R USSIAN M ONARCHY : R EPRESENTATION AND R ULE $ Collected Articles I m p e r i a l E n c o u n t e r s i n R u s s i a n H i s t o r y Series editor: Gary Marker (State University of New York, Stony Brook) Boston 2013 R USSIAN M ONARCHY : R EPRESENTATION AND R ULE K Collected Articles Richard Wortman Library of Congress Cataloging - in - Publication Data: A catalog record for this book as available from the Library of Congress. Copyright © 2013 Academic Studies Press All rights reserved Effective August 2, 2016, this book will be subject to a CC - BY - NC license. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by - nc/4.0/. Other than as provided by these licenses, no part of this book may be reproduced, transmitted, or displayed by a ny electronic or mechanical means without permission from the publisher or as permitted by law. ISBN 978 - 1 - 61811 - 258 - 3 (cloth) ISBN 978 - 1 - 61811 - 259 - 0 (electronic) Book design by Ivan Grave Published b y Academic Studies Press in 2013 28 Montfern Avenue Brighton, MA 02135, USA press@academicstudiespress.com www.academicstudiespress.com In memory of Marlene Stein Wortman, who made everything possible. VII T a ble of C ontent s Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Introduction: Russian Monarchy and the Symbolic Sphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii P a r t I Russian Monarchy and Law 1. Russian Monarchy and the Rule of Law: New Considerations of the Court Reform of 1864 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. The Representation of Dynasty and “Fundamental Laws” in the Evolution of Russian Monarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3. Review of Anatolii Viktorovich Remnev, Samoderzhavnoe Pravitel’stvo: Komitet Ministrov v sisteme vysshego upravlenia Rossiiskoi imperii (vtoraia polovina XIX—nachalo XX veka) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 P a r t I I Scenarios of Family and Nation 4. The Russian Empress as Mother . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 5. The Russian Imperial Family as Symbol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 P a r t I I I Narratives of Monarch and Nation 6. The Invention of Tradition and the Representation of Russian Monarchy . . . . . . 137 7. National Narratives in the Representation of Nineteenth-Century Russian Monarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 8. Moscow and Petersburg: The Problem of Political Center in Tsarist Russia, 1881-1914 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 9. Nicholas II and the Revolution of 1905 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 TA BLE OF CONTENTS VIII P a r t I V Russian Monarchy and the Imperial State 10. The Russian Empire and Russian Monarchy: The Problem of Russian Nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 11. The “Integrity” ( Tselost ’ ) of the State in Imperial Russian Representation . . . . . 233 12. The Tsar and Empire: Representation of the Monarchy and Symbolic Integration in Imperial Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 Richard S. Wortman: A Bibliography (1962-2013) by Ernest A. Zitser . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 IX Per m i ss ion s I thank the following presses and editors for permission to publish my articles: “Russian Monarchy and the Rule of Law: New Considerations of the Court Reform of 1864,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History , Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 2005): 145-170. (Revised version of the introduction to the Russian translation of 2004). “The Representation of Dynasty and the ‘Fundamental Laws’ in the Evolution of Russian Monarchy,” Kritika : Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring 2012): 265-300. Review of A. V. Remnev, Samoderzhavnoe pravitel’stvo: Komitet ministrov v sisteme vysshego upravleniia Rossiiskoi imperii, vtoraia polovina XIX—nachalo XX veka , Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, for Kritika 13: 4 (Fall 2012): 993-1005. “The Russian Empress as Mother,” in The Family in Imperial Russia: New Lines of Historical Research , ed. David L. Ransel, 66-74. Copyright 1978 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illionois. Used with permission of the University of Illinois Press. “The Russian Imperial Family as Symbol,” in Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire , ed. Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel, [Indiana-Michigan series in Russian and East European studies] (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 60-86. “The Invention of Tradition and the Representation of Russian Monarchy,” in Rus’ Writ Large: Languages, Histories, Cultures; Essays presented in honor of Michael S. Flier on his sixty-fi fth birthday , ed. Harvey Goldblatt and Nancy Shields Kollmann (Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Inst., Harvard Univ., 2009), 651-662. PER MISSIONS X Reprinted with permission. © 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. “National Narratives in the Representation of Nineteenth-Century Russian Monarchy,” in Extending the Borders of Russian History: Essays in Honor of Alfred J. Rieber , ed. Marsha Siefert (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2003), 51-64. “Moscow and Petersburg: The Problem of Political Center in Tsarist Russia, 1881- 1914,” in Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics Since the Middle Ages , ed. Sean Wilentz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 244-274. Copyright © 1985 by the University of Pennsylvania Press. All rights reserved. “Nicholas II and the Revolution,” in The Revolution of 1905 and Russia’s Jews , ed. Stefani Hoffman and Ezra Mendelsohn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 31-45. Copyright © 2008 University of Pennsylvania Press. “The Russian Empire and Russian Monarchy: The Problem of Russian Nationa- lism,” Revised original of “Natsionalizm, narodnost’ i rossiiskoe gosudarstvo,” Neprikosnovennyi zapas Vol. 17, No. 3 (2001): 100-105. “The ‘Integrity’ ( tselost’ ) of the State in Imperial Russian Representation,” Ab Imperio: teoriia i istoriia natsional’nostei i natsionalizma v postsovetskom prostranstve 2 (2011): 20-45. “The Tsar and Empire: Representation of the Monarchy and Symbolic Integration in Imperial Russia,” in Comparing Empires: Encounters and Transfer in the Long Nineteenth Century , ed. Jörn Leonhard and Ulrike von Hirschhausen [Schriftenreihe der FRIAS School of History, Band 1] (Oakvill, CT: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 266-86. XI A bbr ev ia t ion s GARF—Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii Scenarios of Power —Richard Wortman, Volume 1, Scenarios of Power: From Peter the Great to the Death of Nicholas I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Volume 2, Scenarios of Power: From Alexander II to the Abdication of Nicholas II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) PSZ— Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii XII XIII I nt r o d uct ion Russian Monarchy and the Symbolic Sphere $ S ince 1967, my scholarly work has been devoted to the institutions and culture of the imperial Russian state. In that year, along with several of my American colleagues, I had the good fortune to conduct my research under the guidance of the eminent Soviet historian, Petr Andreevich Zaionchkovskii. Professor Zaionchkovskii was more than generous in sharing in his learning and assisting us in gaining access to archival sources. 1 Under the ideological and methodological constraints of the Soviet historical profession, he brought about a veritable recrudescence of Russian institutional history. His works on the Great Reforms and later the personnel of the administration, his publication of memoirs of high governmental officials, and his compilation of vital reference works revealed the significance of what he called “the subjective factor” in Russian history, dismissed by the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy that relegated the state to the “superstructure” of historical development. My Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness was one of a number of his students’ works that, following his example, were devoted to the Great Reforms of the first part of the reign of Alexander II. In it, I examined the roots and realization of the Court Reform of 1864, focusing on the education, ideas, and mentality of a group of reformers that emerged during the reign of Nicholas I and emphasized their role in the drafting of a reform that brought a modern liberal judiciary and legal profession to Russia. In the last sections, 1 On the Zaionchkovskii American “school” see O. V. Bol’shakova, “P. A. Zaionch- kovskii i Amerikanskaia russistika, 1960-1980-kh gg,” in Petr Andreevich Zaionchkovskii: Sbornik statei i vospominanii k stoletiiu istorika ed. L.G. Zakharova, S.V. Mironenko, T. Emmons (Moscow: Rosspen, 2008). INTRODUCTION XIV I described the obstacles that arose to the functioning of the new system within the structure of an autocratic state that constrained the development of the independent judiciary over the following half-century. First among these obstacles were the high officials of the state, those close to the tsar and court, determined to prevent further extension of the principle of legality into the space of the tsar’s authority. This was a realm unknown to me, except by what appeared to be their seemingly unreasoned resistance to institutional change. I thus happened on a new object of study, the symbolic sphere of Russian monarchy, comprising image, myth, and symbols, which had left only faint marks in the historical literature. I perceived a sense of this sphere from the numerous memoirs published under aegis of Zaionchkovskii that revealed an official culture where officials felt a sense of belonging to the emotional and mental universe of the imperial family, a universe that encompassed even officials sympathetic to cause of legality in the Russian state. The symbolic sphere was a dominating, one might say hegemonic presence in Russian government until the early twentieth century; its absence from the historical narrative bespoke the prevalence of a teleological faith in its imminent demise among both liberal and revolutionary leaders and historians. I turned for guidance to works of cultural anthropology and literary criticism, particularly those of Clifford Geertz, Marshall Sahlins, and members of the Moscow-Tartu school of semiotics. 2 I began to approach Russian monarchy as an ongoing institution and political culture rather than a succession of individual rulers with idiosyncratic personalities and political views that lacked a sense of the universe they inherited and inhabited. I endeavored to focus on how Russian monarchy functioned, its visual and literary manifestations, and to reveal its presence in Russian life. * * * In the historical literature it is common parlance to conflate the Russian monarchy with the Russian state when referring to imperial Russian government. But in many respects they refer to different entities with different mentalities, goals, and life styles. The relationship between the two was never clearly defined, and the changes and often vexed interaction between the monarchy and the state administration was an ongoing process in the 2 On these influences see my article, “Thought, Culture, and Power: Reflections of a Russianist,” Modern Intellectual History 5, No. 1 (April 2008): 130-35. RUSSI A N MONA RCH Y A ND THE SY MBOLIC SPHER E XV exercise of power in Russia. The monarchy as I conceive it signifies the ruler and those personally close to him—members of the imperial family, of his suite, and those officials in his chancellery and the court whom he invested with special confidence and powers. The state, on the other hand, comprised the administrative-military apparatus and officials who administered the empire and the system of estates that ordered the different groups of the monarchy’s subjects. Peter the Great introduced the concept of the state as an abstract, independent entity with an existence separate from the ruler operating according to regulation, and defined its purview. But at the same time, he identified himself with the imperial state. The sense of Russian autocracy ( samoderzhavie ) as a fusion of absolute monarch and imperial state persisted and received its explicit formulation in the reign of Nicholas I, who was regarded as the “embodiment of Russia.” Reforms during the reign of Alexander I and Nicholas I made court rank dependent on service and brought increasing numbers of high officials into court ceremonies. Officials with court ranks appeared in proximity to members of the imperial family for the major celebrations on the court calendar. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the imperial court had come to represent the epitome of the Russian monarchical state. 3 The Russian emperor identified with the state as its “first servant,” but he and his charismatic inner circle—family, favorites, prominent courtiers—also appeared as above and apart from the state in ceremonies, receptions, and balls and in the representation of the monarch in verse, ceremonial accounts, and visual imagery. The common formula often cited in the nineteenth century was that the emperor was bound by laws until he himself changed them. In fact, the charisma of autocracy emanated in part from the emperor’s superiority to law as well as from his personal sway over servitors who owed him deference. This ambiguity pervaded the tsarist system, which on the one hand relied on elaborate state laws and regulations guiding the administration of state, and on the other required that authority at any level be wielded with a presumption of the personal favor of those above the law that permitted disregard of those constraints. 4 3 Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power, 1; Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, Vol. 1, From Peter the Great to the Death of Nicholas I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 322-32. Henceforth, Scenarios of Power , 1. 4 This ambiguity is the subject of Anatolii Remnev’s Samoderzhavnoe Pravitel’stvo: Komitet Ministrov v sisteme vyschego upravlenia Rossiiskoi imperii (vtoraia polovina XIX—nachalo XX veka) discussed in chapter 3 of this volume. INTRODUCTION XVI In the provinces, the monarch’s ethical supremacy dominated govern- mental and social institutions, the religious services of the various confessions, and eventually the expressions of Russian nationality. As in the center, it operated as a powerful deterrent to alternative forms of representation and activity, ensuring that primary loyalties were owed to the sovereign and his servitors, and precluding dialogue and innovation. The noble estate established by Catherine remained under the domination of the bureaucracy and posed no pluralistic influence to counter the domination of the throne. 5 The sway of the ruler’s person discouraged the development of local institutions and bonds between social groups. Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter has observed, “the ruler’s personal authority (and that of his or her appointed officials) kept the system of governance malleable and dynamic, but once a reigning sovereign, due to individual failings, was no longer free from responsibility, all formally constituted power was threatened.” This left local institutions without official guidance, and “a chronic discrepancy between resources and intentions perpetuated personalized authority, even as explicit rules of administration promoted uniformity and delimited arbitrariness.” As a result “the state’s limited administrative capabilities and atomized institutional structures . . . made it difficult to secure linkages between society and government.” 6 I approach the monarchy as an institution set above the state, dominating and engulfing the organs of the state in the figure of the ruling emperor. Institutional and symbolic change took place within the parameters set by a political culture of personal rule. In the eighteenth century, such a culture was reinforced by an ideology and myth of enlightened absolutism, which 5 Marc Raeff, “Russian Autocracy and Paradoxes of Modernization,” in Marc Raeff, Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 122-23. 6 Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, Social Identity in Imperial Russia (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1997), 6-7. See also, 37-42, 169-73. Victor Zhivov has described the ecclesiastical counterpart to the prevalence of personal, charismatic feeling over institutional requirements in the confessional ministering of the Orthodox Church in medieval Russia. He concludes that his examples “clearly demonstrate that Russians did not rely on institutionalized penitential practices (regular confession, penance, contrition) in their hope for salvation. They rather believed in the mercifulness of God, in the intercession of the saints, in the succor of wonder-working icons, in the beneficial action of sacred wells, holy burial places and the like.” Victor Zhivov, “Institutionalized Soteriology in the Western and Eastern Churches,” in Slavic Ambrosiana , No. 10 (2010): 51-76. RUSSI A N MONA RCH Y A ND THE SY MBOLIC SPHER E XVII made possible the adoption of western ideas, forms of literary and artistic expression, as well as philosophical and scientific inquiry. Once ideas of liberalism and popular sovereignty gained a hold in European monarchies, the ideas and culture of the monarchy sustained an ethos of exclusivism—that Russian monarchy, autocracy, samoderzhavie , was presented as the highest form of western absolutism and therefore immune to political challenge—and later that the monarchy represented a unique institution drawn from native sources that could justify absolute rule over both ethnically Russian provinces and the empire. Within this universe absolute power was the condition of legitimate rule. The prospect of confining the monarch to symbolic preeminence as in English or Japanese monarchy, or sharing responsibilities of rule with a Prime Minister, as in Prussian and Austrian monarchy—prospects contemplated by reformers in the last century of tsarist rule—remained anathema. There could be no Bismarck in the Russian state, directing the course of government in the name of the monarch. Many Russian officials aspired to that role, but it was another fantasy of Russian life leading to inflated hopes and pretentions, as suggested in Prince Vladimir Meshcherskii’s satirical novel, One of our Bismarcks 7 Recent scholarship has documented that the emergence of a nascent civil society came in early twentieth century Russia. 8 However, the elements of a civil society did not necessarily portend the emergence of a pluralistic institutional system. Rather, the nascent civic pluralism only increased the conflict and disconnect between Russia’s social system and institutions of the existing state still dominated by a monarchy not about to bow to concession. As I have argued in the last chapters of Volume Two of Scenarios , the last decades of the monarchy witness a bitter attack on the reformed state not only by insurgent liberals and socialists, but by the monarch himself, which after the downfall of the monarchy left a society in tumult and conflict without the institutions and traditions that could take on the future tasks of governing Russia. 7 Vladimir Meshcherskii, Odin iz nashikh Bismarkov: fantasticheskii roman v trekh chastiakh (St. Petersburg: K. V. M., 1874). 8 Most convincingly in Joseph Bradley, Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia: Science, Patriotism, and Civil Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). For other works on the subject, see Martina Winkler, “Rulers and Ruled, 1700-1910,” Kritika 12, No. 4 (Fall, 2011): 801-05. INTRODUCTION XVIII * * * I characterize the monarchy as an active agent in Russia’s political experience, rather than an institution merely reactive to pressures, economic, political, and military, whose dominant role was resisting change until the inevitable collapse facing all absolute monarchies. The central constitutive element of official representation from the reign of Peter the Great was a myth of conquest. The rule of the monarch found its principal grounds for sovereign power not in divine mandate or dynastic inheritance, though these principles were also invoked, but in his symbolic transcendence, the adoption of the persona of superordinate ruler figure from another realm, a pagan god descendant, a Christ transfigured, whether in ceremony, visual imagery or the printed word. In this framework, the separation between the person of the tsar and the Russian state, Rossiia , did not correspond to western patterns. 9 Peter the Great tried to distinguish the state and its institutions from his personal authority, but failed to do so. 10 Peter’s legitimacy as tsar was based on his performance of heroic acts of state, proving his transcendence by advancing the welfare of the realm. His successors too justified their authority not by inherited rights to the throne but by performance—prodigies, whether real or evoked in representation, effected by the agency of the state for the benefit of the state and nation. The model for representation from the late seventeenth century was the “culture of power” of Baroque Europe, exemplified in the figure of Louis XIV as portrayed in the works of Jürgen Habermas and T. C. W. Blanning. The culture of power was an early stage of public representation addressed to the elite that set its members above and apart from the subjects of the monarch. 11 9 On the separation between the body natural and the body politic of the king, see the classic work, Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 314-450. 10 Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 86. See also, Claudio Sergio Nun Ingerflom, “‘Loyalty to the State’ under Peter the Great? Return to the Sources and the Historicity of Concepts,” in Loyalties and Solidarities in Russian Culture, Society and History , Forthcoming, Oxford University Press. 11 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989); T. C. W. Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe 1660- 1789 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). RUSSI A N MONA RCH Y A ND THE SY MBOLIC SPHER E XIX Festivities, Habermas writes, “served not so much the pleasure of the participants as the demonstration of grandeur, that is the grandeur of the host and guests.” Aristocratic society “served as a vehicle for the representation of the monarch.” 12 Blanning evokes the “representational culture” of seventeenth- century courts comprising the use of art, architecture, music, and elaborate ceremonial as dynamics of power. Thus “the representational display expressed in palaces, academies, opera houses, hunting establishments, and the like was not pure self-indulgence, nor was it deception; it was a constitutive element of power itself.” 13 Representation in the Baroque enhanced and transformed the image of monarch: the very act of artistic rendering elevated him to a different loft y realm of the super-ordinate. It presented him as an “embodiment of a higher power” or “the represented presence of the divine itself.” 14 Michel Foucault focused on a modality of representation that superseded resemblance in seventeenth century Europe. The mirror reflecting the image of Philip IV in Velázquez’s masterpiece, “Las Meninas,” epitomized for him the device of representation, replacing the king himself as the artist’s principal subject. 15 Louis Marin, in Le portrait du roi , identified a “doubling” effect that intensified the presence of the subject of monarch. “The device of representation transforms force into might ( puissance ), force into power ( pouvoir .)” “The king is only truly king, that is the monarch, in images.” 16 For Habermas and his followers, representational culture served as a prelude to the emergence of a public sphere, the participation of bourgeois society in public discourse, which accompanied the differentiation and specialization of state institutions, the appearance of public organizations, and the emergence of pluralistic centers of influence and power. In Russia, monarchical representation as introduced by Peter the Great persisted and remained a principal function of the monarchy. With Peter, the act of borrowing and displaying forms of western imagery became an attribute of power. It produced the “doubling effect” of representation, removing the 12 Habermas, Structural Transformation of Public Sphere , 9-10. 13 Blanning, Culture of Power , 59. 14 Habermas, Structural Transformation of Public Sphere , 7, 252, note 10 where he cites H. G. Gadamer. 15 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 1970), 3-16. 16 Louis Marin, Le portrait du roi (Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1981), 9-13.