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Abstract This paper is on satellite-borne and anti-satellite weapons. In this paper I explore the development, usage, effects, and safety of these spacefaring weapons. I chose this topic because I have an interest in military and space technology, as well as its increasing relevance in the world. I have researched this topic by reading articles from peer-reviewed journals as well as personal correspondence with current and former military and government personnel, and articles and reports from military journals and government documents. This issue is relevant because these technologies are something currently under development, testing, and in some cases use by many nations and could lead to another, modern Cold War that very well could break out into active warfare. This is due to the nature of the weapons which allow attacks that are possible to launch unnoticed until the weapon strikes its target. These weapons are very relevant as attacks on satellites have been occurring since 2003, with at least 1 attack on a US satellite by Iran, and weapons have been demonstrated to destroy satellites in 2007 and 2008.(1) My research will provide a different and unique perspective from others who have done work on this topic as I am able to produce views, evidence, and information from personal correspondence that is backed by both civilian and current military information that a purely civilian or military researcher alone would be lacking. Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………….1 Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………….……...2 Introduction…………………………….…..…....….…………………………………………3 Development of Satellite-Borne and Anti-Satellite Weapons……….…………………5 Usage and Effects of Satellite-Borne and Anti-Satellite Weapons…………………...11 Safety of Satellite-Borne and Anti-Satellite Weapons Systems…………………...….17 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………..21 Works Cited…………………………………………………………………………………...23 1 4941 words Introduction Satellite-borne and Anti-satellite weapons have been under development for many years, stretching back to the Cold War.(2) I find this particular bit of information to be quite interesting as it is likely that the development of these types of weapons will lead us towards a new kind of Cold War where the weapons are hovering over our heads quite literally. The main satellite-borne weapon that I cover in this paper consists simply of a large rod made of metal shaped in a cylinder, which is launched out of the satellite housing and into the Earth’s gravity well when fired. While there are some directed energy weapons theorized, the extreme power requirement of such a weapon to attack from space is prohibitive.(3) Because of this, the rod-based weapon system will be the main focus of the satellite borne weapon portion of this paper. There are several reasons that this weapon would be attractive to the militaries of the world’s nations, the first being it is quite difficult to detect. The size of these rods are relatively small, approximately a foot in diameter and 20 feet long(3), and would weigh in at several tons. Also, since the weapon itself is only a smooth metal rod, it would produce no emissions until it begins to reach high temperatures and create a plasma sheath in the atmosphere on reentry. Additionally, the weapon can create an enormous amount of devastation that, while far smaller than a nuclear weapon, also has none of the fallout which would cause continuing harm to any innocents or noncombatants unaffected by the impact. 2 4941 words There are three main treaties governing weapons in space. The first is the SALT/New START (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and STrategic Arms Reduction Treaty respectively) treaties between the US and USSR in 1969 until the final version and ratification in 2011.(4) The second is the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty which was also between the US and USSR signed in 1972 and expired in 2002.(5) The third one is the Outer Space Treaty which was created in 1967 between the US, UK, and USSR but is open to signing and ratification to United Nations parties.(6) While the SALT and the ABM treaty are only between the United States and USSR and are no longer in effect, they were in effect for the duration of the early development of anti satellite weapons, which current models are based off of. These three treaties prohibit the implementation of nuclear weapons in outer space but make no mention of terminal velocity kinetic bombardment weapons, allowing governments to bypass their spirit through adherence to the wording.(4,5,6,7) In addition to these weapons, there are also anti-satellite weapons being produced, and both the United States and China have used one to destroy one of their own satellites in testing(1,2). Additionally, the Russians claim to have developed and produced an anti-satellite missile, but their system has not been tested to destroy a satellite yet(1). However, there are reports from the Russian military stating that they are currently developing a laser anti-satellite weapon mounted on an aircraft.(2,8) 3 4941 words Development of Satellite-Borne and Anti-Satellite Weapons A large consideration for these weapons, both satellite borne and anti satellite, is the location of the orbit of the satellite. While a satellite in geostationary orbit is generally safe from an anti satellite missile due to the distance being so great, there are few geostationary orbital slots due to the nature of geostationary orbits being restricted to a very small latitude around and over the equator.(9) Because of this, nations cannot launch nearly as many geostationary satellites as they can in other orbits such as Low Earth Orbit for weather or communication spacecraft. In addition, a geostationary orbit must be over 22 thousand miles above the Earth,(9) which puts it out of missile range but also places it much too far above the Earth to serve as an effective weapons platform due to the time it would take for the weapon to travel the distance to fall to the Earth. This means that all weapons platforms based on satellites must be far closer, in a Low Earth Orbit, which is at a minimum of 120 to a maximum of 1200 miles above the surface of the planet(10), which even at higher orbits is still well within the operational range of both the American and the Chinese missiles as shown in both of the nation’s tests in the late 2000’s.(1) In addition, Low Earth Orbits require the least amount of energy to reach and maintain, since a geostationary orbit requires a launch not only to a much higher altitude than Low Earth Orbit, but must then fire its rocket to attain the velocity necessary to 4 4941 words maintain an orbital period equal to the earth’s rotational period,(9) as well as the fact that a Low Earth Orbit is only a tenth of the altitude(11) of a geostationary orbit. Additionally, a satellite in geostationary orbit requires the occasional but regular firing of its station keeping engine due to the procession of the orbit over time,(9) which costs increasingly more fuel over time than a satellite in an orbit that is allowed to “walk” or drift would require, therefore limiting the satellite’s life span. A second consideration of satellite weapon designers is the mass and cost of the weapon’s implementation. Because getting mass to space is expensive, a satellite weapon designer must consider the cost they would be incurring. For example, SpaceX’s Falcon IV Heavy can lift 63,800kg to Low Earth Orbit for 90 million US dollars, but only 26,700kg(41.8% of the mass of LEO) to a geosynchronous transfer orbit for the same cost.(11) This means that a geosynchronous satellite could be prohibitively expensive, in addition to the comparatively long travel time that such a satellite at geosynchronous orbit would require to get its weapon to the surface of the Earth. However, the travel time from a geosynchronous orbit bombardment satellite to the surface would be similar to a current ICBM’s flight time of approximately 35 minutes(12) from rest, and therefore may be considered an acceptable increase in flight time considering the weapon’s power and the stealthy flight that is inherent to its design. 5 4941 words Comparative cost is also something that must be taken into account with actual cost, and while a space based weapon may require 50 times its mass in fuel to put in orbit, ordnance used in the Gulf War was reported to cost approximately 40 times its mass in fuel.(13) Therefore such a massive increase in destructive power and at a relatively small cost increase may also be deemed worth the tradeoffs. The development of anti-satellite weapons have been around far longer than satellite-borne weapons. This is due to the prevalence of spy satellites used by the United States and the USSR in the Cold War through today, as well as being used as anti ballistic missile missiles.(10) Both the US and USSR were developing these weapons as early as the 1950s and 1960s, respectively.(6) Many of these systems were either deemed too impractical or met with failure. For those that reached the operational stage, the United States’ missiles were far too limited, being stationed at only two bases worldwide, and the Soviet’s were deemed too slow to be of operational use, taking multiple orbits to reach its target.(2) However, this field has been constantly developing, and over the decades the two nations as well as China have developed fully operational anti satellite weapons.(2) This initial development was also driven by the possibility of satellite borne weapons even in the 1960’s as Cold War innovations led to plans for nuclear warheads in space. While the Outer Space Treaty(6) banned the use of nuclear weapons in space and therefore helped to assuage the fears both the governments and the people had of nuclear missiles stationed over the heads of 6 4941 words each of the respective nations, the Soviets maintained a weapon system in space they called the Fractional Bombardment System, which had a small nuclear element to it, but only by technicality and was allowed to remain for a time.(2) While no longer allowed due to the prohibition on nuclear weapons in space as per the New START treaty, the case of this weapon being in space at one point is a cause for nations to develop provisions against such weapons in the future. Another issue that leads to the development of Orbital Kinetic Bombardment weapons on satellites are targeting systems. Due to the speed attained, in excess of five to ten km/s, maneuverability once in flight is extremely reduced. At a maximum speed of even the lower estimate, five thousand meters per second, it would be impossible to steer the rod a significant distance laterally before it impacted the surface, rendering the weapon useless against anything mobile. Anti-satellite weapons are far less problematic as they are already in use for interceptor functionality for current defenses and weapon systems for shooting down enemy aircraft and missiles. This means that it is a comparatively small effort to configure these missiles to instead take out satellites, especially since it is not difficult to plot a satellite’s path. However, because of the vertical range required for reaching Low Earth Orbit, the very early Cold War missiles would not be capable of destroying the satellites beyond the very lowest, and were unable to do so within an acceptable time frame(2). Thus the programs 7 4941 words were put on hold until the late 1980’s, when the missile technology developed enough for a more effective interceptor missile to become available for use(2,8). These more effective interceptors in the 1980’s were the ASM-135, which was designed specifically for the destruction of satellites as the Soviet Union weakened, were maintained through the 1990’s and continued through the 2000’s, culminating in the anti satellite missile tests of 2007 and 2008(2) by China and the United States. These tests have led to Russia also declaring they had anti satellite weapons in the form of both an airborne laser system under development(2,8) and functional missiles(2) which remain untested. China also has tested their missiles twice since the 2007 destruction of their defunct satellite, and also is developing a ground based anti satellite laser which has been reported to have been causing the blinding of several United States satellites as they pass overhead.(2) This already has tinges of a new Cold War, but with the additional inclusion of China as a power as well, as the three nations face off in a new show of force. A further issue that an anti satellite missile would come across is the potential for a satellite to be able to evade. Despite the commonly held belief that a satellite is in a fixed, unchanging orbit with constant speed, space is quite large and small changes are possible relatively easily. In the 1980’s, after the development of the ASM-135 and its existence was realized as a threat to satellites currently in orbit and future satellites to be launched, attempts were made to discover if a satellite could defend itself against an attack. These efforts resulted 8 4941 words in the discovery that with the amount of fuel aboard a satellite, an evasion maneuver could be performed that could save the satellite from destruction.(14,16) This revelation on the abilities of a satellite to in turn defend itself from an anti satellite weapon would be a very valuable asset to an organization who wished to place a spacecraft in orbit like an orbital weapons system, because even though this discovery only allows “a single evasive maneuver that...would cause no progressive degradation to the orbit.”(14), the fact that it is possible at all would open the door to mission directors and planners in the future to design their satellites with more fuel to allow for multiple corrections, in the event of multiple satellite interceptor missiles being launched at the spacecraft. While missiles can be sent up in multitudes to destroy satellites, they are still a limited resource due to cost, and a satellite capable of multiple dodges would require several missiles to reliably destroy it.(16) This also means that in the event of satellites that are able to dodge become more and more common, the developers of anti-satellite weapons would have to be able to create a missile capable of tracking and still reliably destroying these new satellites with fewer launches than the current missiles might require. Which in turn would be likely to precipitate more efficient evasive systems on the satellites. Again this parallels the Cold War as an arms race is taking place, between being able to put something out of reach of an attack, creating a weapon to attack it, and then creating a way to evade the attack. 9 4941 words Usage and Effects of Satellite-Borne and Anti-Satellite Weapons Even without having weaponized satellites in space these anti-satellite weapons pose a significant and credible threat to other nations as there are communications, weather, and other strategic satellites that are used for navigation and information gathering within strike range of these missiles.(17) Even in civilian sectors, these satellites are extremely important as they facilitate civilian communications and weather forecasting as well, and without these we are left blind and deaf. While they are quite numerous with over 1400 currently in orbit, almost all of them are within the range of the current anti satellite missiles.(18) Anti-satellite weapons would most likely be used in conjunction with a first strike, in addition to a reply to an attack, however their first strike utility would lead to them being a force multiplier for an attacker as the reliance of modern military on satellite assets is enormous.(17) This enormous dependency on satellites would lead to a crippled military should these assets be destroyed, blinded, or otherwise compromised. Without an enemy’s communications and intelligence gathering satellites, a first strike would be even more powerful, and would allow the attacker an additional advantage in both seeing the defender’s launches in reply and thwarting them as well as targeting further strikes. The effect of multiple enemy nations having anti satellite weapons would be interestingly moot because as an attacker can blind its target, the defender can send its own missiles up to blind the attacker in turn. In this sense, anti satellite 10 4941 words missiles can be an equalizer of Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence(C3I) systems as much as it is a weapon to destroy space vehicles that carry weapons. However the use of anti satellite weapons would simply result in the other using theirs as well and returning to an equal footing, negating ​both​ of the belligerents’ satellite advantages. This could actually be a desirable outcome depending on the belligerents in question, for example reiterating the Cold War idea of Mutually Assured Destruction, deterring an attack on satellites(19) for nations with extensive space capabilities, or as an equalizer for nations without such widespread use of space facing a more exoatmospherically developed enemy nation. With the benefit of an anti-satellite weapon comes a necessity to be able to defend against this weapon. This development of defenses against anti-satellite missiles has been in the works since at least the 1980’s(15) and has also been in the minds of the military in more recent engagements in the Middle East as more nations are able to put vehicles in the air and into orbit.(20) This lead to an already built in system even for the older satellites that still have fuel in them to evade an attack from an anti-satellite weapon(15), and paving the way for development of future satellites to be able to use this system even better by equipping them with larger fuel reserves. The effects of the anti satellite missiles used are already being experienced; however, not because they have been used against active satellites but as a 11 4941 words driving force for geopolitical strife and a new arms race, despite some assurances otherwise.(10) The use of anti satellite missiles create other political issues as well, since a destroyed satellite obviously creates a large amount of hazardous debris. If these anti satellite missiles are used irresponsibly like the Chinese did in their 2007 test, it would create a debris field that lasts for decades,(2,10) which could seriously impact other satellites. This is why the United States does not use kinetic kill interceptor missiles anymore, as an explosive missile will not create as many hazardous fragments in the satellite’s former orbit. However, the United States has been continuing to study these missiles, as Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated they were developing capabilities to both counter another nation’s anti satellite capabilities and the pursuit of disallowing the use of space to enemies of the United States in conflict.(10) While the use of an orbital weapon has never happened so far, it is a concern and is definitely a possibility, as the United States Air Force has looked into orbital bombardment weapons.(3) While other nations may have also looked into these weapons I am unable to directly ascertain the depths, as I can not read Chinese or Russian, and any translations of their documents available are bare of information they have not officially revealed. Therefore any discussion of their orbital weapon status would be speculation, so I will restrict this portion to declassified United States research and the theoretical physical effects of the weapon that can be determined through the common math and physics equations of kinematics. 12 4941 words The energy contained in the rod described above, with a diameter of one foot and length of 20 feet, from its combined speed and mass is so high that it would be capable of penetrating the ground for a distance several times its length.(3) This is the current purpose of a missile called “bunker buster” bombs (which have been in use since World War 2), which penetrates the ground and explodes. However, the destruction that the rod would cause is equivalent to a shaped charge the same weight as the rod, which would be approximately 9 tons.(3) At the upper limit of estimated speed, this energy could reach the equivalent of 44 tons of TNT. (A ton of TNT is an explosive energy of 4.184 GJ(21), and the energy in Joules is found with the kinetic energy formula of J=.5(m(v​2​)) ) Additionally, the extreme speed and relatively small size of an individual rod the size of a telephone pole provides such a small target that once in flight they are essentially impossible to track and destroy. In a different application, bundles of smaller rods could be used to target a larger area for a less extreme, but wider spread destruction. This means that if a nation can get their weapon system in space without detection, the weapon would be essentially impossible to stop before it hit its target. If the satellite were at the upper limits of Low Earth Orbit, and therefore around 2000 kilometers above the surface of the Earth, the rods would experience approximately eight and a half to nine minutes of travel time to their target, using the kinematics equation of d=(v​i​*t)+(.5*g*t​2​). The variance is due to 13 4941 words the amount of force used to launch the rod being uncertain without any testing to use as a basis, and the kinematics equation using a launch velocity of zero which would require the satellite to maneuver itself into a lower orbit before launch due to Newton’s third law pushing it up with the same force it pushed the rod downwards. However, the equation still maintains accuracy due to the short duration of impulse applied at the launch of the weapon and the long distance the weapon must travel. In this time the rod would reach a final velocity of approximately seven kilometers per second. At this velocity, one of the rods mentioned above would still have the explosive energy equivalent of approximately 21.7 tons of TNT. For a weapon stationed in a geostationary orbit, a larger impulse at launch would increase the final velocity and the destructive energy, and decrease the travel time. It would also create a larger thermal signature that would be more likely to be identified as an engine, however a small rocket is unlikely to be detected or if it was be identified as a station keeping burn.(16) This burn would need to be great enough for Earth’s gravity to be able to pull the weapon to the ground faster than it moves laterally in its orbit, which is the same speed as the Earth’s rotation, of approximately 460 meters per second. In this case it would have a travel time almost four times that of a Low Earth Orbit satellite weapon, and would have around nine times the energy, at approximately 190 tons of TNT. This increase of damage at the cost of speed and increased launch requirements may be considered worth the tradeoff in a first strike situation where time is not 14 4941 words yet a valuable commodity, in exchange for overwhelming damage. The extra distance may also be considered worth the tradeoff as it would be well out of the powered missile range of 400 km(13) by a factor of 50. Additionally, accuracy of the weapon would be a part of the issue. Most aiming would have to be done early in the rod’s flight with small reaction engines to adjust the flight profile, because any fins or other method of guidance would be ineffective in space and at the high speeds the rod would attain once in the atmosphere(16). These engines would be unlikely to be detected(16) but would serve as a sufficient enough drive to give the projectile some accuracy. 15 4941 words Safety of Satellite-Borne and Anti-Satellite Weapons Systems Largely, an anti satellite weapon on its own is no more dangerous than any normal missile currently in use, as that is all one is. In fact, in one case, a standard ballistic missile was quickly converted from its intended use to be used as an anti satellite missile on a decaying satellite by the United States.(19) The danger from an anti satellite missile would not necessarily come from loss of a missile to foreign hands, unless the missile was sufficiently advanced to contain otherwise secret technology. Rather, the threat from an anti-satellite weapon occurs after it has already done its job. Some nations, such as China for example, prefer to use kinetic kill vehicles as their anti satellite interceptor missiles.(2,19) This type of missile not only creates a large quantity of debris, some of which may remain in orbit for years or decades(19) but they also may fall to Earth if they are sufficiently sized and moving slowly, or pushed out of orbit by the impact. These remnants could land on the surface, possibly causing damage to something or someone on the surface. The issue of creating a dangerous and possibly cascading effect of space debris is called the Kessler Effect, after Donald Kessler who first hypothesized the problem. It is a serious issue and if the use of kinetic satellite interceptors is continued, could spark the catastrophic event Kessler feared.(22) This catastrophic event is a cascade effect of destruction where space debris over a few centimeters that impact a functioning spacecraft will destroy the craft, which 16 4941 words then creates more space debris, which go on to impact other spacecraft, and so on until everything in that orbit is reduced to debris. The more satellites that are launched and the more space debris created accelerates the timeframe of the Kessler Effect, and therefore the destruction of most or all space vehicles in or that pass through that orbit, or in a worst case scenario completely surrounds the planet, preventing us from launching anything through the layer without a serious risk of it being destroyed. A safer alternative would be an explosive interceptor missile, as it reduces the debris to very small particles with the force of the explosion, as well as possibly burning up some of the debris as well. The possible safety downside of an explosive anti satellite interceptor missile is that it is by nature, explosive. But there are also plenty of missiles already in use with the same specifications that an explosive interceptor missile provides no real safety risk greater than the risk that missile crews would already experience. The benefits of using explosive missiles rather than kinetic to slowing the increase of the Kessler Effect, however, is great, especially if nations that use kinetic missiles continue to make tests of their anti satellite weapons. Safety considerations for a satellite based weapon however would be far greater. Electronic safety and education has been a great consideration of the United States Air Force in its current programs, both weaponized systems of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and the current satellite systems.(23) With the increasing number of hackers in the current age, a system with the utmost 17 4941 words security would be of the highest importance, as this device would allow near-undetectable firing of a weapon where the only defense is to be several stories underground, or to move away from the targeted area. Indeed this concern has already been brought up as well with current satellite systems, with the worry that a cybernetic attack could break the electronic uplink/downlink that ground controllers use to operate satellites.(1,13,23) Another consideration is collateral damage. While a kinetic bombardment weapon would not have the power of “Little Boy”(with a yield of approximately 15 kt(24)), the atomic bomb that was detonated over the city of Hiroshima in the close of World War 2, it still contains great destructive power. The nature of the weapon also means that unless several different satellites were sent to orbit, it would be impossible to select the yield of the weapon used. This could be an issue if a small target is selected, as the single size rod would impart the same energy and therefore damage than if the target had been much larger. If the target is in a wide open, uninhabited location, such as a mountain range or plain then this risk is lessened, but the danger of using it in a populated area are great as the logistics of a weapon from orbit moving at thousands of kilometers per second can cause it to drift off-target and cause damage to noncombatants. Fortunately in this case most of the force is directed downwards, as the rod impacts and its own mass and velocity drives it into the ground, as opposed to a common bomb which people are familiar with, which is more likely to spread its 18 4941 words blast out along the ground as it impacts. With these considerations, it could be more safe to local noncombatants than a conventional bomb dropped from a plane would be, but special attention must be paid to noncombatants and other unintended targets possibly in the area even more so than as if a conventional bomb were dropped due to accuracy issues. 19 4941 words Conclusion Since the Cold War, nations have been attempting research on anti satellite missiles, and in the last 10 years the United States, Russia, and China have seemingly entered into a new Cold War where each is posturing to demonstrate their own capabilities to the others, but nobody has sufficient reason to anger one of the others into action by attacking them. These weapons alone create no additional safety concerns while on the ground because they are just another missile and therefore pose the same hazards as any other. However they can become quite dangerous after their use due to their possibility of creating space debris that could harm satellites not intended as targets. If the amount of debris grows too high, it could spark a chain reaction that will eventually destroy all satellites in orbit from debris impacts that creates a cascading destruction of satellites and creation of more and more debris. Also, the United States Air Force has at least been looking into the possibility of satellite borne weapons and their effectiveness as tactical weapons, if not begun developing them. The kinetic bombardment weapon would be even more effective than current munitions at destroying dug in or hardened targets, and would be able to do so with little to no warning before they struck. Additionally, they would not leave dangerous residue or remnants behind like a nuclear weapon or conventional bomb would, as the weapon is almost entirely composed of a metal rod, with no radioactive fallout or potential for unexploded 20 4941 words munitions. Additional security would have to be put in place to protect such a system if or when it came into existence due to the threats of electronic attacks, however there are already electronic protections on satellite controls currently that could be adapted. Lastly, special attention would have to be paid to accuracy of the weapon, as its potential to lose precision would be disastrous for all those involved. Therefore, these weapons have great potential to be a weapon with similar destructive capabilities but less lasting damage than a nuclear missile would produce, but also could prove just as harmful to civilians. Any belligerent would have to be exceedingly careful with one of these weapons, and improper use would lead to another world war. I believe that with the above information, officially attempting to create one would even raise tensions enormously, again creating another Cold War of its own kind and the arms race to go with it. 21 4941 words Works Cited 1) Cesul, B. T. “A Global Space Control Strategy.” ​Air & Space Power Journal,​ vol. 28, no. 6, 2014, pp. 66–81. 2) Strauch, Adam. “Still All Quiet on the Orbital Front? 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