SHAKESPEARE AND THE FALL OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC EDINBURGH CRITICAL STUDIES IN SHAKESPEARE AND PHILOSOPHY Series Editor: Kevin Curran Edinburgh Critical Studies in Shakespeare and Philosophy takes seriously the speculative and world-making properties of Shakespeare’s art. Maintaining a broad view of ‘philosophy’ that accommodates first-order questions of metaphysics, ethics, politics and aesthetics, the series also expands our understanding of philosophy to include the unique kinds of theoretical work carried out by performance and poetry itself. These scholarly monographs will reinvigorate Shakespeare studies by opening new interdisciplinary conversations among scholars, artists and students. Editorial Board Members Ewan Fernie, Shakespeare Institute, University of Birmingham James Kearney, University of California, Santa Barbara Julia Reinhard Lupton, University of California, Irvine Madhavi Menon, Ashoka University Simon Palfrey, Oxford University Tiffany Stern, Shakespeare Institute, University of Birmingham Henry Turner, Rutgers University Michael Witmore, The Folger Shakespeare Library Paul Yachnin, McGill University Published Titles Rethinking Shakespeare’s Political Philosophy: From Lear to Leviathan Alex Schulman Shakespeare in Hindsight: Counterfactual Thinking and Shakespearean Tragedy Amir Khan Second Death: Theatricalities of the Soul in Shakespeare’s Drama Donovan Sherman Shakespeare’s Fugitive Politics Thomas P. Anderson Is Shylock Jewish?: Citing Scripture and the Moral Agency of Shakespeare’s Jews Sara Coodin Chaste Value: Economic Crisis, Female Chastity and the Production of Social Difference on Shakespeare’s Stage Katherine Gillen Shakespearean Melancholy: Philosophy, Form and the Transformation of Comedy J. F. Bernard Shakespeare’s Moral Compass Neema Parvini Shakespeare and the Fall of the Roman Republic: Selfhood, Stoicism and Civil War Patrick Gray Forthcoming Titles Making Publics in Shakespeare’s Playhouse Paul Yachnin Derrida Reads Shakespeare Chiara Alfano The Play and the Thing: A Phenomenology of Shakespearean Theatre Matthew Wagner Conceiving Desire: Metaphor, Cognition and Eros in Lyly and Shakespeare Gillian Knoll Shakespeare and the Truth-Teller: Confronting the Cynic Ideal David Hershinow Revenge Tragedy and Classical Philosophy on the Early Modern Stage Christopher Crosbie For further information please visit our website at edinburghuniversitypress.com/series/ecsst SHAKESPEARE AND THE FALL OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC SELFHOOD, STOICISM AND CIVIL WAR Ö Ö Ö PATRICK GRAY Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website: edinburghuniversitypress.com © Patrick Gray, 2019 Edinburgh University Press Ltd The Tun – Holyrood Road, 12 ( 2 f) Jackson’s Entry, Edinburgh EH 8 8 PJ Typeset in 11/13 Adobe Sabon by IDSUK (DataConnection) Ltd, and printed and bound in Great Britain. A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 4744 2745 6 (hardback) ISBN 978 1 4744 2747 0 (webready PDF) ISBN 978 1 4744 2748 7 (epub) The right of Patrick Gray to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 , and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498 ). CONTENTS Acknowledgements vii List of Classical Abbreviations ix Series Editor’s Preface xi Introduction: Shakespeare and the Vulnerable Self 1 Part I: Julius Caesar 1 . ‘A beast without a heart’: Pietas and Pity in Julius Caesar 49 2 . ‘The northern star’: Constancy and Passibility in Julius Caesar 95 Conclusion to Part I: Shakespeare’s Passion Play 145 Part II: Antony and Cleopatra 3 . ‘The high Roman fashion’: Suicide and Stoicism in Antony and Cleopatra 177 4 . ‘A spacious mirror’: Interpellation and the Other in Antony and Cleopatra 220 Conclusion to Part II: The Last Interpellation 259 Conclusion: Between Humanism and Antihumanism 271 Bibliography 279 Index 301 For Elizabeth Liebe heißt überhaupt das Bewußtsein meiner Einheit mit einem anderen, so daß ich für mich nicht isoliert bin, sondern mein Selbstbewußtsein nur als Aufgebung meines Fürsichseins gewinne, und durch das Mich-Wissen als der Einheit meiner mit dem anderen und dem anderen mit mir. G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my doctoral supervisors at Yale, Larry Manley and David Quint, as well as my postgraduate supervisor at Oxford, the late A. D. Nuttall, for their generosity, intellectual rigour and attention to detail. Their editorial feedback was invaluable. I would like to thank my professors at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Jessica Wolfe, Reid Barbour, Tom Stumpf, Bill Race and the late John Headley, for their kindness, erudition and inspir- ing example. I would also like to thank my colleagues past and pres- ent at Providence College, Deep Springs College, the United States Military Academy at West Point, and Durham University for their camaraderie and support. This book is the product of many helpful conversations, some in print and some in person. I am grateful to Gordon Braden, Paul Cantor, Russell Hillier, James Kuzner and Leah Whittington for allowing me to read and respond to early drafts of their work on Shakespeare’s Rome. I would also like to thank Ewan Fernie and Peter Holbrook for their insight and encouragement, as well as John Cox and Will Hamlin for their friendship, guidance and reas- surance. I am especially grateful to Peter for his hospitality during my visit to Brisbane as an Early Career International Research Fel- low at the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions, 1100 – 1800 An earlier version of an excerpt from Chapter 1 was published in Shakespeare Jahrbuch , and an earlier version of the conclusion to Part I in Comparative Drama. An abridged adaptation of part of the conclusion to Part II was published in French as a chapter in Shakespeare au risque de la philosophie , edited by Pascale Drouet and Philippe Grosos. I am grateful to Elizabeth Bradburn and the viii ] Shakespeare and the Fall of the Roman Republic readers at Comparative Drama , as well as Sabine Schülting and the readers at Shakespeare Jahrbuch , for their invaluable feedback on these sections of the book, and to Pascale Drouet for double- checking my French. I would like to thank Michelle Houston, Adela Rauchova and Ersev Ersoy at Edinburgh University Press for their interest in the project, as well as Kevin Curran and the readers for the Press for their enthusiasm and advice. Above all, I would like to thank my wife, Elizabeth Baldwin Gray, my parents, Patrick Hampton Gray and Hazel Hartsoe, my brother Oliver, my sister Hazel, my extended family, and my friends both here in England and overseas. Your love, confidence and good cheer have helped to sustain me. CLASSICAL ABBREVIATIONS Arist. De an. Aristotle, De anima Arist. Eth. Nic. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea Arist. Mag. mor Aristotle, Magna moralia Arist. Pol. Aristotle, Politica August. De civ. D. Augustine, De civitate Dei Cic. Amic. Cicero, De amitica Cic. De or. Cicero, De oratore Cic. Fin. Cicero, De fi nibus Cic. Nat. Deo. Cicero, De natura deorum Cic. Off. Cicero, De offi ciis Cic. Tusc. Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes Diog. Laert. Diogenes Laertius Hom. Il. Homer, Iliad Hor. Epod. Horace, Epodi Hor. Od. Horace, Odes Jer. Adv. Iovinian. Jerome, Adversus Iovinianum Jer. De vir. ill. Jerome, De viris illustribus Lact. Div. Inst. Lactantius, Divinae institutiones Luc. Lucan Ov. Met. Ovid, Metamorphoseon libri Pl. Resp. Plato, Respublica Plin. Ep. Pliny, Epistulae Plut. Brut. Plutarch, Brutus Plut. Caes. Plutarch, Caesar Plut. Cat. Mi. Plutarch, Cato Maior Plut. De Stoic Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis Plut. Numa Plutarch, Numa Plut. Pel. Plut. Pelopidas x ] Shakespeare and the Fall of the Roman Republic Prop. Propertius Quint. Inst. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria Sen. Clem. Seneca, De clementia Sen. Const. Seneca, De constantia sapientis Sen. Dial. Seneca, Dialogi Sen. Ep. Seneca , Epistulae Sen. Her. O. Seneca, Hercules Oetaeus Sen. Prov. Seneca, De providentia Sen. Q. Nat. Seneca, Quaestiones naturales Sen. Tranq. Seneca, De tranquillitate animi Sext. Emp. Math Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos Suet. Iul. Suetonius, Divus Iulius Tert. De anim. Tertullian, De testimonio animae Verg. Aen. Virgil, Aeneid SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE Picture Macbeth alone on stage, staring intently into empty space. ‘Is this a dagger which I see before me?’ he asks, grasping deci- sively at the air. On one hand, this is a quintessentially theatrical question. At once an object and a vector, the dagger describes the possibility of knowledge (‘Is this a dagger’) in specifically visual and spatial terms (‘which I see before me’). At the same time, Macbeth is posing a quintessentially philosophical question, one that assumes knowledge to be both conditional and experiential, and that probes the relationship between certainty and perception as well as intention and action. It is from this shared ground of art and inquiry, of theater and theory, that this series advances its basic premise: Shakespeare is philosophical It seems like a simple enough claim. But what does it mean exactly, beyond the parameters of this specific moment in Macbeth ? Does it mean that Shakespeare had something we could think of as his own philosophy? Does it mean that he was influenced by particular philosophical schools, texts and thinkers? Does it mean, conversely, that modern philosophers have been influenced by him , that Shakespeare’s plays and poems have been, and continue to be, resources for philosophical thought and speculation? The answer is yes all around. These are all useful ways of conceiving a philosophical Shakespeare and all point to lines of inquiry that this series welcomes. But Shakespeare is philo- sophical in a much more fundamental way as well. Shakespeare is philosophical because the plays and poems actively create new worlds of knowledge and new scenes of ethical encounter. They ask big questions, make bold arguments and develop new vocab- ularies in order to think what might otherwise be unthinkable. xii ] Shakespeare and the Fall of the Roman Republic Through both their scenarios and their imagery, the plays and poems engage the qualities of consciousness, the consequences of human action, the phenomenology of motive and attention, the conditions of personhood and the relationship among different orders of reality and experience. This is writing and dramaturgy, moreover, that consistently experiments with a broad range of conceptual crossings, between love and subjectivity, nature and politics, and temporality and form. Edinburgh Critical Studies in Shakespeare and Philosophy takes seriously these speculative and world-making dimensions of Shakespeare’s work. The series proceeds from a core convic- tion that art’s capacity to think – to formulate, not just reflect, ideas – is what makes it urgent and valuable. Art matters because unlike other human activities it establishes its own frame of refer- ence, reminding us that all acts of creation – biological, political, intellectual and amorous – are grounded in imagination. This is a far cry from business-as-usual in Shakespeare studies. Because historicism remains the methodological gold standard of the field, far more energy has been invested in exploring what Shakespeare once meant than in thinking rigorously about what Shakespeare continues to make possible. In response, Edinburgh Critical Stud- ies in Shakespeare and Philosophy pushes back against the critical orthodoxies of historicism and cultural studies to clear a space for scholarship that confronts aspects of literature that can neither be reduced to nor adequately explained by particular historical contexts. Shakespeare’s creations are not just inheritances of a past cul- ture, frozen artifacts whose original settings must be expertly reconstructed in order to be understood. The plays and poems are also living art, vital thought-worlds that struggle, across time, with foundational questions of metaphysics, ethics, politics and aesthet- ics. With this orientation in mind, Edinburgh Critical Studies in Shakespeare and Philosophy offers a series of scholarly monographs that will reinvigorate Shakespeare studies by opening new interdis- ciplinary conversations among scholars, artists and students. Kevin Curran INTRODUCTION: SHAKESPEARE AND THE VULNERABLE SELF It would generally be a decisive refutation of a moral philosophy to show that moral agency on its own account of the matter could never be socially embodied; and it also follows that we have not yet fully understood the claims of any moral philosophy until we have spelled out what its social embodiment would be. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 1 The central claim of this study is that Shakespeare is deeply scepti- cal of neoclassical as well as classical glorification of the kind of personal autonomy Seneca describes as ‘constancy’. Shakespeare sees this pursuit of individual invulnerability, not only as a defin- ing feature of Roman culture, but also as the most fundamental cause of the fall of the Roman Republic. The tragic protagonists of his Roman plays strive to transcend the limits of their own physi- cal bodies, as well as their susceptibility to passions such as pity, grief and fear, and instead come crashing back down to earth. The ‘frailty’ that they hope to escape proves instead an intransigent given of the human condition. Unsuccessful efforts to achieve what Hannah Arendt calls ‘sovereignty’ backfire politically, as well. 2 The untrammelled freedom from dependence on all others that Shakespeare’s Romans idealise leaves no room for power-sharing between political rivals or for compromise across social classes, but instead leads them inexorably towards violence and, finally, civil war. As a thought-experiment, Shakespeare’s Roman plays provide a prescient critique of the vision of the good that animates present-day political liberalism, the ethical ideal Quentin Skinner calls ‘neo-Roman liberty’. 3 2 ] Shakespeare and the Fall of the Roman Republic For Peter Holbrook, ‘Shakespeare’s poetic personality is deeply wedded to one particular value: individual freedom.’ ‘More than any other pre-Romantic writer,’ Holbrook argues, ‘Shakespeare is committed to fundamentally modern values: freedom, individuality, self-realization, authenticity.’ 4 For Ewan Fernie, as well, ‘freedom’ is ‘a supreme Shakespearean value’. ‘But what is freedom,’ he asks, ‘and what does it mean to invoke it as a surpassing value in Shake- speare?’ ‘Shakespearean drama doesn’t give us a smug and senti- mental liberalism.’ Fernie sees an analogy between ‘the politics of Shakespearean form’ and ‘the classic statement of liberalism’, John Stuart Mill’s treatise On Liberty , in which Mill speaks of ‘a nec- essary tension between individual freedom and social flourishing’. ‘The Shakespearean struggle for freedom foretells the great political passion of modernity, amounting to a serial and probing experiment in liberal democracy avant la lettre .’ 5 In his ‘Idea for a Universal History’, Kant introduces the coun- terintuitive claim that ‘the cause of lawful order among men’ is not any kind of fellow-feeling, but instead our ‘antagonism’, arising out of what he calls our ‘unsocial sociability’. ‘Man has an incli- nation to associate with others,’ Kant observes. ‘But he also has a strong propensity to isolate himself from others, because he finds in himself at the same time the unsocial characteristic of wishing to have everything go according to his own wish.’ Each of us is ‘pro- pelled by vainglory, lust for power, and avarice’ to achieve ‘a rank among his fellows whom he cannot tolerate but from whom he cannot withdraw’. Such dissatisfaction might seem like a species of damnation. Yet, as Kant sees it, this incessant ‘opposition’ is salu- tary. ‘Thanks be to Nature’, he proclaims, ‘for heartless competi- tive vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess and to rule!’ ‘Thus are taken the first true steps from barbarism to culture.’ If human beings were not so competitive, Kant maintains, ‘all talents would remain hidden, unborn in an Arcadian shepherd’s life, with all its concord, contentment, and mutual affection’. 6 Shakespeare’s Roman plays very precisely contradict Kant’s just- so story here of the development of civilization. As Fernie observes, ‘Shakespeare is aware of how readily freedom degenerates into a violent free-for-all: a “universal wolf” that will devour everything, including itself.’ 7 In his Roman plays, Shakespeare asks what kind of moral character is necessary in order for a republic or, as Fernie says, ‘liberal democracy’ to function. And Shakespeare’s answer Introduction: Shakespeare and the Vulnerable Self [ 3 is that the Christian virtue of what he calls ‘pity’ is what binds civil society together, rather than the pagan virtue of what he calls ‘ambition’. To explain Shakespeare’s sense of what goes wrong in Rome, I draw here on St Augustine’s concept of libido dominandi , a precursor of the ‘insatiable desire to possess and to rule’ that Kant defends as ‘unsocial sociability’ and that Nietzsche later heralds as ‘the will to power’. In Shakespeare’s Roman plays, as in St Augus- tine’s City of God , this ‘drive for dominance’ proves what A. C. Bradley might identify as the ‘tragic trait’ of pagan Rome. Figures such as Caesar and Octavian refuse to rest content with anything less than total dominion, even at the cost of provoking civil war. Fernie sees Shakespeare’s plays as staging a struggle to align ‘personal freedom’ with ‘social flourishing’. ‘No-one is simply free, no-one simply his or her own.’ Instead, ‘there are tensions between subjective, familial, national, and larger political identi- fications as alternative spheres of freedom, and these are tensions which sometimes tear apart the lives of individuals, families, and nations.’ How can such disparate interests be reconciled? For a philosophical analogue of this arbitration, Fernie turns to Hegel. Like Shakespeare, Hegel’s ‘aim’, Fernie argues, is ‘to marry per- sonal freedom at its most realized and powerful with a more com- prehensive and shareable politics of freedom’. The competition for dominance that Kant sees as the engine of civilisation is for Hegel a form of false consciousness, the so-called ‘master–slave dialec- tic’, leading to inequality through competitive coercion. ‘Hegel’s highest evocation of the life of freedom’ is instead, as Fernie says, ‘mutual recognition’, enabling ‘reciprocal fl ourishing’. 8 ‘It is only with the release and liberation of the slave’, Hegel writes, ‘that the master also becomes fully free.’ ‘In this condition of universal freedom, in being reflected into myself, I am immediately reflected in the other person, and conversely, in relating myself to the other I am immediately related to myself.’ 9 As Francis Fukuyama helped to clarify in his account of ‘the end of history’, in the wake of the revolutions of 1989 , as well as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, communism in effect passed away as what William James would call a ‘live option’. 10 What we see now in its place, Patchen Markell suggests, is increasing interest among social and political theorists in Hegel’s concept of ‘recognition’ ( Anerkennung ): ‘a general shift away from a “politics of redistribution,” focused on the satisfaction of interests and the 4 ] Shakespeare and the Fall of the Roman Republic distribution of material goods, and toward a “politics of recogni- tion,” focused on securing equal respect and esteem for the diverse identities borne by members of pluralistic societies.’ 11 One of the first to articulate this change in perspective was Charles Taylor. In an essay, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, which Markell singles out as ‘catalytic’, Taylor describes reciprocal recognition as a ‘vital human need’. ‘A person or group of people can suffer real damage, real dis- tortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.’ 12 As Fukuyama observes, ‘modern identity politics’ now ‘revolves around demands for recognition of group identities’. 13 Is this change necessarily for the better? Peter Holbrook finds it unsettling to see ‘group rights trumping the individual ones clas- sical liberals defended’. ‘We are enjoined to become ever more guarded and careful about language, images, practices that might offend groups , a recent landmark example being the controversy over the Danish Mohammed cartoons, in which the reluctance of many to defend free speech showed how far the West had retreated from liberal values.’ 14 In his critique of ‘the politics of recognition’, Markell argues that the ‘pursuit of recognition’ characteristic of identity politics ‘comes to be bound up with a certain sort of mis- recognition ’, ‘not the misrecognition of identity ’, but ‘an even more fundamental ontological misrecognition, a failure to acknowledge the nature and circumstances of our own activity’. As an illustra- tion of this problem, Markell turns to Sophocles’ Antigone , and what he describes as ‘tragedy’s critique of the pursuit of sover- eignty through recognition’. For Markell, Greek tragedy does not represent ‘the tension between oneself as an individual and oneself as belonging to a larger community’, but instead a more complex, ‘cross-cutting’ tension between ‘the acknowledgment of the open- ness and contingency of human interaction on the one hand, and the denial of that openness and contingency on the other hand through the pursuit of recognition – either of oneself qua indi- vidual or of oneself qua community member, or both’. 15 To help explain the danger he sees latent in ‘the pursuit of recog- nition’, Markell distinguishes between ‘recognition’, as Taylor and others use the term, and what Stanley Cavell describes in contrast as ‘acknowledgment’. ‘The source of relations of subordination lies not in the failure to recognize the identity of the other, but in the failure to acknowledge one’s own basic situation and circumstances.’ That Introduction: Shakespeare and the Vulnerable Self [ 5 is to say, the primary problem with identity politics as it is usually pursued is not so much political resistance as it is the kind of iden- tity that it presumes to exist and that it asks its adherents to demand each other recognise. It continues to invoke the ‘sovereign self’ that it ostensibly aims to displace. ‘What’s acknowledged in an act of acknowledgment is not one’s own identity – at least, not as the poli- tics of recognition conceives of identity: a coherent self-description that can serve as the ground of agency, guiding or determining what we are to do.’ Instead, ‘acknowledgment is directed at the basic con- ditions of one’s own existence and activity, including, crucially, the limits of “identity” as a ground of action, limits which arise out of our constitutive vulnerability to the unpredictable reactions and responses of others.’ Acknowledgment is, in brief, ‘an avowal of one’s own finitude’. 16 For Markell, ‘the fact of human freedom, which is the condition of possibility of effective agency, also limits our practical capabili- ties because it is not exclusively ours but is mirrored in others’. 17 Shakespeare’s Romans are unwilling to acknowledge their partici- pation in what Hannah Arendt calls ‘plurality’, however, because they are too desperate to be recognised as conforming to an ideal of absolute, unattainable individual ‘freedom’: what Arendt calls ‘sovereignty’. As Arendt observes, ‘sovereignty, the ideal of uncom- promising self-sufficiency and mastership, is contradictory to the very condition of plurality. No man can be sovereign because not one man, but men, inhabit the earth.’ ‘Untouchable integrity’ could only be achieved, if it were possible, through ‘arbitrary domination of all others’ or ‘as in Stoicism, the exchange of the real world for an imaginary one where these others would simply not exist’. 18 In Julius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra , Shakespeare shows how Romans’ characteristic drive for dominance can turn inwards, especially in defeat. Examples include Brutus’ retreat into philoso- phy, modelled on contemporary Neostoicism, as well as Antony’s escape to the more sensuous pleasures of Egypt. Antony’s with- drawal into a world of wine, women and ‘fancy’ evokes a fading, medieval ethos of aristocratic licence, as well as the contemporary world of the theatre. The most iconic instance of such involution, however, is the practice Cleopatra calls ‘the high Roman fashion’: suicide. Shakespeare’s Romans’ futile efforts to be recognised as absolute masters of themselves prove equally self-destructive throughout, whether in the public or in the private sphere. In their 6 ] Shakespeare and the Fall of the Roman Republic unwillingness to acknowledge the profound vulnerability of the human condition, including especially what Arendt terms ‘plural- ity’, Shakespeare’s Romans prefigure what Hegel calls the ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ of the modern individual, and which he associates with ‘the Roman Empire, the seat of Stoic strength of mind’, in which ‘a man lives unto himself alone’. 19 The would-be solipsist is ‘unhappy’, Hegel explains, because he finds himself torn between a ‘Stoic’ sense of himself and himself alone as the source of mean- ing and experience and a refractory ‘Sceptical’ countercurrent of awareness that he remains subject, somehow, nonetheless, to forces and powers beyond his control. The new individualism that emerged over the course of the Reformation, as well as the Renaissance, as Jacob Burckhardt sug- gests, and that came to the fore in the Enlightenment, epitomised by Kant, is deeply indebted to early modern Neostoicism such as that of Justus Lipsius, which itself is modelled on the thought of Seneca. 20 What Lipsius calls ‘constancy’, echoing Seneca, Kant appropriates, refines and exalts as ‘autonomy’. Selfhood is identified with an immaterial faculty of the mind, independent of the body, the emo- tions or society at large. Its glory is precisely its ‘freedom’, under- stood as what Fernie calls ‘self-sovereignty, self-possession’. 21 With Romanticism, this dissociation of the self from the world became even more pronounced. As Holbrook notes, ‘The drive toward authenticity is not only a nineteenth-century or post-Romantic phe- nomenon. It has a classical and Renaissance dimension.’ 22 Senecan Stoicism in particular, as Geoffrey Miles explains, carries with it an ‘ ‘‘antinomian” implication that self-consistency is all that matters, and that each individual can define virtue itself’. 23 What was once understood as an objective moral order began to be seen instead as a subjective work of art, an opportunity for the expression of each individual will. Classicist Christopher Gill describes the difference between classical and modern subjectivity in terms of a contrast between ‘objective-participant’ and ‘subjective-individualist’ concepts of personhood. 24 Charles Taylor calls the transition from one to the other the ‘expressivist turn’ and traces it back to the influence of Romanticism, a paradigm shift in the history of ethics which he sees as ‘tremendously influential’. Shakespeare foreshadows this pervasive change in his Roman plays and calls it into question, anticipating later criticism of political liberalism. Shakespeare Introduction: Shakespeare and the Vulnerable Self [ 7 enjoys a critical distance from this now-typical perspective which we today can find it difficult to recapture. ‘Expressive individu- ation has become one of the cornerstones of modern culture,’ Taylor notes, ‘so much so that we barely notice it, and we find it hard to accept that it is such a recent idea in human history and would have been incomprehensible in earlier times.’ 25 As David Bentley Hart observes, ‘We live in an age whose chief moral value has been determined, by overwhelming consensus, to be the absolute liberty of personal volition, the power of each of us to choose what he or she believes, wants, needs, or must possess.’ The result is an unparalleled sense of licence, at once enticing and vertiginous. ‘Each of us who is true to the times stands facing not God, or the gods, or the Good beyond beings, but an abyss, over which presides the empty, inviolable author- ity of the individual will, whose impulses and decisions are their own moral index.’ 26 In his Roman plays, Shakespeare represents this deracinated concept of selfhood as a dangerous mistake. As Stephen Greenblatt suggests, Shakespeare was ‘fascinated by the idea of autonomy’. Nonetheless, he concludes, ‘Shakespeare doubted that it was pos- sible for even the most fiercely determined human being to live as if he were the author of himself.’ ‘Autonomy in the strict sense is not a state available for any sentient creature.’ Even the sup- posed ‘aesthetic autonomy’ of a work of art, such as Cleopatra aims for in her suicide, turns out to be compromised. 27 In this sense, Shakespeare more closely resembles critics of Romanti- cism and modernity such as T. S. Eliot, Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor than he does the German and British Romantics who cemented his fame and who strive to claim him as one of their own. 28 Shakespeare does indeed capture the beginning of the cultural turn Isaiah Berlin describes as ‘the apotheosis of the Romantic will’. 29 But he portrays this embrace of solipsism as tragically misguided, rather than as moral progress. 30 The self- absorbed, quintessentially modern form of self-consciousness Charles Taylor calls ‘radical reflexivity’ and that Eric Langley finds adumbrated in Shakespeare’s representation of narcissism and suicide may be dazzling on stage, in the person of characters such as Richard II and Falstaff, as well as Cleopatra, but it is not in the end, all things considered, a perspective on life Shakespeare himself idealises or sees as advisable. 31