity that, while relying on the validity of a revealed order, was not granted to him by that order in the way that the modern charisma of the pope’s office is granted by the “inspired” council. On the other hand, some elements of his personal leadership resembled revolutionary charisma, notably, his embracement of a mission to confront orthodoxy that he took personally. However, this personal mission was rationalized by an intellectual justification of his interpretation of the scriptures as better than that of the Pope, which contrasts with the prophet’s demand for non-rational submission. In conclusion, the substantive-rational preacher represents a transformation of the charisma of the ethical prophet. His authority is based on claims to a substantive-rational interpretation of the scriptures, typically a new one that justifies breaking with estab- lished authorities and their means to legitimize preachers. Their revolutionary character Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 86 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) comes not from extraordinary personal qualities but from their capacity to use their pre- vious recognition to validate their rational mission. While their primary source of author- ity is rationalized as intellectual interpretation, their authority still rests on a secondary source: the belief in the validity of a divine order, a belief which must remain unques- tioned in the background for the interpretation to be relevant. Rational-religious healer If Luther illustrates a transformation of prophetic charisma in a substantive-rational direction, then early chiropractors illustrate a similar transformation of magicians’ cha- risma in a substantive-rational direction. Unlike medical doctors, early chiropractors in the early twentieth century had no problem with using the extraordinary in the explana- tion of their trade. For them, disease was a result of violations of God’s natural law and “could be overcome only by releasing God’s beneficent powers in the proper flow of innate intelligence” (Martin, 1993: 812, 814). The role of the extraordinary was evident in their practice, which was full of religious imagery, such as the laying-on of hands (p. 813). The idea of personal mission was evidenced by their reference to imprisoned chi- ropractors as martyrs. They also used claims to spirituality to compete with “atheistic materialists” medicine (p. 813). On the other hand, chiropractors also emphasized their rational scientific character to differentiate themselves from Spiritualism. Their practice was defined as a rational science insofar as it involved “careful observation of God’s universe, using inductive reasoning to produce scientific knowledge and natural laws” (p. 813). They saw no conflict between science and religion, with science serving reli- gion “by demonstrating the Creator’s natural laws” (p. 812), which resonated with the cultural assumptions at the time. Thus, like the substantive-rational preacher, these heal- ers claim a substantive-rational interpretation of God’s order based on intellectual analy- sis, and the validity of their authority rests on the belief in the validity of a divine order. Educated charisma Weber described “charismatic education” as one of the transformations of charisma in a formal-rational direction (ES: 1143–1145). This consists of testing to confirm, select, and train the qualified, that is, those possessing latent extraordinary capacities to become warriors, medicine men, rainmakers, and so on. As the specialized charismatic training of novices is rationalized, it slowly approximates the rational training of professionals. Weber described this as a formal-rationalization of charisma because he saw profession- als as inextricably linked to formal-rational authority in bureaucracies, rather than as substantive-rational authorities. Thus, he missed the fact that the educated medicine man was followed because of his extraordinary instrumental-rational capacities – a mix of charisma and substantive rationality – and not due to any formalization of his training, which only worked as a backup. Even in the cases in which charismatic qualification was more formalized, such as the Chinese literati, examinations had a strong substantive-rational character. True, the masses believed the successful candidate possessed magical qualities (Weber, 1951: 128) and this in fact mattered for their duties, which included astrological interpretation of heavenly will (p. 109). This belief illustrates the charismatic authority of the literati. Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Guzmán 87 However, the examinations were not simply standardized evaluations of cultural knowl- edge; they included questions on policy and legal reasoning (Turner, 2008: 131). Answering these questions was seen as condition for substantive-rational capacity for political advice that would realize both Confucian tradition and the emperor’s interest – for instance, through counterintuitive low taxation (p. 131). In other words, while the literati could realize some interests or values by magical (extraordinary) means, they could also realize interests and values by intellectual means. Thus, the legitimacy of the literati came primarily from a combination of both claims to charisma and substantive- rational capacity. The formal-rational procedure was only a secondary source of author- ity that endorsed the claims to charisma and substantive rationality.17 Professional, scientist, and craftsman Professionals, scientists, and craftsmen differ from philosopher kings in the way in which they resolve the tension between their non-extraordinary rational capacity and valid monopoly on reasonableness. They claim to have a valid monopoly of specialized knowl- edge based on their special and long training. Professional authority is a rationalized version of educated charisma. In this case, the charismatic element is left aside and substantive rationality becomes the primary source of authority, while formal-rational endorsement – their credentials – remains as a backup or secondary source. Credentials are typically a formally authorized recogni- tion of rational technical–instrumental knowledge and, sometimes, also of value orien- tations or ethical standards, as in the case of doctors, teachers, and lawyers. Of course, what matters to the person accepting professional authority is the professional’s capac- ity to realize a goal or value on rational grounds – for example, heal an illness using science. Credentials serve only as indicators of this capacity and should thus be under- stood as a backup, a formal endorsement by another authority. As mentioned above, the secondary character of this formal authorization becomes more evident if con- trasted with the formal authority of the bureaucrat, whose stamp is valid primarily because he is legally authorized to stamp a form – that the bureaucrat has the technical capacity to know when a stamp should be given is typically taken for granted and remains in the background. While the defining characteristic of professional authorities is the formal credentials certifying a long special training, this does not mean that professionals do not rely on the validity of other authorities or order. For instance, the authority of medical doctors requires the validity of the scientific order – which has as a maxim that causal effects should be explained by scientific means. This becomes evident when the validity of the scientific order is questioned, as occurred when early chiropractors successfully con- tested medical doctors’ monopoly on healing practices in a context in which the scientific order was problematic (Martin, 1993). A less formalized transformation of educated charisma is found in the case of the craftsman or “experienced authority.” The craftsman’s authority over his apprentices is based on claims to an instrumental-rational capacity backed up only by non-formalized practical experience. This experience is typically endorsed non-formal recognition of clients and the craftsman’s master. In both cases, the endorsement is of substantive- rational origin. Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 88 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) The scientist’s authority lies somewhere in between the professional and the crafts- man, but is closer to the craftsman in that the secondary source of authority is non-for- malized substantive-rational peer recognition. By scientists I refer to those producing knowledge for peers rather than applying it for a client, which is what professionals do – obviously, there are many cases combining elements of both. While scientists have credentials, the scientist bases his or her authority less in formal credentials and more in his or her peers’ non-codified and informal or semiformal recognition of a capacity to produce knowledge. Of course, credentials allow entering the field, but credentials alone do not grant authority within a scientific field; quality publications do. Although formal rankings of the journals may matter in some tenure evaluations, this is only very loosely applied in the assessments of scientific authority by tenured peers. Moreover, there is no standardized formal indicator of the value of books. The scientific method is also insuf- ficient to formally codify authority, since it is ultimately the substantive-rational evalu- ation of a thesis that matters. Technocrat The authority of professionals, scientists, and craftsmen is typically shared by a large group that monopolizes a specialized authority. There are variations in the degree of authority among practitioners but there is rarely one that is at the top or has command over all the rest. When a single person or a very small monopolizing elite claims this substantive-rational capacity, they either approximate the philosopher king or they bring a personalized charismatic element back in; something that would make them exem- plary. Typically, this is based on claims to very scarce and demanded rational capacities, often associated with rare and competitive credentials. This is the case of the techno- cratic authority that represents the technocratic utopia of top political administration based on technical skills – different from the basic technical skills of bureaucratic staff. For example, holding a PhD in economics from a top university in the United States has played a legitimating role among Latin American ministers, presidents, and candidates (Dezalay and Garth, 2002). It should be noted that in the case of the “credentialed tech- nocrat,” as in the case of the professional, credentials are only supposed to be an endorse- ment of substantive-rational capacities and thus not the primary source of legitimacy. A second variant of the technocrat is the “experienced technocrat,” who bases his legitimacy on claims to rare experience that provided high training, yet without formal credentials. An example can be found in the claims revolving an advertisement that received much media attention during the Democratic Party’s presidential primaries in 2008. The advertisement and Hillary Clinton’s speeches at the time stressed that she was better prepared than Barack Obama to provide security in times of crisis, notably because of her previous national security experience as First Lady (Seelye and Zeleny, 2008). Authority endorsed by trusted recommendation Professionals and other authorities often gain legitimacy through endorsement not only by those with substantive competence in the relevant sphere, but by someone who inspires the emotional trust of the ruled. This endorsement can come either from a char- ismatic figure or, in a less authoritative variant, from trusted peers. An example of the Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Guzmán 89 former is television celebrity Phillip McGraw (“Dr Phil”), who is followed as a “relation- ship expert” after an endorsement by the highly influential celebrity Oprah Winfrey – a leader who comes close to the pure type of a charismatic authority. In this case, the authorized authority often acquires some of the charisma of the endorser: Dr Phil is not simply a good doctor; he is such an exceptional expert that a leader like Oprah trusts him. An example of the less authoritative variant would be a doctor who is not demanded so much for having particularly notable credentials, but mostly because of personal recom- mendations from a client to a trusted friend. Toward a general classification of non-pure types These notable examples illustrate how two contributions of this article allow for a better understanding of the sources of legitimacy for various empirical cases. First, they repre- sent a series of variations in the transformations of charisma in a substantive-rational direction that Weber’s typology overlooked and other authors’ modifications still did not account for. Table 2 illustrates the thoroughness of the new typology. Second, these examples show the importance of differentiating primary and secondary sources of legit- imacy, which can be distinguished from simple mixed types that combine different sources fulfilling equivalent legitimating functions. Table 3 summarizes these variations. This provides a visualization of the difference, for instance, between combining cha- risma and substantive rationality as primary sources of legitimacy (third column) and Table 3. Notable transformations of charisma in a substantive-rational direction by source of legitimacy. Primary Charismatic Charismatic and Substantive-rational Secondary substantive-rational No backup by legitimate Prophet Secular saint Trusted recommendation authority or order Magician (less authoritative variant) Warlord Philosopher king (misrecognised accumulation) Revealed order Substantive-rational preacher Rational-religious healer Charisma Charisma of reason Trusted recommendation (authoritative variant) Formal rationality (or Educated charismaa Professional legal order) Credentialed technocrat Substantive rationality Experienced technocrat Philosopher king (or value-rational (acclaimed) order) Scientist Craftsman Note: aFor the Chinese literati the traditional order was also a secondary source of authority. Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 90 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) having substantive rationality as the primary source and the revealed order as the second- ary source (fourth column, third row). Summary and conclusion 1. Using Bourdieu’s idea of doxa, I have reformulated Weber’s concept of legitima- tion and, consequently, provided a more complete solution to the question about why legality can become an independent form of domination. I then explained how this occurs only when the authorizing authority or enabling order becomes doxic. My reformulation makes this “neo-Weberian” typology of legitimacy more consistent with contemporary social theory. The new conceptualization demands more attention to the secondary bases of authority, in other words, the authority authorizing another authority or order, or the backup of codified for- mal-rational authority (Bourdieu). It also suggests considering the legitimation of authority as a mediator between abstract values or goals and concrete policy. 2. I have argued that the fourth pure type of authority found to be missing by schol- ars analyzing some anomalous cases – professional, ideological, and so on – can be encompassed in one type: substantive-rational authority. With this addition, Weber’s typology based on two dimensions – level of rationality and the ordi- nary/extraordinary continuum – gains a third dimension: type of rationality vis- a-vis substance or form. For the purposes of any theory concerned with rationalization processes and how claims to rationality legitimate authority, this distinction between substantive and formal types of rational authority is crucial. The new type and dimension also allow accounting for the anomalies or “fourth types” observed by many scholars, such as the authority of doctors and rulers in Soviet-type societies. 3. I have offered some empirical examples to illustrate the use of the new typology. These examples show how charisma is transformed in a substantive-rational direction, something overlooked by Weber’s lengthy analysis of its formal- rational transformations. Looking at the different variants allows us to see how charisma and substantive-rational authority are not simply blended together in these transformations, but how one can serve as an unproblematic backup of the other. Moreover, these sources are often combined with formal rationality as a secondary or backup source of authority. These examples also show the comple- mentary relations between formal-rational and substantive-rational claims to legitimacy, and between instrumental-rational and value-rational claims. My new typology better explains the role of rationality and charisma in cases for which scholars continue adapting Weber’s typology, such as Soviet-type societies, tech- nocrats, professionals, and scientists (Breuer, 1992; King and Szelényi, 2004; Pace, 2003; Zhao, 2000). 4. This new typology better serves the broader Weberian concern for rationalization processes and should open new avenues of inquiry into the non-formal directions of rationalization of the world. Weber saw the tensions and complementary rela- tions between substantive- and formal-rationalization of law, as well as the gen- erally formalizing historical trends tendencies and the opposite anti-formalistic Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Guzmán 91 trends in modern law (ES: 882–892). However, perhaps because of the limita- tions of his tripartite typology, Weber saw political authority as increasingly bureaucratized. While he noted a tendency toward substantive rationality in the “spirit” or rational bureaucracy and in plebiscitary democracies, he left this underdeveloped (e.g. ES: 226, 269–270, 978–980). Perhaps as a consequence of this, the causal relation between types of domination and rationalization of law that Weber implied (ES: 809) was also left unclear. Thus, the new typology of legitimate domination is better equipped to illuminate the relationship between two contrary rationalization processes in law and politics. A better understanding of the role of substantive rationality in political legitimacy today should probably lead us to moderate Weber’s famous bureaucratization thesis. While we still need further research, we now know that formal-rationalization is not the only direc- tion of rationalization of authority as Weber thought. Thus, we are now forced to seek better specifications of the links and tensions between both forms of ration- ality in legitimation processes. Acknowledgements I thank Melissa Amezcua, Hauke Brunkhorst, José Casanova, Lila Elman, Marisol López- Menendez, Amy Stuart, and three Journal of Classical Sociology reviewers for their very helpful suggestions. Previous versions of this article were presented at the New School for Social Research Latin American Working Group and the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association. Notes 1. Many scholars, when faced with anomalous cases that are not accounted for by Weber’s typology, add one or more ad hoc types represented by their cases (e.g. Breuer, 1992, 1996; Parsons, 1947; Rigby, 1982; Willer, 1967). Unfortunately, this strategy leads to accounting for only a part of what is missing in Weber’s tripartite typology, leaving space open for more anomalies that do not fit the new pure types. For instance, Parson’s (1947) “professional authority” accounts for doctors but not Soviet leaders, whereas Willer’s (1967) “ideological authority” cannot account for doctors. We thus need one or more broader categories that can better complete Weber’s typology of authority. 2. A fourth objective in Weber’s work, which the typology I propose also serves, is clarifying the tensions between personal and depersonalized forms of domination (Schluchter, 1989). For examples of interesting solutions to anomalous cases by building typologies with new criteria that do not serve Weber’s main purposes, see Hamilton (1984), Turner (2008), and Zhao (2000, 2009). 3. There is some controversy about whether domination is an adequate translation of the term Herrschaft, which can also be translated as “rule,” “dominion,” “control,” “imperative con- trol,” “power,” “leadership,” or “sway.” I follow the terminology used by the translators of Economy and Society (cf. ES: 61–62 n. 31, for a brief discussion). 4. Many empirical studies have shown that compliance is produced not so much by legality but by procedural fairness, which may be non-legal and non-formal (see Tyler, 2006: 379–380 for a review of those studies). In Weberian terms, this could be called the “procedural order.” Thus, legality would only produce legitimacy insofar as it is considered procedurally fair, that is, that the legal order is fair. Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 92 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(1) 5. Weber also notices that conceptions of the “rightness on the law” based on “Natural Law” often affect positive law when they motivate the behavior of groups interested in the law even beyond lawmakers and law practitioners (ES: 866). 6. Bourdieu’s critique is targeted against Weber’s understanding of charisma, but it is evidently applicable to his other types of authority. 7. This argument contradicts the Weberian idea that charisma derives from a personal gift (cf. Adair-Toteff, 2005: 195). It also contradicts contemporary reinterpretations such as Turner’s (2003) explanation of charismatic leaders’ powers as based on the illusion of success against illusory or empty threats. While this may sometimes occur, the sole fact that the examples he mentioned – for example, Saddam Hussein and Hugo Chávez – actually faced violent attacks in the form of coups and invasions suggests that threats were not false. Furthermore, if anything, this illusion could only explain the leaders’ maintenance of legitimacy, not their original legitimation when confronting an established orthodoxy. 8. Note that this does not mean that the authority is traditional. Following a traditional ruler because he is deemed legitimate involves a conscious belief in the sanctity of tradition (ES: 215). Instead, I am here speaking here of a pre-reflexive acceptance of an order, closer to habit and discipline, that is, without a conscious question and belief in its legitimacy or illegitimacy. 9. Others reformulate Weber’s typology adding non-rational types (e.g. Matheson, 1987), sub- dividing the formal-rational type (Nass, 1986), or looking for anti-authoritarian variants (Thomas, 1984). Weber (2005) himself also considered adding a fourth type, based on legiti- macy derived from the will of the ruled, although he never developed this idea. 10. The importance of claims to legitimate interpretation is suggested with Breuer (1992). 11. There is some debate about whether the defining characteristic of charisma is extraordinari- ness or something else – for example, personalism (Turner, 2003, albeit somewhat ambigu- ously), “baffling success” (Turner, 2003), or magic (Adair-Toteff, 2005). The problem with personalism is that it is also often typical of traditional authority. The limitations of Turner’s argument about “baffling success” are discussed in note 7 above. The problem with magic is that it does not necessarily go together with extraordinariness and exemplary character, as in the case of charismatic warriors like Napoleon. Thus, stressing only extraordinariness as the defining dimension of charisma provides a more thorough concept. It also better illustrates the historical effects of charisma: breaking routine and established authorities. 12. Defining mixed types as moving in a continuum and limiting the area of logically possible combinations solves Turner’s (2003) unnecessary confusion with mixed types that combine antithetical elements, such as “business charisma” – that is, mixed types do not simply add elements of two pure types but partly sacrifice some of those elements as they include oth- ers. The sacrifice is smaller when the elements of other types remain in the background, as in many of the cases described in the section “Putting the new typology to work.” 13. In his influential work, Schluchter (1989: 235) interprets “office charisma” as a fourth type rather than as a transformation of charisma as Weber sees it (ES: 1139–1141). Such inter- pretation results from Schluchter’s replacement of the rational/irrational axis in my two- dimensional scheme with a personal/impersonal axis. The main problem here is that a focus on personalization rather than rationalization makes the schema less helpful for research that relates authority to Weber’s broader concern and contribution, the problem of rationalization. A second problem is that Schluchter’s “office charisma” focuses on the depersonalization of the mission rather than on the depersonalization of authority. However, a personal mission is only an element of some charismatic authorities, central to the prophet but not at all to the magician. This also leads Schluchter to wrongly categorize substantive-rational natural law as impersonal extraordinary law, corresponding with charismatic domination. The problem here is that there is no clear extraordinary element in natural law and that the authority validating Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Guzmán 93 law as substantive rational does not need a charismatic character – for example, when validat- ing human rights. 14. This interpretation of the concept of “charisma of reason” differs from Roth’s (1979) and Breuer’s (1992), but it is similar to Breuer’s (1996) in his analysis of the French Revolution. 15. The Cult of the Supreme Being was Robespierre’s short-lived attempt to unify and control various cults, especially the rather atheistic Cult of Reason, under a sort of civil religion. In the Cult of the Supreme Being, reason came from God but was interpreted by its leader, Robespierre. 16. Weber also argues that the chariot army and schooled priests of Solomon’s new rigidly organ- ized political structure led to a decline of ecstatic heroes. However, he does not explain what replaced the legitimacy that the ecstatic heroes’ charisma provided (pp. 98–101). 17. Additionally, tradition worked as another secondary or backup source of authority, since the relevance of the rational and magical capacities mattered only insofar as the validity of the traditional order was unproblematic in the literati’s evaluations. References Adair-Toteff C (2005) Max Weber’s charisma. Journal of Classical Sociology 5(2): 189–204. Albrow MC (1972) Weber on legitimate norms and authority: A comment on Martin E. Spencer’s account. British Journal of Sociology 23(4): 483–487. Auyero J (2001) Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita. 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Weber M (2005) Ein Vortrag Max Webers über die Probleme der Staatssoziologie. In: Weber M Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Herrschaft. (ed E Hanke and T Kroll). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 752–756. Willer DE (1967) Max Weber’s missing authority type. Sociological Inquiry 37(2): 231–239. Wrong DH (1988) Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses, 2nd edn. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Zhao D (2000) State-society relations and the discourses and activities of the 1989 Beijing student movement. American Journal of Sociology 105(6): 1592–1632. Zhao D (2009) The mandate of heaven and performance legitimation in historical and contempo- rary China. American Behavioral Scientist 53(3): 416–433. Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016 Guzmán 95 Author biography Sebastián G Guzmán is a PhD candidate in Sociology at the New School for Social Research. His interests include political sociology, class subjectivities, social movements, labor, social theory, and Latin America. His publications include “Reasons and the acceptance of the authority’s speech: An empirically-grounded synthesis of Habermas and Bourdieu,” in Sociological Theory. He is currently researching how consent and resistance to debt payment are produced among social housing mortgage-debtors in Chile. Downloaded from jcs.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on May 17, 2016