17 © The Author(s) 2019 R. Isaacs, A. Frigerio (eds.), Theorizing Central Asian Politics , International Political Theory, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97355-5_2 CHAPTER 2 Legitimacy and Legitimation in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Sofya du Boulay and Rico Isaacs This chapter is concerned with the concepts of legitimacy and legitimation and how they can be understood and conceptualised in an authoritarian context. These concepts remain fundamental to modern social science, embedded as they are in our understanding of modern democracies and the justification for state power. In polyarchies, we can rely on relatively reliable indicators of public consent to understand the extent to which a regime is believed to be considered legitimate by the populace. Our under- standing of legitimacy and legitimation in authoritarian contexts, how- ever, is deeply limited and perhaps for very good reason. It is challenging to observe and analyse the subjective beliefs of citizens in non-democratic S. du Boulay ( * ) R. Isaacs Department of Social Sciences, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK e-mail: 15058899@brookes.ac.uk; ricoisaacs@brookes.ac.uk Sofya du Boulay is an Early Stage Researcher on the Marie Skłodowska-Curie European Training Network, CASPIAN (SEP-210161673), funded under the EU Horizon2020 programme. 18 contexts because we cannot get a reliable gauge on what those beliefs are. Elections, opinion polls and the media are not helpful guides in this respect. Yet, any cursory search of the vast scholarship on the nature and dynamics of authoritarian regimes speaks often of legitimacy and legitima- tion processes, but our conceptual grasp of what this means is fragile. One existing issue with the current formulations of legitimacy within comparative authoritarianism is that legitimacy is often simply used as a label in passing or as an equation filler—plugging the gap to explain why certain phenomena may contribute to the stability of non-democratic rule. A lack of legitimacy is, therefore, often associated with regime collapse (Hoffmann 2011). The relationship between authoritarian durability and legitimacy is much more complex. Public dissatisfaction, and thus regime illegitimacy, can arise via a decision between exit and voice (Hirschman 1970) or even in silence and apathy (Bexell 2014, p. 23). Illegitimate regimes, therefore, can persist without explicit manifestations of public support whether through mass mobilisation or an informal social contract in which citizens give up their rights and freedoms in exchange for the stability and security of long-term authoritarian rule and social and mate- rial benefits. There is, however, an overemphasis with regard to the extent to which non-democratic leaders require public support. Whether such non-democratic regimes can rely on genuine public support or not, each regime does strive to legitimise itself in some form, whether through adopting democratic institutional arrangements or through a more discur- sive mode whereby the process of legitimation is tied up in an ideologi- cally inevitable and divine mission of the regime to the peace, prosperity and security of the nation (Omelicheva 2016, p. 134). These forms of legitimation are essentially self-legitimation: the attempts by which the regime justifies its belief that its position as arbiter and wielder of power is right and proper. This chapter seeks to explore the concepts of legitimacy and legitima- tion and how they relate to regime self-legitimation in the cases of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. What we argue in this chapter is that legiti- mation and legitimacy in authoritarian contexts need to be understood as a three-part process. The first concerns ‘inputs’, the narratives, discourses and claims of legitimation on behalf of the regime. The second aspect is the process of legitimation, the ways in which actors use and apply these claims in relation to broader society. Finally, there are ‘outputs’, the extent to which the application of claims about the right to rule is ‘believed’ by the population. As noted above, we do not think it entirely possible to S. DU BOULAY AND R. ISAACS 19 make generalised claims in this chapter about the extent to which citizens in authoritarian states believe in the legitimacy of rulers, simply because it is very difficult to discern genuine beliefs in such closed political contexts. Thus, we focus on conceptualising authoritarian claims of self-legitimation. We argue that the existing conceptual framing of legitimation disaggre- gates the concept too far. Approaching our analysis using Von Soest and Grauvogel’s six-part conceptualisation of legitimation, we suggest that in fact many of their separate types of legitimation are overlapping, interde- pendent and interrelated to such an extent that it does not make sense in conceptual terms to treat them as analytically distinct. Instead, we propose a return to the Weberian categories of legal-rational, traditional and char- ismatic legitimation in order to make sense of regime claims of self- legitimation. In applying this conceptual framing to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, we find empirically that not only is there interdependency between these different forms of legitimation, but also the regimes rely on all three forms of legitimation for claim-making about their rule. It is the case, however, that in either case it is possible to see the reliance on specific forms of legitimation more weighted than others. C onCeptualising l egitimaCy and l egitimation in n on - demoCratiC C ontexts There are no single definitions of legitimacy or legitimation that could fully embrace the complexity of their conceptual meaning and functional specificities. While Weber’s much paraphrased definition of legitimacy focuses on a state’s monopoly of physical violence (Weber 1978), other formulations tend towards conflating both legitimacy and legitimation— especially when seeking to understand the relationship between legitimacy and political stability. For example, Morris (2008) considers it a necessary condition of a genuine authority, while others as an activity of either seek- ing or granting legitimacy (Bexell 2014); the basis for the validity of social order (Beetham 1991); or finally a form of ‘institutionalised beliefs’ and ‘a complex political exchange of meanings’ (Omelicheva 2016, p. 6). Beetham (1991) argues that the confusion surrounding the concepts of legitimacy originate from Weber’s Economy and Society where legitimacy is defined as the ‘belief in legitimacy’. And that ‘power is legitimate where those involved in it believe it to be so; legitimacy derives from people’s belief in legitimacy’ (Weber 1978, p. 23). The Weberian interpretation of LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMATION IN KAZAKHSTAN AND TURKMENISTAN 20 legitimacy has drawn criticism, not least for the way in which it reduces legitimacy to the ‘belief in legitimacy’ and as Schaar writes ‘all dissolve legitimacy into belief or opinion. If a people hold the belief that existing institutions are “appropriate” or “morally proper”, then those institutions are legitimate. That’s all there is to it’ (Schaar 1969, p. 284 cited in Beetham 1991, p. 9). For Beetham, most studies of legitimacy that have proceeded from a Weberian interpretation have been prone to bad social science because the ‘belief in legitimacy’ approach has ‘no adequate means of explaining why people acknowledge the legitimacy of power at one time or place or another’ (Beetham 1991, p. 10). Typical Weberian interpreta- tions of legitimacy tend to ignore elements not related to beliefs such as outward demonstrations of consent and legal validity. What is important, according to Beetham (1991, p. 9), is how processes of socialisation and agencies of information dissemination can reproduce ideas and values which engender support for the ‘belief in legitimacy’ of any given regime or set of institutions which underpin political relations. While legitimacy has been typically understood as the ‘belief in legiti- macy’, despite the limitations outlined by Beetham, legitimation must be understood as a distinct concept in its own right (Hinsch 2008). The clas- sic Weberian definition of legitimation refers to the validity of ‘a social action, which involves a social relationship, guided by the belief in the existence of a legitimate order ’ (Weber 1978, p. 31). Thus, legitimation represents a process initiated by a form of social action, typically on the part of the regime (whether a social benefit or a discursive order), which establishes a social relationship that creates the condition in which belief in the existing order of relations between the ruler and the ruled becomes understood as the right, proper and legitimate state of affairs. For Weber, the cultivation of legitimacy exists as three ideal types of domination: the legal-rational, traditional and charismatic (Weber 1978, p. 215). There is no need to rehearse such universally well-known social scientific tropes here, but to re-affirm the main point, legitimacy is distinct from legitimation and their relationship, at least in Weberian terms, is con- ditioned by a process in which social action seeks to establish a set of social relations (legitimation) which can determine the belief in a given configu- ration of political institutions, apparatus and personnel as the right and proper constellation of authority. For power to be fully legitimate, Beetham suggests three conditions are required: conformity to established rules, the justifiability of the rules by reference to shared beliefs and the express consent of the subordinate S. DU BOULAY AND R. ISAACS 21 to the particular relations of power (Beetham 1991, p. 19). The third ele- ment depends on the demonstrative expression of popular consent by the subordinate. The lack of evidence of this consent or disobedience pro- vokes a de-legitimation effect (revolts, revolutions and mass migration). Thus, the process of legitimation is a far more dynamic paradigm with specific properties, discourses and strategies, by which actors aspire to gain and maintain legitimacy, but upon which they are dependent on the consent of the subordinate to believe in the existing relations of power and the justification of such power on the part of the regime (Bexell 2014). This latter point is what could be characterised as ‘self-legitima- tion’ or as Rodney Barker notes, how ‘legitimacy functions as self-justifi- cation for the administrative personnel of government’ (Barker 2001, p. 45). This is what Lipset (1969) drew as a distinction between ‘claims of legitimacy’ and ‘legitimacy’ itself. Claims of regime legitimacy have fundamental political repercussions with regard to ‘elite cohesion, opposi- tion activity and potential regime popularity’ (ibidem, p. 19). Such ‘inter- nal legitimacy claims’ relay the idea that the existing political and social order is righteous and consequently power in the country depends on the popular loyalty and the political elite’s support to such claims (Nazarov 2013, p. 41). Understanding legitimation as a process of self-justifying claim-making is important for our concern. Simply put, most accounts, and especially Beetham’s, of the legitimation of power seek to provide an explanation of legitimation rooted within a democratic frame of reference because of its focus on ‘belief in legitimacy’ (Kneuer 2017). However, in non-democratic contexts, and especially in the Central Asian case, unpacking the extent to which the popular consent part of the legitimation equation is nigh is impossible. Thus, we should instead turn our attention away from the subordinate to the dominant. Differently put, we must address the process of legitimation via the lens of self-legitimation. As Reinhard Bendix noted (1959, p. 294): like all others who enjoy advantages over their fellows, men in power want to see their position as “legitimate” and their advantages as “deserved”, and to interpret the subordination of the many as the “just fate” of those upon whom it “falls”. All rulers therefore develop some myth of their natural superiority, which usually is accepted by the people under stable conditions but may become the object of passionate hatred when some crisis makes the established order appear questionable. LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMATION IN KAZAKHSTAN AND TURKMENISTAN 22 Self-legitimation is therefore an important part of the process of legiti- mation as a mechanism to produce legitimacy. To clarify much of the dis- cussion thus far, legitimacy concerns output: it is the specific condition of a belief in the legitimacy of the ruler to rule. Legitimation is the process by which that legitimacy is produced in which social action (certain actions on the part of the regime) assists in engendering a relationship between the ruler and the ruled in which belief in the legitimacy of the ruler is viewed as right and proper. In non-democratic contexts, in the absence of reliable indicators of consent outside periods of regime instability (revolution and mass pro- test), our intellectual focus should be on the process of self-legitimation: the strategies, stories, discourses and narratives which the regime tells about itself in the hope that it produces legitimacy. The actors within this process are involved in the writing, implementation and interpretation of these different strategies and discourses of regime self-legitimation. What we argue below is that the strategies and discourses of self-legitimation are best analysed utilising Weber’s tripartite typology of legitimation: charis- matic, traditional and legal-rational (Fig. 2.1). l egitimation in an a uthoritarian C ontext Authoritarian legitimation (like all other forms of political legitimation) strongly relies on self-legitimising hegemonic strategies which present the existing political order as natural and uncontroversial (March 2003, p. 210). But how can we best conceptualise the legitimising strategies available to authoritarian regimes, and how are such strategies to be under- stood and contextualised in the case of Central Asia? Recent conceptual modelling by Von Soest and Grauvogel (2015) has provided a six-part disaggregation of self-legitimising strategies. Firstly, post-Soviet regimes rely on ideology which exists as a framework of beliefs Inputs: strategies, discourses etc. (self- legitimation) Process of legitimation: social action conditions relationship between ruler and ruled Output: belief in legitimacy Fig. 2.1 From self-legitimation to legitimacy S. DU BOULAY AND R. ISAACS 23 regarding the righteousness of a given political order (Easton 1975 in Von Soest and Grauvogel 2015, p. 21). Secondly, there is a foundational myth which seeks to embody the connection between the present and the past of the modern state’s territory and symbolises the adaptive capacity of the regime to ensure its historical legacy (Von Soest and Grauvogel 2015, p. 20). Thirdly, there is personalism which seeks to attach the achieve- ments of state security and stability to the actions and abilities of individ- ual leaders (ibidem, p. 25). The fourth type of legitimising strategy concerns the international engagement strategy of authoritarian regimes to bolster their domestic legitimacy by obtaining external claims of legiti- macy for their right to rule. The fifth form of authoritarian legitimation concerns the use of procedure , in other words the formal and legal institu- tions and processes such as elections. Finally, Soest and Grauvogel (2015, p. 22) identify performance-based legitimation which is characterised by the various claims to success in producing desirable political, social and economic outcomes. Soest and Grauvogel’s typology is helpful in disaggregating potential authoritarian legitimation strategies, but the extent to which it reflects the nature and dynamics of legitimation strategies in post-Soviet Central Asia could be questioned. This is for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, as we will observe below, in the cases of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, these forms of self-legitimation are overlapping and thus challenging to disen- tangle from one another. Thus, questioning the necessity for conceptualis- ing them separately. A foundational myth and personalism, for example, are completely intertwined in the case of the first president of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov (see below). Consequently, and the second issue with the typology, it is possible to wonder if there is not some re-invention of the Weberian wheel taking place here. Many of these six legitimation strategies map directly on to Weber’s existing three-part typology for domination. Personalism is essen- tially a Weberian type of charismatic authority, under which ideology could also be posited. This is because of the way in which the personal authority of an authoritarian president can become an ideological framework of beliefs premised upon the personal qualities of the leader. As noted above, foundational myth and personalism overlap too, but they also equate to a Weberian form of traditional legitimation. The procedural strategy of legitimation mirrors Weber’s legal-rational type of authority, and to some extent, it is possible to fold under the same rubric performance-based legitimation too. While it can easily be framed as a form of social LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMATION IN KAZAKHSTAN AND TURKMENISTAN 24 contract theory, performance-based legitimation concerns the effective- ness of the regime to offer a bureaucratic-based administrative system which can provide public goods according to some legally bound rule process. This can take the form of the development strategies regimes put forward with promises of a golden utopian economic paradise or the abil- ity of the state to provide basic public services and goods for citizens. In either case, regime legitimation is dependent on a rational-legal rule- bound system of public delivery (Matveeva 2009, p. 1100). As we will see in the cases below, the regime will often construct a discourse of success and prosperity in spite of its failure in delivery of public goods and values. Von Soest and Grauvogel’s notion of external legitimation is also a form of legal-rational/performance-based legitimation. The strategic use of major international events is often used by authoritarian regimes as a way to seek recognition and acceptance into the international legal-rational order of states. Such events also offer regimes the opportunity to legiti- mise their rule to a domestic audience by emphasising their credentials as important international players. Major international events, therefore, can become a major determinate of the performance of the regime in relation to its external reputation. Simplifying these different typologies of regime legitimation makes sense in the Central Asian context, not least because the regimes in the region tend to adopt various forms of legitimation strategies (Isaacs 2015), but these different forms of claim-making are intrinsically intertwined and interdependent. As will be explained below, these claims can feature com- ponents, say, of personalism, ideology and foundational myths which are then dependent on one another for their viability. In other words, they make no sense outside of the context of each other (see Table 2.1). In light of this, we propose a simpler analytical framework to consider the legitimising claims of authoritarian regimes which recognise the interde- pendency between these different strategies of legitimation. Our aim is Table 2.1 Weberian framework for understanding self-legitimation in authori- tarian regimes Form of legitimation Strategies identified by Van Soest and Grauvogel Charisma Personalism, ideology Tradition Foundational myth, personalism Legal-rational Procedure, performance-based, external legitimation S. DU BOULAY AND R. ISAACS 25 principally to return to the ideal types adopted by Weber as heuristic devices to interpret and understand the capacity of regime self-legitimation strategies in the cases of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This is what we seek to do below. s trategies of s elf -l egitimation Charismatic Legitimation: The Interdependence of Ideology and Personalism For Weber, a charismatic leader is followed and obeyed ‘by virtue of per- sonal trust in his revelation, his exemplary qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the individual’s belief in charisma’ (Weber 1978, p. 213). Charismatic self-legitimation concerns a combination of political ideology and personalised leadership. In Kazakhstan, the interdependent nature between state self- legitimation claims and ideological identification politics has often been viewed as contradictory rather than mutually reinforcing (Akiner 1995; Olcott 2002; Cummings 2006). The relationship underlining the produc- tion of elite-led legitimation and the collective national identity in many cases has been underemphasised or completely overlooked. Partially this problem relates to the overdue transfer of power to a new post-Soviet generation in Central Asia (Olcott 2002, p. 8). For Turkmenistan, how- ever, the focus has been on the complementary relationship between the development of the personality cults of presidents Saparmurat Niyazov and Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov and nation-building (Polese and Horak 2016). These personality cults are understood to offer an integrat- ing narrative around the leader ‘in order to overcome regional/tribal dif- ferences’, compensating for a perceived weakness in terms of a unified national identity (Bohr 2016, p. 29). While these studies are right to focus on the relationship between personality cults and nation-building, they tend to omit two fundamental points in our understanding of them. Firstly, post-Soviet nation-building does not constitute a tabula rasa ; nation-building began in the Soviet period too. And secondly, personality cults are ultimately a form of ideology linked to a Weberian form of char- ismatic legitimation (Isaacs 2015). In general, therefore, we can observe this interdependent nature between ideology and personalism as a form of charismatic legitimation. However, the emphasis on either ideology or personalism is weighted LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMATION IN KAZAKHSTAN AND TURKMENISTAN 26 differently in the two cases. In Kazakhstan, there has been greater empha- sis on the construction of a self-legitimising regime ideology through vari- ous state-building development strategies, which as an addendum are linked to the personal rule and abilities of Nazarbayev. In Turkmenistan, the concentration has been on the personalist rule of both Niyazov and Berdymukhamedov, with state- and nation-building more a by-product of such ideologisation (Polese and Horak 2016). Nonetheless, there has been the gradual emergence of a charismatic personality cult in Kazakhstan too, but obviously not to the extent we have witnessed in Turkmenistan. In Kazakhstan, state-building goals shaped by elites in order to legiti- mise Nazarbayev’s regime included the so-called tripartite program of identification (Cummings 2006, pp. 177–178), consisting of the follow- ing objectives: (a) nurturing of supra-national patriotism; (b) embracing cultural diversity; and (c) reserving a process of cultural awakening for the titular population. The implementation of this national consolidation project was partially realised via the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, which was set up as a presidentially appointed body in 1995. It mainly deals with issues associated with ethnic minorities and multiple ideological projects like Magilik Eli (2016) and Ruhany Zhangyru (2017) which sought to engender the revival of national history and traditions. Nursultan Nazarbayev’s official statements regarding these ideological projects (2013) appeal to the origins of charismatic leadership throughout history, drawing parallels between economic prosperity and political sta- bility. For instance, Nazarbayev self-legitimised his leadership by way of connecting it to historical precedents of charismatic Kazakh leaders of the past such as Ablai Khan (Nazarbayev 2013): His conscientious life Ablai Khan dedicated to the strengthening of the Kazakh State established by the founding fathers Zhanybek and Kerey Khan. He freed the lands of the Kazakh Khanate and secured its territorial integ- rity. History is a true witness of the fact that Ablai was a prominent leader who dreamed to elevate the Kazakh people, to ensure the country’s prosper- ity with the power of diplomacy, without the sharpness of spears. Vladimir Putin’s statement regarding the historical absence of Kazakh statehood and its construction by Nazarbayev led (Osharov 2014) the Kazakh government to launch a state-sponsored TV series The Kazakh Khanate for ‘helping the younger generation realize its cultural and his- toric belonging of their country’ (RBK 2016). The general tendency in S. DU BOULAY AND R. ISAACS 27 identity legitimation policy concerns ethnic Kazakh cultural revival through the monopolisation of the corridors of power by predominantly titular Kazakh nationals and the growing role of the Kazakh language (Cummings 2006; Smagulova 2008; Dave 2007). The strengthening of Kazakh territorial integrity in the post-Soviet period, the promotion of Kazakh ethnic identity as well as the economic prosperity garnered via developmental state-building programmes such as the 2030 and 2050 strategies are closely linked by political elites to the personal attributes of Nazarbayev (Isaacs 2010, p. 441). These ideological state-building pro- grammes are understood as successful as a consequence of Nazarbayev personally. As one parliamentary deputy noted in comparing the president with other father of the nation figures (Suleev 2009): He is not just the president of Kazakhstan. He is the man for the Turks that is Ataturk, for the Malayans – Mahathir, for the Singaporeans – Lee Kuan Yew and for the Americans – Roosevelt ... supporters and opponents of Nazarbayev are united in one thing – without him there would be no present-day Republic of Kazakhstan and the modern state system. The general tendency towards increasing the personality cult of Nazarbayev signals serious political stagnation in society without alterna- tives. In 2017, the capital’s airport was renamed after the president (Nur. kz 2017). Similarly, a central street in Almaty (Furmanov street) was also renamed after Nazarbayev on the commemoration day of the first presi- dent on 1 December 2017 (Radio Azattyk 2017). A similar fate befell Astana Avenue in Shymkent (Isa 2018). All of the above only serves to highlight the extent to which the Kazakhstani regime relies on charismatic authority for its self-legitimation in which ideology and personalism are two interdependent constituent parts. This interdependence between state-building ideological goals and per- sonalism is also evident in Turkmenistan. Broader ideology associated with state-building is directed through personalised narratives regarding ini- tially Niyazov and then Berdymukhamedov. The so-called Golden Age of Turkmenistan, introduced in the 1990s, was built upon the three pillars of ‘independence, neutrality and Ruhnama ’ (Polese and Horak 2016, p. 160). According to Annette Bohr, the Ruhnama (Soul Book) repre- sents Niyazov’s attempt to create a pseudo-ideology which provided a national code of spiritual conduct which also depicts the fundamental LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMATION IN KAZAKHSTAN AND TURKMENISTAN 28 traits and traditions of the Turkmen people (Bohr 2003, p. 13). The book, which has been likened to a mixture of ‘folk history, old wives tales and rather conservative edicts on personal morals’ (Lewis 2008, p. 81), was supposed to be penned by Niyazov. It became a fundamental piece of the Niyazov personality cult. It was also a central element of the nation- building strategy in the regime’s efforts to unify the Turkmen people in the face of traditional tribal and regional divisions (Bohr 2016; Polese and Horak 2016). On assuming the presidency, Berdymukhamedov gradually adopted a personalised ideological framework to define his period of rule. ‘The Golden Age’ was superseded by ‘The Great Renaissance’ in which Berdymukhamedov was praised as being the initiator of great reforms. Partly, the national development programme aimed at socioeconomic development was central to this new epoch of Turkmen history. Nonetheless, the ideology of ‘The Great Renaissance’ as form of legitima- tion cannot be untethered from the special personal qualities of the presi- dent. Echoing the unique qualities inherent in charismatic legitimation, frequent reports in the Turkmen media attest to this connection between ideology and personalism (Nordonov 2008): We all are witnesses to how – thanks to your leadership – the Turkmen peo- ple reached new frontiers to the amazement and vast respect of the interna- tional community. The strategic and tactical reforms you initiated (specific, considerate, aimed at progress and modernization of all spheres of life) imbue every Turkmen with feelings of pride in the Fatherland and in being a citizen of a so advanced and progressive a state. The development of both the Niyazov and Berdymukhamedov person- ality cults are well-documented and there is no necessity to repeat existing analysis (Polese and Horak 2016; Bohr 2003, 2016; Peyrouse 2012; Kunysz 2012) other than to note that Niyazov’s personality cult bordered on the excessive. Not only were there pervasive statues, portraits and other symbolic regalia, but in naming himself Turkmenbashi (leader of all Turkmen), his name was anointed to all manner of places and objects: cit- ies, airlines, vodka, asteroids and so on (Lewis 2008, p. 82). According to Denison, the personality cult became ‘indissoluble from Niyazov’s own predilections and idiosyncrasies materialising the organic, primordial, mys- tical connection between land and people’ (Denison 2009, p. 1176). While Berdymukhamedov slowly decommissioned the Niyazov cult, it was S. DU BOULAY AND R. ISAACS 29 simply replaced with a personality cult dedicated to the new president. In 2011, the Halk Maslahaty (Council of Elders) bestowed the title of Arakdag (protector) on Berdymukhamedov (Bohr 2016, pp. 29–30). Where there had been portraits and golden statues of Niyazov, now they were replaced like for like with the new president’s image. Where once the book shops had been filled with the Rhunama and texts written by Niyazov, now shelves were stocked with the work of the new president. That we can observe personality cults in the Niyazov and Berdymukhamedov regimes is not in doubt, but what it serves to exemplify is not just the very obvious personal nature of rule in Turkmenistan, but also, more impor- tantly, the way in which it rests upon charismatic legitimation. Authority in Turkmenistan is legitimised through the promotion of the exceptional and special qualities of the presidents who have so far held office and their unique and timely contribution to the development of the Turkmen nation. This is charisma, but it includes infused elements of both ideology and personalism. State- and nation-building goals cannot, therefore, be separated from the special attributes and qualities of the leader. Traditional Legitimation: The Interdependence of the Foundational Myth and Personalism For Weber, traditional legitimation rests ‘on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them’ (1978, p. 212). Obedience is delivered to the per- son of ‘the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority and who is (within its sphere) bound by tradition’ (ibidem, pp. 212–3). Therefore, belief in legitimacy is conditioned by historical precedent and patterns of the normative traditional order and often relate to political relations built on loyalty and patronage. There is a substantial body of literature already on Central Asia which explores how political authority in the region is dependent on a set of traditional relations between the subordinate and the dominant marked as a form of patrimo- nialism or neopatrimonialism (Ishiyama 2002; Lewis 2012; Isaacs 2014). Rather than repeating already existing analysis on traditional forms of legitimation in this particular configuration, we wish to examine how the foundational myth, posited by Von Soest and Grauvogel, in essence repre- sents and is a form of traditional legitimation. The foundational myth is a constituent and basic element of traditional legitimation in that it is the embodiment of the complex connection between past and present that LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMATION IN KAZAKHSTAN AND TURKMENISTAN 30 exists on a modern state’s territory, and which symbolises the adaptive capacity of the regime to ensure its historical legacy (Von Soest and Grauvogel 2015, p. 20). There are two predominant narratives associated with the foundation of Kazakh statehood, the Kazakh Khanate and modern statehood since 1991, but the process of traditional legitimation attempts to directly draw a line from the latter to the former. The foundational myth of the Kazakh Khanate is problematic not least because it cannot be understood as a state in modern terms. The three Kazakh Zhuz 1 were mostly separated from each other, did not develop a well-established national identity and lastly were subsumed into the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. The construction of the Kazakh Khanate as a foundational myth is also rooted in Russian (and Kazakh Russian and Soviet educated) historians’ reading of Kazakh history such as in the work of Russian orientalist Vasili Barthold. Barthold’s reading is that the Kazakh Khanate was established by Zhanybek and Kerey Khan, who in the seventeenth century led disparate Uzbek-Turkic tribes to what is now the plains of the Kazakh steppe (Olcott 1987). Since indepen- dence, this foundational myth has acted as a self-legitimating tool for the Nazarbayev regime in which it seeks to illustrate antecedents for statehood which go back further than Kazakhstan’s creation as a Soviet Republic and independent statehood. This historical foundational myth of the Kazakh Khanate is used as a self-legitimising tool to illustrate that modern Kazakh nationhood is the historical continuation of the Kazakh Khanate. This is achieved mostly through cultural works. State-sponsored films such as Nomad (2005) and Myn Bala (2011), alongside the TV series the Kazakh Khanate , are all aimed at fostering social bonds of connection to this construction of his- tory (Isaacs 2018). But it is also used as a broad narrative to legitimise the authority of Nazarbayev’s rule and to demonstrate that he holds the posi- tion of leader on the basis of sanctioned historical tradition and some form of social historical normative order. Nomad , a historical film about Ablai Khan, which was sponsored by the presidential administration, is especially evocative of this form of tradi- tional legitimation. It is suggested that the president’s involvement with 1 Zhuz , which translates as hundred or horde, were tribal federation structures based on genealogical lineage rather than being associated with any formal state structures or specific geographical bounded territory. S. DU BOULAY AND R. ISAACS 31 the film was an attempt to draw a direct analogy with himself and a key figure in Kazakh history (Yessenova 2011, p. 190). In the film, Ablai Khan’s achievement of defending the homeland and unifying all the Kazakh Zhuz is construed as analogous to Nazarbayev’s state-building efforts in the post-Soviet period, given Kazakhstan’s complex multi-ethnic demographic make-up. Despite the attempt to draw parallels between the Kazakh Khanate and the modern Kazakh state, and historical figures such as Ablai Khan, some scholars have, however, challenged the idea of direct continuity between the Kazakh Khanate and the modern Kazakh state because of the very different cultural contexts in which these states were constituted (Hancock-Parmer 2015). Traditional legitimation exists in Turkmenistan too. This was realised most acutely through an emphasis on linking the modern Turkmen people and the Niyazov regime with mythical rulers and folklore well-known to the Turkmen people, in particular Oghuz Khan, Sultan Sanjar and the poet Magtymkuly (Denison 2009, p. 1173). Historians and ideologues were then charged by the regime with connecting ‘the personal history of the president and his family with the history of the Turkmen nation in a relationship of mutual dependency’ (Polese and Horak 2016, p. 463). The point was to establish a clear set of normative relations between the president and the historical past which could act to justify belief in his leadership on the basis of tradition and history. Much of this historical nar- rative was embedded in the Ruhnama where Niyazov was positioned as the culmination of these great figures in Turkmen history and the greatest Turkmen that ever lived (Polese and Horak 2015, p. 463). Justification of Niyazov’s rule, therefore, was driven partially by attempts at traditional legitimation, despite the outlandish claims inherent to the narrative. Such efforts have been less evident during Berdymukhamedov’s tenure as presi- dent, thus far, but the case of Turkmenistan, as with Kazakhstan, serves to underline the way in which we cannot separate notions of a foundational myth from the Weberian classification of traditional legitimation, and that it makes little sense to do so. Legal-Rational Legitimation: The Interdependence of Procedural, Performance-Based and External Legitimation As argued above, Von Soest and Grauvogel’s notions of procedural, performance-based and external legitimation can also be understood as overlapping and tied to the Weberian concept of legal-rational legitimation. LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMATION IN KAZAKHSTAN AND TURKMENISTAN 32 Legal-rational legitimation depends on the belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands’ (Weber 1978, p. 212). In the case of legal authority ‘obedi- ence is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office under it by virtue of the formal legality of their commands and only with the scope of authority in the office’ (ibidem, pp. 212–3).In the case of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, procedural legitimation can be observed by looking at formal institutional processes and rules; performance-based legitimation can be seen in the construction of national development strategies; and external legitimation claims can be located in the ways in which regimes use high-profile inter- national events in an attempt to legitimise their rule for both domestic and international audiences. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan both possess a set of legal-rational norms codified within their constitutions. Political leaders in both countries pay homage to the importance of constitutional rule and hold up such consti- tutional prescriptions as evidence of their commitment to international democratic norms. Elections are important in as much as they are a dem- onstration to the regime, citizens and external actors that the regimes pos- sess legitimacy from citizens in their rightness to hold authority and their right to rule. The excessive votes in favour of the presidential incumbents in both countries (in 2015, Nazarbayev received 97.7% of the votes, and in 2017, Berdymukhamedov gained 97.69%) to some extent alert us to the importance of elections as a form of legitimation and affirmation for the regimes. While of course elections are problematic in terms of their validity and reliability as guides for truly understanding the political prefer- ences of citizens in both countries due to their fraudulent nature, elections can still