ACTUAL NOTICE Certified Mail # ________________________________ To: Fred O. Dickinson, Executive Director Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles 1 Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-0500 T. N. Prakash, Deputy Director Division of Driver License 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 The Aggrieved, _____________________, hereby serves statement of good-faith reliance on the law and issues regarding the purported mandate for one to maintain a driver’s license and register his private property (i.e. automobile or other) with the State of Florida: 1. An Act of the legislature of the State of Florida can embrace only one subject. a. Florida Constitution, Art. 3 § 6 says that, "Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title. No law shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only. Laws to revise or amend shall set out in full 1Notice to Principal is Notice to Agents and Notice to Agents is Notice to Principal; moreover, the enclosed is notice to all Assigns and Successors of the addressed Office or the like. The term “or the like” means any office that is styled in an analogous or similar manner as the addressed. Due Process and Stipulations on Advancement Page !1 of 10 ! the revised or amended Act, section, subsection or paragraph of a subsection. The enacting clause of every law shall read: ‘Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida.’ " b. Since The Florida Constitution says that each legislative enactment can embrace only one subject and the matter connected to it, then there is no room for more than one subject matter to be embraced in a single legislative enactment. c. Therefore, an Act of the legislature can contain only one subject at hand and not two or more. 2. There is only one legislative enactment in Title XXIII, Florida Statutes, controlling drivers’ licenses. a. Florida Statute 322.51 says, “This act may be cited as the ‘Uniform Classified Commercial Driver's License Act.’ ” (Laws of Florida s. 1, ch. 89-282.) Note: There are no other “acts” or legislative enactments controlling drivers’ licenses in the entire Title XXIII, Florida Statutes. b. Since the only legislative enactment existing in XXIII Florida Statutes is The Uniform Classified Commercial Driver's License Act, there is no other evidence of any other law besides 322.51 controlling drivers’ licensing statutes in Florida. c. Therefore, 322.51 is evidence of the only legislative enactment in existence which controls drivers’ licensing in Florida Statutes. d. In light of (1)(c) and (2)(c) above, the legislative intent for drivers’ licensing in the entire Title XXIII, Florida Statutes, deals with the single subject of commercial drivers’ licensing to the exclusion of any other type of license. e. Because the title of this Act has the words “Commercial Driver’s License Act”, it does not prompt me to inquire into the body of the Act, since I am not a commercial driver: Williams v. State, 370 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1979): Due Process and Stipulations on Advancement Page !2 of 10 ! Second, Williams asserts that the statute violates article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution in that the statute’s title does not adequately apprise a person of average intelligence of the statute's contents. We disagree. The title of a statute need not index all of the statute's contents. The proper test is whether the title is so worded as not to mislead a person of average intelligence as to the scope of the enactment and is sufficient to put that person on notice and cause him to inquire into the body of the statute itself. Pruitt v. State, 363 So.2d 552 (Fla.1978); Mayo v. Polk Co., 124 Fla. 534, 169 So. 41, Appeal dismissed, 299 U.S. 507, 57 S. Ct. 39, 81 L. Ed. 376 (1936); Butler v. Perry, 67 Fla. 405, 66 So. 150 (1914), Aff'd, 240 U.S. 328, 36 S. Ct. 258, 60 L. Ed. 672 (1916). State v. Volusia Cty. Indus. Development Authority, 400 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1981): The test for the adequacy of a title is "whether the title is so worded as not to mislead a person of average intelligence as to the scope of the enactment." Williams v. State, 370 So.2d 1143, 1144 (Fla.1979). f. Laws of Florida s. 1, ch. 89-282 makes no mention of licensing requirements for people traveling by automobile in a non-commercial and/or private capacity, because to do so would embrace more than the single subject, which is the licensing of commercial and/or for-hire drivers. 3. Class D or E driver licenses apply only to driving in commerce and/or for-hire activity, to the exclusion of all other driving activity. a. Laws of Florida s. 1, ch. 89-282 § 4(5)(e) says that “A resident who is exempt from obtaining a commercial drivers’ license . . . may drive a commercial motor vehicle. . . if he possess a valid Class E drivers’ license. 1) More mention of Class D or E licenses within this Act are in § 5(2)(e), § 6(3), and § 10(2). Due Process and Stipulations on Advancement Page !3 of 10 ! 2) The Aggrieved has not seen nor been presented with any legislative acts which mention the Class D or E License EXCEPT IN The Uniform Classified Commercial Driver's License Act. b. Since The Uniform Classified Commercial Driver's License Act deals exclusively with licensing those engaged in commercial or for-hire transportation, and since it is the only legislative Act in Florida which makes reference to Class D or E licenses, then the Class D or E licenses only applies to the single subject of commercial or for-hire driving. c. Applying the Class D or Class E licenses to non-commercial activity would require that the Act, in addition to defining commercial and for-hire activity, also defined non-commercial activity, which it has not done and which violates the single-subject provision of Florida Constitution, Art. 3 §6 d. Therefore, the Class D and Class E driver licenses are within the legislative scope limited to that of licenses for commercial and for-hire activity. 4. The legislative intent controlling driver licensing starts at Fla. Stat. 322.02. The earliest reference made in the statutes is s. 14, ch. 19551, enacted in 1939. As a result of this Act, The Department of Public Safety was created with two divisions: The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) and the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP). Section 54 of this Act says, “All laws or parts of laws in conflict and inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.” Therefore, any acts regarding driver licensing enacted prior to 1939, if not already expressly repealed, amended or in conflict with the 1939 Act or subsequent Acts, would still stand as valid legislative intent regarding driver licensing. a. The legislative scope regarding the regulation of automobile use prior to 1939 was only limited to drivers who were engaged in for-hire or other commercial driving activities. 1) In 1929, Chapter 13700 of the Laws of Florida regulated the use of the public highways for compensation. Due Process and Stipulations on Advancement Page !4 of 10 ! a) Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. State Railroad Commission, 132 So. 851 (Fla. 1942), states, "Chapter 13700, Laws of Florida, contemplates: (1) The conservation of the highways constructed by taxation and other public funds in the state for the use of the public for transportation purposes; (2) the safety of persons and property in the use of the highways; (3) a limited and regulated use of motor vehicles on the highways by persons and corporations engaged in the business of transportation for compensation on such highways only as the public convenience and necessity may require. . . an intent of chapter 13700, Laws of Florida, is the permissive limited and not unjustly discriminating use of the highways in the business of transportation for hire, only as the public necessity and convenience may require, and only as such use does not duly impair the roads or the safety of their use by the public." b) In Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931), "Laws 1929, c. 13700, applying to business of private motor carrier, operating under special contract for compensation upon public highways between fixed termini and over regular route, same scheme of regulation as to common carriers, was beyond power of state.” 2) Since the Florida Courts held that the legislative intent of 13700 was limited to regulating motor vehicles engaged in transportation for hire as common carriers and that 13700 was not intended to apply to “the private motor carrier, operating under special contract”, then the legislature could not have intended that the driving regulations would apply to people engaged in private automobile use on the highways. b. Therefore, the legislative scope regarding the regulation of automobile use prior to 1939 was only limited to drivers who were engaged in for-hire or other commercial activities as common carriers. 5. The document common carriers were required to obtain in order to engage in commercial transport for hire was called a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (COPCAN) (see Laws of Florida, 1929, ch. 13700 § 2). The subsequent Act which incorporated and amended ch. 13700 was Due Process and Stipulations on Advancement Page !5 of 10 ! the Laws of Florida 1931, Chapter 14764, which regulated motor carriers using the public highways for compensation through the Railroad Commission. a. The legislature did not intend for people who were not common carriers engaged in commercial transport to obtain a COPCAN. b. Laws of Florida 1931, Chapter 14764 in § 30 states as follows: Recognizing and declaring that the transportation exempted in this section is casual, seasonal and not on regular routes or schedules, is slow moving, frequently in special equipment, and for comparatively short distances over the improved highways of the State . . . [n]othing in this Act contained shall be construed or applied to require any private motor vehicle engaged in the transportation of goods, wares or merchandise belonging to the owner or operator of such vehicle to secure a permit or a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity under the provisions of this Act or to become subject to regulation prescribed by this Act or by the Railroad Commission in respect to common, private contract or for hire carriage, or to pay the mileage tax provided by this Act. Casual or irregular trips by motor vehicles not engaged in the business of for hire carriage but operate under private license shall not subject such motor vehicles to the provisions of this Act so long as such motor vehicles may not lawfully be required to operate under for hire license tags. c. State Ex Rel. Fohl v. Karel, Sheriff, 180 So. 3 (Fla. 1937), states the following: "The statute regulating motor vehicles carriers for hire was designed merely to regulate those who operate motor vehicles for compensation and was not intended to apply to persons, firms, or corporations engaged in transporting their own goods over the public highways as a mere incident to their mercantile or private business. Acts 1931, c. 14764." Due Process and Stipulations on Advancement Page !6 of 10 ! d. Since 14764 § 30 and supporting case law say that the legislative intent regulating motor vehicle usage was not meant for people who were engaged in random or private business, then it was not necessary for such people to obtain any certificate in order to travel by automobile. e. Therefore, the legislature did not intend for those who are not engaged in public commercial driving activities to obtain a COPCAN. 6. The legislative intent of s. 14, ch. 19551, 1939 as codified as Statute 322.02 did not expand beyond the scope of the 1931 Act ch. 14764 § 30. a. The 1935 Act, ch. 17115 amended the 1931 Act ch. 14764 § 30, b. The 1937 Act, ch. 18028/18029 amended the 1935 Act, ch. 17115. c. Since none of the text in the 1935 and 1937 amendments to § 30 of the 1931 Act expands the scope of motor vehicle statutes to apply to people who are traveling by automobile in a private capacity, then the language of such Acts intends that only “for hire” common carriers be required to obtain a COPCAN and to obey any other statutes concerning motor vehicle operation. d. Since none of the language § 30 of 14764 and its subsequent amendments are in conflict with the 1939 Act found in s. 14 ch. 19551, then such section has not been repealed (see paragraph 4). e. Therefore, in the 1939 Act, the legislative scope of motor vehicle statutes remained limited in application to the for-hire common carriers. 7. Although the 1939 Act specified, for the first time, exact classifications of people who are exempt, the nature of the exempt activities in the 1931 Act ch. 14764 § 30 and subsequent amendments through 1937, remains unchanged to this present day. Due Process and Stipulations on Advancement Page !7 of 10 ! a. Section 16 of the 1939 Act enumerates specifically those who are exempt from licensing. Such section is today’s 322.04, Florida Statutes. b. Section 54 of s. 14, ch. 19551, 1939, does indeed say that “all laws or parts of laws in conflict and inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.” c. Since the 1939 Act only introduced the types of people exempt, and did not introduce any new type of activity that may or may not be exempt other than those enacted or amended from 1931-1937, then the only type of activity which could be regulated by the Department of Public Safety and its divisions was transportation for hire. d. On its face, it appears that the legislature enacted the 1939 Act only to replace existing law regarding regulation of traffic through the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles and the Florida Highway Patrol; however, it did not expand application of licensure and motor vehicle statutes to apply to people and activities exempted in § 30 of the 1931 Act and its amendments. 8. Although the Act of 1941, chapter 20451 repealed the 1939 Act, the legislative intent did not expand beyond the scope of the previous Acts which only applied to for hire transportation activities. a. The 1941 Act created the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) within the Executive branch which transferred the responsibility for licensing motor carriers and drivers from the Department of Public Safety to the DHSMV. b. Since the Act created the DHSMV to license motor carriers changing only some of the definitions in form, while maintaining the same substance without altering the nature of the law, which was regulating the use of the public highways for hire, then there was no legislative intent to repeal the exempted people and activities in § 30 of the 1931 Act and its amendments. c. Since the 1941 Act remains today as the basis for F.S. 322 and its definitions are codified in F. S. 322.01, then the exempted activity in § 30 of the 1931 Act and its amendments still applies today. Due Process and Stipulations on Advancement Page !8 of 10 ! d. Therefore, there was and still is no legislative intent to expand beyond the regulated for- hire driving activities and persons. 9. No Acts subsequent the 1931 Act have repealed the activities exempted in § 30 of the Act. a. The Aggrieved has not found any legislation which has repealed the law exempting the people and activities in § 30 of the 1931 Act and its amendments. b. Since there are no laws which have repealed the exempted activities, then such exempted activity is still exempt. c. Therefore, the legislative intent of Title XXIII, Florida Statutes, is exclusively limited to regulated for-hire driving activities and persons, and has been consistent from 1929 to the present Uniform Classified Commercial Driver's License Act. 10.The COPCAN is synonymous with any current Florida Drivers’ License class. a. In Diamond Cab Owners Ass'n v. Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, 66 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1953), the Florida Supreme Court stated the following: Statutes pertaining to issuance of licenses for the operation of taxicabs, and referring in part to “every such person owning, leasing, using or exercising dominion over motor vehicles operated in the transportation of persons or property over public highways for hire,” by use of the disjunctive, places the control, operation, or management of such motor vehicles on equal footing with the ownership thereof, and plainly shows the purpose of the Act was to regulate and control the person or persons controlling, operating, managing, using, or exercising dominion over such motor vehicles. F.S.A. ss. 323.01(7)(c), 323.05. 1) Compare F. S. 322.01: "Drive" means to operate or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in any place open to the general public for purposes of vehicular traffic. Due Process and Stipulations on Advancement Page !9 of 10 ! 2) "Driver's license" means a certificate which, subject to all other requirements of law, authorizes an individual to drive a motor vehicle. [Emphasis added] b. Since the legislative intent for driver licensing never expanded past the scope commercial / for-hire driving activities to include people traveling privately; c. Then the word “certificate” found in the definition of “driver license” in 322.01 is the same in nature to that of a COPCAN as found in acts previous to 1939. d. Therefore, a “driver’s license” as found in the 2007 Florida Statutes is a COPCAN as found in acts prior to 1939, which was exclusively limited to the regulation of persons and activities involving commercial for-hire transportation. CONCLUSIONS 11.Since the Aggrieved is not a regulated person in a regulated activity pursuant to The Laws of Florida, including but not limited to Title XXIII and supporting case law, then he is not required to possess a Florida Drivers’ License of any class. 12.The DHSMV and its principals and agents, including but not limited to, Sheriff officers, FHP, and municipal police, would be acting ultra vires towards the Aggrieved should they not recognize his lawful immunity from Title XXIII. Served on Officer _________________________ Badge #_________ on _____________________ ____________________________________________ [Name] Due Process and Stipulations on Advancement Page !10 of ! 10
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