IJDATICS_V12_N2.pdf

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DESIGN, ANALYSIS AND TOOLS FOR INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS The International Journal of Design, Analysis and Tools for Integrated Circuits and Systems (IJDATICS) was created by a netwo rk of researchers and engineers both from academia and industry. IJDATICS is an international journal intended for professionals and researchers in all fields of desig n, analysis and tools for integrated circuits and systems. The objective of the IJDATICS is to serve a better understanding between the community of researchers and practitioners both from academia and industry. Vijayakumar Nanjappan Jie Zhang University College Cork, Ireland Xi'an Jiaotong - Liverpool University Hui - Huang Hsu Tamkang University, Taiwan Editor - In - Chief Ka Lok Man Xi'an Jiaotong - Liverpool University, China Associate Editor s Danny Hughes Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium M L Dennis Wong Heriot - Watt University, Scotland Editorial Board Yuxuan Zhao Kamran Siddique Xi'an Jiaotong - Liverpool University, China University of Alaska Anchorage Tomas Krilavičius Young B. Park Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania Dankook University, Kore a Vladimir Hahanov Salah Merniz Kharkov National University of Radio Electronics, Ukraine Paolo Prinetto Politecnico di Torino, Italy Massimo Poncino Politecnico di Torino, Italy Alberto Macii Politecnico di Torino, Italy Joongho Choi University of Seoul, South Korea Wei Li Fudan University, China Michel Schellekens University College Cork, Ireland Emanuel Popovici University College Cork, Ireland Jong - Kug Seon LS Industrial Systems R&D Center, South Korea Umberto Rossi STMicroelectronics, Italy Franco Fummi University of Verona, Italy Graziano Pravadelli University of Verona, Italy Vladimir PavLov Intl. Software and Productivity Engineering Institute, USA Ajay Patel Intelligent Support Ltd, United Kingdom Thierry Vallee Georgia Southern University, USA Menouer Boubekeur University College Cork, Ireland Monica Donno Minteos, Italy Jun - Dong Cho Sung Kyun Kwan University, South Korea AHM Zahirul Alam International Islamic University Malaysia, Malaysia Gregory Provan University College Cork, Ireland Miroslav N. Velev Aries Design Automation, USA M. Nasir Uddin Lakehead University, Canada Dragan Bosnacki Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands Dave Hickey University College Cork, Ireland Maria OKeeffe University College Cork, Ireland Milan Pastrnak Siemens IT Solutions and Services, Slovakia John Herbert University College Cork, Ireland Zhe - Ming Lu Sun Yat - Sen University, China Jeng - Shyang Pan National Kaohsiung University of Applied Sciences, Taiwan Chin - Chen Chang Feng Chia University, Taiwan Mong - Fong Horng Shu - Te University, Taiwan Liang Chen University of Northern British Columbia, Canada Chee - Peng Lim University of Science Malaysia, Malaysia Ngo Quoc Tao Vietnamese Academy of Science and Technology, Vietnam Mentouri University, Algeria Oscar Valero University of Balearic Islands, Spain Yang Yi Sun Yat - Sen University, China Damien Woods University of Seville, Spain Franck Vedrine CEA LIST, France Bruno Monsuez ENSTA, France Kang Yen Florida International University, USA Takenobu Matsuura Tokai University, Japan R. Timothy Edwards MultiGiG, Inc., USA Olga Tveretina Karlsruhe University, Germany Maria Helena Fino Universidade Nova De Lisboa, Portugal Adrian Patrick ORiordan University College Cork, Ireland Grzegorz Labiak University of Zielona Gora, Poland Jian Chang Texas Instruments Inc, USA Yeh - Ching Chung National Tsing - Hua University, Taiwan Anna Derezinska Warsaw University of Technology, Poland Kyoung - Rok Cho Chungbuk National University, South Korea Yong Zhang Shenzhen University, China R. Liutkevicius Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania Yuanyuan Zeng University College Cork, Ireland D.P. Vasudevan University College Cork, Ireland Arkadiusz Bukowiec University of Zielona Gora, Poland Maziar Goudarzi University College Cork, Ireland Jin Song Dong National University of Singapore, Singapore Dhamin Al - Khalili Royal Military College of Canada, Canada Zainalabedin Navabi University of Tehran, Iran Lyudmila Zinchenko Bauman Moscow State Technical University, Russia Muhammad Almas Anjum National University of Sciences and Technology, Pakistan Deepak Laxmi Narasimha University of Malaya, Malaysia Danny Hughes Xi'an Jiaotong - Liverpool University, China Jun Wang Fujitsu Laboratories of America, Inc., USA A.P. Sathish Kumar PSG Institute of Advanced Studies, India N. Jaisankar VIT University. India Atif Mansoor National University of Sciences and Technology, Pakistan Steven Hollands Synopsys, Ireland Felipe Klein State University of Campinas, Brazil Enggee Lim Xi'an Jiaotong - Liverpool University, China Kevin Lee Murdoch University, Australia Prabhat Mahanti University of New Brunswick, Saint John, Canada Tammam Tillo Xi'an Jiaotong - Liverpool University, China Yanyan Wu Xi'an Jiaotong - Liverpool University, China Wen Chang Huang Kun Shan University, Taiwan Masahiro Sasaki The University of Tokyo, Japan Vineet Sahula Malaviya National Institute of Technology, India D. Boolchandani Malaviya National Institute of Technology, India Zhao Wang Xi'an Jiaotong - Liverpool University, China Shishir K. Shandilya NRI Institute of Information Science & Technology, India J.P.M. Voeten Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands Wichian Sittiprapaporn Mahasarakham University, Thailand Aseem Gupta Freescale Semiconductor Inc., USA Kevin Marquet Verimag Laboratory, France Matthieu Moy Verimag Laboratory, France Ramy Iskander LIP6 Laboratory, France Suryaprasad Jayadevappa PES School of Engineering, India S. Hariharan B. S. Abdur Rahman University, India Chung - Ho Chen National Cheng - Kung University, Taiwan Kyung Ki Kim Daegu University, South Korea Shiho Kim Chungbuk National University, South Korea Hi Seok Kim Cheongju University, South Korea Siamak Mohammadi University of Tehran, Iran Brian Logan University of Nottingham, UK Ben Kwang - Mong Sim Gwangju Institute of Science & Technology, South Korea Asoke Nath St. Xavier's College, India Tharwon Arunuphaptrairong Chulalongkorn University, Thailand Shin - Ya Takahasi Fukuoka University, Japan Cheng C. Liu University of Wisconsin at Stout, USA Farhan Siddiqui Walden University, Minneapolis, USA Yui Fai Lam Hong Kong University of Science & Technology, Hong Kong Jinfeng Huang Philips & LiteOn Digital Solutions, The Netherlands Assistant Editor - In - Chief Shuaibu Musa Adam Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium Publisher Cooperation Name : Solari Co., Hong Kong Address : Unit 1 - 5, 20/F, Midas Plaza, 1 Tai Yau Street, San Po Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong Phone : (852) 3966 - 2536 ISSN: 2071 - 2987 (online version), 2223 - 523X (print version) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DESIGN, ANALYSIS AND TOOLS FOR INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS https://www.cicet.org/ijdatics / i Preface Welcome to the Volum e 1 2 Number 2 of the International Journal of Design, Analysis and Tools for Integrated Circuits and Systems (IJDATICS). This issue p resents six high quality academic papers , providing a well - rounded snapshot of current research in the field of Computing in AI, Internet of Things (IoT), Integrated Circuits and Systems and Computer Engineering Technology There are two key themes evident in these paper s: • Application Design Support: Three papers investigate how artificial intelligence can be used to engineer more efficient and flexible networked embedded systems. • Efficient Hardware Design for IoT : Three papers tackle how machine learning can enable more efficient hardware design for Internet of Things applications We would also like to thank the IJDATICS editorial team, which is led by: Editor - I n - Chief Ka Lok Man Xi’an Jiaotong Liverpool University, China Vijayakumar Nanjappan University College Cork, Ireland Guest Editors Kamran Siddique University of Alaska Anchorage Jie Zhang Xi’an Jiaotong Liverpool University, China Yuxuan Zhao Xi'an Jiaotong - Liverpool University, China Assistant Editor - In - Chief Shuaibu Musa Adam Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium ii Table of Contents Vol. 1 2 , No. 2 , December 20 2 3 Preface ................................................................................................. i Table of Contents ................................................................................... ii 1. Shu Jui Chang, Tim Watson, Iain Phillips and Andrew Peck, Is your AI in cyber research still capable of leaping forwards: The US and China military’s approach to AI in Cyber conflict, Loughborough University, UK 1 2. Usman Ibrahim Musa, Aminu Ibrahim Musa, Shuaibu Musa Adam Sakshi Dua and Apash Roy, Facial Emotion Recognition for Enhanced , Lovely Professional University, India 7 3. Xuan Li, Qiaoyun Zhang and Chih - Yung Chang, Network Traffic Prediction Using Temporal Correlation - Based LSTM Models , Tamkang University, Taiwan 1 5 4. Christopher Chuang, Qiaoyun Zhang and Chih - Yung Chang, Automatic Sports Event Highlight Video Clipping with Transformer - Based Video Question Answering (VQA ), Tamkang University, Taiwan 1 7 5. Tzren - Ru Chou and Pin - Yin Chen, Emotional Text Classification of Color Imagery Using Pretrained Model , National Taiwan Normal University, Taiwan 1 9 6. Queen Emmanuella Mensah, Usman Ibrahim Musa, Yusupha Sinjanka and Kawaljeet Kaur, ML - Based Network Efficiency Prediction in IIoT , Lovely Professional University, India 24 7. Shijie Liu, Wenchong Wu and Yungang Zhang , Leveraging Diverse Vectors in ViT for Image Super Resolution , Yunnan Normal University , China 30 8. Guannan Lv, Wenchong Wu and Yungang Zhang , JAQE: Joint — Alternating Query Extension for Image Retrieval , Yunnan Normal University, China 3 7 Is your AI in cyber research still capable of leaping forwards: The US and China military’s approach to AI in Cyber conflict Shu-Jui Chang, Tim Watson and Iain Phillips Abstract — This paper analyses military-grade AI initiatives by the United States (US) and China in the cyber domain. It sheds light on these nations’ strategic priorities and implications for the ever-changing landscape of AI-driven cybersecurity. Since 1949, with evolving dynamics among China, the US, and Taiwan, marked by the unresolved civil war and the inception of the Taiwan Relations Act, China has emerged as a potential rival and the US as a possible ally. Understanding the disparity in their AI interests is now vital for Taiwan. Do so to avoid a lag in the swiftly advancing realm of AI-driven cybersecurity. Recognising this urgency, Taiwan should contemplate strategic adjustments to bridge the gap between China and the US in this domain. Our analysis reveals that the US and China prioritise addressing supply chain vulnerabilities but differ in their secondary priorities for various reasons. For the US, the secondary focus lies in enhancing defence capabilities, whereas China emphasises augmenting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). These commonalities and differences in direction are discussed in the context of the two nations’ respective national strategies and current situations. Thus, this paper contributes to Taiwan’s proactive consideration of information to help shape its cybersecurity strategy and ensure Taiwan remains competitive in an increasingly AI-centric world. Index Terms — AI, Cyber, military I. I NTRODUCTION Alongside and preceding all significant conflicts, various competitions exist that are not on the battlefield. These often influence the outcome as they play out in approaches to espionage, military-industrial development, and procurement. In the past, these sidebars to war have included the development of better aircraft, improved personal weapons systems, and enhanced missiles and payloads. The following “Great Games” of competing industrial and espionage prowess will likely be played out in developing and acquiring cyber warfare capabilities. The 2023 Global Risks Report from the World Economic Forum [1] underscores “cybercrime and cyber insecurity” as prominent global risks, both in the short and long term. In addition to environmental and societal challenges, such as natural disasters, climate change, and cost-of-living crises, geoeconomics confrontations claim the third position in the rankings. Taiwan, situated at a critical node, faces significant risk exposure in both domains. Moreover, “i n the context of cybersecurity, AI may be seen as an emerging approach, and accordingly, AI techniques have Shu-Jui Chang is a PhD student at Loughborough University, Tim Watson and Iain Phillips are professors at Loughborough University. been used to support and automate relevant operations,” as quoted from ENISA AI cybersecurity challenges report [2]. Furthermore, ’The weaponisation of AI in the military domain is moving apace as states harness it for an advantage over adversaries’ [3]. The implications of cyber, AI, and the military are generally believed to be complicated without evidence. According to a 2020 study by RAND, AI can realise many applications in the military, such as increased speed of decision-making, improved targeting and vision, enhanced cyber defence, and improved ISR [4]. History is a mirror; Russia already uses AI technologies to support its hybrid, grey zone, and information warfare operations abroad [4]. Although it is impossible to predict how soon military AI will be so capable that it changes the character of war in the Taiwan Strait, significant advances are suggested to occur in the next 10 to 15 years [4]. Drawing from the implications mentioned earlier, this paper will focus on AI in the cyber domain in the military-grade research trend of Taiwan’s potential adversary and partner. To examine the gaps within this domain and how it can be improved from the perspective of Taiwan. II. M ETHODOLOGY Before the analysis process, there are two primary steps involved. The first step is data acquisition, and the second is function schema identification. The subsequent paragraphs will explore the requirements for assembling the research program’s data set and defining the function for the category’s purpose. A. Data set 1) The US: To comprehensively investigate the US Department of Defence’s (DoD) investments in the development of AI and its application in the domain of cybersecurity, this study relies on the extensive resources provided by the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a prominent research partner closely aligned with the strategic goals of the US DoD. DARPA offers a comprehensive programme portfolio accessible through their online platform [5]. This portfolio encompasses a wide range of research topics that can be explored using its search index. As this study focuses on AI development and cyber, the keywords of AI and cyber are searched. 1 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DESIGN, ANALYSIS AND TOOLS FOR INERGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 12, NO. 2, DECEMBER 2023 More than just the information provided by the DARPA is required as it only describes the programme without other details. Therefore, the System for Award Management (SAM.gov), an official website of the US government [6] is referenced to the additional information like programme phase, schedule, and deliverables. 2) China: In 2021, a comprehensive research initiative was undertaken by CSET to delve into the Chinese military’s integration of AI [7]. This investigation involved a meticulous analysis of Change to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) AI - related contracts in 2020. While these contracts are invaluable reference materials for this study, their utility is contingent upon two critical considerations. Firstly, these contracts transcended the realm of cyberspace, extending their reach into diverse domains, including electronic warfare, rocket systems, and beyond. Secondly, the overarching purpose of our study is to facilitate ongoing and future planning programmes. Consequently, CSET’s research [7] is no longer relevant or suitable for application, rendering these materials useless. Nonetheless, it is essential to emphasise that looking at the reference citations in the CEST [7], a PLA procurement bulletin enables a nuanced understanding of the PLA requirements and strategic intentions [8]. In July 2023, the team reviewed the PLA procurement bulletin board, successfully extracting the requisite data. However, two months later, when the team revisited the site, we needed help accessing it. Fortunately, despite this setback, archival material is available through the Wayback Machine [9], a U.S.-based digital library of internet sites, keeping some invaluable resources for further use. In contrast to the user-friendly DARPA website, navigating the search engines on the PLA procurement bulletin board proved more complex. There were no predefined categories for filtering, making a basic understanding of the Chinese language essential. When translating “artificial intelligence” into Chinese, various terms like 动 (auto), 动化 (automation), 治 (autonomous), 人工智能 (artificial intelligence), 智能 (intelligent), and 无人 (unmanned) can all be relevant. Similarly, when dealing with “cyber” concepts, multiple Chinese terms such as 病毒 (malware), 威胁 (threats), 网络 (Internet), 软件 (software), 信息 (information, message), 云 (cloud), 开源软件 (open-source), and 漏洞资源 (vulnerability database) can be considered. Besides, more than merely extracting keywords is required. For instance, this study focuses on AI in cyberspace, where (unmanned) is a characteristic of AI systems. However , (unmanned aerial vehicle) is not within our scope, which is just a one- word difference between ” 无人 ” (un - manned) and ” 无人机 ” (unmanned aerial vehicle) in Chinese characters, leading to different meanings. Furthermore, the PLA procurement bulletin board may feature project titles with minor differences in purpose but essentially refer to the same thing. For example, “ 典型装备对抗仿真模型开发及仿真实验技术服务中标 ” (Awarded Contract for the Development of Simulation Models for Adversarial Scenarios of Typical Equipment and Simulation Experiment Technical Services) and “ 典型装备对抗仿真模型开发及仿真实验技术服务竞争性谈判 ” (Negotiation for the Development of Simulation Models for Adversarial Scenarios of Typical Equipment and Simulation Experiment Technical Services) convey similar meanings, with the former indicating the project has been awarded and the latter signifying negotiation. Similarly, “ 威胁建模与仿真系统软件采购（三次） ” (Procurement of Threat Modeling and Simulation System Software (The third time)) and “ 威胁建模与仿真系统软件采购（二次） ” (Procurement of Threat Modeling and Simulation System Software (The second time)) essentially denote the same thing but differ only in the number of auctions conducted. Additionally, some posts may relate to price inquiries rather than actual needs, as seen in “ 某周界入侵动侦测软件购置询价结果 ” (Inquiry Results for the Purchase of Automatic Intrusion Detection Software for a Certain Perimeter). Lastly, specific entries may involve hard- ware purchases rather than research programmes, exemplified by “ 某学院智能一体化存储服务器采购 ” (Purchase of Intelligent Integrated Storage Servers for a Certain College). B. Function defined This study examined the cyber force structure in the US and China, i.e. the US Cyber Mission Force [10] and PLA’s Strategic Support Force. Both forces are responsible for cyberspace operations, supported by offence , defence , and ISR operations. Next, decision-making and training are identified for several reasons. Cyber operations involve complex technical and strategic considerations. Decision-making plays a vital role in determining the appropriate response to cyber threats. On top of that, because the cyber threat landscape is constantly evolving, training programmes and exercises must keep pace. It is indispensable to stay updated on the latest threats, understand their potential impact, and make informed choices to mitigate them. At the same time, training is crucial for keeping cybersecurity professionals updated on the latest threats and techniques. Besides skills training, realistic exercises and simulations are vital for preparing individuals for the dynamic and often dangerous challenges of the real world by developing and refining the necessary expertise to make informed decisions regarding incident responses and recovery. Lastly, it is crucial to possess the training and expertise needed to handle these actions and make informed decisions regarding incident response and recovery. The supply chain issue is inherently tied to the nature of cyberspace, serving as the foundational element for the functions above. Supply chain is a broad and conceptual term. The cyber-world can refer to making software from a binary to a product, the system composed of the hardware to the software, or even the information flow from ISR to better use of offence and defence capabilities building. Judging from the national strategy, the supply chain issue in the US is mainly concerned with its critical infrastructure, while in China, it is more prone to the chain regarding information. The supply chain topic has attracted significant attention in the 2 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DESIGN, ANALYSIS AND TOOLS FOR INERGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 12, NO. 2, DECEMBER 2023 US, China, and worldwide due to its crucial role and wide- ranging implications, from hardware to software and even the software itself. In a nutshell, the research will examine six elements of cyber security. Those elements include the mission tasks: offence, defence, and information network operations, as well as the processes of decision-making and training, all of which are supported and sustained by the cyber environment’s supply chain. III. R ESULTS A. US Through the data extraction process mentioned above, a comprehensive review of DARPA’s programme portfolio revealed eight ongoing programmes. Those programmes were initiated within the past five years. Three archived programmes from the pre-2020 period are also available. Although those archived programmes might provide more complete details and results, reviewing them in this study is inappropriate. This paper focuses on the current trends and future development. This provides an updated overview of eight AI research programmes within the DoD, each with distinct objectives and functions. The analysis of the US DoD’s AI studies programmes reveals a well-balanced and comprehensive approach to AI development in the cyber domain. These findings highlight the multifaceted nature of AI applications in enhancing national security in the cyber domain. Key takeaways from the analysis include: 1) Weighted Functions: 1) Supply Chain: Four interconnected projects collectively address the multifaceted landscape of supply chain se- curity. They encompass the spectrum from initial devel- opment to open-source integrity and the enhancement of self-developed products. 2) Defence: Three projects aim to apply AI techniques to bolster cyber defence capabilities, using developing an AI toolkit designed to train defensive agents in sim- ulated networks, identifying vulnerabilities augmenting overall defence capabilities, and improving safety during software development. Although working on the defence purpose, the nuanced differences are CASTLE prioritises enhancing personnel defence skills, HARDEN focuses on fortifying software development procedures, and GARD emphasises the security of the software products. This diversity encompasses the entire software security spectrum, ranging from pre-development considerations through the development process to the final product’s functionality. 2) Other Functions: Apart from functions identified above as defence and supply chain, other programmes support decision-making processes, training purposes, countering mis- information and manipulating social influence online for real- world scenarios. B. China A comprehensive analysis reveals thirteen programmes on this topic, each representing various facets of technological advancement and innovation. While the PLA procurement bulletin board does not specify the contract terms of these programmes, it is assumed that they all pertain to the year 2023. This study categorises each programme function based on the requirement titles without further details. After group- ing, these selected programmes can be identified. 1) Weighted Functions: 1) Supply Chain Security: Five distinct programmes rep- resent the function of the supply chain. Each serves a unique purpose, contributing to a different aspect of the supply chain. These purposes carry out the three stages: 1. comprehensive supply chain management, 2. software and hardware integration, and 3. protocol-level assessment to application-level functionalities. 2) ISR: Two programmes are oriented towards ISR, specif- ically security and risk assessment. These work on the AI application of text-based and voice-based content translation and analysis. By harnessing AI capabilities for interpreting and evaluating text and voice content, these programmes aim to equip organisations with ad- vanced tools to understand better and respond to emerg- ing threats from text-based social media channels and streaming-based information-sharing platforms. 2) Other Functions: In contrast to separate offensive and defensive programmes, 多智能体协同 Qu 防算法研究采购 (Research on Multi-Agent Collaborative Attack and defence Algorithms Procurement) focuses on collaboration algorithm without explicit operational details. 网络安全维修虚拟仿真培训系统 (Virtual Simulation Training System for Network Security Maintenance) is a simulation system to train people to do cyber maintenance. IV. D ISCUSSION Given the unequal number of programmes selected from the US and China, Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of programme investment weights as a percentage of the overall investment. This approach provides a comprehensive view of the collective efforts made by both countries. A. Overall Implications and Significance Military-grade research and national strategy are complementary to each other. On the one hand, thanks to the research results supporting the next leap’s strategic ambition. On the other hand, investing in research without a clear strategy direction rarely leads to success. 1) US: The first two priorities of the US AI research in the cyber domain are supply chain and defence. For one thing, the US acknowledges that “ adversaries increasingly target suppliers and ICT/networking supply chains. Therefore, cybersecurity standards and enforcement mechanisms that recognise shared national interests need to be developed” quoted from Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains [19]. 3 xt INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DESIGN, ANALYSIS AND TOOLS FOR INERGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 12, NO. 2, DECEMBER 2023 Fig. 1. The percentage off the AI investment of US and CN in Cyber Function. Furthermore, Defending Against Software Supply Chain At- tacks [20] demonstrates the DoD is committed to strengthening the supply chain’s security to meet national security needs. For the other thing, the 2022 US defence strategy [21] and the 2023 US National Cybersecurity Strategy [22] that involve the idea of “defend forward” with ”persistent engagement”, showing the determination on strengthening the defence ability. The weighted investment focus supply chain and defence align with the national strategy development. 2) China: China’s first two priorities are supply chain and ISR. The results can be traced back to China’s history. Since 2004, Hu Jintao ( 胡锦涛 ) has advocated for a ”warfare with information principle” due to his deep understanding of how information played an essential role in wars like the Kosovo War (1999), the Afghan War (2001) and the Iraq War (2003), Xi Jinping ( 习近平 ), the current President of the People’s Republic of China, still adheres to the ”information - oriented principle” till today. Furthermore, realising how the information can get the advantage at the initial stage, President Xi applies the intelligence systems to manage and control the flow of information effectively [23] and purposes ”accelerating the transformation towards informationised warfare, with the beginnings of intelligent warfare.” mentioned in the 2019 National Defence white paper [24]. Therefore, as the PLA accelerates its informatisation processes, it continues to deepen the reliance on information systems in military operations. As a result, the PLA’s sense of crisis regarding the military-purpose supply chain process. In other words, the PLA needs to ensure that its supply chain flow, from the hardware, protocol, and software to the application, is accurate so that its information will not be compromised. Thus, China’s strategy echoes back to the PLA’s supply chain and ISR investment. 3) Comparison: Examining the military-grade research programmes of the US and China, it becomes evident that both nations allocate their resources by their respective national strategies, which are expected and consistent with the results above. The strength can be amplified if both countries’ strategies and policies are aligned; otherwise, they will end up in confrontation. As the statistics and the national strategies revealed in this study, apart from focusing on supply chain security, the US emphasises enhancing its defensive cyber capabilities. At the same time, China concentrates on bolstering its ISRs. The conflict might lie in the scenario that China leverages its superior ISR capabilities, using information warfare or conducting operations in the information domain to gain an advantage. The question is whether the US possesses a robust enough defence posture to counter such Chinese malign information operations. The answer is probably not. On the other hand, if the US continues to enhance its defensive capabilities, would that threaten China? Probably not, either. There is no judgement of both country’s strategies. How - ever, as Taiwan is in the middle between potential adversaries and potential partners nowadays, how should Taiwan adjust its strategic priorities and programs to ensure preparedness and mitigation for future conflict? B. Supply chain security is a double-edged sword The saying goes , “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result.” Supply chain security is one example to prove this saying. First, most of the supply chain-related research mentioned in this study takes testing and vulnerability scanning into the design considerations. Through this process, security and safety can be improved by finding weak points in the design phase. Secondly, there are inevitably some similarities in the development sharing between each other. The similarities of vulnerabilities may be overlooked everywhere. Therefore, once the vulnerabilities are found on one side, there might be exploitable vulnerabilities in the adversary’s environment. While strengthening the defence ability, the proactive measures to be taken from an offensive standpoint are simultaneously generated. The gap in the supply chain security between China and the US is that the former emphasises the entire process involving AI techniques, from the physical to the logical layer to the application. At the same time, the US has invested heavily in the software-related programme only. Although Taiwan took action in 2020 by prohibiting the use or procurement of information and communication products branded in China, including software, hardware, and services of the government sectors [25] to narrow the gap, the inter- nationalisation of the supply chain process makes it difficult to define the security of each component based solely on its brand. More effective defence measures against opponents and assisting partners should be considered. C. Consideration of Data set Limitations The US data set analysed by this research is only sourced from DARPA’s unclassified publications. Recognised that DARPA is not the only institute for military-grade research within the DoD, the selected programmes still represent a portion of the comprehensive landscape of the DoD’s AI research. 4 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DESIGN, ANALYSIS AND TOOLS FOR INERGRATED CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 12, NO. 2, DECEMBER 2023 The China data set needs to pay attention to other PLA’s research funding beyond the PLA procurement bulletin board. Additional sources might include but are not limited to the 863 National High Technology Research and Development Program ( 国家高技术研究发展计划 ), the 973 National Key Basic Research Program ( 国家高技术研究发展计划 ), and the National 242 Information Security Program ( 国家 242 信息安全计划项目 ) etc. Nevertheless, as the saying goes, “ The fall of a single leaf ushers in autumn.” Despite the limited data set, it offers valuable insights into the trends and directions the US and China are pursuing in AI regarding the cyber domain. To sum up, Taiwan should be aware of the evolving landscape and the future trajectory of the US and China’s strategies and take action to narrow the gaps correspondingly. V. C ONCLUSION In conclusion, the AI research endeavours of both the US and China offer a forward-looking perspective on national security and technological advancement, with a notable emphasis on crucial areas of AI application in cyber offence, the enhancement of defence capabilities, safeguarding supply chain integrity, and the development of advanced training environments. It is imperative, however, to acknowledge the potential bias in this representation stemming from the limitations inherent in the dataset available for analysis. While it is highly likely that a broader portfolio of programs beyond those examined exists, the research results unequivocally indicate that the DoD and the PLA place paramount importance on supply chain security as a primary focal point. Nevertheless, their secondary priorities diverge significantly. The United States focuses on bolstering defence capabilities as a secondary priority, underscoring its strategic emphasis on fortifying cyber defences. In contrast, the PLA accords greater weight to augment ISR capabilities as its secondary focus. These distinctive priorities reflect each nation’s unique national security strategy and the challenges they anticipate in the cyber domain. For Taiwan, amidst this dynamic landscape, there are critical considerations. Taiwan can play a pivotal role in this evolving cyber arena. Given its robust technological prowess and expertise in the semiconductor industry, Taiwan is well- positioned to contribute significantly to global efforts in bolstering supply chain security. By fostering collaboration between government agencies, research institutions, and the private sector, Taiwan can further fortify its cyber resilience and establish itself as a critical player in the global cyber ecosystem. Taiwan should also remain vigilant to the evolving strategies and priorities of major players like the United States and China. Understanding their emphasis on supply chain security, defence capabilities, and ISR provides valuable insights into Taiwan’s cybersecurity strategy. Additionally, Taiwan should continue to invest in research and development in AI and cybersecurity, ensuring that it stays at the forefront of techno- logical advancements in the cyber domain. Furthermore, Taiwan can potentially effect change glob- ally by advocating for international cooperation and norms in cyberspace. By actively participating in discussions on cybersecurity, sharing best practices, and collaborating with like-minded nations, Taiwan can contribute to developing a more secure and stable cyber environment. In navigating this complex and dynamic cybersecurity arena, Taiwan must balance preparing for potential conflicts and fostering partnerships with potential allies and adversaries. By remaining proactive, adaptive, and forward-thinking, Taiwan can carve out a significant role in shaping the future of cybersecurity in the region and beyond. VI. F UTURE W ORK In future work, it is imperative to delve deeper into the evolving dynamics of AI-driven cybersecurity within the con- text of Taiwan’s national security. This entails examining Taiwan’s cybersecurity infrastructure, policies, and technological capabilities to understand and adopt the best practices observed in the PLA and the US DoD procurement initiatives. Furthermore, an in- depth analysis of Taiwan’s collaborations and partnerships in cybersecurity, particularly with the US, will be pivotal. Drawing from the successful practices of these collaborations, Taiwan can refine its cooperative frameworks. This paper lays the foundation for exploring potential avenues for Taiwan to bolster its cybersecurity posture through strategic adjustments and leveraging its AI and technology strengths. A prospective study could also involve a comparative analysis with other nations actively engaged in AI-driven cybersecurity initiatives. This would provide valuable insights into best practices and potential areas for further enhancement. Lastly, tracking the evolving landscape of military AI procure- ment and cybersecurity initiatives in real-time, particularly in response to emerging threats and geopolitical shifts, will be essential for Taiwan to maintain its competitive edge in this rapidly evolving domain. 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