Unequal Exchange and Value Capture in Global Trade This report adopts the explicitly critical framing requested by the user, while also following the user’s equally explicit instruction to avoid exaggeration and state only claims that can be supported as rigorously as possible. Executive summary The basic empirical pattern is not controversial: many low- and middle-income economies remain specialized in raw or lightly processed exports, while a disproportionate share of value is captured in processing, logistics, branding, finance, intellectual property and retail, which are concentrated elsewhere. UNCTAD defines a country as commodity-dependent when at least 60% of its merchandise export revenues come from commodities; in 2018–2019, about 53% of all UNCTAD member States and 64% of developing countries were commodity-dependent. “Ordinary specialization” is not the same thing as “unequal exchange.” Specialization can be mutually beneficial in principle. The unequal-exchange claim is narrower: under actually existing market structures, institutional rules and bargaining asymmetries, some participants systematically capture far more value than others for connected stages of the same chain. Cocoa is a strong opening example, but not an isolated one. UNCTAD’s own comparative evidence shows similar price ladders in bauxite → alumina → aluminium, LNG → fertilizers, coffee, timber and other chains. In cocoa, UNCTAD reports indicative net export unit values of roughly $2.47–$2.58/kg for beans, $4.41–$4.74/kg for cocoa butter, $5.54/kg for filled chocolate bars, and $7.20/kg for unfilled chocolate bars. In a related UNCTAD value-share example for a milk chocolate bar, cocoa bean production captured 12% of value, intermediate processing 8%, industrial chocolate manufacturing 23%, and final production plus retail and distribution 57%. Coffee shows the same structural skew. UNCTAD’s coffee study found that Ethiopian growers in the example it analyzed received 2.8% of the retail price, while only about 5% of global value remained in the producing country; UNCTAD later summarized the same case by noting that retailers captured 48% and roasters 14.8%. The mechanisms are multiple and cumulative: concentrated trading and processing, tariff escalation against processed exports, control over standards and logistics, ownership of brands and IP, cheap labor through buyer power, and external financing structures that drain foreign exchange and public revenue from producer economies. Market concentration matters. UNCTAD reported that in cocoa, the three biggest trading and processing companies handled roughly 50–60% of world production in 2013 and four transnational corporations controlled more than 60% of world cocoa grindings in 2014. In coffee, UNCTAD reported that five traders handled over 40% of world trade and two major roasters controlled about one quarter of roasting. This is not only about “raw materials versus factories.” OECD estimates that intangible capital accounts for about 27% of income in manufacturing global value chains, and WIPO emphasizes that technology, design and branding account for a large part of what consumers pay. In other words, value capture is increasingly concentrated in assets that scale globally and can be legally protected. • 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6 • 7 • 8 1 Labor unequal exchange is real in the modest, uncontroversial sense that buyer-driven chains often rely on wage arbitrage and purchasing practices that suppress wages and compliance at the supplier level. ILO research links adverse sourcing practices to lower pay, longer hours and poorer compliance outcomes in garment supply chains. A more expansive recent peer-reviewed literature goes further, estimating very large net transfers of embodied labor from South to North; those stronger claims are important, but require more caution in how they are phrased. Ecological unequal exchange is also more than a slogan. UNEP notes that resource extraction and processing account for over 60% of global warming impacts and 40% of health-related air- pollution impacts; high-income countries use roughly six times more materials per capita than low-income countries, and around 40% of global resource extraction and use is linked to world trade once indirect resource use is included. Debt and fiscal leakage reinforce the pattern. The World Bank reported that developing countries spent a record $1.4 trillion servicing foreign debt in 2023, with interest payments of $406 billion. UNCTAD has estimated that tax avoidance linked to offshore investment hubs costs developing countries about $100 billion per year in lost tax revenue. The evidence does not support a simplistic claim that “all processing should always be localized.” Some downstream stages are energy-intensive, scale-intensive, quality-sensitive or geographically tied to final demand. The stronger claim that survives scrutiny is narrower: the present international distribution of markets, capabilities, bargaining power and rules makes moving up the chain systematically harder for many commodity exporters than standard trade theory often implies. There are real counterexamples and partial successes. Indonesia’s nickel policy increased downstream processing and export value, though at environmental, geopolitical and allocative cost. Botswana achieved partial upgrading in diamonds, but with limited job creation and continued dependence. Côte d’Ivoire increased cocoa grinding, but Europe still dominates the higher-value chocolate and branded retail stages. The main conclusion is therefore strong but bounded: cocoa is not an anomaly. It is a typical and unusually legible case of a broader pattern in which producer countries often capture little from the most lucrative stages of the chains they physically sustain. The magnitude differs by sector, time and policy regime, but the pattern itself is well supported. Terms and method This report uses the following terms in restrained, operational senses. Ordinary specialization means countries focusing on different stages or products according to capabilities, endowments, institutions and market access. Commodity dependence follows UNCTAD’s threshold: at least 60% of merchandise export revenues from commodities. Global value chains are cross-border production systems in which distinct tasks are located in different jurisdictions. Value capture means the share of value added or final price appropriated at a given stage. Unequal exchange is used here as a claim about persistent asymmetry in value capture across linked stages, not as a claim that trade is always zero-sum. Ecological unequal exchange refers to asymmetric transfers of biophysical resources and environmental burdens. Labor unequal exchange refers to asymmetric transfers of embodied labor time and/or the systemic use of wage differentials and buyer power to depress compensation in supplier locations. Methodologically, the report privileges institutional sources for quantitative claims: UNCTAD, World Bank, WITS/UN Comtrade, ICCO, ILO, OECD, WIPO, UNEP, WTO and IMF. Where there is no clean public institutional series linking two stages, I use transparent proxies and mark them as such. All “multiplication factors” in the table are unit-value ratios , not profit margins and not estimates of surplus extraction at the firm level. They mix different geographies, quality mixes and contract terms; • 9 • 10 • 11 • 12 • 13 • 14 15 2 they are therefore best read as illustrative ladders of value capture , not as exact measures of net profit. A second limitation is comparability. Farm-gate, FOB, exchange-traded benchmark, export unit value, wholesale and retail prices are not the same thing. In several chains, the public data are strongest at one stage and weaker at another. Whenever that happens, the text separates high-confidence structural claims from medium-confidence indicative comparisons . That distinction matters, because the core argument does not depend on any single spectacular multiplier; it depends on the repeated appearance of the same pattern across many chains and mechanisms. The charting recommendation also follows from method. For a public PDF, the best design is a horizontal bar chart , with full labels at left, numeric factor labels at the end of each bar, and either a second panel or a log scale if extreme outliers such as bauxite → aluminium tubes are included. The user’s earlier concern about unreadable x-axis labels was correct: for this subject, readability is not cosmetic; it is methodological. Cocoa as the entry point Cocoa remains one of the cleanest examples because the contrast is visible even in simple benchmark data. The ICCO reported that Côte d’Ivoire’s fixed 2024/25 farm-gate price was CFA 1.8 million per tonne, equivalent to about $3,060 per tonne , or $3.06/kg , at the start of the season. ICCO also explains that the fixed producer price is built from roughly 60% of the average price on export licences and forward contracts plus the $400/tonne Living Income Differential . Separately, the World Bank’s 2024 cocoa benchmark averaged $6.52/kg , showing how high terminal-market prices can sit above regulated producer prices. That does not mean the farmer “should” automatically receive the terminal benchmark. Farm-gate and exchange prices are different stages with different deductions, timing and risk allocations. But it does show a steep ladder. UNCTAD’s commodity value-added report gives indicative net export unit values of $2.47–$2.58/kg for cocoa beans, $4.41–$4.74/kg for cocoa butter, $5.54/kg for filled chocolate bars and $7.20/kg for unfilled chocolate bars. In other words, even before one reaches branded supermarket retail, the chain’s unit values already rise materially as control moves away from bean production. Retail is the hardest stage to measure with a clean international institutional per-kilogram series, so the most defensible institutional proxy is a value-share decomposition rather than a single shelf price. In UNCTAD’s milk-chocolate-bar example, cocoa bean production captured 12% , intermediate processing 8% , industrial chocolate manufacturing 23% , and final production plus retail and distribution 57% . That is the essential political economy of the chain in one picture: the bean matters physically, but most monetized control sits downstream. Concentration makes this easier to reproduce. UNCTAD reported that the three biggest cocoa trading and processing companies handled roughly 50–60% of world cocoa production in 2013, and four 16 17 weak bargaining power debt & FX constraints ecological burden trader concentration IP & branding rents Extraction / farm-gate Export sale / port / benchmark price Primary processing Industrial manufacturing Branding, distribution, retail 18 19 20 3 transnational corporations controlled more than 60% of global cocoa grindings in 2014. The result is not a literal cartel in the simple sense, but it is a structure in which a very fragmented production base faces a much more concentrated set of buyers, processors and brand owners. One can therefore summarize the cocoa case cautiously as follows: farmers are not “paid nothing,” producer states are not wholly excluded from processing, and local grinding in West Africa has increased. But the chain’s most defensible public data still show that the most lucrative stages remain disproportionately located in countries and firms that do not grow cocoa. Cocoa is not proof of every radical claim ever made about trade; it is proof of a more modest but still serious claim: physical indispensability does not guarantee monetary capture Cocoa stage Indicative figure Interpretation Confidence Côte d’Ivoire farm- gate price, 2024/25 $3.06/kg Regulated producer price at season opening High ICCO pricing-rule export-contract basis about $4.43/kg Inferred from ICCO’s “60% of forward export price + $400/t LID” rule; this is a proxy , not a directly observed standardized FOB series Medium World Bank cocoa benchmark, 2024 average $6.52/kg Terminal-market benchmark, not farm-gate High Cocoa-butter net export unit value $4.41– $4.74/kg Primary processing already raises unit value High Chocolate-bar net export unit value $5.54– $7.20/kg Industrial manufacturing raises it further High Final production + retail + distribution share 57% of bar value Best institutional proxy for the shelf-price stage High Comparative evidence across chains The point of the next table is not that every chain behaves identically. Some multipliers are modest at early processing stages; others are huge only once metallurgy, chemistry, engineering, branding or packaging enter. The point is that across a wide range of chains, the producer position is often structurally closer to the lowest-margin segment of the ladder, while the better-defended segments sit downstream. The chart below uses a subset of the table’s ratios. To keep the scale readable, the most extreme outlier, bauxite → aluminium tubes and pipes , is omitted from the graphic and left in the table. For the final public PDF, this should be redrawn as a horizontal bar chart with a legend or adjacent table giving full chain names and end labels for every value. 21 22 23 23 24 19 19 20 25 4 Chain Producer side Downstream side Raw unit value Transformed unit value Indicative factor Principal value- capture mechanism Sources Co Cocoa beans → cocoa butter Bean exporters led by Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Nigeria Butter/ chocolate hubs led by Europe $2.47– $2.58/ kg $4.41–$4.74/ kg 1.7–1.9x Grinding capacity, standards, finance, concentration Hi Cocoa beans → filled chocolate bars Same Germany/ Belgium/ Poland among top chocolate exporters $2.47– $2.58/ kg $5.54/kg 2.1–2.2x Manufacturing, branding, distribution Hi Cocoa beans → unfilled chocolate bars Same Same $2.47– $2.58/ kg $7.20/kg 2.8–2.9x Manufacturing complexity, branding, logistics Hi Indicative value multiplication in selected chains Cocoa → butter Cocoa → bar Coffee → roast Tea → pkg Logs SEA → sawn Phosphate → DAP Cotton → garment Iron → bars Bauxite → Al 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Factor 26 27 27 5 Chain Producer side Downstream side Raw unit value Transformed unit value Indicative factor Principal value- capture mechanism Sources Co Green coffee → roasted coffee Raw exporters led by Brazil, Vietnam, Colombia Roasted exporters led by Switzerland, Italy, Germany about $4.52/ kg about $36.44/kg 8.1x Roasting, blending, packaging, brand power M Green coffee → roasted decaf coffee Same Exporters such as Switzerland, France, Italy about $4.52/ kg about $34.90/kg 7.7x Processing, technology, packaging, brands M Bulk black tea → packaged black tea Bulk exporters led by Kenya, Sri Lanka, India Packaged exporters include Sri Lanka, Poland, UK about $2.24/ kg about $6.52/ kg 2.9x Packaging, blending, market access M Bulk black tea → packaged black tea Same Poland as a large packaged-tea exporter about $2.24/ kg about $12.31/kg 5.5x Packaging, re- exporting, distribution M Logs, Africa → sawnwood, Africa benchmark Regional benchmark Regional benchmark $379.9/ cum $607.6/cum 1.6x Milling and grading Hi Logs, Southeast Asia → sawnwood, Southeast Asia benchmark Regional benchmark Regional benchmark $200.5/ cum $691.1/cum 3.4x Milling, drying, sorting Hi Bauxite ore → alumina Bauxite- producing economies Alumina refining hubs $0.04– $0.06/ kg about $0.42–$0.46/ kg 7.0–11.5x Energy- intensive refining, capital, technology Hi Bauxite ore → unwrought aluminium Same Smelting hubs $0.04– $0.06/ kg about $3.28/ kg 54.7– 82.0x Smelting, electricity, scale economies Hi 28 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 6 Chain Producer side Downstream side Raw unit value Transformed unit value Indicative factor Principal value- capture mechanism Sources Co Bauxite ore → aluminium tubes and pipes Same Advanced metalworking exporters $0.04– $0.06/ kg about $5.8– $9.2/kg 96.7– 230.0x Fabrication, engineering, standards Hi LNG → ammonium nitrate Gas exporters Fertilizer producers about $0.92/ kg about $1.30/ kg 1.4x Chemical conversion, energy integration Hi LNG → urea Gas exporters Fertilizer producers about $0.92/ kg about $1.50/ kg 1.6x Chemical conversion, industrial policy Hi Phosphate rock → DAP Rock exporters / reserve- holders Fertilizer producers $152.5/ mt $599.2/mt 3.9x Chemical upgrading Hi Phosphate rock → TSP Same Fertilizer producers $152.5/ mt $451.3/mt 3.0x Chemical upgrading Hi Raw cotton → cotton yarn Raw exporters led by Brazil, U.S., Australia Yarn exporters led by Pakistan, India, Turkey about $1.86/ kg about $2.44/ kg 1.3x Early-stage spinning; modest gain at first processing step M Raw cotton → cotton garments Same Garment exporters incl. China, Jordan, India about $1.86/ kg about $26.43/kg 14.2x Apparel assembly, finishing, market access, branding (partial) M Natural rubber TSR20 → smoked sheets Raw rubber producers led by Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia Early processed- rubber exporters about $1.58/ kg about $2.30/ kg 1.46x Early processing only; larger gains occur further downstream M 32 32 32 31 31 33 34 35 7 Chain Producer side Downstream side Raw unit value Transformed unit value Indicative factor Principal value- capture mechanism Sources Co Iron ore → forged iron/non- alloy steel bars and rods Iron-ore exporters led by Australia, Brazil Downstream steel exporters incl. Malaysia about $0.10/ kg about $0.51/ kg 5.1x Metallurgy, energy, fabrication M The comparative lesson from the table is not that every raw material can or should become a final consumer good in the country of origin. It is that when one follows the best-documented price ladders , the low-value position is disproportionately the one occupied by raw-material exporters, while higher-value stages are associated with capital, energy, technology, logistics, standards, IP and access to demand. Those are not natural facts; they are institutionally produced advantages. Beyond raw materials The same pattern extends beyond the raw-material stage. In labor terms, buyer-driven chains often transfer competitive pressure downward. ILO research on garments links purchasing practices to low wages, longer hours, poorer compliance and workplace stress; the ILO also reports that adverse sourcing practices correlate with lower pay and poorer compliance outcomes, and one supplier-side study found wages 50% below sectoral averages in South Africa and 26% below in another case referenced in the survey material. UNCTAD’s coffee work reaches a parallel conclusion from the commodity side: growers can receive only a tiny fraction of the final consumer price. A stronger, more theoretical literature quantifies this as unequal exchange of labor. A 2024 Nature Communications paper estimates that in 2021 the economies of the global North net-appropriated 826 billion hours of embodied labor from the global South, with a wage-value equivalent of €16.9 trillion in Northern prices. That paper should neither be ignored nor repeated carelessly: it is peer-reviewed and methodologically serious, but it also depends on definitions of North/South, wage valuation and input- output accounting that are open to debate. The safest conclusion is that the mainstream institutional literature already documents the mechanisms of wage suppression in global chains, while the more radical literature attempts to aggregate them. Ecologically, UNEP’s evidence is unambiguous that the environmental load is heavily tied to extraction and processing. The 2024 Global Resources Outlook states that resource extraction and processing account for over 60% of climate-warming impacts and 40% of health-related air-pollution impacts. UNEP also highlights the distributive asymmetry: high-income countries use around six times more materials per capita than low-income countries, and an earlier UNEP/IRP assessment found that roughly 40% of global resource extraction and use is linked to world trade once indirect material use is counted. OECD work on embodied carbon likewise shows that several non-OECD economies are net exporters of CO2 embodied in trade. Intellectual property, design and branding move the story into intangibles. WIPO’s World IP Report stresses that technology, design and branding determine a large share of what consumers ultimately pay, and OECD estimates that total intangible capital accounts for about 27% of income in manufacturing GVCs . Put bluntly: one reason the cocoa farmer does not capture the chocolate margin 36 37 38 39 40 8 is that the chocolate margin is not only “manufacturing”; it is also package design, trademarks, formulations, consumer data, supermarket shelf access and the legal ability to defend those rents. Finance amplifies these asymmetries. The World Bank reports that developing countries spent a record $1.4 trillion on foreign-debt service in 2023, including $406 billion in interest. IMF work similarly stresses that many emerging and developing economies face elevated debt vulnerabilities and financing needs that squeeze development spending. And UNCTAD’s estimate of $100 billion a year in tax-revenue losses tied to offshore investment links shows that even when value is generated locally, part of the bookable income can still be shifted away fiscally. Finally, logistics and port systems matter because trade is not frictionless. The World Bank’s Container Port Performance Index emphasizes that longer turnaround times reduce effective shipping capacity and propagate delays through global networks. UNCTAD’s maritime review likewise notes that after the pandemic-era congestion, port performance and connectivity directly shape cargo handling and trade facilitation. This does not by itself prove unequal exchange; it shows how the capacity to coordinate and move goods becomes one more layer of advantage in downstream capture. Counterarguments and moving up the chain The strongest counterargument is the simplest one: raw exporters are not “cheated” merely because someone else processes the raw material. Processing takes capital, electricity, engineering, quality control, proximity to consumers and scale; in many cases, it is efficient that not every producing country undertakes every stage. That objection is valid as far as it goes. It rules out lazy moralism. It does not rule out the possibility that the current allocation of profitable stages is systematically shaped by unequal bargaining power, tariff escalation, concentrated buyer structures, financial constraints and asymmetric control over intangibles. A second counterargument is that some producer countries have moved up the chain, which would seem to disprove the trap thesis. That objection is useful, because it forces the analysis to become empirical. Indonesia is the clearest large-scale success story in this report: after the nickel-ore export ban, a World Bank study found increased domestic value added in downstream iron- and steel-using exports, and a U.S. ITC review notes that the value of Indonesia’s nickel exports surged from $3 billion to $30 billion within two years as exports shifted toward processed products. Yet even here the story is mixed: the same World Bank work studies allocative trade-offs, and other assessments raise environmental and governance concerns. This is better understood as partial strategic upgrading , not as a universally replicable blueprint. Botswana shows a different kind of qualified success. A World Bank skills note describes how the country moved from exporting rough diamonds with minimal local processing toward building a cutting and polishing industry, valued at $550 million in the note’s account. But the same family of evidence also stresses the limits: the diamond sector remains capital-intensive, job creation is constrained, and the economy stays exposed to diamond dependence. Botswana therefore demonstrates that “moving up the chain” is possible, yet insufficient on its own when the upstream sector is narrow and downstream capabilities remain enclave-like. Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa strategy fits the same pattern of partial upgrading. Public and quasi-public studies document the country’s effort to increase domestic grinding through tax incentives and differential export duties. That matters: local processing is real, jobs are real, and export structure can change. But the top chocolate-exporting countries remain overwhelmingly European, and the most defensible public value-share decompositions still place the largest slice near final production, retail and 41 42 43 44 45 46 9 distribution. So local grinding helps, but it does not by itself relocate branding, supermarket power or premium consumer markets. There are also straightforward failures or stalled cases. UNCTAD itself uses Nigeria and Zambia as emblematic examples: Nigeria exports crude oil and imports refined oil; Zambia exports raw copper and imports copper-made electric wires. Those cases matter because they remind us that the relevant question is not “can one imagine a factory?” but “can the whole ecosystem of energy, finance, technology, standards, scale and demand be assembled?” Often the answer remains no, or not yet. The counter-counterargument is therefore this: yes, upgrading is difficult for real economic reasons; but that difficulty is part of the phenomenon , not a refutation of it. If countries systematically face higher tariffs on processed products, thin fiscal space because of debt service, technology barriers because of IP and concentration, and volatile foreign exchange because they remain commodity-dependent, then saying “they should simply diversify” is analytically shallow. That is exactly why UNCTAD speaks of a commodity dependence trap Conclusion and reliability notes The clearest answer to the report’s final question is this: cocoa is typical, not isolated . It is not identical to coffee, bauxite, phosphate, cotton, timber or nickel, and the scale of the multiplier differs radically by sector. But the broader pattern repeats too often to dismiss. The world economy repeatedly places producer economies at stages where prices are volatile, bargaining power is weak, environmental burdens are heavy and differentiation is limited, while downstream stages capture the margins associated with chemistry, metallurgy, engineering, IP, brand control, distribution and finance. My confidence is high on the existence of the pattern, high on many of the chain-level price ladders in the comparison table, high on the concentration and debt-service claims, medium on broad generalization from any one chain to the whole world economy, and medium-to-cautious on the most ambitious “labor unequal exchange” aggregates from recent academic work. That distribution of confidence is exactly what one should want in a public-facing document: strong where the evidence is strongest, explicit where interpretation begins. A short quotable formulation would be: The problem is not that producer countries contribute no value. It is that, in too many global chains, they are structurally confined to the stages where value is hardest to defend and easiest for others to price down. That is why cocoa is not a curiosity. It is a readable case of a wider architecture. Claims most likely to be attacked online. The strongest claims in this report are the ones with direct institutional numerics: commodity-dependence frequencies, cocoa/coffee value ladders, bauxite and fertilizer multipliers, concentration in cocoa and coffee, debt-service burdens and the role of intangibles in GVC income. The claims that require the most careful phrasing are the more synthetic ones: that unequal exchange is the best theoretical label for these patterns, and that embodied-labor estimates such as 826 billion hours should be treated as exact magnitudes rather than model-based approximations. Those claims are not weak, but they are more interpretation-sensitive and should remain explicitly labeled as such. Promising but insufficiently quantified chains. Public institutional sources suggest the same broad logic in cashews, fish/tuna, leather/footwear, copper/cable, lithium/cathodes, cobalt/precursors, silicon/ wafers, rare-earth magnets, vanilla/flavorings and crude oil/petrochemicals. I did not include them in the core table because I did not find, in the time available, a clean enough institutional series linking 47 1 48 49 50 2 51 10 directly comparable units at both ends of the chain without stretching the evidence. That omission is a strength, not a weakness: it is better to leave a plausible example out than to force it in on weak comparability grounds. Bibliography grouped by type. The institutional backbone of the report is UNCTAD’s Commodities and Development and Structural Transformation through Domestic Value Addition materials; the World Bank’s Pink Sheet, WITS/UN Comtrade interfaces and debt reports; ICCO’s market reviews; ILO work on purchasing practices and wages; OECD studies on intangible capital and embodied carbon; WIPO reports on intangible capital and IP indicators; UNEP’s Global Resources Outlook and IRP material-flow work; WTO/UNCTAD/ITC tariff-profile material; and IMF work on debt vulnerabilities. Peer-reviewed academic work was used mainly where institutional series are thinner on theory-driven constructs, especially the recent Nature Communications article on embodied labor. NGO and quasi-public material was used only sparingly and only where methods were transparent or where it documented publicly described policy instruments already corroborated elsewhere. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditccom2021d1_en.pdf https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditccom2021d1_en.pdf https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ c1mem2d61_en.pdf https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/c1mem2d61_en.pdf https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditccom2018d1_en.pdf https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditccom2018d1_en.pdf https://unctad.org/press-material/report-cocoa-industry-reform-needed-stop-farmers- being-left-behind https://unctad.org/press-material/report-cocoa-industry-reform-needed-stop-farmers-being-left-behind https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/returns-to-intangible-capital-in-global-value-chains_4cd06f19- en.html https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/returns-to-intangible-capital-in-global-value-chains_4cd06f19-en.html https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/%40ed_protect/%40protrav/ %40travail/documents/publication/wcms_561141.pdf https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/wcmsp5/groups/public/%40ed_protect/%40protrav/%40travail/documents/ publication/wcms_561141.pdf https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/rich-countries-use-six-times-more- resources-generate-10-times https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/rich-countries-use-six-times-more-resources-generate-10-times https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/12/03/developing-countries-paid- record-1-4-trillion-on-foreign-debt-in-2023 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/12/03/developing-countries-paid-record-1-4-trillion-on-foreign- debt-in-2023 https://unctad.org/news/tariff-escalation-keeps-developing-economies-moving-global-value- chains https://unctad.org/news/tariff-escalation-keeps-developing-economies-moving-global-value-chains https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/ermm_indonesia_export_ban_of_nickel.pdf https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/ermm_indonesia_export_ban_of_nickel.pdf 52 1 2 15 51 3 4 14 19 25 26 27 32 49 52 5 6 7 21 50 8 9 38 10 40 11 42 12 44 48 13 11 https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/ 5d903e848db1d1b83e0ec8f744e55570-0350012021/related/CMO-Pink-Sheet-December-2024.pdf https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/5d903e848db1d1b83e0ec8f744e55570-0350012021/related/CMO-Pink-Sheet- December-2024.pdf https://www.icco.org/wp-content/uploads/Cocoa-Market-Report-September-2024.pdf https://www.icco.org/wp-content/uploads/Cocoa-Market-Report-September-2024.pdf https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/edar2019_en_ch3.pdf https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/edar2019_en_ch3.pdf https://www.rvo.nl/files/file/2023-03/Cocoa-Processing-Study-Final-report.pdf https://www.rvo.nl/files/file/2023-03/Cocoa-Processing-Study-Final-report.pdf https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/GBR/year/2024/tradeflow/Imports/ partner/ALL/product/090111 https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/GBR/year/2024/tradeflow/Imports/partner/ALL/product/090111 https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/ALL/year/2024/tradeflow/Exports/partner/ WLD/product/090240 https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/ALL/year/2024/tradeflow/Exports/partner/WLD/product/090240 https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/All/year/2024/tradeflow/Exports/partner/ WLD/product/520100 https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/All/year/2024/tradeflow/Exports/partner/WLD/product/520100 https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2020/09/returns-to-intangible- capital-in-global-value-chains_43f8aab3/4cd06f19-en.pdf https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2020/09/returns-to-intangible-capital-in-global-value- chains_43f8aab3/4cd06f19-en.pdf https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-024-49687-y https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-024-49687-y https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_944_2017.pdf https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_944_2017.pdf https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/87d77e6d-6b7b-4bbe-b292- ae0f3b4827e8 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/87d77e6d-6b7b-4bbe-b292-ae0f3b4827e8 https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099457511102525232/pdf/IDU-dd5457e6-f5fe-419c- b0ef-ae05bd244854.pdf https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099457511102525232/pdf/IDU-dd5457e6-f5fe-419c-b0ef-ae05bd244854.pdf https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/8a754160-26ad-5509-affb-de5497eea53f https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/8a754160-26ad-5509-affb-de5497eea53f 16 24 31 35 36 17 18 23 20 22 47 28 29 30 33 34 37 39 41 43 45 46 12