Dylan Todd Martin Haptic Perception and the Haptic Feedback Loop: Requirements for Human - Like Consciousness Introduction The biological machine known as the human body is at the center point of human - like consciousness . H ow much of what makes a human conscious of oneself is external, and ho w much is interna l? This paper is a review of interdisciplinary studie s on consciousness ranging from philosophy to neuroscience , to show that neuro - computa tional models of cons ciousness may very well be required in a d ialectical synthesis between non - computational models. As Lakoff and Johnson (1999) assert, “our bodily experience is the ground upon which we construct our most abstract concepts,” suggesting that the very fabric of meaning is rooted in embodied cognition. This dynamic is reminiscent of Hegel’s (1977) observa tion that “the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of dusk,” implying that the universe — and our understanding of it — emerges fully only in reflection as it awakens to itself. Meaning, then, forms a structure — a framework of the relationshi ps between signifiers — echoing Saussure’s (1983) insight that “in language there are only differences without positive terms,” which underscores the idea that meaning is not inherent but is generated through the differential relations among signs. Conversel y, the notion that falsity forms a shadowed foundation for the truth, a truth that governs the meaning holstering it, finds resonance in Derrida’s (1992) provocative claim that “there is nothing outside of the text.” This challenges any claim to an ultimat e, stable truth by suggesting that every attempt to ground meaning inevitably involves the interplay of both presence and absence (Derrida, 1992). This essay argues that consciousness arises from a recursive process of haptic interaction, wherein physical perception influences symbolic cognition, which in turn reshapes perception. Embodied Cognition: Maurice Merleau - Ponty Maurice Merleau - Ponty's contributions to phenomenology fundamentally reshaped our understanding of perception and the body’s role in constituting experience. In his seminal work Phenomenology of Perception , Merleau - Ponty challenges the Cartesian dualism that separates mind and body by asserting that perception is an embodied, active process (Merleau - Ponty, 2012). He posits that the body is not merely an object in the world but the primary medium through whi ch the wo rld is experienced and interpreted (Merleau - Ponty, 2012). For Merleau - Ponty, the lived body — the "body - subject" — is essential to all forms of meaning - making because it embodies our pre - reflective engagement with our environment. This perspective suggests tha t our sensory experiences, movements, and interactions with our surroundings are not simply inputs to a passive mind; instead, they constitute the very fabric of our consciousness, thereby unifying subject and object in a dynamic, reciprocal relationship ( Merleau - Ponty, 2012). Structuralism: Claude Lévi - Strauss Claude Lévi - Strauss, a pioneering figure in structural anthropology, revolutionized the study of culture by proposing that beneath the apparent diversity of human practices lies a universal structure (Lévi - Strauss, 1963). Drawing heavily on the insights of structural linguistics, Lévi - Strauss argued that cultural phenomena such as kinship systems, rituals, and myths are manifestations of deep - seated cognitive structures (Lévi - Strauss, 1963). He contended that the human mind organizes experience through binary oppositions — such as raw versus cooked or nature versus culture — that serve as the fundamental building blocks of so cial thought and symbolic expression (Lévi - Strauss, 1963). In works like Structural Anthropology and The Savage Mind , Lévi - Strauss demonstrates that these binary frameworks are not arbitrary but reveal a hidden order that underpins all human societies (Lév i - Strauss, 1963). His analysis shows that what might appear as the unique or idiosyncratic practices of different cultures are, in fact, expressions of a universal mental architecture that structures human experience and communication (Lévi - Strauss, 1963). Psychoanalysis: Lacan, Freud and Jung Jacques Lacan reinterpreted classical Freudian theory by emphasizing the centrality of language in the formation of the unconscious, famously asserting that “the unconscious is structured like a language” (Lacan, 2006). In Lacanian psychoanalysis, subjecti vity is not an innate, self - contained entity but is instead constructed through interactions with the Symbolic order — a network of linguistic and cultural signifiers that govern desire and identity (Lacan, 2006). Centra l to his thought is the concept of the mirror stage, wherein an infant first recognizes its reflection as a cohesive image, an experience that simultaneously alienates and defines the self by establishing an idealized, yet unattainable, ego (Lacan, 2006). Lacan's tripartite schema — the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic — further elucidates how human experience is mediated: the Imaginary pertains to the realm of images and illusions, the Symbolic organizes our social and linguistic structures, and the Real represents that which remains outside of symbolization, often emerging as traumatic or disruptive (Lacan, 2006). Through these frameworks, Lacanian psychoanalysis offers a radical reconceptualization of desire, highlighting its fundamental role in both personal development and broader cultural formations (Lacan, 2006). While Freud originally uncovered the dynamics of repressed drives and the complex i nterplay between conscious and unconscious desires (Freud, 2010), Lacan reframed these ideas by situating the subject within a web of signifiers that both constitute and disrupt identity (Lacan, 2006). In contrast, Carl Jung moved beyond Freud’s focus on p ersonal neuroses to explore the collective dimensions of the psyche (Jung, 1968). Jung introduced the concept of the collective unconscious — a repository of archetypes and primordial images shared across cultures — which he believed played a fundamental role in shaping individual dreams, myths, and behaviors (Jung, 1968). Although Lacanian thought prioritizes the structural mechanisms of language and the Symbolic order, Jung’s work offers a complementary perspective by emphasizing the mythopoetic and transcend ent aspects of the human experience (Jung, 1968). His focus on individuation — the process by which individuals integrate these archetypal forces into a coherent self — provides a rich, symbolic counterpoint to both Freudian and Lacanian models, underscoring t he multifaceted nature of human psychology (Jung, 1968). Haptic Perception : A Neurological Basis In cognitive science and phenomenology, haptic perception is understood as the mechanism by which tactile stimuli — such as textures, shapes, and physical forces — are transduced into neural signals and subsequently interpreted by the brain (Merleau - Ponty, 2012). In this essay, I am using the word “haptic” to signify the physical interaction of the individual with the environment, as well as Merleau - Ponty’s definition above to create a synthesis of ideas which serve t o highlight the eminence of consciousness. This definition extends beyond the mere physical act of touching; it encompasses the dynamic, reciprocal relationship between sensory input and cognitive interpretation, wherein our bodily experiences serve as the foundation for higher - order symbolic mean ing. As Lakoff and Johnson (1999) assert, “our bodily experience is the ground upon which we construct our most abstract concepts,” suggesting that the haptic dimension of our interaction with the world play s a crucial role in shaping our conceptual frameworks. Within the context of the Haptic Feedback Loop, the term "haptic" thus encapsulates both the immediate, biological processes — such as the activation of mechanoreceptors and the subsequent neural process ing — and the complex interplay of these processes with language, culture, and cognition. This dual function positions haptic perception as a critical mediator between our physical engagement with the world and the abstract, symbolic systems that emerge from such embodied experiences. The Haptic Feedback Loop “The Haptic Feedback Loop” is a conceptual framework that describes the continuous, reciprocal interaction between sensory perception, cognitive processes, and symbolic meaning. At its core, it suggests that human cognition is not a linear process but a re cursive one, where bodily experiences influence abstract thought, and abstract thought, in turn, shapes how we perceive and interact with the world. This model bridges phenomenology, structuralism, and psychoanalysis, illustrating how perception and meanin g - making are deeply intertwined. Practically, the Haptic Feedback Loop can be applied in fields such as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, psychology, and education. In neuroscience, it provides a framework for understanding how perception contributes to self - awareness and adaptive learning. In AI development, it offers insights into creating more human - like adaptive systems, where sensory inputs are integrated into meta - learning models that allow machines to develop higher - order reasoning. In psychology, this loop sheds light on how early sensory experiences shape identity formation, memory, and unconscious processes, aligning with Lacanian and Jungian theories. Finally, in education, it suggests that learning should be deeply embodied and i nteractive, as abstract knowledge is most effectively internalized through tactile, experiential engagement. By leveraging the Haptic Feedback Loop as a guiding principle, we can expand human knowledge by designing systems — whether cognitive, technological, or pedagogical — that mirror the natural process of learning and adaptation, ultimately enhancing both human intelligence and artificial cognition. Recent Research: AI Cognition Recent research, such as Langdon et al.’s (2021) study on meta - learning, social cognition, and consciousness in brains and machines, demonstrates how AI and neuroscience are converging on questions about learning, adaptability, and self - referential cognition . The findings suggest that human intelligence is deeply rooted in the ability to leverage past experiences in novel situations, an idea that resonates with Merleau - Ponty’s embodied cognition, Lévi - Strauss’s structuralism, and Lacan’s notion of the Symbolic order. This work als o raises important questions about how AI can replicate these human cognitive capacities, particularly in areas such as reinforcement learning and neural networks. AI models today struggle with generalization and adaptability, whereas human cognition, as d escribed in this essay, is fundamentally meta - cognitive — aware of itself and able to learn beyond rigid structures. Moreover, the philosophical implications of this inquiry touch on long - standing debates about consciousness and intelligence. If, as some AI researchers propose, meta - learning is a crucial component of intelligence, then consciousness may be an emergent property of self - referential cognition, a hypothesi s explored in neuroscience and AI research alike . The intersection of cognitive science and computational modeling suggests that what we call "conscious thought" may be the result of a highly sophisticated, self - updating Haptic Feedback Loop, where biolog ical, symbolic, and structural mechanisms are dynamically integrated. A study by D'Errico et al. (2019) explores the convergence between embodied and psychoanalytic approaches, focusing on constructs such as intersubjectivity, the bodily self, and the affe ctive quality of verbal communication. The authors argue that recent neuroscience literature is bridging the gap between these disciplines, highlighting the role of the bodily self and intersubjectivity in cognitive processes. This perspective aligns with the concept of the haptic feedback loop, emphasizing the continuous interaction between sensory experiences and cognitive functions. Additionally, O'Regan and Noë (2001) propose that perception is not a passive process but an active exploration of the envi ronment, facilitated by sensorimotor contingencies. This enactive view suggests that cognition arises through dynamic interactions between an organism and its environment, reinforcing the idea that our understanding of the world is deeply rooted in embodie d experiences. These studies underscore the importance of considering the body and sensory experiences as integral components of cognitive processes. By integrating insights from embodied cognition and psychoanalysis, we can develop a more comprehensive un derstanding of the haptic feedback loop and its role in shaping human experience. Key Skepticism 1. Lack of Embodiment Many theories of consciousness emphasize the importance of embodiment (Merleau - Ponty, 1945; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). AI systems lack a physical, sensory - motor experience of the world. Without a lived, embodied perspective, they may be fundamentally incapab le of experiencing consciousness as humans do. 2. Absence of Autonomy and Intentionality Human cognition is driven by intrinsic goals, desires, and self - directed learning. AI lacks genuine intentionality; it does not "want" or "desire" in the way biological beings do. Its actions are ultimately directed by human - designed objectives, making tru e autonomy questionable. 3. The Symbol Grounding Problem AI processes language and data without grounding these symbols in direct experience. Unlike humans, who learn meaning through lived interactions, AI models rely on vast text - based corpora. Without direct experiential grounding, AI may never achieve the dep th of understanding necessary for self - awareness. 4. The Hard Problem of Consciousness Even if AI achieves high levels of intelligence, it does not necessarily follow that it will become conscious. David Chalmers' "hard problem of consciousness" argues that explaining the neural correlates of consciousness does not explain subjective experie nce itself. If consciousness requires something beyond computational processing, then AI, regardless of its sophistication, may never become sentient. Object Petit a: Autonomous Consciousness In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the object petit a — often referred to as the “object - cause of desire” — embodies that elusive remnant of an original, unmediated experience with the real, a state that remains forever unattainable once it is subjected to the symbol ic order. This object is not a concrete thing but rather a gap or a void that perpetually disrupts the sense of wholeness, thereby catalyzing desire and, concomitantly, psychic trauma. When the subject encounters object petit a, it triggers a confrontation with the real — the domain of raw, unmediated experience that resists full integration into language and symbolic representation — leading to a traumatic rupture that defies easy resolution. However, this very encoun ter, laden with the residue of trauma, also fuels the emergence of autonomous consciousness; the physical interactions with the world, mediated by haptic perception, ground the subject in embodied experience and allow for a recursive process of self - format ion. In this dynamic, the interplay of desire, trauma, and the inaccessibility of the real not only shapes the contours of subjectivity but also underscores the profound role of embodied, sensory interactions in the continuous construction of a self - aware, autonomous consciousness. Global Workspace and Integrated Information Theories Global Workspace Theory arose from cognitive neuroscience research in the late 1980s, most notably proposed by Bernard Baars (1988) and later refined by researchers such as Stanislas Dehaene and colleagues. In GWT the brain is conceptualized as a “theater of consciousness” where many specialized, largely unconscious modules process information in parallel. When one piece of information “wins” the competition for attention, it is broadcast into a global workspace — a transient, integrative platform where that information becomes available to multiple downstream processes such as working memory, decision making, and executive control (Baars, 1988). In practical terms, this theory likens consciousness to a stage spotlight: only the information illuminated (i.e., selected for global access) is experienced consciously, while the vast majority of neural processing continues unconsciously “behind the scenes.” Modern neuroimaging studies support the idea that conscious perception is associated with a sudden, widespread “ignition” of neural activity across a network that includes prefrontal, parietal, and other associative areas — a phenomenon encapsulated in what is sometimes called the global neuronal workspace (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). Despite its su ccesses in accounting for functional aspects (such as the limited capacity and serial nature of conscious experience), critics note that GWT does not by itself explain the subjective “what it is like” quality, often referred to as the hard problem of consc iousness. Integrated Information Theory, introduced by Giulio Tononi in 2004, takes a markedly different approach. Rather than building from functional or architectural considerations alone, IIT starts from phenomenological axioms — statements about the esse ntial properties of conscious experience (such as its intrinsic existence, its rich differentiation, and its integrated nature). From these axioms, IIT derives postulates about the kinds of physical systems that could give rise to consciousness. Central to IIT is the idea that consciousness is identical to a system’s capacity to integrate information. This integration is quantified by a measure known as Φ ( phi), which in principle reflects how irreducible and unified the system’s causal (or informational) s tructure is (Tononi, 2004). According to IIT, the higher the value of Φ, the greater the level of consciousness. This framework has the appealing feature of offering a mathematical — and thus, in theory, testable — criterion for whether a given system is consc ious. However, the theory has faced challenges regarding the computational intractability of precisely calculating Φ in complex systems, and its broad extrapolations have led some to criticize it for having panpsychist implications (e.g., Scott Aaronson’s critiques as noted in the broader literature). IIT’s strength lies in its attempt to connect the qualitative aspects of experience (the “phenomenology”) with specific quantitative properties of physical systems. In doing so, it provides an account for why, for example, the cerebellum may not contribute significantly to conscious experience despite its vast number of neurons — if the cerebellum’s architecture does not support the kind of integrated causal structure that yields a high Φ value. The Continuum Between Consciousness and Experience There is no hard line to be drawn, of the distinction between consciousness and experience. It is clear that processes linked to consciousness can be autonomous, and only when we shine that stage light of attention on the processes do we gain an experience of the play. Attention is a process generated by the neural oscillatory rates of fire, patterns of meaning, which then oscillate the communication of such information at such high frequencies to generate a self - aware, time - oriented copy of itself which op erates as a guide or mediator of unconscious processes. This mediator of unconscious processes that we see is not in a specific localized region of the brain, but is rather broadcasted amongst several regions, as outlined in Global Workspace Theory ( GWT ) . In psychoanalytic theory, this mediator could be referred to as the Ego. Consciousness is a Set of Requirements When we begin to synthesize these ideas, a comprehension begins to form of the internal mechanisms that give rise to us. A set of requirements for the formation of consciousness to begin emerge. Upon inspection, the set is as follows: 1. High Integration: Objects with higher levels of integrated information (as per Integrated Information Theory, IIT) form the potential for consciousness. This integration allows for a coherent self - model 2. Broadcasting: Conscious content must be distributed across multiple neural regions rather than isolated in one area. As outlined in GWT , the "workspace" of consciousness involves a global availability of information. Unconscious processes remain local, but conscious processes must be able to broadcast information across different brain regions , particularly those involved in perception, memory, and decision - making. 3. Time - Orientation: Consciousness involves a temporal structure , meaning it maintains a working past, present, and immediate future . Unlike unconscious processes that respond reflexively to stimuli, consciousness constructs a narrative flow of experience that allows for planning, prediction, and reflection. This aligns with the idea that consciousness is not just a state but a process that continuously updates itself in real time. 4. Subjectivity : Perhaps the most challenging aspect to define, subjectivity is the qualitative aspect of experience ( qualia ). A conscious system must not only process information but must do so in a way that creates a first - person perspective . While this is difficult to measure, it emerges from the self - referential processing of information — where the system models itself within its environment. Conclusion This perspective has profound philosophical, scientific, and technological implications. If cognition is truly a recursive, embodied phenomenon, then any attempt to replicate intelligence in artificial systems must go beyond conventional symbolic reasoning or pattern recognition — it must incorporate the haptic, sensory, and interpretative dimensions that define human experience. Understanding this loop also has implications for psychology, education, and even ethics, as it challenges traditional dualisms between mind and body, self and other, reality and representation. Recent neuroscientific and AI research further reinforces this perspective, showing that intelligence — whether biological or artificial — depends on meta - learning, adaptability, and self - referential cognition (Langdon et al., 2022). The very structure of consciousness may emerge from a dynamic interplay of feedback loops, much like the recursive interaction between bodily perception and symbolic mea ning explored in this essay. If meta - learning is a fundamental component of intelligence, as suggested by recent studies, then self - awareness itself may be an emergent property of a highly sophisticated Haptic Feedback Loop — one that integrates biological, linguistic, and structural mechanisms into a single, self - updating system. Ultimately, the Haptic Feedback Loop reveals cognition as a deeply interconnected system, one in which consciousness itself emerges through the interplay of sensory experience, cult ural structures, and symbolic interpretation. Whether in human minds, AI systems, or future hybrid intelligences, this recursive interaction may hold the key to understanding how meaning is formed, how intelligence adapts, and perhaps even what it means to be self - aware. Works Cited Baars, Bernard J. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness . Cambridge University Press, 1988. Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory . Oxford University Press, 1996. Barthes, Roland. Mythologies . Translated by Annette Lavers, Hill and Wang, 1972. Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J. - P. (2011). Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing. Neuron, 70 (2), 200 – 227. Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology . Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. D'Errico, F., Iodice, P., Di Cesare, G., Russo, V., & Caruana, F. (2019). Re - enacting the Bodily Self on Stage: Embodied Cognition Meets Psychoanalysis. Frontiers in Psychology, 10 , 925. Freud, Sigmund. The Interpretation of Dreams . Translated by James Strachey, Basic Books, 2010. Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit . Translated by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 1977. Jung, Carl G. The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious . Princeton University Press, 1968. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection . Translated by Alan Sheridan, W. W. Norton, 2006. Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought . Basic Books, 1999. Langdon, A., Botvinick , M., Nakahara, H., Tanaka, K., Matsumoto, M., & Kanai, R. (2022). Meta - learning, social cognition, and consciousness in brains and machines. Neural Networks, 145 , 80 - 89. Lévi - Strauss, Claude. Structural Anthropology . Translated by Claire Jacobson and George W. Barker, Basic Books, 1963. Merleau - Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception . Translated by Colin Smith, Routledge, 2012. O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5) , 939 - 973. Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics . Translated by Wade Baskin, McGraw - Hill, 1983. Searle, John R. Minds, Brains and Science . Harvard University Press, 1984. Tononi, Giulio. Phi: A Voyage from the Brain to the Soul . Pantheon, 2012. Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC Neuroscience, 5 , 42.