ZIONISM AND THE PALESTINIANS ZIONISM AND THE PALESTINIANS S IM H A FLAPAN CROOM HELM LONDON BARNES & NOBLE BOOKS • NEW YORK (a division of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.) ©1979 Simha Flapan Croom Helm Ltd, 2*10 St John’s Hoad, London SW11 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Flapan, Simha Zionism and the Palestinians. 1. Jewish-Arab relations 2. Palestinian Arabs - History 3. Zionists - Attitudes I. Title 956.94’004*927 DS119.7 ISBN 0-85664-499-4 Published in the U.S.A. 1979 by HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS, INC. BARNES & NOBLE IMPORT DIVISION ISBN Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Flapan, Simha Zionism and the Palestinians Includes index. 1. Jewish-Arab relations - 1917-1949 2. Zionism - History. I. Title. DS119.7.F6 956.94*001 78-26044 ISBN 0-06-492104-2 Printed in Great Britain by Biddles Ltd, Guildford, Surrey CO NTENTS Acknowledgements Preface Part One A ttitu d es: The Zionist Leadership and the Arab Question 1917-1948 1. Dr Weizmann and His Legacy Introduction — 1 7 ;The ‘British Connection’ — 20; The ‘Hashemite Connection* —31 ; Weizmann and the Palestinians —55; Weizmann and Bi-nationalism — 70; Conclusions — 78; Notes — 83 2. Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement Jabotinsky’s Position in Zionism — 96; The Jewish Legion: Myth and Reality — 100; Jabotinsky and Britain — 1 05;The ‘New Zionist Organisation’ — 109; Jabotinsky and the Arabs — 113 ; Conclusions — 116 ; Notes — 118 3. Dr Nahum Goldmann 4. Ben-Gurion and Sharett Ben-Gurion — 131 ; Sharett — 148; Notes —160 5. The Bi-Nationalists Brith Shalom — 163; Arthur Ruppin — 167; Judah L. Magnes — 174;Poalei Zion Left — 178; Hashomer Hatzair — 183; Notes — 187 Part Two Crucial Decisions Foreword 6. The Policy o f Economic and Social Separation Introduction — 194; Jewish and Arab Labour — 199; Land — 208; Boycott and Counter-Boycott — 219; The Impact o f Zionist Colonisation on Arab Society — 223 ; Conclusions —230; Notes — 232 7. The Arab Revolt o f 1936 and the Policy o f Partition Introduction —236; The Partition Plan —239; The Zionist Leadership and Partition — 241 ; The Failure o f the Partition Policy — 251 ; The Debate on Transfer — 259; Abortive Negotiations — 266; The Mufti’s Fatal Decision —273 ; Notes —276 8. The War o f 1948 From Biltmore Back to Partition — 281 ; Israel’s ‘Original Sin’ —295 ; The War o f the Palestinian Arabs 1947-8 —297; The American Truce Proposal — 302; The Israeli Rejection o f the Truce —313; Arab Attitudes to the Truce —325 ; Notes — 344 In Place o f a Summary Index This book is dedicated to the memory o f Louise Berman and Paul Jacobs who did not live to see the fruits o f their efforts to promote Jewish-Arab understanding. A C K N O W LED G EM EN TS This book probably never would have been written had it not been for the encouragement o f the late Mrs Louise Berman (New York), who persuaded me to engage in research. She, as well as the Institute for Policy Studies (Washington), the Foundation for National Progress (San Francisco) and Dr Nahum Goldmann provided the funds necessary for the long period o f research which involved extensive travel and the aid o f many assistants. I am particularly grateful to Dr Goldmann, who introduced me to the intricate problems of Zionist strategy in a series o f long and fascinating interviews. In addition to her stimulating company, Mrs Sylvia Shine (London) kindly provided me with a studio, ideal for research and writing. I am indebted to my colleague David Shaham who agreed to replace me at the editorial desk o f New Outlook during the year I was writing this book. I am grateful to my assistants, Yoel Blumenkrantz, Livia Rokah, 111ana Cohen, Tirza Posner, Tony Klug, Abe Heiman and Daham al Attawnah, who spared me precious m onths of work in perusing archives, assembling documents, interview ing people, editing and translating. Most o f their research-findings will be reflected in the forthcoming volume, dealing with the post-1948 period. For this volume I am particularly indebted to Stephen Schifferes who has been an indispensible collaborator. Without his diligent research and editing many chapters o f this book could not have been written. I am thankful also, to Dan Gillon and Ian Black (London) for allowing me to consult their archives, and to Joseph Vashtiz and Yoram Nimrod o f Givat Haviva (Israel) for making available to me their, as yet, unpublished works. While all the above mentioned influenced in one way or another the final shape of this book, this does not meant that they necessarily share the views expressed therein, which are entirely my own. Finally I owe an irredeemable debt to my wife Sara and my daughters Yael and Naama for all they had to endure and tolerate while this book was being written. S. Flapan October 1978 PREFACE This book is a study of the roots o f present-day Israeli policy towards the Arabs. The point o f departure is that Israeli political thinking was moulded during the pre-state period and in its crystallisation made a ritual o f several basic concepts: (1) gradual build-up o f an economic and military potential as the basis for achievement of political aims; (2) alliance with a great power external to the Middle East; (3) non recognition o f the existence of a Palestine national entity; (4) Zionism's civilising mission in an undeveloped area; (5) economic, social and cultural segregation as prerequisites for the renaissance o f Jewish national life; (6) the concept of ‘peace from strength’. Part One o f the book describes the attitudes o f the Zionist leaders in the pre-state period 1917-48 towards the Arab National Movement in general and towards the Palestinian Arabs in particular; Part Two deals with the application o f these attitudes in a number o f critical situations which constituted turning points in Jewish-Arab relations: the Arab Revolt and the Zionist struggle for Partition in 1936-8; the *White Paper’ policy 1939-45; the 1948 war in Palestine. Sketching profiles o f Zionist leaders required moving forwards and backwards between political events, regardless of their sequence. Thus the descrip tion o f the evolution o f the conflict was made impossible —nor was it my intention — though some measure o f chronological order was main tained in Part Two dealing with major events between 1936 and 1945. The focal point o f the book is the attitude o f the Zionist movement towards the Palestinian Arabs and their aspirations to national inde pendence. The Zionist attitude towards the pan-Arab national movement has been the subject o f many im portant studies. But little attention has been paid specifically to the Palestinian component o f the problem. Even an excellent work such as Aharon Cohen’s Israel and the Arab World , which describes in detail contacts between Arabs and Jews, subsumes the Palestinian-Zionist conflict within the framework o f relations between Jews and the Arab national movement in general. Yet, it was specifically the Palestinian issue which played the decisive role in the failure to resolve the Israel-Arab conflict.1 When former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was criticised for her widely-publicised pronounce ment th at ‘there is no such thing as a Palestinian people’, it escaped the 11 12 Preface notice o f her critics that the view she expressed was the cornerstone of Zionist policy, initiated by Weizmann and faithfully carried out by Ben-Gurion and his successors. This policy has been pursued despite abundant proof o f the tenacity with which the Palestinians have clung to their national identity in the most adverse circumstances. Non-recognition o f the Palestinians remains until the present the basic tenet o f Israel's policy-makers who, like the Zionist leadership before 1948, nurture the illusion that the Palestinian national problem disappeared with the creation o f the state o f Jordan, leaving only the residual humanitarian problem o f the refugees to be solved. The war o f 1948 was deemed to have vindicated the policy o f non- recognition o f the Palestinians; on the surface, the Palestinian people, dispersed as refugees all over the Middle East, had ceased to exist, and only the conflict between Israel and the Arab states remained un resolved. Nearly 30 years had to pass before it became clear that the 1948 war did not liquidate the national problem o f the Palestinians, but only aggravated and complicated it, changing some o f its aspects and adding new ones, coming to resemble the problem of the Jews dispersed throughout the world, which the Zionist movement proposed to solve by Ingathering o f the exiles’. This analysis was originally conceived as an introduction to the work on Israel's contemporary problems and, in particular, on the contro versy following the 1956 Suez War between Ben-Gurion and his opponents Sharett and Goldmann, who opposed the policy o f massive retaliation and preventive war. But while studying the pre-1948 docu ments, I was struck by the unbroken continuity, up to the present, of views and attitudes regarding the Arab problem, and by the relevance o f pre-state debates and decisions to the situation o f today. Thus, what was intended as an introductory chapter developed into a fully fledged volume, deferring execution o f the original plan for a later stage. One may doubt the wisdom o f plunging into the past and reviving the bitter memory o f old grievances and wrongs at a time when the focus must be on the future, and on the advance towards reconciliation. The Greeks held that even the gods are unable to change the past. How ever, people build their future on concepts and ideas derived from the past. Jews and Arabs in particular — and this they have in common — possess a long historical memory and suffer from the trauma o f tragic experiences, unable to Torget and forgive’. A critical review o f the past may contribute to loosening the grip o f prejudices that obscure the vision o f the future. Preface 13 The conclusions this work offers may come as a surprise and even a shock to those accustomed to accepting propaganda m yths as historical truths. Unfortunately, there are many o f these in both camps. In few national conflicts has propaganda become such a poisonous weapon and achieved such a powerful hold over the minds o f leaders and people alike. Partisanship, emotional bias and propaganda pervade the massive literature on the Israeli-Arab conflict and have created a thick fog obscuring its real content. Arguments advanced in the heat o f pas sionate debate and in the struggle to gain support o f public opinion at home and abroad have acquired the status and force o f axioms and absolute truths. While statesmen have become prisoners o f their own propaganda, the peoples have become its victims. This book deals principally with the strategy o f the Zionist leader ship and dwells only marginally on the attitudes and policy o f the Arabs. Such asymmetry may give the impression that the book holds the Zionist movement solely responsible for the absence o f peace. This is not my thesis. As the work shows, the Palestinian Arab leadership had options that were realistic and more promising, but elected to follow a course which led to perpetuation o f the conflict and to national calamity. There were im portant elements in the Zionist movement who placed a high priority on peace and were willing to recognise the legitimacy o f Palestinian national rights. The Palestinian leadership’s intransigence, which culminated in the fateful choice o f collaboration with Nazi Germany during World War II, further reduced the chances o f these . forces to have a decisive impact on Zionist policy. But a critical re appraisal o f Arab policies and tactics must be undertaken by an Arab historian if it is to be credible and effective. It is my fervent hope that this work will stimulate one to undertake it. To dispel misunderstanding, I want to make it clear that my belief in the moral justification and historical necessity o f Zionism remains unaffected by my critical reappraisal o f the Zionist leadership. The history o f Zionism demonstrates the extent to which the urge to create a new society, embodying the universal values o f democracy and social justice, was inherent in the Zionist movement and responsible for its progress in adverse conditions. Israel’s problem today lies in the disinte gration o f these values, due largely to the intoxication with military success and the belief that military superiority is a substitute for peace. Unless the liberal and progressive values o f Zionism are restored and Palestinian rights to self-determination within a framework o f peaceful coexistence are recognised, Israel’s search for peace is doomed to 14 Preface failure. I firmly believe that these trends will ultimately become the deciding force in Israel. Notes 1. Jon Kimche in his Second Arab Awakening (New York, 1970) and Palestine or Israel (London, 1973) was perhaps the first to throw light on this subject, using a number of hitherto unknown documents. In fact, it was Kimche’s study which drew my attention to Dr Weizmann’s attitude towards the Palestinian Arabs and stimulated this research. PART ONE: ATTITUDES The Zionist Leadership and the Arab Question 1917-1948 1 DR WEIZMANN AND HIS LEGACY Introduction In his monumental work on Israeli foreign policy,1 Professor Michael Brecher has suggested a three-fold typology o f Israeli approaches to the Arabs: Buberism — reconciliation through compromise on final aims. Ben-Gurionism — peace resulting from superior Jewish strength. Weizmannism and its derivative, Sharettism — a rational search for moderate and realistic solutions. While this typology correctly describes the general attitude of the leading figures in the Zionist movement, it does not provide a frame of reference for an analysis o f Zionist policy towards the Arabs, as it took shape during the period before the emergence o f the state. The fact is that despite differences in outlook, both Ben-Gurion and Sharett accepted the basic tenets o f Weizmann’s policy. During the Mandatory period (1917-48) the Zionist and Palestin ian National Movement advanced so far along separate political trajectories that the partition o f Palestine became the only realistic solution to their conflict. Inasmuch as Weizmann’s strategy dominated Zionist councils, the most critical decisions o f the Zionist movement vis-à-vis the Arab problem must be ascribed to him. Weizmann’s pre eminent position in the Zionist leadership and his decisive role in shaping pre-state Zionist policy are generally conceded. Already a legendary figure in his own time, as the architect o f the Balfour Declaration, he has become known as the father o f the Jewish state. This is Abba Eban’s assessment o f Weizmann:2 Few men in history have carried such a remote dream to such ful filment . . . for three decades from the beginning o f the First World War to the end o f the Second, he was the dominant figure in Jewish life, recognized everywhere as the chief custodian o f his people’s in terests. . . There is a tendency to juxtapose Weizmannism and Ben-Gurionism as two opposing methods and ideologies. A close analysis, however, 17 18 Dr Weizmann and His Legacy shows that these two trends in Zionist policy are not as contra dictory as they appear at first glance, and that there is substantial continuity in Zionist strategy before and after statehood. Not only was Ben-Gurion in full agreement with Weizmannist strategy during the Mandatory period, differing only on questions o f tactics, but some o f the basic tenets o f Weizmannism have remained the guidelines for Israeli foreign policy to the present day. 'Weizmannism is a combination o f maximalist — even extreme — aims, and a gradualist, pragmatic and flexible means to achieve them. Weizmann’s ultimate goal from which he never deviated, was a Jewish state within frontiers even exceeding those o f the "Greater Israel" militants o f today. In his view, Palestine was a Jewish and not an Arab country.’3 Thus, he fought for a Jewish state which would extend to the Litani River in present-day Lebanon, to well east o f the Jordan River. However, conscious o f the realities o f international politics and o f the weakness of the Zionist movement, he envisaged the realisa tion of this aim over a long period. Weizmann conceived the state as an entity which had to be built up step by step, brick by brick, and settlement by settlement. This could be accomplished only through the creation o f a new productive society, imbued with a pioneering spirit and aiming to synthesise tradi tional Jewish moral values with modem needs.4 This concept o f state building found a ready response in the Jewish labour movement o f Palestine. Over the years, Weizmann developed a close alliance with them. Weizmann encouraged the labour movement to build a society unique in its innovative organisation o f economic activity.5 In turn, the labour movement acceded to Weizmann’s political strategy for achieving this aim. So long as it was possible to continue constructive work in Pales tine, Weizmann was inclined to be flexible regarding political formula tions. He was ready to compromise on these in order to remove the obstacles to practical work. He viewed the limitations imposed on Zionist colonisation as temporary setbacks which, in due course, would be overcome by the creative energies o f the Yishuv, fuelled by the crisis o f European Jewry. Therefore, it was precisely during times of restriction that he intensified his efforts to establish fa its accomplis in the form o f additional Jewish settlements, industries and land acquisitions.6 Weizmann’s political flexibility, which led him in the 1930s to accept the idea o f political parity with the Arabs in Palestine and then the partition o f the country into two separate states, made him Dr Weizmann and His Legacy 19 the main target o f the rightist elements in Zionism, the Revisionists, led by Jabotinsky, part o f the General Zionists and also Religious Zionists. In the eyes o f Jewish maximalists, his flexible diplomacy bordered on ‘betrayal’ while in the eyes o f the Arabs it was regarded as hypocrisy and deception. In fact, it was neither; rather, it was a product of Weizmann’s attem pts to reconcile his strategic concepts — to which he remained wedded all his life — to the developing realities in Pales tine. Weizmann always had an unswerving belief in a Jewish Common wealth; he agreed to partition only as a temporary expedient to serve for a single generation.7 At the same time he believed that the state had to be based on justice and on an accommodation with the Arabs: 'I am certain the world will judge the Jewish state by how it will treat the Arabs.’8 His desire for peace with the Arabs was genuine: but he conceived o f it only within the framework o f close collaboration with Great Britain. Weizmann’s strategic concepts, which were his heritage to the Zionist movement, rested on three principles: 1. The Jewish Commonwealth would become an integral part of the British Commonwealth and guardian o f Britain’s strategic interests in the Middle East. 2. Under British auspices, an agreement between Zionism and the Arab National Movement would be reached which would ensure the development o f the Jewish settlement in Palestine in return for substantial aid in modernising the Arab world. Zionism would serve as a link between the Arabs and the Western world. 3. The Arabs o f Palestine are a tiny and unimportant fraction o f the Arab Nation; their opposition to Zionism is generated by the narrow interest o f feudal landlords and is not an expression o f genuine nation alism. This opposition would diminish when the masses receive the economic benefits that Zionism will bring to Palestine. Some would elect to migrate to wholly Arab countries. The events during Weizmann’s period o f leadership disproved all these tenets. The British never accepted the identity o f their and Jewish interests. On the contrary, they regarded Zionism as an increasing liability and acted accordingly. Moreover, the ‘British Connection’ on which Zionist policy was based made it a target for the increasing anti-imperialist tendencies o f the Arab National Movement when the thrust o f this movement for independence brought it into conflict with Great Britain. But Weizmann’s most serious error was his failure to give 20 Dr Weizmann and His Legacy due weight to the militancy o f the Palestine National Movement and its bitter opposition to the whole Zionist enterprise. In the end, it was the escalating resistance of this movement which brought about the erosion of the British commitment to a Jewish national home. These developments in Palestine did not lead Weizmann to reassess his strategy, but rather increased his tactical flexibility in order to gain time for the Yishuv. This delayed the final break with the British, and the major clash with the Arabs until the Jewish settlement was well- organised and strong enough to weather the storm. Paradoxically, the achievement o f the Jewish state was not due to Weizmann’s strategic views, but to his diplomatic skill in preserving the concrete achieve ments o f Zionism in Palestine. But the legacy that Weizmann’s diplo macy left to the state was the unresolved conflict with the Arabs. In later years, this conflict reached a point where it even overshadowed the unique and spectacular achievements o f practical Zionism. The importance o f analysing Weizmann’s strategy derives from the fact that the assumptions on which they were based were, with slight modifications, adopted by Ben-Gurion and his successors. If one sub stitutes ‘United States’ for G reat Britain’ and the ‘Hashemite Kingdom o f Jordan’ for the ‘Arab National Movement’, Weizmann’s basic strategic concepts might be taken as descriptive o f Israel’s present foreign policy. Specifically, the non-recognition o f the national rights o f the Palestinian people has remained an immutable feature o f Zionist orientation with respect to the Arab problem. The ‘British Connection’ I have defended the British Administration before my own people, from public platforms, at Congress in all parts o f the world, often against my own better knowledge, and almost invariably to my own detriment. Why did I do so? Because to me close co-operation with Great Britain was the cornerstone o f our policy in Palestine. But this co-operation remained unilateral —it was unrequited love. (Weizmann, Trial and Error , pp. 783-4) Weizmann’s role in bringing about the Balfour Declaration and a British Mandate over Palestine has been the object of exhaustive scholarly research.1 It is not our intention to tread over such familiar ground. What is less well-known is the extent to which British policy influenced Weizmann’s views o f the Arabs. Weizmann staked the entire fate o f Zionism on an alliance with Great Britain, as against the principle o f neutrality to which the Zionist