Resolved: The United States should remove nearly all of its military presence in the Arab States of the Persian Gulf. April 2020 PF Brief* *Published by Victory Briefs, PO Box 803338 #40503, Chicago, IL 60680-3338. Edited by Lawrence Zhou. WriĴen by Ilana Cuello-Wolffe, Pia Dovichi, Roshni Varma, and De- von Weis . Evidence cut by Lawrence Zhou. For customer support, please email help@ victorybriefs.com or call 330.333.2283. This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Devon Weis's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to help@victorybriefs.com. Contents 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis 7 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.2 Resolution Breakdown and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.2.1 Nearly All . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.2.2 Military Presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.2.3 Arab States of the Persian Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.2.4 Summing Up the Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.3 Affirmative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.3.1 Preventing War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.3.2 Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.3.3 Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.4 Negative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.4.1 Triggering War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.4.2 Military Presence Benefits the Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.4.3 Undermining Security Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.4.4 Foreign Policy Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.4.5 Beyond Nearly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2 Topic Analysis by Pia Dovichi 17 2.1 Introduction and Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.3 Affirmative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.4 Negative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3 Topic Analysis by Roshni Varma 26 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. 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Contents 3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3.2.2 Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.3 Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.4 Pro Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.4.1 Tensions Deescalate Without U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.4.2 U.S. Diplomacy Won’t Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.5 Con Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.5.1 U.S. Military Presence Key to Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.5.2 Oil Interests Are Vital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4 Topic Analysis by Ilana Cuello-Wolffe 36 4.1 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.2 A ffirmative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4.2.1 Inflaming Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4.3 Negative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4.3.1 Aggravating Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4.3.2 Protecting Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.3.3 ISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5 Background Evidence 45 5.1 Military Presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5.1.1 Troops and Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5.1.2 Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 5.1.3 New Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5.2 Topicality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 5.2.1 Military Presence = Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 5.2.2 Military Presence = More Than Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 5.2.3 Arab States of the Persian Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 6 Pro Evidence 57 6.1 Presence Bad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 6.1.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 6.1.2 Solvency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 6.1.3 Zero Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 6.1.4 Balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 6.1.5 Leverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 3 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. 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Contents 6.1.6 Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 6.1.7 Russia Miscalculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 6.1.8 Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 6.1.9 Middle East Not Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 6.1.10 AT: Satloff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 6.1.11 AT: US Key for Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 6.1.12 AT: Instability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 6.1.13 AT: Security Spiral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 6.1.14 AT: Regional Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 6.1.15 AT: China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 6.1.16 AT: Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 6.1.17 AT: Heg Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 6.1.18 AT: Retrenchment Now . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 6.1.19 AT: Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 6.1.20 AT: Bases Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 6.1.21 AT: Fifth Fleet Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 6.2 OSB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 6.2.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 6.2.2 History Proves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 6.2.3 AT: OSB Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 6.2.4 AT: Oil Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 6.2.5 AT: Syria Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 6.2.6 AT: Trump Bad for OSB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 6.2.7 AT: Brands and Feaver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 6.2.8 AT: Feaver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 6.2.9 AT: Reassurance Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 6.2.10 AT: Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 6.3 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 6.3.1 OSB Solves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 6.3.2 Pressure Bad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 6.3.3 Deterrence Fails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 6.3.4 Security Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 6.3.5 AT: Presence Deters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 6.3.6 AT: Iran Bad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 6.3.7 AT: Troops Solve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 6.3.8 AT: Mandelbaum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 4 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. 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Contents 6.4 Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 6.4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 6.4.2 AT: Link Turn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 6.4.3 AT: ISIS Resurgence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 6.4.4 AT: ISIS Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 6.4.5 AT: Counterinsurgency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274 6.5 AT: Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 6.5.1 Non-Unique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 6.5.2 Leverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 6.5.3 AT: Lashout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 6.6 AT: Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 6.6.1 AT: Saudi Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 6.6.2 AT: Saudi Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 6.6.3 AT: Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294 6.6.4 AT: Prolif Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 7 Con Evidence 303 7.1 Retrenchment Bad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 7.1.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 7.1.2 Power Vacuum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 7.1.3 Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324 7.1.4 Fill-In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 7.1.5 Russia Fill-In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328 7.1.6 Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 7.1.7 Fifth Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342 7.1.8 Jordan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346 7.1.9 AT: Karlin and WiĴes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347 7.1.10 AT: Indyk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350 7.1.11 AT: GCC Moderates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352 7.2 AT: OSB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354 7.2.1 Military Presence Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354 7.2.2 Prolif . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368 7.2.3 Withdrawal Fails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 7.2.4 Air and Navy Power Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 7.2.5 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385 7.2.6 AT: Mearsheimer and Walt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388 5 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. 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Contents 7.2.7 AT: Alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405 7.2.8 AT: Entrapment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409 7.2.9 AT: Light Footprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410 7.3 Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413 7.3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413 7.3.2 Syria Magnifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 7.3.3 AT: ISIS Defeated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419 7.4 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422 7.4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422 7.4.2 New Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426 7.4.3 Deterrence Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428 7.5 Saudi Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431 7.5.1 Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431 7.5.2 Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444 7.5.3 Yes Prolif . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447 6 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Devon Weis's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to help@victorybriefs.com. 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis Devon is the Director of Public Forum at Victory Briefs. Devon graduated from New York University in the winter of 2017 as a Politics major with a double minor in Philosophy and History. At NYU he was a semifinalist of the Global Debate Competition, and served as the VP of the school’s American parliamentary debate team for two years. Devon has been involved with Public Forum Debate for about 10 years, competing at Suncoast High School in Florida, and coaching since then. In addition to working freelance with a number of teams around the country, Devon was the head Public Forum Debate Coach at Byram Hills High School for three years, coaching the school’s first ever TOC qualifiers. Most recently he coached the 2019 NSDA national champions. Throughout his career, teams he’s coached have made it to late outrounds at a variety of tournaments like CFL Nationals, TFA State, Princeton, Harvard, Penn, Lexington and the Sunvitational. 1.1 Introduction April is arguably the most intense month for debaters competing on the circuit, there are state and national championships galore. With few opportunities to compete this late in the season, many teams will only have one or two weekends of April to get in practice rounds at locals or diagnose the circuit meta. This means that preparation will be all the more essential this month. However, having a gameplan is more important than cuĴing cards. Succeeding at high-level tournaments like the TOC necessitates more than a big blockfile, it requires having a strategy, trusting that strategy, and executing that strategy to the best of your ability every round. “Having a strategy” does not just entail a plan to collapse on the second link of the first contention, it’s more like a dogma, or a worldview that fits together all the relevant ideas of a topic. I encourage you to organize all your thoughts on the topic, maybe even literally map them out, before mindlessly downloading every article with the words Persian Gulf. I’d also like to note that because 7 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Devon Weis's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to help@victorybriefs.com. 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis Iran is a global flashpoint, many of the facts on the ground will be in flux, which makes April even more exciting for everyone! 1.2 Resolution Breakdown and Background “Resolved: The United States should remove nearly all of its military presence in the Arab States of the Persian Gulf.” This resolution isn’t exactly run of the mill, so a clear understanding of its wording is going to be much more important this month than in months prior. While some of the phrases used may seem general and arbitrary, the terminology was chosen to imply a specific meaning. Let’s break down some of the trickier parts. 1.2.1 Nearly All It seems debaters are hesitant to debate a resolution with a shaky modifier like “nearly all.” While some debaters may aĴempt to craft positions contingent on an interpretation of nearly all as being “greater than 50%” of presence, past examples of “nearly all” in legal precedent define the term as being about 99%.¹ The phrasing “nearly all” was likely intended by the framers as a way of removing the viability of negative positions centered around minute benefits of troops like mine removal or supporting naval presence, to instead focus the debate on the benefits and harms of a near complete pullout. My issue with this component of the resolution is the leeway it gives affirmative teams in an event that is deathly afraid of “plans.” Affirmative teams may aĴempt to lazily get out of negative perception arguments by saying that there will still be “some” US military presence that nevertheless triggers their harms, denying the neg their solvency. I don’t think this will be of big concern so long as a definition of nearly all is established and agreed upon. 99% withdrawal of presence will likely generate some degree of solvency. However, if nearly all presence is removed, then what presence remains? This is the part of the resolution that is a tad annoying, but important to prepare for. Debaters should be ready to make arguments about which types of military presence are most likely to remain in a world where nearly all presence is removed. The question of what presence remains is essential for both sides. It will allow the affirmative to delink negative disads about specific forms of presence being good or bad (i.e. drones), by suggesting that kind ¹hĴp://www.onenation.org/article/ron-unz-gilroy-violates-prop-227/ 8 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Devon Weis's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to help@victorybriefs.com. 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis of military presence most likely would or would not be withdrawn. On the negative, proving which military presence is most likely to be withdrawn or stay is key to winning links into those disads. For example, the negative can’t just say drones are good, aff withdraws them so negate. The aff can get out of that argument preĴy simply by just saying that it is most likely that everything other than our drones would get withdrawn instead. 1.2.2 Military Presence This is one of the more interesting parts of the debate in my opinion. Military presence can imply quite a bevy of subjects. The most obvious definition includes troops and military equipment like fighter jets and tanks. However, there are also definitions that label bases² a form of military presence which would be a strong link into arguments for either side. I also think there are arguments to be made about naval presence. For those of you that didn’t debate UNCLOS, the territorial waters of coastal states extend 12 nautical miles past the shoreline. This implies that the resolution would also remove US naval vessels within those waters. Since we have quite a few ships in the Persian Gulf,³ that could be an interesting subject to cover. I predict that one of the primary forms of trickiness on this resolution will come from alternative definitions of military presence, so cuĴing topicality cards will be an important way to stay ahead of anything your opponents might throw at you. Keep an open mind and try to think outside the box. 1.2.3 Arab States of the Persian Gulf This is a term of art that refers to 7 particular countries: Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. There’s also an organization called the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is a political and economic alliance between all the “Arab States of the Persian Gulf” minus Iraq. The idea was to create a collective-defense capability, sort of like an Arab NATO.⁴ However, the Council is highly reliant on US security guarantees and military support. Argu- ²hĴps://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/38/1/121/1785193?redirectedFrom=fulltext ³hĴps://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Ref-0213-US-Military-Bases- and-Facilities-Middle-East.pdf ⁴hĴps://mepc.org/journal/security-assurances-gulf-states-bearable-burden 9 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Devon Weis's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to help@victorybriefs.com. 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis ments about fracturing or strengthening this coalition are another interesting realm of the topic to consider. 1.2.4 Summing Up the Resolution Before I go into pro and con arguments, it seems that the framers have intended for April to be a debate about general US foreign policy strategy in the Middle East, particularly with regards to Iran. The fiat of this resolution is quite powerful as the affirmative needs to defend an extremely substantial withdrawal of military presence, which will likely generate massive perception links on both sides about how US strategy should or should not change. While specific examples of military presence being beneficial or harmful will be useful, I think the larger debate to be had is about which foreign policy strategy is holistically preferable. 1.3 Affirmative Arguments 1.3.1 Preventing War As is the case with most every foreign policy topic, the resolution will most likely be dominated by arguments about which side can prove that war is more likely. Affirma- tive teams will likely want to read that we are right on the brink of war with Iran and our path of engagement in the status quo is making a military confrontation inevitable. Our military presence in the Persian Gulf is to encircle Iran militarily and to lend credi- bility to our deterrent forces in the region. This strategy is known as containment. The converse to containment is appeasement, which as its name suggests, involves giving important concessions to adversary states in hopes of defusing tensions. Our military presence is mostly aimed at strengthening containment, although there are also quite a few authors that describe our current deterrent as weak and ineffective. Regardless, re- moving nearly all military presence would signal a shift in Iranian engagement strategy towards appeasement. To make an argument about resolving Iranian instability (and thereby potential war scenarios) one can argue both A: that containment is failing, and that B: appeasement is good. For example, Bishara of Al Jazeera warns of the dangers of a pressure-dominated foreign policy strategy for Iran.⁵ ⁵hĴps://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/arrogance-fanaticism-prospect-iranian-war- 190430085736682.html 10 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Devon Weis's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to help@victorybriefs.com. 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis Washington’s aggressive approach will likely weaken Iranian pragmatists like Rouhani, and empower hardliners. This will cause Iran to abandon diplomatic efforts to contain the crisis and seek to quit the nuclear deal and perhaps even the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty altogether, rile up its Gulf neighbours, and undermine the US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would inevitably evoke a sharp reaction from Washington, which may lead to war or wars by proxy throughout much of the region. Moreover, arguing about the ineffectiveness of militarily deterrence on a nation that en- gages in conflicts through asymmetric means will also set the stage for arguments about how the only solution to instability in the Gulf is through diplomacy. It stands to rea- son that appeasing Iran would be the best method for re-opening diplomatic talks and re-integrating an agreement-ordered middle east, as opposed to infinitely deploying American troops as global policemen. In terms of big picture strategy, if the affirmative can find and win some really good uniqueness evidence about how the US is on the brink of conflict with Iran right now, then they can engage in the rhetorically compelling “try or die for the aff” style weighing because neg must defend the status quo. If a war is coming, I’m confident that majorly reducing our regional military presence will do more to avert that war than continually issuing “credible threats” will--especially if debaters argue those threats are the reason why we’re on the brink of war in the first place. 1.3.2 Terrorism Robert Pape is a fantastic author that I encourage you all to read. He famously authored a book called “Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” His work is a data-driven project analyzing decades of data about suicide terrorism. While terror is often treated as a monolith in high school debate, Pape nuances our understanding of the concept. One of his most renowned conclusions is that suicide aĴacks are highly strategic and almost always aimed at foreign military occupiers--like the US.⁶ He reaches this finding by tracking the targets, timelines and demographic profile of the terrorists that engage in suicide aĴacks. Terrorism, particularly suicide terrorism, is harmful for a number of reasons. Thus, I can easily picture affirmative teams suggesting that the root ⁶hĴps://news.uchicago.edu/story/how-end-suicide-bombings-b-book-argues-problem-not-islam- lengthy-military-occupations 11 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Devon Weis's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to help@victorybriefs.com. 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis cause of terrorism in the Arab States of the Persian Gulf is foreign occupation, or at the very least, the perception of foreign domination of middle eastern politics and culture. The fiat of the resolution seems to imply that we would largely be ending the war on terror as our bases and troop presence tend to either engage in, or support counter- terrorism objectives in the regions they’re located. The thing is, as Pape seems to agree, counter terrorism tends to exacerbate and stoke the flames of terror more than it does to uproot it. This thesis manifests itself in the data surrounding our counter effective drone strike policy and in the enduring political instability following decades of interventions and consequent occupations. 1.3.3 Alternatives As I mentioned in the resolution breakdown section, debaters should be prepared to discuss what sort of military presence would be most likely to remain in an affirmative world. In light of this question, I think the aff can make arguments about how a near pullout of US troops in the Persian Gulf would encourage a greater use of small footprint or non-presence based forms of interaction. There are definitions of military presence that specifically exclude non-combat personnel or cyberspace engagement. Those of you that enjoyed extolling the virtues of offensive cyber operations or have a secret love of spec ops forces should be excited. One could argue that the fiat of the resolution pushes the US military into a more humanitarian role in the Persian Gulf, or instead refocuses our counterterrorism posture in a more covert, surgical way. I also think that teams could make arguments about encouraging regional military self-sufficiency. Much of our presence in the Persian Gulf is related to training local militaries. As I mentioned earlier, the GCC has strived for military independence for decades, so if the US stops “helicopter parenting” (snare drum) the region, perhaps such a signal will force Arab Gulf States to take their national security more seriously and expedite their plans for military modernization. Watch out for impact turns about oil state militarization though. Furthermore, there is quite a bit of academic literature regarding “Offshore balancing.” Put simply, offshore balancing is the idea that we should have fewer troops deployed abroad. Eugenio Lilli has wriĴen one of the most important pieces on this topic com- paring offshore balancing to deep engagement, specifically in the context of the Persian Gulf.⁷ ⁷hĴp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arĴext&pid=S0034-73292018000100204 12 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Devon Weis's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to help@victorybriefs.com. 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis On the other hand, advocates of a strategy of offshore balancing maintain that their own brand of grand strategy best serves the US national interest. Walt writes that ‘Offshore balancing is the ideal grand strategy for an era of American primacy. It husbands the power upon which this primacy rests and minimizes the fear that this power provokes’ (Walt 2005). Posen (2013) agrees and criticizes deep engagement by saying that “it makes enemies al- most as fast as it slays them, discourages allies from paying for their own defense, and convinces powerful states to band together and oppose Wash- ington’s plans, further raising the costs of carrying out its foreign policy” (2013, 2) 1.4 Negative Arguments 1.4.1 Triggering War This is the heart of the topic. Negative teams were meant to make narrowly tailored arguments as to why US military presence in the Persian Gulf is key to deterring Ira- nian aggression. I’m going to spend less time explaining this argument as it is simply the converse of the first argument from the affirmative side: containment is good and appeasement would be bad. Many authors contend that the Obama-era engagement with Iran was a form of ap- peasement, citing examples like the nuclear deal as evidence of the strategy. Much of this work is published around January because it was likely wriĴen to elevate Trump’s killing of General Soleimani as a strategy pivot towards containing Iran. Plenty of ex- perts believe that appeasing Iran would be bad, and the Lilli study cited earlier⁸ proves that containment has been preĴy successful, finding that there was “an overall trend toward a reduction of the total number of armed conflicts,” as military presence in the Persian Gulf steadily rose. As I mentioned on the affirmative side, while the aff can say this round is try or die to avoid a war, the negative can play that game a bit as well. There is currently no war in the status quo, despite how high tensions with Iran are. If we were to conduct a radical policy shift like a near complete troop withdrawal from the region, one could argue that there’s a high probability that such an action could trigger feelings of opportunism on ⁸hĴp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arĴext&pid=S0034-73292018000100204 13 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Devon Weis's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to help@victorybriefs.com. 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis the part of Iran, or conversely anxiety on the part of our allies, resulting in a wide range of potential miscalculation scenarios. Because the resolution does so much to change the political and security landscape, both sides need to engage in a highly nuanced comparison of which world would be more stable. 1.4.2 Military Presence Benefits the Region While this is my least favorite potential negative strategy, there is undoubtedly good literature about the beneficial impact that US military presence can have on the area it occupies. This could range from humanitarian assistance and aid delivery to local military training. For example, in 1991, the US military engaged in Operation Provide Comfort where troops delivered humanitarian assistance to refugees and kickstarted a strong alliance with the Kurds.⁹ Military training also seems to go hand in hand with weapons sales and is a large part of our military strategy in the Persian Gulf as well.¹⁰ As I briefly alluded to earlier in the affirmative strategy section, I think encouraging GCC military self-sufficiency is a relevant area of impact. If removing nearly all of our troop presence significantly inhibits our ability to train local forces, then in the instance of a future conflict, the United States would have liĴle choice but to re-deploy troops to secure shipping routes, or instead take a massive hit to the legitimacy and confidence in American security guarantees. As such, I think the military training argument could be framed as the only way for the US to permanently get out of the Middle East, which would highly mitigate the timeframe of aff impact scenarios. Think, why would we remove all our military presence if we will just have to reinstate it later? 1.4.3 Undermining Security Guarantees While the topic is about the Persian Gulf and Iran, without a doubt, there will be ar- guments made about how withdrawing US troop presence from the Arab States of the Persian Gulf will threaten other countries’ confidence in the United States security um- brella, which could cause a whole host of unwanted outcomes. Elliot Silverberg of For- eign Policy magazine describes our waning alliance with South Korea and Japan as a “geopolitical recession.”¹¹ South Korea and others (like Taiwan, Israel and the Baltics) ⁹hĴps://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/operation-provide-comfort-a-forgoĴen-mission-with-possible- lessons-for-syria/ ¹⁰hĴps://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessing-the-global-operating-environment/middle-east ¹¹hĴps://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/03/china-japan-korea-trump-comfort-women-east-asia-alliances- falling-apart/ 14 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Devon Weis's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to help@victorybriefs.com. 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis have been put on edge by Trump’s withdrawal of troops from Syria.¹² When the United States reneges on security guarantees, the damage to its legitimacy ripples across the global alliance system. Countries like Japan and South Korea are of particular impor- tance due to their economic power and political/security significance with regards to China and North Korea. Debaters could argue that removing military presence from the Persian Gulf pushes teetering alliances with East Asia over the edge, and leaves states with no choice but to pursue their own defense strategy. South Korea has con- templated acquiring its own nuclear warhead and Japan seems intent on remilitarizing. If allied states across the Asian continent view troop pullout as symptomatic of Trump’s appetite for isolationism, we could see global nuclear proliferation and cascading arms races on a massive scale for the next few years. 1.4.4 Foreign Policy Realism Under a realist foreign policy perspective, power is best understood in relative as op- posed to absolute terms. That is to say, one cannot understand how much power one has unless they understand how that power relates to another’s power. Thus, it is a zero sum game, where anyone’s increase or decrease in power translates to a converse reaction for the other. Realist foreign policy theorists don’t trust other states and posit that a state’s primary goal is to ensure its national security by maintaining power over all others. Given this realist foreign policy framing, negative teams need only win that removing “nearly all” military presence from the Arab States of the Persian Gulf consti- tutes a strategic misstep by diminishing our ability to power project or assert relational power over adversaries like Iran. If one can win that states should act according to a realist foreign policy mindset, then one will likely have an easier time geĴing the judge to negate I encourage debaters to delve into the different subsets and variations of realism as it will be a very helpful way to lend legitimacy to the case arguments you’re making. I also believe there is strategic value in focusing more round time to the theoretical un- derpinnings for military presence rather than fussing over particulars of what presence actually means or trying to predict future scenarios through a crystal ball. Debates about the superiority of particular views on foreign policy will be more sophisticated than line by line uniqueness debates that tend to err in favor of the second speaking team. ¹²hĴps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-south-korea-military-cost-dispute-and- trumps-moves-in-syria-fuel-doubts-over-us-commitment/2019/11/01/7048b030-fa30-11e9-9534- e0dbcc9f5683_story.html 15 This product is licensed to devon@victorybriefs.com by Victory Briefs. Any distribution or modification of this file not explicitly allowed by the terms of purchase (including removing or obscuring this text or sending to anyone outside Devon Weis's school) is a violation of copyright. Please report illicit distribution of this file to help@victorybriefs.com. 1 Topic Analysis by Devon Weis 1.4.5 Beyond Nearly I have a bit of an anti-utilitarian bent so I figured I’d also go over a less traditional vein of argumentation as well. Negative teams can take a principled stance against leaving any military presence