UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Case No. 20-5852 JOHN DOE; TARA BLESSING; CHRIS BLESSING, Parents and Natural Guardians of their minor son Next Friend Charles B. Blessing; JENNIFER FOUST; JOHN FOUST, Parents and Natural Guardians of their minor son Next Friend Austin Foust; GINA FRIES; DANIEL FRIES, Parents and Natural Guardians of their minor son Next Friend William Fries; SHANNON CRAIG; ANTHONY GARDNER, Parents and Natural Guardians of their minor son Next Friend . Evan Anthony Gardner; LORI GRAY; MICHAEL GRAY, Parents and Natural Guardians of their minor son Next Friend Liam Gray; SAUNDRA SMITH: MICHAEL SMITH, Parents and Natural Guardians of their minor son Next Friend Charlie Smith; ERIC CURK; ANDREW GIBSON; PATRICK KENNEDY; WYATT SCHWARTZ; BRADLEY KATHMAN; NADINE PALEY: KEVIN PALEY, Parents and Natural Guardians of their minor son Next Friend Sam Paley Plaintiffs-Appellants v. KATHY GRIFFIN Defendant-Appellee Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Kentucky · Case No. 2:19-cv-00126 REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS Kent W. Seifried POSTON, SEIFRIED & SCHLOEMER 2039 Dixie Highway Fort Mitchell, KY 41011 Tel: (859) 431-3200 Fax: (859) 655-7765 Kent@pss-law.net Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................... .i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................. .iii I. GERBER'S HOLDING APPLIES ................................................... 1 II. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD LONG-ARM PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER MS. GRIFFIN ............................................. 9 A. Ms. Griffin's Tortious Criminal Acts Were "Acts" In Kentucky ....... 9 B. Personal Jurisdiction Over Ms. Griffin Is Constitutional. ............... 12 III. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT, AND REMAND FOR FURTHER CONSISTENT PROCEEDINGS ........ 17 A. Appellants' Claims Are Not Barred By The First Amendment; ....... 18 B. Appellants Have Stated Claims For Relief ............................... 21 I. Harassment (KRS 525.070(1)(e)) .................................. .22 2. Harassing Communications (KRS 525.080(1)(a)) ............... 23 3. Threatening (KRS 508.080) ......................................... 24 4. Menacing (KRS 508.050) ........................................... 25 5. Invasion of Privacy ................................................... 26 IV. LIMITING PRINCIPLES ........................................................... 27 V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 28 1 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 2 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................... 29 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................. 30 11 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Boulger v. Woods, 917 F .3d 471 (6th Cir. 2019) ........................................................................ 6, 7 Brennan v. Stevenson, 2015 WL 7454109 (D. Md. 2015) ............................................. 14, 21 Bristol Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, 901F.2d165 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ....................................................... 5 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471U.S.462 (1985) ................................................................. 15 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) ................................................................. 15 Chinnock v. Navient Corp., 2008 WL 5312462 (N.D. Ohio) .................................................... .3 CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) ........................................................ 18 Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396 (6th Cir. 2020) ........................................................ 27 Doe v. Haaland, 973 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2020) ................................................... 16, 20 FCA US, LLC v. Spitzer Autoworld Akron, LLC, 2017 WL 512790 (E.D. Mich.) ...................................................... 4 · Gerber v. Riordan, 649 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2011) ................................ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 27 111 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 4 Graham v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. App. 1983) .................................................. 26 Harmer v. Colom, 650 Fed. App'x. 267 (6th Cir. 2016) ........................................... 17, 18 · Hensley v. Gadd, 560 S.W.3d 516 (Ky. 2018) ........................................................ 22 Hickey v. General Elec. Co., 539 S.W.3d, 19 (Ky. 2018) ......................................................... 21 Higgins v. Kentucky Sports Radio, 951 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2020) ................................................... 20, 21 , Horn v. City of Covington, 2019 WL 2344773 (E.D. Ky. 2019) ................................................ .3 Innovation Ventures v. Custom Nutrition Labs, 912 F.3d 316 (6th Cir. 2018) ...................................................... 7, 8 Jn Re: Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, 2019 WL 5799575 (S.D. Ohio, 2019) ............................................. 14 Johnson v. Soal, Inc., 2019 WL 333557 (E.D. Ky. 2019) .................................................. 3 Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1977) ........................................................ 11 ! Kenyon v. Clare, 2016 WL 6995661 (M.D. Tenn.) ................................................ .4, 8 :King v. Taylor, ' th 694 F.3d 650 (6 Cir. 2012) .......................................................... 3, 5, 6 Lanier v. American Bd. of Endodontics, 843F.2d901(6thCir.1988) ................................................... 17,18 lV Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 5 M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GnbH & Co., KG, 508 Fed. App'x. 498 (6th Cir. 2012) ........................................ 2, 3, 4, 5 McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 632 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981) ........................................................ 26 Means v. US Coriference of Catholic Bishops, 836 F.3d 643( 6th Cir. 2016) ...................................................... ?, 8 Mills v. Louisville Metropolitan Government, 2019 WL 1427553 (W.D. Ky. 2019) .............................................. 23 Montell v. Diversified Clinical service, Inc., 757 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2014) ........................................................ 23 Neal v. Janssen, 270 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2001) ........................................................ 15 ·. Parchman v. SLM Corp., 896 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2018) ....................................................... 7, 8 Power Investment, LLC v. SL EC LLC, 927 F.3d 914 (6th Cir. 2019) ........................................................ 15 Reynolds v. lnt'l Amateur Athletic Fed., 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994) .......................................................... 6 · Schall v. Suzuki Motor of Am., Inc., 2017 WL 2059662 (W.D. Ky.) ...................................................... 3 Serras v. First Tennessee Bk. Nat'!. Assn., 873 F .2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1989) ...................................................... 17 SG ex rel S.B.J. v. Care Academy, Inc., 2012 WL 246439 (Ky. App.) ...................................................... 26 v Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 6 · Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235 (6th Cir. 2011) ...................................................... .16 , ·Sines v. Kessler, 2019 WL 691788 (W.D. Va. 2019) ................................................ 14 SKG Int 'l Inc. v. Italia, S.p.A., 2017 WL 2812903 (E.D. Mich.) .................................................... .4 State v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2012) ....................................................... .12 • State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1989) ........................................................ 10 Talley v. Mac Auto Team, LLC, 2016 WL 4410091 (Ky. App. 2016) ............................................... 23 •. Thames v. City of Westland, •. 796 Fed. App'x 251 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, -US- 2020 WL 5882312 (October 5, 2020) ...................... .13 · Thomas v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. App. 1978) ............................................. 24, 25 •United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997) ....................................................... 12 • .. United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds 543 U.S. 1182 (2005), reinstated 125 Fed. App'x. 701 (6th Cir. 2005) ......................... 19, 21, 24 United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473 (6 1h Cir. 2012) ........................................................ 12 Vl Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 7 United States v. Landham, 251F.3d1072 (6th Cir. 2001) ........... ~ .......................................... .19 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) ................................................................. 18 United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 2015) ...................................... 12, 13, 14, 19, 25 United States v. 9.1 Acres of Land, 416 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1969) ........................................................ 5 Vangheluwe v. Got News, LLC, 365 F.Supp 3d 850 (E.D. Mich. 2019), appeal pending, Case No. 19-1162 (6th. Cir) .................................. 14, 21 Vanhook v. Somerset Health Facilities, LP, 67 F.Supp 3d 810 (E.D. Ky. 2014) ................................................. 22 · Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) ................................................... 11, 12, 13, 18 Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) ................................................................ 15 Wright v. Spaulding, 931F.3d695 (6th Cir. 2019) ...................................................... 1, 4 •.Yates v. Commonwealth, 753 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. App. 1988) .............................................. 23, 24 .. Zink v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. App. 1994) ................................................. 26 vu Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 8 Statutes , KRS 367.667(2)(a)(b) ....................................................................... 10 KRS 367.46999(4)(a)(b) .................................................................... 10 KRS 446.070 ................................................................ 9, 10, 21, 27, 28 , KRS 435.250 ................................................................................. 11 , KRS 436.107 ................................................................................. 11 KRS 454.210(2)(a)(3) ........................................................... 9, 10, 12, 28 • KRS 454.210(2)(a)(4) ....................................................................... 28 KRS 454.210(2)(a)(9) ....................................................................... 10 KRS 500.100 .................................................................................. 11 KRS 501.100(4) .............................................................................. 23 , KRS 508.050 ............................................................................ 25, 26 i KRS 508.080 ............................................................................ 11, 24 : KRS 508.130(2) .............................................................................. 23 KRS 525.070 ............................................................................ 22, 25 , KRS 525.080· ........................................................................ 11, 23, 25 Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h) ........................................................................... 6 vm Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 9 Other Authorities KRS 508.050 Commentary ......... - ........................................................ 25 KRS 508.080 Commentary ............................................................ 11, 24 , KRS 525.080 Commentary ................................................................. 11 lX Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 10 I. GERBER'S HOLDING APPLIES. Ms. Griffin's Brief does not, and cannot, refute this Court's holding in Gerber that her first filing of a general appearance by counsel was acceptance of the district court's jurisdiction and a waiver of her personal jurisdiction defense. , Rather, her Brief on this issue is an extensive exposition critical of that holding, which criticism simply confirms that the Gerber holding applies to her. Wright v. Spaulding, 941 F3d 695 (6th Cir. 2019) instructs us on two relevant points: (1) what is a Court's holding, Id. at 701-702; and, (2) when that holding "cuts against a party," what the party must do to avoid its effect. Id. at 709 (Thapar, Concurring). Regarding the former, Appellants detailed Gerber's holding: CONCLUSION Defendants waived their lack of personal jurisdiction defense, and voluntarily submitted to the district court's jurisdiction, when their attorney entered a general appearance with the district court on their behalf. Accordingly, we REVERSE the decision of the court below. ',Gerber v. Riordan, 649 F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir. 2011). This conclusion meets the 'Sixth Circuit's holding criteria. "The decision of the issue contribute[d] to the judgment; ... clear[ly] the court intended to rest the judgment ... on its conclusion , about the issue; . . . [and] clear[ly] the court considered the issue and consciously reached a conclusion about it." Wright, supra at 701-702. 1 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 11 Ms. Griffin does not challenge any of these three points, nor does she argue that the above is not this Court's holding. Instead, she criticizes the holding at 1 length. In her criticism, Ms. Griffin repeatedly relies on Concurring Judge , Moore's criticism of the majority panel's holding, citing and quoting the Concurrel}ce no less than six separate times. (See, Appellee Brief at pp. 15, 18, 19, 20 and n.5, 22). However, this criticism of Gerber confirms its holding. Indeed, Judge Moore subsequently affirmed Gerber's holding in M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmdH & Co., KG, 508 Fed. App'x 498 (6 1 h Cir. 2012) where, concurring, she , again criticized the majority opinion for applying "a principle it derived from Gerber" that the first filing of notices of appearance "resulted in a waiver of , [defendants'] personal jurisdiction defense." Id. at 501. Ms. Griffin's criticism of Gerber's holding also includes reliance on a law review article (Appellee Brief at p. 14, n. 1), and on a pre-Gerber, 1982 Florida Supreme Court decision rejecting a Gerber-like holding as "a meaningless technicality." (Appellee Brief at pp. 20-21, n. 4). Neither criticism affects Gerber. Lastly, Ms. Griffin relies on Sixth Circuit district court decisions which, like the district court in the present appeal, criticize the Gerber holding. Like her other criticisms, however, these decisions do not change Gerber's holding. Moreover, these are readily distinguished. 2 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 12 For example, in Chinnockv. Navient Corp., 2008 WL 5312462 (N.D. Ohio), defendants did not file a general appearance; rather, counsel "filed a special appearance and, the very same day, moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction." Id. at *2. In Horn v. City of Covington, 2019 WL 2344773 (E.D. Ky. 2019), defendant "by failing to raise the service defense in his Answer, ... waived his ability to assert this defense later on;" waiver did not occur by the first filing of a general appearance. Id. at *4. Similarly, in Johnson v. Soal, Inc., 2019 WL 333557 (E.D. Ky. 2019), defendant did not first file a general appearance; rather, he included "lack of jurisdiction among his affirmative defenses," but · subsequently forfeited this defense by litigation participation. Id. at *2, citing King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2012). 1 And, in Schall v. Suzuki Motor of Am., Inc., 2017 WL 2059662 (W.D. Ky.) the defendant did not file a general appearance - neither as a "first filing," or at any time - thus, the district court expressly deferred from determining "whether the entry of a general appearance waives a , defense of personal jurisdiction." Id. at *2, n. l. : 1 In so holding, the Johnson Court, citing King, supra, reiterated an important ! distinction: The term "waiver" properly applies to relinquishment of the defense due to a party's failure to preserve it in an initial pleading, while "forfeiture" is more appropriate to describe a party's submission to the Court's jurisdiction via its conduct in the litigation. · Id. at *2, n.1. 3 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 13 There are, of course, a number of Sixth Circuit district courts which correctly apply Gerber's first filing holding as a "bright-line waiver rule," consistent with M&C Corp. 's reiteration that Gerber "requires courts in the Sixth Circuit to exercise personal jurisdiction whenever a defendant's attorney enters a general appearance." See, ~' SKG Int'!., Inc. v. SKG Italia, S.p.A., 2017 WL 2812903 (E.D. Mich.) at *2, quoting FCA US, LLC v. Spitzer Autoworld Akron, LLC, 2017 WL 512790 (E.D. Mich.) at *9, quoting M&C Corp., supra, 508 Fed. App'x. at 501. See also, Kenyon v. Clare, 2016 WL 6995661 (M.D. Tenn.). Ms. Griffin's criticisms cannot change the effect of Gerber's holding on her. • She has only three means to avoid Gerber: "distinguish it," or have it overruled en • bane or by the Supreme Court. Wright, supra, 94 l F .3d at 709. The latter two are, • perhaps, for another day. In this appeal, Ms. Griffin has not and cannot distinguish : Gerber from her situation. Ms. Griffin first argues that Gerber is distinguishable on its face because Gerber is not a "first filing" case as [Appellants] use that term, where a general appearance by defense counsel precedes all other submissions to the court. Rather, a careful reading of Gerber confirms that, as their first step in that case, the defendants "filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction." •Appellee Brief at pp. 13-14, quoting Gerber, 649 F .3d at 516. Not so. As the next paragraph in Gerber explains, the corporate defendant filed its motion pro se, ·which was not a responsive pleading. Gerber, supra at 516, quoting then Judge 4 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 14 Ruth Bader Ginsburg that "a corporation may not appear pro se." Bristol Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, 901 F.2d 165, 166 n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also, United States v. 9.1 Acres of Land, 416 F.2d 1244, 1245 (6th Cir. 1969): "a corporation cannot appear otherwise than through an attorney." Thus, contrary to Ms. Griffin's assertion, and as further elucidated in M&C Corp., its counsel's general appearance was Gerber's "first filing." M&C Corp., 500 F. App'x. at 501. Ms. Griffin next argues that King, supra "rejected Gerber as not controlling." (Appellee Brief at p. 14). However, as Appellants have explained, , King did not and could not reject or overrule Gerber, nor did it attempt to do so. King is readily distinguishable from Gerber because the King defendant's first i filing was, in fact, an assertion of the jurisdictional defense of lack of proper service. King, 694 F.3d at 660, n. 7. Under that controlling fact, when defendant's counsel filed a general appearance a year later, this tardy filing was not a waiver. . These circumstances are the context in which King stated counsel's written 'appearance "one month before [defendant] moved for dismissal ... does not . constitute forfeiture." 694 F.3d at 660 n.7 (emphasis added). King is a forfeiture case - i.e., submission to jurisdiction via litigation conduct - not a waiver case - 5 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 15 · i.e, relinquishment of the defense by failing to preserve it in a first filing. Johnson, supra, citing King, supra. 2 Boulger v. Woods, 917 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2019) is also a forfeiture, not a waiver case. Defendant's counsel never filed a general appearance, and defendant reserved his jurisdictional defense in his Answer. Id. at 477. Defendant subsequently forfeited that defense by litigation participation. In this forfeiture context, Boulger cautioned that "there is no bright-line rule" as to what "conduct serves as constructive consent to personal jurisdiction," Because Boulger did not involve the first filing of a general appearance, the Court's "bright-line rule" statement did not apply to the waiver circumstance in the present appeal. Failing to distinguish Gerber, Ms. Griffin attempts to re-write it. She argues . that Gerber's holding "is incompatible with FRCP 12." (Appellee's Brief, p. 18). • However, Gerber expressly held the opposite. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h), a party waives the right to contest personal jurisdiction by failing to raise the issue when making a responsive pleading or a general appearance. ';Id., 649 F.3d at 520, quoting Reynolds v. Int'!. Amateur Athletic Fed'n., 23 F.3d ·.1110, 1120 (6th Cir. 1994), and citing additional authorities. Ms. Griffin's reliance ·. 2 King emphasized this distinction by "noting an appearance of counsel, filed after '.properly raising lack of proper service in the first responsive pleading, did not waive the defense." Id. at 660, n. 7. 6 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 16 on Judge Moore's concurring comment that "the majority's holding appears to be at odds with Rule 12" is, again, misplaced. "Objections to personal jurisdiction can be and frequently are waived." Innovation Ventures v. Custom Nutrition Labs, 912 F.3d 316, 332 (6th Cir. 2018), where defendant chose to waive personal jurisdiction defense. By contrast, a defendant can choose not to first file a general appearance, and preserve the defense. See, M=_, Boulger, supra. Also, a defendant can choose to file a special appearance preserving her defense. In fact, many defendants throughout the Sixth Circuit have done so. See, M=_, Parchman v. SLM Corp., 896 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. ·. 2018), and Means v. US Conference of Catholic Bishops, 836 F .3d 643 (6th Cir. 2016). Contrary to Ms. Griffin, the first filing of her general appearance was not · "necessary for access to the Federal court's ECF filing system." (Appellee Brief, p. 22). First, Ms. Griffin could publicly access the system without any filing to ·monitor her case. Second, if she wanted to register her appearance for more convenient monitoring and case notification, she could have first filed, inter alia, a ! special appearance (Means, supra; Parchman, supra), a general appearance preserving her jurisdictional defense (Gerber, supra), or her motion to dismiss. She chose instead to file her general appearance without more. 7 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 17 Ms. Griffin's choice did not violate her due process rights. At its core, due process requires notice and an opportunity to act. Gerber's holding, itself based upon decades of Sixth Circuit predicates, is and remains the law. Other defendants have recognized it, and chosen accordingly. Parchman, supra; Means, supra. Some frequently waive their defense, while others decide to preserve it. Innovation Ventures, supra. Ms. Griffin chose the former. There is nothing Constitutionally "casual or cavalier" (Appellee Brief, p. 22) in holding Ms. Griffin to her choice. Lastly, Ms. Griffin's suggestion that the Eastern District of Kentucky's Local Rules somehow misled her to file her general appearance is flawed. (Appellee's Brief, p. 20). First, the Rule does not require the first filing of an ·. appearance of counsel. Second, the Local Rule does not require that the appearance of counsel be a general appearance. See, Kenyon, supra at *3: "Her argument that the Court's Local Rules require her to file a notice of appearance is ·. not persuasive because they do not specify the form of the notice of appearance, leaving it open whether the defendant wishes to file a special or general , appearance." Third, the Rule similarly did not prohibit Ms. Griffin filing a general appearance in which she preserved her jurisdiction defense. Gerber, supra. 8 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 18 II. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD LONG-ARM PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER MS. GRIFFIN. A. Ms. Griffin's Tortious Criminal Acts Were "Acts" in Kentucky. Contrary to Ms. Griffin (Appellee Brief, p. 23), this appeal raises a matter of first impression statutory construction. Neither the Supreme Court of Kentucky nor other courts have determined whether communicative criminal behavior under relevant Kentucky criminal statutes, rendered civilly actionable under KRS · 446.070, was intended to and is included as "an act ... in this Commonwealth" : under KRS 454.210(2)(a)(3). The district court acknowledged this when it · predicted that "neither the Kentucky legislature nor Kentucky courts" would adopt ' Appellants' argument. (Memorandum Opinion, RE 43, Page ID #278). The nature of the statutory interpretation is not in dispute. Rather, and respectfully, the district . court erred in its prediction of the Kentucky legislature and Kentucky courts' . understanding of and intention regarding subpart (2)(a)(3) of Kentucky's long-arm ·statute. The district court's error, repeated by Ms. Griffin (Appellee Brief, p. 25), ;lies in the rejection of Appellants' argument as "flawed logic." The district court overlooked and Ms. Griffin omits the key component in the argument concerning •.what the Kentucky General Assembly necessarily understood and intended in 1968 regarding a communication crime by a foreign actor. Under both the United States •Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution, as expressed in the common law 9 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 19 te.rritoriality principle, a foreign actor's criminal communication conduct - fh&., sending a threatening letter to a Kentucky citizen, or harassing that citizen by telephone - constituted an "act" that occurred in Kentucky even if the perpetrator was not physically present in the State. (See, Appellants' Brief, pp. 21-22 collecting multiple Federal, State, and other authorities.) In the context of a communication crime, the term "act" in the long-arm statute had the common, plain, and Constitutionally required meaning of an act that occurred in Kentucky. Far from being an "irrelevancy," Kentucky's long history of adherence to the territoriality principle - stated in the iconic Hatfield/McCoy case - directly bears upon and informs the plain meaning of the type of tortious criminal communicative "acts" that occur in Kentucky. Moreover, when the General Assembly enacted the long-arm statute in 1968, it knew this meaning of an "act" and intended to harmonize it with the impact of KRS 446.070 whenever Kentucky . citizens pursued claims under subpart (2)(a)(3) for tortious criminal communication acts committed by non-residents. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1989). 3 Ms. Griffin ignores Reeder to argue that for 3 By contrast, where electronic tortious communications are not encompassed by 446.070, the legislature must specifically include such in the statute. For example, . charitable and telephonic solicitation statutes each "specify the civil remedy available to an aggrieved party" - Charitable, KRS 367.667(2)(a)(b); Telephonic, KRS 367.46999(4)(a)(b); thus, 446.070 does not apply. Reeder, supra at 118. Accordingly, the General Assembly in 1994 had to specifically add these to the long-arm statute. KRS 454.210(2)(a)(9). 10 Case: 20-5852 Document: 18 Filed: 10/27/2020 Page: 20