Readings in Ethics, 1935 Pg. 12 Without definition there can be no knowledge. Selections from Hellenistic Philosophy, 1978 Pgs. 243 - 244 Lines 17 - 28 give an excellent statement of the realistic theory of knowledge. Truth is the possession of the objects themselves, not the possession of their impressions, which act as a veil between knower and object. Sextus Empiricus, as a true skeptic, ha d assumed a division between knower and known. Plotinus, like any true realist, attacks the unexpressed basis of skepticism. A Christian Philosophy of Education, 1988 Pg. 19 Now the study of the relationships among chemistry, Greek, and anthropology is not just another subject among many. While it is so listed for the convenience’ sake in college catalogs, philosophy is rather the subject that underlies our approach to and use of all other subject matter. Philosophy is the study not of a part but of the whole. And for the lack of serious study of the whole, American education has lowered its standards, compromised with commercialism, and distinguished itself by mediocrity. Pg. 31 In view of this pragmatic dealing with history, its positivistic denial of universal law, of metaphysics, of supernatural interpretation, it may be permitted by way of anticipation to suggest the conclusion that, instead of beginning with facts and later discovering God, unless a thinker begins with God, he can never end with God, or get the facts either. Pgs. 33 - 34 Basic worldviews are never demonstrated; they are chosen. William James and Bertrand Russell may believe in a pluralistic universe, but they can offer no dem onstration of this, the most fundamental of their intellectual beliefs. The mechanist believes that all natural phenomena can be reduced to mathematical, quantitative equations, but he never gives a mathematical demonstration of his belief. So it is with e very world - view; the first principle cannot be proved – precisely because it is first. It is the first principle that provides the basis for demonstrating subordinate propositions. Now if such be the case, the thoughtful person is forced to make a voluntar y choice. As a matter of fact, the thoughtless person as well is forced to choose, though the necessity to make a choice and the particular choice made may not be so obvious. It is obvious, however, that a thoughtful person, one who wishes to understand, o ne who wants to think and live consistently, must choose one or another first principle. Pg. 34 Etymologically a skeptic is one who seeks; but philosophically a skeptic is one who does not find. Or, rather, he finds that there is nothing to be found. The re is no truth, and knowledge is impossible. Aside from the self - contradiction of asserting the truth that there is no truth, skepticism is not a world - view. In particular no theories or policies or policies of education can be deduced. Neither can objecti ons against naturalism or theism be based on pure ignorance. It is therefore useless to spend further time on skepticism. Pg. 38 The atheist who asserts that there is no God, asserts by the same words that he holds the whole universe in his mind; he asse rts that no fact, past, present, future, near, or far, escapes his attention, that no power, however great, can baffle or deceive him. In rejecting God, he claims omniscience and omnipotence. In other words an atheist is one who claims that he himself is G od; and the pantheist must be said to join him in the same claim. Pgs. 41 - 42 Still it remains true that no demonstration of God is possible; our belief is a voluntary choice; but if one must choose without a strict proof, none the less it is possible to have sane reasons of some sort to justify the choice. Certainly there are sane reasons for rejecting some choices. One most important fact is the principle of consistency. In the case of skepticism inconsistency lies immediately on the surface. Explicit at heism requires only a little analysis before self - contradiction is discovered. Some statements of naturalism more successfully disguise their flaws. But all these choices are alike in that it is not sane, it is not logical, to choose an illogical principle Consistency extends further than a first principle narrowly considered, so that it can be shown to be self - contradictory in itself; it extends into the system deduced from the first principle or principles. The basic axiom or axioms must make possible a harmony or system in all our thoughts, words, and actions. Should someone say (misquoting by the omission of an adjective) that consistency is the mark of small minds, that he does not like systems, that he will act on one principle at one time and anoth er at another, that he does not choose to be consistent, there would be no use arguing with him, for he repudiates the rules, the necessary rules of argumentation. Such a person cannot argue against theism, for he cannot argue at all. Pg. 42 While consistency is one of the basic reasons for adopting a world - view, from a more proximate standpoint the world - view must function as a practical postulate. Pgs. 42 - 43 When now the theist speaks of theism as a practical postulate, he is not indulging in any “as - if” philosophy. He means that God exists and that one should conduct his daily life by that belief. It is called a postulate because it is an indemonstrable first principle and not a theorem derived from more ultimate premises. Pg. 43 It is b etter to say that the truth of the Bible is the basic axiom of Christian theism, for it is there alone that one learns what God is. It is there alone that one learns what man is. And what children are. And what college students are. And what education shou ld be. There is still more but this chapter does not aim to give an account of the entire system. In conformity with tradition, the argument has centered on the question of God’s existence. As an axiom or first premise it is incapable of proof or demonstration . Right from the start, at the very beginning, we say, “I believe in God the Father Almighty.” Pg. 96 The Scripture speaks of the law of God as written on the hearts of men; it teaches that man was made in God’s image and has an innate knowl edge that right is different from wrong and that God punishes wrong. But the Scripture also teaches that man suppresses this knowledge by his wickedness, that he does not wish to retain God in his knowledge, and that God has given him over to a reprobate m ind. Pg. 105 The Christian system starts with God – not just any sort of God, but with a very definite God, the God of the Bible. Pg. 129 That Christianity allows no flux in truth is clear from the immutability and omniscience of God, who is truth itse lf. If God is truth and truth changes, a particular revelation from God would be useless a few years of even a few minutes after he gave it. God would have changed; and no one, even if he knew what God wanted us to do yesterday, could guess what God’s trut h might be today. Pg. 130 The cannibal morality of the Congo is different from the bull - fight morality of the Spanish Catholics. But is “two plus two is four” and “Lincoln was President during the Civil War” are true in America, while “two plus two equal s five” and “Lincoln was Pericles’ successor in Greece” are true in Africa, while again “two plus two equals six” and “Lincoln was the first astronaut to step on the moon” are true in Asia, then there simply are no subjects such as arithmetic and history. And if moral principles differ from place to place, there is no morality. And if truth changes, there is no truth. And if there is no truth, the truth that truth changes is not true. Pgs. 137 - 139 This nontheistic, naturalistic view is difficult to accept because it implies that the mind, too (as well as the body) is an evolutionary product rather than a divine image. Instead of using eternal principles of logic, the mind operates with the practical results of biological adaptation. Concepts and propositions neither reach the truth nor even aim at it. Our equipment has evolved through a struggle to survive. Reason is simply the human method of handling things. It is a simplifying and therefore falsif ying device. There is no evidence that our categories correspond to reality. Even if they did, a most unlikely accident, no one could know it; for to know that the laws of logic are adequate to the existent real, it is requisite to observe the real prior t o using the laws. But if this ever happened with subhuman organisms, it never happens with the present species man. If now the intellect is naturally produced, different types of intellect could equally well be produced by slightly different evolutionary p rocesses. Maybe such minds have been produced, but are now extinct like the dinosaurs and dodos. This means, however, that the concepts or intuitions of space and time - the law of contradiction, the rules of inference - are not fixed and universal criteria of truth, but that other races thought in other terms. Perhaps future races will also think in different terms. John Dewey insisted that logic has already changed and will continue to change. If now this be the case, our traditional logic is but a passing ev olutionary moment; our theories - dependent on this logic - are temporary reactions, parochial social habits, and Freudian rationalizations; and therefore the evolutionary theory, produced by these biological urges, cannot be true. The difference between natu ralism and theism - between the latest scientific opinions on evolution and creation; between the Freudian animal and the image of God; between belief in God and atheism - is based on their two different epistemologies. Naturalism professes to learn by observa tion and analysis of experience; the theistic view depends on Biblical revelation. No amount of observation and analysis can prove the theistic position. Of course, no amount of observation and analysis can prove evolution or any other theory. The secular philosophies all result in total skepticism. In contrast, theism bases its knowledge on divinely revealed propositions. They may not give us all truth; they may even give us very little truth; but there is no truth at all otherwise. So much for the secular alternative. Pg. 142 Christianity, however, is intellectualistic. God is truth, and truth is immutable. Pg. 149 ...the chief objection to the theology of feeling is its assertion that God is unknowable. It should be perfectly clear that no man knows eno ugh to assert the existence of an object of which he knows nothing. And not only so, but the assertion that an object exists of which nothing can be known reduces to skepticism. The right of each man to assert the kind of unknowable he chooses throws all o bjectivity into confusion; and the implicit contradiction contained in asserting that something cannot be known cuts the foundation out from under any and all knowledge. Pgs. 151 ...if reality is deeper than thought, it follows that thought is not real. Or , more clearly expressed, if thought and the object of thought are never the same, as he says, then we never know the object. At best we have only a representation of the object, but a representation that cannot be known to represent it. Pg. 152 Obedien ce to divine commands depends on a revelation that is intellectually grasped; it requires a knowledge of God; and hence alleged obedience must be judged by the norms of truth; but this makes truth and intellect superior to will. Pg. 155 There are such th ings as values, of course; but to be truly valuable, a value must first be true. Truth is primary, value secondary. And the supreme value in the life of man is to be sought in the activity of the intellect as it grasps truth. Pgs. 169 - 170 The single Gosp el of John, which near its beginning describes Christ as full of grace and truth, contains a score or more references to truth. This truth, since it is the complex of propositions that constitute the mind of God, is fixed, final, and eternal. Pgs. 195 - 196 If truth is a system, as the omniscience of God guarantees, and if an institution of higher learning aims to transmit some truth, then a professor ought to have at least an elementary grasp of the system in order to locate the position of his subj ect as a whole. Pg. 219 ...thought and knowledge cannot be obtained from pure sensation; or, in other words, to preserve a connection between sense experience and rational knowledge, sensation must be understood as an incipient form of reason. The two type s of mental action must somehow be united, and if empiricism in philosophy results in skepticism while in theology it removes revelation, the only possible expedient is to explain sensation in terms of thought rather than thought in terms of sensation. Pg . 226 Statements, propositions, predicates attached to subject, are true (or false). But how could a nocturne or one of Rodin’s sculptures be true? The sculpture might resemble its model, and the proposition “the sculpture resembles its model” would be a truth; but how could a bronze or marble statue be a truth ? Only propositions can be true. If I merely pronounce a world – cat, college, collage – it is neither true nor false: It doesn’t say anything. A Christian View of Men and Things, 2005 Pg. 17 Philosophy, as the integration of all fields of study, is a wide subject, and if theism is to be more than imperfectly justified, it will be necessary to show its implications in many of these fields. A God, or a belief in god, that had no repercussions either in sociology or epistemology would be of little philosophic import Pgs. 19 - 20 A system of philosophy purports to answer certain questions. To understand the answers, it is essential to know the questions. When the questions are clear ly put, there is less likelihood that the answers will seem irrelevant to important issues. Pgs. 22 - 24 William James, in his A Pluralistic Universe stressed the disconnectedness of things. Wholes are to be explained by parts and not parts by wholes, he s aid; one group of events, though interrelated among themselves, may be unrelated to another group; there is no dominating unity – however much may be reported as present at any effective center of consciousness, something else is self - governed, absent, and unreduced to unity. In one place James denied the need of answering a question that many others have thought as important as it is difficult: “Not why evil should exist at all, but how we can lessen the actual amount of it, is the sole question we need th ere to consider.” Of course, if a question is literally meaningless (such as, why is music oblong?) it is really not a question at all and does not need to be answered. But if a question is not senseless, by what right can a philosophy rule it out of court ? Even if it were quite trivial, it should find its place and its answer in some minor subdivision of the truth. Then, too, one might ask how James discovered that some groups of events are unrelated to other groups? Or, more exactly, since he allowed “ext ernal” relations and denied only “internal” relations, one might ask how James could discover that something is absent from and unreduced to unity by every effective center of consciousness? In other words, did James have a valid argument for the conclusio n that there is no Omniscient Mind whose thought is systematic truth? He may then be caught on the horns of the dilemma he tried to escape. Irrational chaos and Hegelian monism were equally repellent to him. He wanted to find a middle ground. But perhaps t here is no escape from irrational chaos except, not exactly Hegelian monism, but a logical completeness of some sort. It would be surprising, would it not, if social stability could be based on incoherence, or even large - scale disconnectedness? At any rat e, the suspicion that the introductory questions are all related and that an answer to any one of them affects the answer to every other would accord with the theistic belief in divine omniscience. The discouragement, the reflection, the suspicion of the p revious pages do not prove or demonstrate the existence of an omniscient God; but if there is such a God, we may infer that all problems and all solutions fit one another like pieces of a marvelous mosaic. The macrocosmic world with its microcosmic but tho ughtful inhabitant will not be a fortuitous aggregation of unrelated elements. Instead of a series of disconnected propositions, truth will be a rational system, a logically - ordered series, somewhat like geometry with its theorems and axioms, its implicati ons and presuppositions. Each part will derive its significance from the whole. Christianity therefore has, or, one may even say, Christianity is a comprehensive view of all things: It takes the world, both material and spiritual, to be an ordered system. Consequently, if Christianity is to be defended against the objections of other philosophies, the only adequate method will be comprehensive. While it is of great importance to defend particular points of special interest, these specific defenses will be i nsufficient. In addition to these details, there is also needed a picture of the whole into which they fit. This comprehensive apologia is seen all the more clearly to be necessary as the contrasting theories are more carefully considered. The naturalistic philosophy that engulfs the modern mind is not a repudiation of one or two items of the Christian faith leaving the remainder untouched; it is not a philosophy that is satisfied to deny miracles while approving or at least not disapproving of Christian mo ral standards; on the contrary, both Christianity and naturalism demand all or nothing: Compromise is impossible. At least this will be true if the answer of any one question is integral with the answers of every other. Each system proposes to interpret al l the fact; each system subscribes to the principle that this is one world. A universe, even James’ pluralistic universe, cannot exist half - theistic and half - atheistic. Politics, science, and epistemology must all be one or the other. The hypothesis of di vine omniscience, the emphasis on the systematic unity of all truths, and the supposition that a particular truth derives its meaning or significance from the system as a whole does not imply that a man must know everything in order to know anything. It mi ght at first seem to; and Plato, who faced the same difficulty, tried to provide for two kinds of knowing so that in one sense a man might know everything and in another sense not know and learn a particular truth. At the moment, let an illustration suffic e. To appreciate an intricate and beautiful mosaic, we must see it as a whole; and the parts are properly explained only in terms of the whole; but it does not follow that a perception of the pieces and some fragmentary information is impossible without fu ll appreciation. Or to pass from illustration to reality: A child in first grade learns that two plus two is four. This arithmetical proposition is true, and the greatest mathematician cannot disprove it. But the mathematician sees this truth in relation t o a science of numbers he understands how this sum contributes to phases of mathematics that the child does not dream of and may never learn; he recognizes that the significance of the proposition depends on its place in the system. But the child in school knows that two and two are four, and this that that child knows is true. Omniscience, even higher mathematics, is not a prerequisite for first grade. Pg. 26 But what about these assumptions or axioms? Can they be proved? It would seem that they cannot, for they are the starting points of an argument, and if the argument starts with them, there is no preceding argumentation. Accordingly, after the humanist or theist has worked out a consistent system by arranging all his propositions as theorems in a seri es of valid demonstrations, how is either of them to persuade the other to accept his unproved axioms? And the question is all the more perplexing when it is suspected that the axioms were chosen for the express purpose of deducing precisely these conclusi ons. Pgs. 26 - 29 Skepticism is the position that nothing can be demonstrated. And how, we ask, can you demonstrate that nothing can be demonstrated? The skeptic asserts that nothing can be known. In his haste he said that truth was impossible. And is it true that truth is impossible? For, if no proposition is true, then at least one proposition is true – the proposition, namely, that no proposition is true. If truth is impossible, therefore, it follows that we have already attained it. From this fact can be derived a method of procedure for discussing humanism and theism. If it can be shown that a proposed system of philosophy – Aristotelianism or Spinozism, for example – or if it can be shown that a particular proposition, whether it be a first principle or a subsidiary side issue, implies that knowledge is impossible, then that proposition or system may be eliminated from further consideration. Skepticism refutes itself because it is internally self - contradictory. If skepticism is true, it is false. And when a more elaborate complex of ideas is internally inconsistent, the complex must be rejected. This is similar to the method called reduction ad absurdum in geometry. A thesis has been proposed for examination, for example, that the interior angles of a triangle are greater than 180 degrees. From this assumption a series of deductions is made, until finally it is demonstrated that this thesis implies that a right angle is equal to an obtuse angle. This conclusion is absurd of self - contradictory; the logi c by which it was deduced from the thesis is valid; therefore, the thesis is false. By this method the argument for a theistic worldview would be obliged to examine the absolute idealism of Hegel, the dialectical materialism of Marx, the systems of Berkele y and Bergson, and show them to be incoherent. The method of procedure stresses coherence or self - consistency, and the implications of each position must be traced out to the end. A reduction ad absurdum would be the test. The legitimacy of such a procedu re will cause little dissent, but objections will soon be raised as to its sufficiency. It is widely admitted that skepticism is self - contradictory and must therefore be false. Other views, especially subsidiary contentions, can also be eliminated. But sup pose, what now seems likely, that after all these eliminations, three or even two imposing systems remain, each coherent within itself, either leading to skepticism, but mutually contradictory. What then? Now, there is a theory that the ultimate test of tr uth is coherence, and on this theory it would be impossible to have two self - consistent, mutually contradictory philosophies. A false statement, so it is said, will always, if pursued far enough, imply its own falsity. If this coherence theory of truth sho uld be established, then we could rely with confidence on this application of the law of contradiction. Its sufficiency would be inherent in the nature of truth. The mere fact that the coherence theory of truth would eliminate a final impasse might even be reason enough for adopting it. One might holds that all other theories of truth lead to skepticism, and that therefore the coherence theory alone is coherent and true. Possibly all this is so, but surely it needs some more talking about. And in talking ab out it, there can be no logical objection to using the law of contradiction as far as it will go. Perhaps it will go further than is now expected. But suppose there still remain two or more fairly self - consistent but mutually incompatible systems of thought. This is likely to be the case even if the coherence theory of truth is correct, for the coherence theory cannot be applied with final satisfaction unless one is omniscient. S ince life is short and since the implications of various propositions have not been exhausted, there may remain false propositions whose absurd conclusions have not yet been deduced. We may therefore be left with large but incomplete worldviews. Instead of being thoroughly integrated. The opposing systems will lack some parts and connections. Nonetheless, they will be worldviews on a large scale. Each one will have its first principles, the outlines will be plainly drawn, the main figures will have been pai nted in, and considerable detail will have been finished. Even though the artists have had neither time nor genius to finish their pictures, the contrast between them is unmistakable. What must be done? Must anything be done? Can we not simply look at bot h pictures and go our way without expressing any preference? Most people, with their interest in comics, do not even look at these great works of art; and since the coherence theory of truth and dialectical materialism mean nothing to them, they are incapa ble of having a preference. And cannot students of philosophy, and even scholars, consider carefully and make no choice? But suspension of judgment is more difficult than it would at first seem. It is difficult because the situation goes beyond the esoter ic futility of the proverbial armchair and ivory tower and involves the most intense issues of personal and social stability. To use William James’ language, it is a forced and vital option. Suspension of judgment may seem possible and even necessary in re latively trivial matters. One need not give immediate assent to the claims of a new toothpaste or to a new planetesimal theory. But even in these cases the refusal to accept the claims is not so much the absence or suspension of judgment as it is the accep tance of a different judgment. The belief that toothpaste advertisements are fraudulent is itself a belief. Instead of suspending judgment, one has judged unfavorably. Or one may use the toothpaste because of the judgment that it can do no harm and may pos sibly do some good. Even in these trivial matters suspension of judgment is not easy to achieve. In fact, it is impossible. Whether it is toothpaste of theism, one must either accept it or go without. Presumably the blessing of God rests only on those who believe in him. As Christ said, “He that is not with me is against me,” and “He that is not against us is on our part.” One must therefore be either for or against; there is no neutral or intermediate position. Suspension of judgment seems possible only wh en the practical business of living is excluded from consideration. If this unreal abstraction is repudiated, it will be seen that everyone lives either with the fear of God before his eyes or not. Our preferences, our standards of morality, our purpose in life accord with a theistic worldview, or they do not. And if they do not, we are acting on the assumption, whether we admit it or not, that there is no God to hold us responsible. Suspension of judgment, so - called, is but a disguised, if dignified, form of unbelief. A choice, therefore, cannot be avoided. The philosophically minded may be repelled by the notion of choice because it seems to smack of unphilosophical arbitrariness. The theory of vital options dimmed the luster even of William James in some quarters. But it is easier to be repelled by the notion of choice than it is to show that choice is not necessary. Yet also it must be admitted that choice is sometimes arbitrary and whimsical. The majority of the population choose religious, political, a nd philosophical beliefs that form the weirdest patterns. Still the choice of an ultimate principle or of a system of philosophy is not necessarily or ordinarily a personal whim or an arbitrary decision. Such a choice is the result of a long course of stud y to organize one’s universe. It is made with a fairly clear consciousness of the implications in many fields of inquiry. A whim, on the other hand, is the choice of some special factor without regard to the rest of life or to one’s other beliefs. Choice, however, is unavoidable because first principles cannot be demonstrated, and though some choices are arbitrary, the philosophical choice has regard to the widest possible consistency. Choice, therefore, is as legitimate as it is necessary. Pg. 29 No phil osopher is perfect and no system can give man omniscience. But if one system can provide plausible solutions to many problems while another leaves too many questions unanswered, if one system tends less to skepticism and gives more meaning to life, if one worldview is consistent whole others are self - contradictory, who can deny us, since we must choose, the right to choose the more promising first principle? Pg. 73 ...assertions relative to the species presuppose certain views concerning the genus. Pg. 79 Flux is often considered in relation to physical science; norms usually introduce questions of ethics; fixed and eternal truths concern epistemology and theology. Pg. 109 The more the various subjects are studied, the more their interrelationships wi ll be seen. Indeed, the breadth of philosophic discipline as opposed to the narrow specialty of a single science depends on these manifold and intricate connections. For example, the reason that epistemology has been regarded as the crucial point and the m ost profound part of philosophy is that botany, sociology, physics, and literature furnish it with a common area of investigation. Pgs. 127 - 128 There are some philosophers who reject any view depending on innate ideas or intellectual intuitions. This epi stemological problem would lead too far afield at the moment. Let it be granted that a system may have, if not immediate first truths, at least presuppositions, postulates, assumptions, or axioms. However, these must not be multiplied with abandon. Such pr imary principles must be restricted to a small number. The ideal in logical systems is to make as few assumptions as possible and to deduce as many theorems as possible. The British Intuitionists, unfortunately, were too liberal with their first principles . If this type of theory is to meet with general approval, it must be worked out on the basis of a single principle, or at most two or three, but certainly not two or three dozen. Pg. 146 There may at first be reluctance to face the question, What is fact? Yet, if facts are unyielding absolutes, it ought not to prove too difficult to show what a fact is. Pg. 149 The scientist wants mathematical accuracy; and when he cannot discover it, h e makes it. Since he chooses his law from among an infinite number of equally possible laws, the probability that he has chosen the “true” law is one over infinity, that is, zero; or, in plain English, the scientist has no chance of hitting upon the “real” laws of nature. No doubt that scientific laws are useful: By them the atomic bomb was invented. The point of all this argument is merely this: However useful scientific laws are, they cannot be true . Or, at the very least, the point of all this argument i s that scientific laws are not discovered but are chosen. Pg. 170 As Kant showed, the cause of empiricism’s failure was not its sensory definition of experience – Locke in fact did not restrict experience to sensation – but the impossibility of basing u niversality and necessity on momentary states of consciousness. The propositions of mathematics and the basic principles of physics are allegedly true at all times and in all cases. Such truths cannot be established on experience, not because the experienc es are sensory, but because they are momentary particulars. Sensation failed to arrive at universality, not because it was sensation, but because it was contingent. Therefore, Brightman’s wider definition of experience does not avoid the difficulty. If a s ensation is a fleeting temporal event, a non - sensory state of consciousness is equally so. And from such, universal propositions cannot be obtained. This means that objectivity is left without foundation. If there are no a priori forms identical in all lea rning minds, the contents of experience will be so personally subjective that it will be difficult to escape solipsism. Pgs. 182 - 183 How then could God show to a man that it was God speaking? Suppose God should say, “I will make of you a great nation... and I will bless them that bless you and curse him that curses you.” Would God call the devil and ask Abraham to believe the devil’s corroborative statements? Is the devil’s word good evidence of God’s veracity? It would not seem so. Nor is the solution to be found in God’s appealing to another man in order to convince the doubter. Aside from the fact that this other man is no more of an authority than the devil, the main question reappears unanswered in this case also. What reasons can this man have to con clude that God is making a revelation to him? It is inherent in the very nature of the case that the best witness to God’s existence and revelation is God himself. There can be no higher source of truth. God may, to be sure, furnish “evidence” to man. He m ay send an earthquake, a fire, or still small voice; he may work spectacular miracles, or, as in the cases of Isaiah and Peter, he may produce inwardly an awful consciousness of sin, so that the recipient of the revelation is compelled to cry out, “Woe is me! For I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips.” But whether it be an external spectacle or an inward “horror or great darkness,” all of this is God’s witnessing to himself. Pg. 183 These are first principles which themselves are the basis or be ginning of argument; and if they are the beginning, they cannot have been previously argued. To require a proof of a first principle is to misunderstand the whole procedure. Pg. 186 ...there is agreement that consistency is a test of truth, and in some ph ilosophical writings consistency and coherence are synonyms; but insofar as Brightman’s category of coherence is not mere formal consistency, it is so poorly defined as to be useless and even meaningless. Pg. 189 There is, to be sure, a more profound pr oblem in the relation between God’s will and the law of contradiction. No doubt reason may be called an eternal attribute of God, and as such it is uncreated. It does not follow, however, that the laws of reason are independent of the will of God or in any way limit his power. The laws of reason may be taken as descriptive of the activity of God’s will, and hence dependent on it, though not created as the world has been created. This involves a view of God’s will, nature, and being that must be referred to later. Pg. 201 The question, How do you know? May seem simple enough; but the answer virtually controls the whole system of philosophy. Pg. 205 - 206 Now, any given word must signify one thing, or a finite number of things, or an infinite number of things. If the word has a finite number of meanings, then it would be possible to invent a name for each meaning, so that all words would have a single meani ng. But if each word has an infinite number of meanings, reasoning and conversation have become impossible, because not to have one meaning is to have no meaning. But if a word has a meaning, the object cannot be both man and not - man. If the skeptic attemp t to avoid the arguments, he might do so by saying nothing. In this case, however, there is no skeptical theory awaiting refutation. Or he might accuse Aristotle of begging the question by using the law of contradiction. But, then, if he says this, he has said something, and has himself admitted the force of logic. Pg. 206 The skeptics refer to propositions as false, doubtful, or probably; but these terms would have no meaning unless there is some truth. A false proposition is the contradictory or a true proposition. If one say a proposition is doubtful, one must recognize the possibility of its being true. And the probable or plausible is what resembles the truth. From all this it follows that unless a man knows the truth, he cannot know what it probable. Accordingly, if truth is not known, there is no reason for acting in one way rather than another. Life has become meaningless. Pg. 207 The theory of progress holds that all theories become false. From which it follows that if progress is now the truth, it will soon not be. Perhaps it is already false. Pg. 209 Relativism is always asserted absolutely. If it were not intended to apply generally, it would have no claim to philosophic importance. But if it is asserted universally, then its assertion cont radicts what is being asserted. An absolutistic relativism is a self - contradiction. If it is true, it is false. Pg. 210 A sound epistemology cannot demand omniscience or complete freedom from error: Its aim is not to show that all men or any man knows e verything, but that some men can know something. Pg. 211 ...words are instruments or symbols for expressing thoughts. The letters t , w , o or the Arabic numeral 2 , are not the number itself, they are the visual or audible symbols used to refer to the intel lectual concept. Pg. 222 The “proof” of God’s existence, which is not at all a logical demonstration, results from showing that consistency is maintained by viewing all things as dependent on God. In the present instance, what hypothesis provides a grou nd for the common possession of the categories as adequately as Christian theism does? Though the existence and nature of God is insusceptible of formal demonstration, yet if Christian theism is true, there is no mystery in the fact that all human minds us e the same categories, and there is no suspicion that the objective world or some Ding - an - sich escapes their necessary connections. Pg. 223 What is true today always has been and always will be true. Any apparent exception, such as, It is raining today, is an elementary matter or ambiguity. Pg. 223 The idealistic philosophers have argued plausibly that truth is also mental or spiritual. With out a mind truth could not exist. The object of knowledge is a proposition, a meaning, a significance; it is a thought, And this is necessary if communication is to be possible. If a truth, a proposition, or a thought were some physical motion in the brain , no two persons could have the same thought. A physical motion is a fleeting event numerically distinct from every other. Two persons cannot have the same motion, nor can one person even have it twice. If this is what thought were, memory and communicatio n would both be impossible. Pg. 224 ...if one may think the same thought twice, truth must be mental or spiritual. Not only does it defy time; it defies space as well, for if communication is to be possible, the identical truth must be in two minds at onc e. If, in opposition, anyone wishes to deny that an immaterial idea can exist in two minds at once, his denial must be conceived to exist his mind only; and since it has not registered in any other mind, it does not occur to us to refute it. Is all this a ny more than the assertion that there is an eternal, immutable Mind, a Supreme Reason, a personal, living God? The truths or propositions that may be known are the thoughts of God, the eternal thought of God. And insofar as man knows anything he is in cont act with God’s mind. Since, further, God’s mind is God, we may legitimately borrow the figurative language, if not the precise meaning of the mystics and say, we have a vision of God. Pg. 226 This chapter has tried to show by an application of the law of contradiction – a law that is not merely formal but is itself and integral part of the system of truth – that truth exists and that knowledge is possible. Knowledge means the possession of truth. It is not necessary to work out a philosophical system to d emonstrate truths before having them. On the contrary, even in geometry, one usually has come into the possession of