7KH1\ă\DVŗWUD supposition 2QHSURFHHGVWKHUHE\WRPDNHNQRZQWKHH[FHO OHQFHRIRQH·VRZQWKHVLVDQGWRFRQGHPQWKHWKHVLVRIDQRWKHU Accepted positions are thus the solid building blocks of a school’s entire system of thought, and as the core tenets of a tradition of thought, they serve to structure philosophical investigation and disputation. )RUWKHÀQDOLQVWDOOPHQWRIWKLVFKDSWHURQFHUWLÀFDWLRQDQG philosophical methodology, we again turn to what the classical FRPPHQWDWRUVWDNHWREHDFKDOOHQJHE\0ăGK\DPLND%XGGKLVWV (modern scholars, in contrast, disagree about who the opponent LVWKDW*DXWDPDPD\KDYHKDGLQPLQG +HUHWKHRSSRQHQW puts forth a challenge to the SUDPăʏD epistemology as a whole. 7KHVWUHWFKRIVŗWUDV²FRQWDLQVRQHRI1\ă\D·VPRVW LPSRUWDQW DQWLVNHSWLFDO DUJXPHQWV ,W UDQNV DORQJVLGH WKH defense of the reality of the world found in Chapter 3, “In 'HIHQVHRIWKH5HDOμLQWKLVYROXPHDQGDUHVSRQVHWR ́GHVWUXF WLYHGHEDWHμIRXQGLQ&KDSWHU ́'HEDWHμ+HUH1\ă\DPXVW DQVZHU WKH FKDUJH WKDW LW IDFHV D UHJUHVV RI MXVWLÀFDWLRQ DQ\ attempt to justify our knowledge of SUDPăʏDV would UHO\ RQ IXUWKHU SUDPăʏDV DG LQÀQLWXP :H PD\ QRWH WKDW VŗWUDV ² KDYH FOHDU SDUDOOHOV LQ 1ăJăUMXQD·V 9LJUDKDY\ăYDUWLQĦ 5HIXWLQJWKH$UJXPHQWV YHUVHV² 7KHGLVFXVVLRQEHJLQVZLWKWKHTXHVWLRQRIKRZZHFDQ know the SUDPăʏDV WKHPVHOYHV9ăWV\ă\DQDDUJXHVWKDWWKH FRUUHFW PHWKRGRORJ\ KHUH LV ÀUVW WR LGHQWLI\ LQVWDQFHV RI cognitive success and then to theorize about what sorts of processes or conditions give rise to them. Earlier in his com PHQWDU\ VŗWUD >@ KH H[SUHVVHV WKH LGHD DV IROORZV ́6LQFH WKHUH LV QR UXOH DERXW WKH H[DFW ZD\ WKDW knowledge sources and their objects are connected . . . we LGHQWLI\ WKH ZD\V WKH\ DUH FRQQHFWHG WKURXJK UHÁHFWLRQ XSRQ FRPPRQ H[SHULHQFHμ &RPPHQWLQJ RQ KH H[SDQGVRQWKHLGHDE\SRLQWLQJRXWWKDWNQRZOHGJHVRXUFHV can themselves be objects of knowledge, should we choose WR UHÁHFW RQ WKHP $ VNHSWLFDO FKDOOHQJHU DUJXHV WKDW WKLV OHDGVWRDGLOHPPD:HZRXOGHLWKHUKDYHDQLQÀQLWHUHJUHVV where SUDPăʏD WRNHQ 2 is used to justify SUDPăʏD WRNHQ 1 , SUDPăʏD WRNHQ 3 is used to justify SUDPăʏD WRNHQ 2 , and so on, or one must try to stop the regress with a mere assump tion that one has knowledge without proof. Chapter 2: Doubt and Philosophical Method 9ăWV\ă\DQD [62.17–63.2]: 7KH WHFKQLFDO WHUPV ́NQRZOHGJH VRXUFHμ DQG ́REMHFW RI NQRZOHGJHμ PD\ UHIHU WR WKH VDPH WKLQJ DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH RFFDVLRQ IRU XVH RI WKH WHUPV 7KH RFFDVLRQ IRU XVLQJ WKH WHUP ́NQRZOHGJH VRXUFHμ LV ZKHQ VRPHWKLQJ LV D PHDQV RI NQRZOHGJH 7KH RFFDVLRQ IRU XV LQJ WKH WHUP ́REMHFW RI NQRZOHGJHμ LV ZKHQ VRPHWKLQJ LV DQ REMHFW RI NQRZOHGJH $QG WKXV D VLQJOH REMHFW PD\ EH FDOOHG SUDPăʏD RU prameya REMHFW RI NQRZOHGJH DFFRUGLQJ WRZKHWKHULWLVDPHDQVRINQRZOHGJHRUDQREMHFWRINQRZO HGJHIURPDSDUWLFXODUSRLQWRIYLHZ7KHIROORZLQJVŗWUDLV PHDQWWRLOOXVWUDWHWKHSRLQW 2.1.16: And knowledge sources may be objects of knowl- edge, like a measuring scale. 9ăWV\ă\DQD >²@ $ VFDOH LV D VRXUFH RI NQRZOHGJH DV LW SURGXFHV NQRZOHGJH RI VRPHWKLQJ·V PHDVXUHPHQW RI ZHLJKW7KLQJVZLWKZHLJKWVXFKDVELWVRIJROGDUHWKHQWKH REMHFWVRINQRZOHGJHWKHWKLQJVNQRZQ%XWZKHQDVHFRQG VFDOHLVFDOLEUDWHGE\XVLQJJROGDOUHDG\ZHLJKHGWKHJROGLV WKHNQRZOHGJHVRXUFHSURGXFLQJNQRZOHGJHDERXWWKHVHF RQGVFDOHDQGWKHVHFRQGVFDOHZRXOGEHWKHWKLQJNQRZQ 2EMHFWLRQ)LQH/HW·VDFFHSWWKHIROORZLQJ$VLQJOHWKLQJ FDQEHUHIHUUHGWRE\ZRUGVLQGLFDWLQJLWVGLͿHUHQWIXQFWLRQV DFFRUGLQJWRWKHRFFDVLRQRIXVHWKDWLVZKHWKHUWKHWKLQJ LVWDONHGDERXWDVDQREMHFWDQLQVWUXPHQWDORFDWLRQDQG VRIRUWK$QGSHUFHSWLRQDQGWKHUHVWDUHVRXUFHVRINQRZO HGJHLQVRIDUDVWKH\DUHFDXVHVRINQRZOHGJHDQGWKH\DUH REMHFWV RI NQRZOHGJH LQVRIDU DV WKH\ DUH WKH FRQWHQW RI NQRZOHGJH 0RUHRYHU WKDW WKH\ DUH FRPPRQO\ NQRZQ DV VXFKLVLOOXVWUDWHGE\VWDWHPHQWVVXFKDV ́,WLVE\SHUFHSWLRQ WKDW,NQRZLWμ ́,WLVE\LQIHUHQFHWKDW,NQRZLWμ ́,WLVE\ DQDORJ\WKDW,NQRZLWμ ́,WLVE\WHVWLPRQ\WKDW,NQRZLWμ DQG ́0\NQRZOHGJHLVSHUFHSWXDOμ ́0\NQRZOHGJHLVLQ IHUHQWLDOμ ́0\NQRZOHGJHLVDQDORJLFDOμ ́0\NQRZOHGJHLV WHVWLPRQLDOμ7KHQWKH\DUHJUDVSHGLQLQGLYLGXDOLQVWDQFHV )XUWKHUPRUH ZH XQGHUVWDQG WKHP LQ VSHFLÀF ZD\V WKURXJKWHFKQLFDODQDO\VHVOLNHWKHGHÀQLWLRQRISHUFHSWXDO NQRZOHGJH DW 1\ă\DVŗWUD ́ knowledge that arises from a connection of a sense faculty with an object .” %XW UHJDUGLQJWKHNQRZOHGJHWKDWWDNHVSHUFHSWLRQDQGWKHUHVW 7KH1\ă\DVŗWUD DVLWVREMHFW D :RXOGLWEHHVWDEOLVKHGE\DQRWKHU SUDPăʏD RU E ZRXOGLWQRWEHHVWDEOLVKHGE\DQRWKHU SUDPăʏD " 5HVSRQVH :KDW LV WKH GLͿHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKHVH DOWHU QDWLYHV" 2.1.17: (Objector:) On the view (a) that knowledge sources are themselves established by knowledge sources, the unwanted consequence would be that still other knowl- edge sources would have to be proved. 9ăWV\ă\DQD >²@ 7KH REMHFWRU FRQWLQXHV ,I SHUFHS WLRQDQGWKHUHVWDUHWKHPVHOYHVNQRZQWKURXJKNQRZOHGJH VRXUFHVWKHQWKDWE\ZKLFKWKH\DUHNQRZQZRXOGKDYHWREH D GLͿHUHQW NQRZOHGJH VRXUFH LPSOLFDWLQJ DV DQ XQZDQWHG FRQVHTXHQFHWKHH[LVWHQFHRIVWLOOIXUWKHUNQRZOHGJHVRXUFHV 7KH VŗWUDPDNHU LV WDONLQJ DERXW DQ LQÀQLWH UHJUHVV ́7KLV LV NQRZQ E\ DQRWKHU ZKLFK DOVR LV NQRZQ E\ DQRWKHU DQG VR RQμ %XW VXFK D UHJUHVV ZRXOG EH XQDFFHSWDEOH EHFDXVH WKDWLVQRWDFRKHUHQWSRVVLELOLW\ :KDW LI LQVWHDG ZH DFFHSW WKDW D SUDPăʏD QHHG QRW EH HVWDEOLVKHGE\DQRWKHU" 2.1.18: (Objector:) Or if we say (b) one SUDPăʏD need not be established by another, then, in the same way, we should accept objects without reasons. 9ăWV\ă\DQD >²@ 7KHREMHFWRUFRQWLQXHV ,IZHFDQFODLP NQRZOHGJH RI SHUFHSWLRQ DQG WKH UHVW ZLWKRXW KDYLQJ WR DGPLWIXUWKHUNQRZOHGJHVRXUFHVWKHQZHFDQGRWKHVDPH IRUVXSSRVHGREMHFWVRINQRZOHGJHVXFKDVDVHOI7KHUHLVQR UHOHYDQWGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHWZR 1RZVLQFHWKHYHU\QRWLRQRIDNQRZOHGJHVRXUFHZRXOG WKXVEHXQGHUPLQHGWKHVŗWUDPDNHUVD\VQH[W 2.1.19: (Answer:) No, SUDPăʏDV are established like the light of a lamp. 9ăWV\ă\DQD >²@)RUH[DPSOHWKHOLJKWRIDODPSFDQ EHDNQRZOHGJHVRXUFHDVSDUWRIWKHSURFHVVRISHUFHSWLRQ ZKHQ VRPHWKLQJ YLVLEOH LV DSSUHKHQGHG E\ VLJKW ZKLOH LW LWVHOIZRXOGEHNQRZQWKURXJKDQRWKHULQVWDQFHRISHUFHSWLRQ Chapter 2: Doubt and Philosophical Method WKURXJKLWVFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKHYLVXDORUJDQ7KDWWKHODPS LV D FDXVH RI SHUFHSWLRQ LV DOVR NQRZQ WKURXJK LQIHUHQFH VLQFH RXU DELOLW\ WR VHH RU QRW FRQIRUPV WR LWV SUHVHQFH RU DEVHQFH:HFRXOGDOVRNQRZLWWKURXJKWKHVWDWHPHQWRIDQ DXWKRULW\ ́,QWKHGDUNQHVVXVHDODPSμ,QWKHVDPHZD\ WKHUHLVNQRZOHGJHRISHUFHSWLRQDQGWKHUHVWMXVWE\RWKHU LQVWDQFHVRISHUFHSWLRQDQGWKHRWKHUVDVWKHFDVHPD\EH 7KH ́ODPSμ DQDORJ\ VHHPV QDWXUDOO\ WR VXSSRUW D IRXQGD WLRQDOLVW response to the problem of regress: in the very act of illuminating other things, light—similarly knowledge— makes itself known without requiring yet another source of LOOXPLQDWLRQ %XW WKLV LV QRW KRZ 9ăWV\ă\DQD XQGHUVWDQGV WKHPDWWHU$0ĦPăʋVDNDRU9HGăQWLQRULQGHHGD<RJăFăUD %XGGKLVW³RSSRVHG WR 1\ă\D·V YLHZ RI ́FHUWLÀFDWLRQ E\ DQRWKHUμ SDUDWDɭSUăPăʏ\D ³PLJKWXVHWKHODPSH[DPSOHWR LOOXVWUDWH D YLHZ RI ́VHOIFHUWLÀFDWLRQμ VYDWDɭ SUăPăʏ\D , D NLQG RI VHOIMXVWLÀFDWLRQ IRU WKH NQRZOHGJH VRXUFHV 7KXV our knowledge of them would be the foundation of all the rest of our knowledge. According to this idea, knowledge sources generate knowledge of themselves as they gener DWH NQRZOHGJH RI WKHLU REMHFWV 7KLV ZRXOG HͿHFWLYHO\ EH D WKLUG RSWLRQ ́VHOIMXVWLÀFDWLRQμ SDVVLQJ WKURXJK WKH horns of the skeptical dilemma: there would be no need for another knowledge source, nor would there be postulation ZLWKRXW SURRI %XW LQ KLV FRPPHQWV 9ăWV\ă\DQD LQWHU prets the lamp analogy in a way that underscores the fact that SUDPăʏDV VXSSRUW RQH DQRWKHU 7KLV UHVRQDWHV ZLWK D modern family of views called FRKHUHQWLVP , which holds that interlocking consistency within one’s belief system is ZKDWSURYLGHVMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUDQ\SDUWLFXODUEHOLHI,WLVQRW WKDWVRPHIRXQGDWLRQDOEHOLHIVDUHMXVWLÀHUVZKLOHRWKHUVDUH GHSHQGHQWDQGMXVWLÀHG5DWKHUWKH\DUHDOOLQWHUGHSHQGHQWWKH beliefs generated by SUDPăʏDV can be employed by us in GLͿHUHQWZD\VDVMXVWLÀHURUMXVWLÀHGDFFRUGLQJWRFLUFXP VWDQFHV%\UHDGLQJWKHVŗWUDLQWKLVZD\9ăWV\ă\DQDVHWVD GLVWLQFWWUDMHFWRU\IRUVXEVHTXHQW1\ă\DHSLVWHPRORJ\ 5HMHFWLQJ VHOIFHUWLÀFDWLRQ DV ZKDW WKH VŗWUDPDNHU meant with the lamp analogy, our commentator now takes XSWKH0ăGK\DPLNDFKDUJHRILQÀQLWHUHJUHVV 7KH1\ă\DVŗWUD 6RPHWLPHVZHÀQGWKDWQRIXUWKHUVRXUFHLVUHTXLUHG ZKLOH VRPHWLPHV ZH ÀQG WKDW DQRWKHU VRXUFH LV UHTXLUHG 7KHUHLVQRÀ[HGUXOH 9ăWV\ă\DQD >²@ 7KH REMHFWRU KDV FODLPHG ́,I SHUFHSWLRQDQGRWKHUNQRZOHGJHVRXUFHVDUHPDGHNQRZQ E\ RWKHU SHUFHSWLRQV DQG VR RQ WKHQ \RX IDFH DQ LQÀQLWH UHJUHVV ZKLFK XQGHUPLQHV \RXU HQWLUH WKHRU\ μ :H VD\ WKDWWKLVLVZURQJ,INQRZOHGJHRISHUFHSWLRQRURIDQRWKHU NQRZOHGJHVRXUFHDVDVRXUFHODQGHGXVLQLQÀQLWHUHJUHVV WKHQHYHU\GD\DFWLRQDQGGLVFRXUVHZRXOGQRWJRRQZLWK UHVSHFW WR FHUWLÀDEO\ NQRZQ WKLQJV DQG WKH NQRZOHGJH VRXUFHVWKDWVXSSRUWWKHP+RZHYHUHYHU\GD\DFWLRQDQG GLVFRXUVHGRSURFHHGIRUVRPHRQHFRPSUHKHQGLQJNQRZQ WKLQJV DQG WKHLU LGHQWLÀDEOH NQRZOHGJH VRXUFHV :KHQ , JUDVSDQREMHFWE\SHUFHSWLRQRUE\LQIHUHQFHRUE\DQDORJ\ RUE\WHVWLPRQ\WKHFHUWLÀFDWLRQDOFRJQLWLRQWKDWRFFXUVJRHV OLNHWKLV ́0\NQRZOHGJHLVSHUFHSWXDOμRU ́0\NQRZOHGJH LVLQIHUHQWLDOμRU ́0\NQRZOHGJHLVIURPDQDORJ\μRU ́0\ NQRZOHGJHLVWHVWLPRQLDOμ $QGPRWLYDWLRQWRVHHNULJKWHRXVQHVV dharma ZHDOWK SOHDVXUH DQG OLEHUDWLRQ SURFHHGV WKURXJK WKHVH FRPSUH KHQVLRQVDVOLNHZLVHPRWLYDWLRQWRUHMHFWZKDWLVRSSRVHG WR WKHP ZKHUHDV LI WKHUH ZHUH VWLOO GRXEW QR VXFK JRDO GLUHFWHGDFWLYLW\ZRXOGRFFXU 6XFKGLVFRXUVHDQGDFWLRQ ZRXOG FHDVH WR EH SRVVLEOH LI WKH DOOHJHG UHJUHVV ZHUH LQGHHGWRRFFXU$QGLWLVQRWWKHFDVHWKDWWKHUHLVDFWLRQ DQGGLVFRXUVHRWKHUWKDQWKLVWKDWZRXOGODQGXVLQLQÀQLWH UHJUHVVZKHUHE\WKHDOOHJHGODFNRIDVWRSSLQJSRLQWZRXOG UHDOO\RFFXU 7R VXPPDUL]H WKH 1\ă\D HSLVWHPRORJ\ ZH PD\ VD\ WKDW *DXWDPDDQG9ăWV\ă\DQDEHJLQE\ORRNLQJIRUNLQGVRISUR cesses that generate knowledge, identifying four irreducible SUDPăʏDW\SHV : perception, inference, analogy, and testimony. 7KHVHSURGXFHNQRZOHGJHDXWRPDWLFDOO\ZLWKRXWDQHHGIRU FRQVFLRXVUHÁHFWLRQRURYHUVLJKW%XWZKHQOHJLWLPDWHGRXEW or controversy arises, a responsible epistemic agent typical ly shifts to careful sorting through the evidence to adjudi FDWHWKHVWDWXVRIEHOLHIZKDWZHKDYHFDOOHG ́FHUWLÀFDWLRQμ Chapter 2: Doubt and Philosophical Method &HUWLÀFDWLRQ LQYROYHV WKH YDULRXV SUDPăʏDV working to gether to produce a web of interlocking beliefs, some of which DUHFHUWLÀHGZKHUHZHNQRZWKDWZHNQRZFHUWDLQWUXWKV ,QUHVSRQVHWRWKHFKDOOHQJHWRWKHZKROHRIWKH1\ă\D approach, which alleges that the theory is beset by an LQÀQLWH ́FHUWLÀFDWLRQμUHJUHVV1\ă\DDUJXHVWKDWZHWUXVW FRJQLWLRQWKDWLVDSSDUHQWO\WUXH7KLVWUXVWLVVXSSRUWHG RQ SUDJPDWLF JURXQGV :H UHO\ RQ NQRZOHGJH VRXUFHV WR guide us in our practical pursuits, and with especially im SRUWDQW SXUVXLWV ZH GR VR VHOIFRQVFLRXVO\ 9ăWV\ă\DQD stresses. 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