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Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 1 of 84 IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF GEORGIA LINDSAY BRADFORD, ) ) Applicant, ) ) DOCKET NO. vs. ) ) ________________________ DALE WILSON, KAREN STOKER, ) and the WALKER COUNTY ) BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND ) IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF REGISTRATION, ) WALKER COUNTY, GEORGIA ) Respondents. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 20SUCV0227 EMERGENCY APPLICATION AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED DISCRETIONARY APPEAL PRESENTED BY: Benjamin T. Bradford (Ga. Bar No. 916288) & David N. Lockhart (Ga. Bar No. 675404) Bradford & Lockhart, P.C. 120 East Patton Street LaFayette, Georgia 30728 [email protected] Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 2 of 84 JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT This matter originated with Applicant filing with the Walker County Board of Elections and Registration (“Board of Elections”), pursuant to O.C.G.A. §21-2-6, challenges to the qualifications of Respondents Dale Wilson (“Wilson”) and Karen Stoker (“Stoker”) as candidates in the 2020 Republican primary election for the Walker County Board of Education. The challenge was predicated upon the following, to wit: Wilson and Stoker are presently members of the Walker County Board of Education. Wilson and Stoker are “immediate family members” as defined by O.C.G.A. §20-2-51. Wilson and Stoker are ineligible to hold the office sought, contrary to the assertions made in their affidavits of candidacy. Wilson and Stoker are therefore ineligible to seek election and must be disqualified from the primary election. When the Board of Elections denied Applicant’s challenges, she appealed to the Superior Court of Walker County, which issued an order from which this Application arises. This Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over “[a]ll cases of election contest.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II(2). Qualifications of a candidate to run in a pending election qualify as “cases of election contest.” Cook v. Board of Registrars of Randolph County, 291 Ga. 67 (2012). The order from which appeal is sought is a “final judgment” as described by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a). While O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) does require application for 1 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 3 of 84 “[a]ppeals from decisions of superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . state and local administrative agencies and lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings,” it is not clear that the trial court order at bar is such a decision. However, out of an abundance of caution, Applicant has submitted this Application, recognizing that, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(j), if this Honorable Court determines that Applicant is entitled to a direct appeal, the application will be granted. ORDERS TO BE APPEALED Applicant seeks appeal of an order entered in the Superior Court of Walker County, Georgia, on April 28, 2020 (Exhibit 1) affirming the decision of the Walker County Board of Elections and Registration (Exhibit 2), and Order on Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, entered May 13, 2020, denying Applicant’s motion for reconsideration (Exhibit 3). Applicant also seeks to appeal the order issued by the trial court making the Board of Elections a party to this cause of action (Exhibit 4). RATIONALE AND REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED BRIEFING SCHEDULE Applicant filed her challenge to the qualifications of candidates Stoker and Wilson within ten days of the termination of the qualifying period as provided by law. Applicant has diligently sought to prosecute her case, first before the Board of Elections, then before the Superior Court, and now before this Court. This case is an election challenge, as Applicant seeks to have Respondents Stoker and Wilson removed from the ballot for the primary election to be held June 9, 2020. If this case 2 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 4 of 84 were to proceed under a normal briefing schedule, it is not possible for this Court to issue a judgment prior to the said primary election. This Court has authority to grant Applicant’s request for an expedited briefing schedule and decision pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 9, which provides that “[t]he Court may issue supersedeas or other orders whenever deemed necessary.” (emphasis supplied). Applicant submits that the issues raised in her proposed appeal will not be mooted by the June 9, 2020, primary elections regardless of the results of her race. Stoker is running unopposed and will be on the ballot in the November, 2020, general election. Consequently, if this Court cannot decide the issues presented herein prior to June 9, 2020, Applicant requests that this Court render a decision in this case in order to prevent Applicant from the necessity of filing an election contest or other action upon the same issues raised in this application. All of the issues raised in this cause of action were briefed fully by the parties and will be available to the Court as part of the record on appeal if this application is granted. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS Upon review of the record, the Court will find that there are no disputed facts. All evidence was entered without objection and without any attempt to impeach any witness, and the witnesses all agreed on the material facts which are as follows: 3 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 5 of 84 Wilson and Stoker are present members of the Walker County Board of Education. Both Stoker and Wilson were elected in 2011, took office January 1, 2012, and have served continuously since that time. Stoker has a sibling, a sister, that is married to Wilson. In other words, Wilson is Stoker’s brother-in-law. During the first week of March, 2020, qualifying began for candidates seeking election in the May, 2020, primary election.1 Both Stoker and Wilson went to the Walker County Republican Party’s office in Walker County in an attempt to qualify as candidates for the Board of Education. Both Stoker and Wilson paid a qualifying fee and signed two separate affidavits swearing to their eligibility to serve. The affidavit most pertinent to this appeal is entitled “Declaration of Candidacy and Affidavit.” The affidavit of Wilson is attached as Exhibit 5. The affidavit of Stoker is attached as Exhibit 6. Qualifying for candidacy closed at noon on March 6, 2020. At the time that Wilson attempted to qualify by paying the fee and signing the affidavits, both Wilson and Stoker were members of the Board, and Wilson was married to Stoker’s sibling. At the time that Stoker attempted to qualify by paying the fee and signing the affidavits, both Wilson and Stoker were members of the Board, and Wilson was married to Stoker’s sibling. 1 The May primary has been moved to June 9, 2020, because of the outbreak of COVID-19. 4 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 6 of 84 When the qualifying period ended on March 6, 2020, at noon, both Wilson and Stoker were members of the Board, and Wilson was married to Stoker’s sibling. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CASE Pursuant to O.C.G.A. §21-2-6, Applicant filed a challenge to the qualifications of Wilson and a challenge to the qualifications of Stoker as candidates for election to the Walker County Board of Education (“Board of Education”). The challenges were filed with the Board of Elections as required by law.2 On March 26, 2020, the Board of Elections conducted the hearing required by O.C.G.A. §21-2-6(c). Applicant, Wilson, and Stoker were all present at the hearing, and all parties were given the opportunity to submit evidence, call witnesses, testify, and make argument. Upon motion of the Applicant, and because the challenges were predicated on substantially the same facts, the challenges were consolidated into a single hearing without objection. The hearing was taken down by a certified court reporter. On March 26, 2020, the Board of Elections issued a final decision. The Board of Elections found that the Respondents were qualified to seek election because “O.C.G.A. Section 20-2-51, State Board of Education Rule 16-5-1-.36, the Walker County Board of Education policies, and the other issues raised and authorities cited 2 O.C.G.A. §21-2-6(b) requires that a challenge be filed with the superintendent. In counties where there is a board of elections and registration, said board is the superintendent. O.C.G.A. §21-2-2(35). 5 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 7 of 84 in both challenges are not within the authority and purview of the [Board of Elections] to render a decision.” In other words, the Board of Elections simply passed the buck without considering the issues raised by the Appellant. See Exhibit 2. Within ten days of the final decision of the Board of Elections, Applicant filed an appeal to the Superior Court of Walker County pursuant to O.C.G.A. §21-2-6(e), The challenges were consolidated into one appeal because they were consolidated by the Board of Elections and only one decision was entered. The full record of the proceedings below was filed by the Board of Elections as required by law and is a part of the record, including the transcript of the proceedings below. There being no facts in dispute, the Superior Court entered an order affirming the decision of the Board of Elections without conducting a hearing. See Exhibit 1. The Superior Court, did, sua sponte, enter an order making the Board of Elections a party to the proceedings. See Exhibit 4. Subsequently, Applicant has had to argue against not only Wilson and Stoker, but also the Board of Elections, which has sought tirelessly to defend its decision. This Applicant now seeks to appeal the decision of the Superior Court. 6 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 8 of 84 ENUMERATION OF ERRORS TO BE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1. The trial court incorrectly interpreted O.C.G.A. §21-2-51, allowing Wilson and Stoker, who are immediate family members, to serve together on the same local board of education. 2. The trial court erred in failing to consider that Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 160-5-1- .36 (the “SBOE Rule”) and The Walker County Board of Education’s Nepotism Policy (the “local board policy”) prohibit Respondent Stoker and Respondent Wilson from serving on the same board of education, regardless of whether their service is prohibited by statute. 3. The trial court erred in ordering that the Walker County Board of Elections and Registration be joined as a party to this proceeding. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY I. THIS APPLICATION SHOULD BE GRANTED IN ORDER TO RECONCILE THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING AND THE SBOE RULE. Supreme Court Rule 34 provides that an application will be granted when reversible error appears to exist or where the establishment of precedent or further development of the common law is desirable. This case presents each. This is a case of statutory construction. O.C.G.A. §20-2-51 prohibits “immediate family members” from serving on the same local board. The statute 7 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 9 of 84 further defines immediate family members, and includes “the spouse of a sibling,” as one such prohibited relationship. The trial court went through great contortions to construe O.C.G.A. §20-2-51 in a way that would allow Wilson and Stoker to serve together on the local board, despite their relationship as brother-in-law and sister-in- law. In order to protect the sanctity of elected boards of education across the state and in order that the law be applied equally statewide, it is necessary that this Court read, construe, and clarify the meaning of O.C.G.A. 20-2-51. Furthermore, it is clear that the Georgia Department of Education and the State Board of Education interpret O.C.G.A. §20-2-51 to prohibit Respondents Wilson and Stoker from serving on the same local board. The State Board of Education has promulgated rules requiring local boards to adopt policies which would prevent Wilson and Stoker from serving together, and the Georgia Department of Education has published Guidance for the SBOE Rule that unambiguously states that persons that are related as the spouse of a sibling cannot serve together on the local board. Given the conflicts between the trial court’s reading of O.C.G.A. §20-2-51 and the directives published by the other state agencies, it is imperative that this Court weigh-in on the issues presented. 8 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 10 of 84 II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING O.C.G.A. §20-2-51 TO ALLOW RESPONDENTS TO SERVE ON THE SAME LOCAL BOARD OF EDUCATION. A. The plain language of O.C.G.A. §20-2-51 prohibits Respondent Wilson and Respondent Stoker from serving together on the same local board of education because they are “immediate family members.” O.C.G.A. §20-2-51(c)(4)(A) provides as follows: No person who has an immediate family member sitting on a local board of education or serving as the local school superintendent or as a principal, assistant principal, or system administrative staff in the local school system shall be eligible to serve as a member of such local board of education. As used in this paragraph, the term ‘immediate family member’ means a spouse, child, sibling, or parent or the spouse of a child, sibling, or parent whose employment as the local school superintendent or as a principal, assistant principal, or system administrative staff in the local school system began on or after January 1, 2010.” O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(c)(4)(A) (emphasis supplied). The law is clearly formulated in order to stop nepotism on local school boards, to ensure that boards of education are free from the appearance of impropriety, and to ensure that local school boards operate in a manner that is in the best interest of all children involved, free from undue influence and from the control of a powerful few. The trial court’s decision to allow both Stoker and Wilson to seek re-election hinged primarily upon two issues: 1. The trial court’s perceived problem with the application of the definition of “immediate family member” as it pertains to the 9 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 11 of 84 relationship between the Respondents; and 2. What Applicant references as “the limiting language” found at the end of the statutory definition of “immediate family member,” to wit: “or parent whose employment as the local school superintendent or as a principal, assistant principal, or system administrative staff in the local school system began on or after January 1, 2010.” O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51(c)(4)(A) (emphasis supplied). Both the Respondents and the trial court struggled with the fact that, while Stoker is the sibling of Wilson’s spouse, a clearly prohibited relationship, Wilson is not the sibling of Stoker’s spouse. Respondents argued that Stoker may be prohibited from serving with Wilson, but that Wilson was not prohibited from serving with Stoker. This position is laughable. Suppose a man were to say, “John Doe is my cousin, but I am no cousin of his.” This is not how familial relationships work. Further, the idea that one Respondent could serve with impunity whilst the other would suffer is absurd. “It is the duty of the court to consider the results and consequences of any proposed construction and not so construe a statute as will result in unreasonable or absurd consequences not contemplated by the legislature.” State v. Mulkey, 252 Ga. 201, 204 (1984). “Where law is susceptible of more than one construction, it must 10 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 12 of 84 be given that construction which is most equitable and just.” Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 468 (1950). Respondents urged the trial court, and the court apparently acquiesced, to view the prohibited degrees of kinship from only the perspective of one board member or the other. The law does not require such a reading. The statute defines an immediate family member as “a spouse, child, sibling, or parent or the spouse of a child, sibling, or parent . . .” (emphasis supplied). The use of the word “a,” instead of “the,” or “the candidate’s,” demonstrates that the relationship between Respondents is singular and is properly analyzed by looking at the relationship as a whole. The correct question is thusly, “does the relationship between the two involve a spouse of a sibling? Yes. Respondent Wilson is a spouse of a sibling of Stoker. Compare O.C.G.A. §21-2-51(c)(4) with O.C.G.A. §34-1-10, Georgia’s Family Care Act, which defines “immediate family member” as “an employee’s child, spouse, grandchild, grandparent, or parent . . .” (emphasis supplied). It is clear that, when the legislature wants to predicate relationship status based only from the perspective of one person, such as “an employee,” the legislature knows how to do just that. “A statute must be construed in relation to other statutes of which it is a part, and all statutes relating to the same subject-matter, briefly called statutes in pari 11 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 13 of 84 materia, are construed together, and harmonized whenever possible, so as to ascertain the legislative intendment and give effect thereto.” Tew v. State, 320 Ga. App. 127, 130 (2013). O.C.G.A. §20-2-58.1 provides that “[n]o local board of education shall employ or promote any person who is a member of the immediate family of any board member . . .” The statute goes on to use the same definition of “immediate family” as “a spouse, child, sibling, or parent or the spouse of a child, sibling, or parent . . .” This statute, when construed in pari materia with O.C.G.A. §20-2-51, demonstrates that the legislature intended that the court identify “members” as persons that fit the definition of “immediate family,” a construction that allows the court to identify members from the perspective of either party, and does not lead to unreasonable and absurd results. The trial court rejected the assertions of Applicant as set forth above and instead found that it must construe O.C.G.A. §20-2-51 in a manner that would prevent the absurdity presented by Respondents’ reading of the statute, while still maintaining that the relationship between Stoker and Wilson is of a dual nature. The trial court found its work-around in the limiting language. Respondents argued in their trial brief that, even though the plain language of the statute prohibits immediate family members from serving on the same board, the definition of “immediate family member” requires one of the family members to be an employee. 12 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 14 of 84 School board members cannot be employees. See O.C.G.A. §20-2-51(b)(2). In other words, Respondents argued that, even though the statute purports to prohibit immediate family members from serving on the same board, the definition of “immediate family” allows for all persons to serve on the same school board regardless of their relationship status. Under this interpretation, even a husband and wife could be on the same local school board, so long as one of them is not the superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or system administrative staff. Respondents’ interpretation of the statute renders the statement that “[n]o person who has an immediate family member sitting on a local board of education . . . shall be eligible to serve as a member of such local board of education,” completely meaningless and the words, therefore, superfluous. “All parts of a statute should be harmonized and given sensible and intelligent effect, because it is not presumed that the legislature intended to enact meaningless language.” Grimes v. Catoosa Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 307 Ga. App. 481, 483-84 (2010). “Courts should give a sensible and intelligent effect to every part of a statute and not render any language superfluous.” Berryhill v. Georgia Cmty. Support & Solutions, Inc., 281 Ga. 439, 441 (2006). “In order to discern the meaning of the words of a statute, the reader must look at the context in which the statute was written, remembering at all times that the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is 13 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 15 of 84 more than the notes. If the words of the statute, however, are plain and capable of having but one meaning, and do not produce any absurd, impractical, or contradictory results, then [the Court] is bound to follow the meaning of those words. If, on the other hand, the words of the statute are ambiguous, then [the Court] must construe the statute, keeping in mind the purpose of the statute and ‘the old law, the evil, and the remedy.’” Rite-Aid Corp. v. Davis, 280 Ga. App. 522, 524 (2006) (emphasis supplied). Applicant submits that there is a more reasonable and logical application of the statutory language, to wit: A person’s immediate family members are exactly those one would classify as immediate family in every-day speech – one’s spouse, child, sibling, parent and the spouse of one’s child, sibling, and parent. If one desires to run for election to the local school board, there are two categories of persons created by the statute where one must be wary for the presence of immediate family members: (1) members of the local school board; and (2) employees in leadership positions - the superintendent, principals, assistant principals, and system administrative staff. It is impossible to apply the limiting language, “whose employment . . . began on or after January 1, 2010,” to the first category (current board members) and, therefore, the phrase only modifies the second category of persons (employees in leadership positions). 14 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 16 of 84 The trial court rejected both Applicant and Respondents’ arguments and found an interpretation that split the proverbial baby. The trial court found that the limiting language did not apply to “a spouse, child, sibling, or parent,” but that the limiting language did affect those relationships involving “a spouse of a child, sibling, or parent.” The trial court’s ruling would prohibit spouses, siblings, and parents and their children from serving on the same local board, but would allow in-laws to serve together. The trial court’s rationale is set forth in its order. See Exhibit 1. The trial court’s rationale does not comport with the obvious intention of the legislature. Why would our lawmakers prohibit a board member from serving with his sister-in-law as an assistant principal, but allow the same pair to serve together on a five-person board, a much more powerful and dangerous combination? Furthermore, the placement of the commas found in the definition of “immediate family member” precludes the trial court’s interpretation, as “the absence of offsetting commas suggests that a phrase modifies only the language immediately adjoining.” J. Kinson Cook, Inc. v. Weaver, 252 Ga. App. 868, 870 (2000) (citing Amica Mutual Insurance v. Bourgault et al., 263 Ga. 157 (1993)). The last item on the list of immediate family members is “[the spouse of a] parent whose employment began . . .” There is no offsetting comma between the word “parent” and the phrase “whose employment began . . .” If this Court were to ignore what Applicant regards as the clear intent of the legislature and instead base an 15 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 17 of 84 interpretation upon a strict reading of the statute, the Court must find that the limiting language only applies to the last item on the list – a spouse of a parent. To have the limiting language apply to the entire list of relationships, the legislature would have placed a comma after the word “parent.” To accomplish the trial court’s interpretation, the law should be written to define “immediate family member” as “the spouse of a child, sibling, or parent, whose employment . . .” (emphasis placed on comma after parent placed by Applicant). While the trial court’s interpretation presents a “middle of the road” reading of the statute between the litigants to this action, for the reason set forth above, it does not comport with the clear legislative intent or with the plain language of the statute. B. When O.C.G.A. §20-2-51 is read in concert with the SBOE Rule, it is clear that the statute prohibits Stoker and Wilson from serving together on the same local board. If O.C.G.A. §20-2-51 is ambiguous, then this Court must resolve that ambiguity. As the SBOE Rule is an interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 20-2-51 and “comports with legislative intent and is reasonable,” it should be given “great weight.” See Cook v. Glover, 295 Ga. 495, 500 (2014); Schrenko v. DeKalb Cnty. School Dist., 276 Ga. 786, 791 (2003). 16 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 18 of 84 The State Board of Education, seemingly in response to O.C.G.A. §20-2-51, adopted the SBOE Rule regarding nepotism (Exhibit 7), which provides the following: Each local board of education shall adopt policies regarding nepotism. Local board of education policies regarding nepotism shall, at a minimum, include the following provisions: 1. No person who has an immediate family member sitting on a local board of education . . . shall be eligible to serve as a member of such local board of education provided that the immediate family member’s employment in his or her position in the [Local Board of Education] began on or after January 1, 2010. This paragraph shall apply only to local board of education members elected or appointed on or after July 1, 2009. Exhibit 7, pg. 5. (emphasis supplied). Unlike O.C.G.A. §20-2-51, which inserts the definition of “immediate family member” into the same paragraph as the prohibition on service, the SBOE Rule has a separate definitions section. The SBOE Rule defines immediate family member simply as “. . . a spouse, child, sibling, or parent or the spouse of a child, sibling, or parent.” Exhibit 7, pg. 1 (emphasis supplied). Because the definition of “immediate family member” found in the SBOE Rule does not contain the limiting language, the SBOE Rule cannot be used to create two categories of immediate family members. Under the SBOE Rule, a sibling and the spouse of a sibling are both immediate family members – there is no distinction between them. 17 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 19 of 84 Appellant invites this Court’s attention to the Georgia Department of Education’s publication, “Guidance for State Board of Education Rule 160-5-1-.36” ( “SBOE Guidance,” Exhibit 8). The SBOE Guidance was published by the Georgia Department of Education to assist local school boards in implementing the changes necessitated by the passage of Senate Bill 84 (amending O.C.G.A. §20-2-51 to its current iteration) and the SBOE Rule. See Exhibit 8, pg. 1. The Georgia Department of Education pronounced that, in order to comply with the State Board of Education’s policy against nepotism and Georgia law, local schools board policies must: clearly state that on or after July 1, 2009, individuals are not eligible for election or appointment as a LBOE member if: • An immediate family member sits on the same LEA’s local board. • An immediate family member serves as the local school superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or system administrative staff of the same LEA if the immediate family member’s employment in that position began on or after January 1, 2010. Exhibit 8, pg. 10 If this Court construes and interprets O.C.G.A. §20-2-51 in harmony with the SBOE Rule, then the statute must be read so as to prevent Wilson and Stoker, whose relationship consists of “a spouse of a sibling,” from serving on the local board of education together. 18 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 20 of 84 III. IRRESPECTIVE OF THE APPROPRIATE CONSTRUCTION OF O.C.G.A. §20-2-51, WILSON AND STOKER ARE PROHIBITTED FROM SERVING TOGETHER BY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THEIR OWN LOCAL BOARD POLICY. In response to Georgia law and in accordance with the mandate to adopt a nepotism policy found in the SBOE Rule, the Walker County Board of Education adopted a nepotism policy, the local board policy, on August 9, 2011 (Exhibit 9). The local board policy on nepotism provides as follows: In compliance with Georgia Board of Education Rule 160-5-1-.36 Local School Board Governance, the Board of Education (“the Board”) adopts the following nepotism provisions: No person who has an immediate family member sitting on the Board or serving as the Superintendent or as a principal, assistant principal, or system administrative staff shall be eligible to serve as a member of the Board, provided that the immediate family member’s employment in his or her position began on or after January 1, 2010. This paragraph shall apply only to Board members elected or appointed on or after July 1, 2009. Local Board Policy, Exhibit 9. The local board policy does not define “immediate family member,” but it does state that the policy is adopted “in compliance with Georgia Board of Education Rule 160-5-1-.36 [the SBOE Rule],” and it must therefore encompass the minimum degree of kinship prohibited by said SBOE Rule. Further, the citations provided by the Walker County Board of Education, on its website, where the Board’s nepotism 19 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 21 of 84 policy is found, indicate that the definition of “immediate family member” may be found at O.C.G.A. §20-2-58.1, which defines immediate family member as “a spouse, child, sibling, or parent or the spouse of a child, sibling, or parent,” and contains no limiting language. O.C.G.A. §20-2-58.1 (emphasis supplied). The trial court’s order states that O.C.G.A. §20-2-51, the SBOE Rule, and the local board rule are substantially the same. Ironically, the critical distinction between the admittedly similar provisions is the definition of “immediate family members,” the very portion of the statute upon which the trial court based its decision. Because the local board rule incorporates by reference the SBOE Rule, it must be construed in relation to the said SBOE Rule. As argued in detail in the preceding section of this application, the SBOE Rule, especially when read conjunction with the guidance provided by the Georgia Department of Education, clearly and unequivocally prohibits Wilson and Stoker from serving on the local board together. Given that the local board will be compelled, by this Applicant if necessary through further action, to remove Wilson and Stoker from the local board if they are both successful in their bids for re-election, it seems illogical to allow them both to seek election in the first place. 20 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 22 of 84 IV. THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS WAS THE ORIGINAL FINDER OF FACT AND LAW AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE A PARTY TO THIS ACTION. The trial court erred in, sua sponte, joining the Walker County Board of Elections and Registration a party to this cause of action. The Board of Elections, as superintendent, and pursuant to their duties as set forth O.C.G.A. §21-2-6, conducted the initial hearing on Applicant’s challenges. The Board of Elections ultimately found that they did not have jurisdiction to rule on the challenge and issued an order to that effect. See Exhibit 2. The trial court found that only the Board of Elections, and neither Stoker and Wilson, could grant the relief requested by Applicant, and therefore joined the Board of Elections as a party to the action. The relief requested by Applicant was for Wilson and Stoker to be removed from the ballot in the primary election. The trial court’s finding is erroneous in that the Board of Elections is not the only entity that can grant the relief requested. In Applicant’s appeal to the Superior Court, Applicant requested that the Superior Court issue an order removing Wilson and Stoker from the ballot. If Applicant’s application is granted, Applicant will ask this Court to grant the relief requested. The trial court’s order making the Board of Elections a party to this action placed Applicant in an unjust and unfair predicament. The Board of Elections 21 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 23 of 84 originally heard this cause of action in a judicial capacity, and therefore had a duty to be impartial. One of the actions that was available to the Superior Court was for the court to remand the case to the Board of Elections for further action. See O.C.G.A. §21-2-6. Applicant’s position in this case on appeal is similar to a plaintiff whose motion for summary judgment was denied and finds herself arguing not only against the defendant on appeal, but also against the trial judge who was invited to become a party and defend his judgment. Unsurprisingly, even though the Board of Elections decided not to decide the case, as pointed out by the trial court in its final order, the Board of Elections defended the results of its ruling by filing an answer that adopted the arguments set forth by the Respondents. This is unsurprising, as it is well-known human behavior to feel compelled to defend one’s actions. Applicant, who had already chosen to take on two Respondents at one time, found herself with yet another opponent – a government opponent with political ties that was supposed to be a neutral party. Applicant did not sue the Board of Elections. This case should be contrasted with instances where plaintiffs have applied for a writ of mandamus or have otherwise sued a governmental board. Applicant is not arguing that the Board of Elections failed to perform its duties. Obviously, Applicant disagrees with the 22 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 24 of 84 findings of the Board of Elections, but there is a big difference between appealing the decision of a tribunal and suing the said tribunal. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Applicant prays that the Court grant this Application and expediting this case so that the issues raised herein may be decided prior to the June 9, 2020, primary election. Respectfully submitted this 20th day of May, 2020. s:\Benjamin T. Bradford Benjamin T. Bradford Ga. Bar No.: 916288 s:\David N. Lockhart David N. Lockhart Ga. Bar No.: 675404 Attorneys for Applicant Bradford & Lockhart, P.C. 120 East Patton St. LaFayette, Georgia 30728 706/638-4700 706/638-2077 (fax) [email protected] 23 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 25 of 84 IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF GEORGIA LINDSAY BRADFORD, ) ) Applicant, ) ) DOCKET NO. vs. ) ) ________________________ DALE WILSON, KAREN STOKER, ) and the WALKER COUNTY ) BOARD OF ELECTIONS AND ) IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF REGISTRATION, ) WALKER COUNTY, GEORGIA ) Respondents. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 20SUCV0227 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have this day, by U.S. first class mail marked for first- class delivery, postage prepaid, served Respondents, by and through their respective attorneys of record, as follows: David D. Gottlieb Robert T. Monroe Michael D. McRae P.O. Box 445 P.O. Box 418 P.O. Box 418 LaFayette, GA 30728 Cedartown, GA 30124 Cedartown, GA 30124 This 20th day of May, 2020. s:\Benjamin T. Bradford Benjamin T. Bradford Ga. Bar No.: 916288 Bradford & Lockhart, P.C. 120 East Patton St. LaFayette, Georgia 30728 706/638-4700 706/638-2077 (fax) [email protected] 24 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 26 of 84 EXHIBIT 1 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 27 of 84 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 28 of 84 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 29 of 84 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 30 of 84 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 31 of 84 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 32 of 84 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 33 of 84 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 34 of 84 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 35 of 84 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 36 of 84 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 37 of 84 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 38 of 84 EXHIBIT 2 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 39 of 84 Case S20D1228 Filed 05/20/2020 Page 40 of 84