Human Rights Council Sixty - second session 1 5 June – 1 0 July 202 6 Agenda item 3 Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development Visit to Germany Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression , Irene Khan * , ** Summary The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression carried out an official country visit to Germany from 26 January to 6 February 2026. In this report, she identifies major trends affecting freedom of e xpression in Germany, including increasing polarization of society, chilling of speech, and an upsurge in antisemitism, Islamophobia and hate speech against migrants and minorities. While acknowledging Germany’s strong constitutional protection of human ri ghts, a robust, independent judiciary, diverse media and initiatives in the digital sphere, she expresses concern about excessive use of the criminal law to restrict freedom of expression, especially in the context of Palestine and climate related advocacy and activism. She encourages the Government to carry out legal and policy reforms to strengthen freedom of expression in line with international human rights standards and, working with civil society and other relevant stakeholders, combat antisemitism, a nti - Muslim hatred and other forms of hate speech, invest in digital and media literacy and other measures to expand safe and pluralistic spaces online and offline for all * The present report was submitted after the deadline so as to include the most recent information. ** The summary of the report is being circulated in all official languages. The report itself, which is annexed to the summary, is being circulated in the language of submission only. A /HRC/ 62 / 67 /Add. 1 Advance unedited version Distr.: General 10 June 202 6 Original: English A/HRC/ 62 / 67 /Add. 1 2 Annex Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Irene Khan I. Introduction 1. The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of freedom of opinion and expression, Irene Khan, conducted an official country visit to Germany from 26 January to 6 February 2026, the first ever to that country by this mandate since its establishme nt in 1993. The visit was carried out in accordance with the standing invitation extended by the Government of Germany to all Special Procedures and pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution 52/9 of 3 April 2023 2. The Special Rapporteur visited Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden, Cologne, Dusseldorf, and Karlsruhe. The main purpose of the visit was to assess the state of freedom of opinion and expression in Germany in light of international human rights norms and standards an d make recommendations based on her findings. 3. At the Federal level, the Special Rapporteur met with officials of the Federal Foreign Office (GFFO), and Ministries of the Interior and Justice, as well as the Federal parliamentary committees on Digital Transformation and Government Modernisation and the Interior. She had the honour to call on the Presidents of the Federal Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. She also met with the Director of the German Institute for Human Rights, the Federal Government Commissioner for J ewish Life in Germany and the Fight against Antisemitism , Federal Anti - Discrimination Commissioner, officials of the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the Media, the Federal Network Agency, the Commission on Concentration in the Media and the Director - General of Deutsche Welle. 4. At the State (Land) level, in Berlin the Special Rapporteur met with the State Secretary for the Interior, senior representatives of the police, and the Public Prosecutor General. In Saxony, she met with the Minister for Justice, the Attorney - General, Minister for Social Affairs, Health and Social Cohesion, as well as the State Media Authority and the Commissioner for Jewish Life. In North - Rhine Westphalia, the Special Rapporteur met Minister for Federal, European, In ternational Affairs and Media and the Head of the State Chancellery of North Rhine - Westphalia , Minister of Justice, and the Commissioner for the Combatting of Antisemitism, Jewish Life and Culture of Remembrance as well as the Head of the Directorate - General for Police and the Director of the State Media Authority. 5. At the municipal level, the Special Rapporteur met the Deputy Mayors and officials of Leipzig and Cologne. A request was made to meet the Mayor of Berlin but he was not available. 6. The Special Rapporteur met with a wide range of civil society actors from across the country, including human rights activists, journalists, media representatives, academics, students, artists, legal and policy experts, and members of the major political p arties. Additionally, she received over 140 written submissions from civil society and individuals in response to her call for inputs ahead of the visit. Many individuals provided personal testimony in writing or in person which helped the Special Rappo rteur to ground her findings in the lived experience of rights holders. 7. The Special Rapporteur is grateful to the Government for the invitation and facilitation of the visit and to the officials and institutions for their full, frank and constructive engagement. She thanks civil society representatives and individuals for gene rously giving their time and sharing their information, experience and insights with her. A/HRC/ 62 / 67 /Add. 1 3 II. Context 8. The right to freedom of expression in Germany is in the eye of a perfect storm of complex challenges: an increasingly polarized political landscape marked by a rise in exclusionary ideologies which seek to distort and weaponize freedom of expression; surgi ng antisemitism, Islamophobia and other forms of hate speech against minorities and migrants; evolving new technologies which expand both opportunities and risks for expression; and a growing tendency to use the criminal law to restrict expression. 9. During the country visit, the Special Rapporteur was able to probe into not just challenges facing freedom of expression in the country but also the work in progress and possible solutions by various stakeholders. She believes that Germany is well - positioned to weather the storm with its robust constitutional protections for freedom of expression and other human rights, a strong and independent judiciary, a dynamic civil society, an independent, diverse media and in itiatives to address new challenges in the digital sphere. She acknowledges the Government ’ s commitment to protect and defend human rights, including freedom of expression for all and welcomes the Government’s willingness to engage with the international human rights system and in particular her mandate. However, the gravity of the threats to fr eedom of expression in Germany should not be underestimated in the current domestic and global political climate. 10. Germany stands at an inflection point. The 2025 parliamentary elections dramatically reshaped German politics, with the three political parties in the former governing coalition losing popular support while the far - right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) doubled its share to become the second - largest party in the country, despite its exclusionary rhetoric and positions. One poll revealed a stark divide in perceptions of freedom of speech among political parties. While 78% of Green Party and 61% of So cial De mocratic Party voters do not perceive speech restrictions, only 12% of AfD supporters feel the same way. 1 The figures highlight not just the polarization of German society but also at its epicentre a deep rift in the understanding of what constitutes freedom of expression. 11. During the visit, the Government and parliamentary committee shared with the Special Rapporteur their conviction that, based on Germany’s history and political context, defending democracy from capture by authoritarian forces and fighting antisemitism and terrorist threats require restricting expression, including through the use of counter - terrorism laws, criminal speech offenses, and surveillance tools. While noting the Government’s position, the Special Rapporteur is concerned about conflation of act ivism and advocacy with antisemitism and terrorism, and the compatibility of a criminalized and security - oriented approach with international human rights standards. Furthermore, she fears that such an approach risks narrowing the space for diverse, meaningful debate to build shared values in a democratic socie ty, and could increase the potential for large sections of the public to lose trust in the very institutions that the Government is seeking to protect. 12. While assessing Germany’s commitment to freedom of expression, the Special Rapporteur would like to acknowledge the significant role that Germany plays in the promotion of freedom of expression abroad. She commends Germany for its championing of freedom of expression and active role in the Media Freedom Coalition and for supporting several programmes for the protection of foreign journalists, human rights defenders, scholars and artists at risk. Germany’s engagement with the Human Rights Council, includ ing as its President in the past, its former Foreign Minister as the current President of the General Assembly and its candidature for the Security Council in 2027 – 2028 are all signs of Germany’s commitment to the rule - based order, international law and human rights. That creates high expectations about Germany’s commitment and rigor to ensure effective promotion and protection of human rights domestically, including regarding freedom of opinion and expression. 1 Rainer Zitelmann, “ Darf ich alles sagen? Viele Bürger fühlen sich unfrei – große Ausnahme sind Grünen - Fans ” , Focus Online , 22 October 2024, citing Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach / Mill - Institut, Freiheitsindex Deutschland 2024. A/HRC/ 62 / 67 /Add. 1 4 III. Legal Framework 13. Germany is a party to a wide range of international and regional human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its Optional Protocol and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The International Covenant protects the right to freedom of opinion and expression (art. 19), as well as related rights to freedom of peaceful assembly (art. 21), freedom of association (art. 22) and public and political participa tion (art. 25) without any discrimination (arts. 2 and 26). 14. Freedom of expression is a limited right under international law. While article 19(3) sets out the international standards of legality, necessity and legitimate objectives according to which freedom of expression may be restricted, article 20(2) requires S tates to prohibit the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. 15. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also guarantees freedom of expression and provides similar grounds for its limitation (art. 10). 16. Freedom of expression, media freedom and academic and artistic freedom enjoy strong constitutional protection in Germany. The Basic Law acknowledges at the outset human dignity and the inviolable and inalienable nature of human rights. It guarantees the pr inciple of non - discrimination and equality of all people before the law (art. 3). The provision on freedom of opinion and expression (art. 5) states that there shall be no censorship and explicitly guarantees that the arts and sciences, research, and t eaching shall be free. However, it states that expression must be within the framework of general laws and must not violate the right to personal honour or the protection of children. 17. Several provisions of the German Criminal Code ( Strafgesetzbuch , or StGB) prohibit or limit certain forms of expression. Section 130 prohibits historical revisionism, incitement to hatred against national or religious groups and insults that target human dignity ( Volksverhetzung) . “Abusive criticism” ( Schmähkritik ) and defamation are criminalized under sections 185, 186 and 187. Section 188 o f the Strafgesetzbuch provides for heightened penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment for insulting public of ficials. 18. The Criminal Code includes some offences related to security or counter - terrorism which impact on expression. Section 86a of the Criminal Code prohibits the dissemination or display of symbols or the use of slogans of “unconstitutional organizations”, asso ciations designated by the Federal or State Ministries of Interior, and political parties prohibited by decision of the Federal Constitutional Court as well as those on the EU’s terrorist list, whether or not they are active or banned in Germany. The p rohibitions carry penalties of fines or up to three years’ imprisonment. There are exceptions to section 86a for contexts such as civic education, art or science, research or teaching, and reporting on current or historical events. Membership in and support of criminal organizations is prohibited by Section 129(1) of the StGB, and for domestic and foreign ter rorist organizations in Sections 129a and 129b. 19. Activities of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution ( Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz – BfV), governed by the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (BVerfSchG), are relevant to freedom of expression. Because the BfV focuses on identifying unconstitutional activities before they become criminal offences, its activities usually inv olve scrutinizing speech which impacts on the right to freedom of expression. A group suspected of unconst itutional behavior can be designated as: (1) case subject to review ( Prüffall ); (2) suspected (extremist) case or subject of extended investigation to verify a suspicion ( Verdachtsfall ); and (3) extremist endeavour corroborated by hard evidence ( gesichert extremistisch ). The term “extremism” is not defined in German national law but relies on designation by the BfV. 2 20. Other legislation relevant to freedom of expression are the Digitale - Dienste - Gesetz (DDG) which assists in implementing the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA) in 2 Reply to AL DEU 07/2024, Ref.: Pol 381.70/57, Note No.: 89/2025. A/HRC/ 62 / 67 /Add. 1 5 Germany . The Federal Network Agency / Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) is responsible for the implementation of the DDG. The European Media Freedom Act, which establishes Europe - wide rules to protect media pluralism, is also applicable in Germany. IV. Main Findings A. Hate speech, fear and marginalization 21. The climate for expression and information in Germany is becoming increasingly polarized, fraught, and divisive, reducing the space for freedom of expression to be exercised safely by all. 3 22. Many individuals to whom the Special Rapporteur spoke, ranging from members of the Jewish community and Palestine activists to women politicians, complained of online and offline attacks against them directly or more generally that made them fearful of spe aking out publicly. Individuals espousing right or left leaning ideologies felt excluded from mainstream discourse and concerned about state surveillance. Academics, journalists, and civil society actors described an increasing sense of discomfort abou t expressing their views on controversial topics for fear of becoming targets of attack, a dynamic which some interlocutors described as “pre - emptive obedience”. 23. The Special Rapporteur is alarmed by the surge in antisemitism in Germany after October 2023, aggravating a serious pre - existing problem. 4 Threats of violence, assaults, and destruction and defacement of property belonging to members of the Jewish community more than doubled between 2022 and 2024. 5 Data from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights found that two - thirds of Jews in Germany reported encountering online antisemitism “all the time”. 6 Over three - quarters at least occasionally avoided wearing signs of their faith in public out of fear of violence. In a meeting with the Special Rapporteur, a group of Jewish students described feeling so threatened on campus that they hid signs of their f aith or skipped classes out of fear of being attacked until they were able to persuade the University to take measures to improve their safety. 24. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the various policy, institutional and concrete measures by the Government to combat antisemitism, such as the National Strategy against antisemitism and for Jewish life, the appointment of a Federal Government Commissioner for Jewish L ife and the Fight against Antisemitism, and funds to improve security measures at Jewish facilities. Much more is needed. She encourages the authorities to continue to make further efforts in consultation with the Jewish community. 25. The Special Rapporteur notes with serious concern the almost doubling of violent anti - Muslim attacks between 2022 and 2024 with nearly half of Muslims feeling they are not accepted as part of German society. 7 In their meetings with the Special Rapporteur, Palestinian, Arab and other Muslim representatives highlighted structural factors, including the criminalization of their cultural and political expression in the context of the Gaza 3 A study from the Technischen Universität Dresden found that 81% of Germans perceived society was divided. https://forum - midem.de/wp - content/uploads/2025/11/TUD_MIDEM_Polarization - Barometer - 2025_ - 1.pdf 4 Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland, Lagebild: Auswirkungen des Krieges in Israel auf die Jüdischen Gemeinden in Deutschland, October 2024, https://www.zentralratderjuden.de/wp - content/uploads/2025/03/ZDJ_GC - War_3009b - 1.pdf 5 Federal Association of Departments for Research and Information on Antisemitism (RIAS), Antisemitic Incidents in Germany: Annual Report 2024, 4 June 2025. https://report - antisemitism.de/documents/04 - 06 - 25_Antisemitic_incidents_in_Germany_Annual - Report_Federal_Association_RIAS_2024.pdf 6 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism: Second Survey on Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in the EU, 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra - 2024 - experiences - perceptions - antisemitism - survey_en.pdf 7 Deutsche Islam Konferenz, Islam in Germany: Facts and figures, 15 October 2025, https://www.deutsche - islam - konferenz.de/EN/DatenFakten/daten - fakten_node.html A/HRC/ 62 / 67 /Add. 1 6 conflict, stigmatizing media portrayals and differential policing, that they believe constrain their free expression. These factors have deepened their fear and distrust of the authorities. Black people, Kurdish communities, migrants, and other people of colour also described security threats and dominant public narratives that depict them as outsiders, which discourages their participation in public debate and reinforces the ir marginalization. 26. The sense of marginalization, which contributes to a chilling effect on expression, has been amplified by political rhetoric. For instance, the AfD party platform states that “Islam does not belong to Germany”. 8 As another example, violent attacks on refugee shelters trebled between 2022 and 2024 as vitriol against migrants became a flash point in German politics. 9 Racial, ethnic, and religious minority communities fear that following AfD’s rise in politics, hateful rhetoric and hostility particularly toward migrants have become more normalized in mainstream political discourse, as other political parties attempt to “ outdo ” it in order to gain more popularity. They see the growing use in mainstream politics of the term “imported antisemitism” in relation to migrants from North Africa and the Middle East as an attempt to stigmatize and distract attention from other manifestat ions of antisemitism in German society. 10 27. Culture wars and attacks on Woke - Kultur or “ wokeness ” have also become more prominent in political discourse. Ahead of the February 2025 federal elections, AfD leader Alice Weidel campaigned on a promise to eradicate what she called “queer - woke insanity” alongside an anti - migrant stance. 11 28. There has been a marked rise in anti - feminist, sexist, and trans - hostile attitudes although the severity of the trends vary regionally. Women and members of the LGBTQ+ community are being singled out for attacks online and offline with misogynistic hate cr imes surging in recent years, particularly in Eastern Germany. 29. There is an alarming increase in threats and violence based on political viewpoints. Reports indicate that at least 85 acts of physical violence targeting politicians and political parties occurred across the country in 2024 alone. 12 Municipal authorities in Cologne and Leipzig informed the Special Rapporteur attacks on local politicians have escalated, including sharply rising vitriol against women politicians on social media, especially targeting those coming from migrant origins. 30. Empirical evidence shows that much of the political violence is emanating from far right groups, including those associated with the AfD, and to a lesser degree from far left groups. 13 On the other hand, the AfD party believes that they are being censored by the authorities and subjected to double standards in comparison to other political parties and that such actions are affecting their participation in public life. B. Restrictions on expression, advocacy and activism 31. Reports from international and local human rights organizations and testimony from individuals indicate that pro - Palestine and climate advocacy in Germany continues to be unduly suppressed by the authorities through restrictions on protests and using count er - terrorism, “ propaganda ” and hate crime provisions in the German criminal code. The Special Rapporteur is also concerned about significant ambiguity in the definition of the definition of concepts such as “ antisemitism ” and “ extremism ” which is leadi ng to overreach in 8 AfD, Zeit für Deutschland, 2025, https://www.afd.de/wp - content/uploads/2025/02/AfD_Bundestagswahlprogramm2025_web.pdf 9 See Kriminalität im Kontext von Zuwanderung, Fokus: Fluchtmigration, Bundeslagebild 2022; Drucksache 21/146, 21.Wahlperiode 12.05.2025, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/001/2100146.pdf 10 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Michael O'Flaherty, Memorandum on Germany, June 2026 , p. 8. 11 https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/political - science/articles/10.3389/fpos.2025.1568816/full 12 https://acleddata.com/report/germanys - political - polarization - spills - streets - ahead - federal - elections 13 https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Deliktsbereiche/PMK/PMKZahlen2024/PMKZahlen 2024_node.html A/HRC/ 62 / 67 /Add. 1 7 restricting freedom of expression and creating confusion among rights holders with a dramatic chilling effect. 1. Limits on public protests 32. Following the attacks by Hamas on Israel in October 2023 and Israel’s war in Gaza, Palestine - related activism spiked in Germany as did allegations of protest bans, speech restrictions and human rights violations by the law enforcement authorities. In early 2025, the Special Rapporteur, jointly with other Special Rapporteurs, conveyed to the German Government their serious concerns about bans and restrictions on peaceful protests, slogans and symbols, arbitrary arrests and detention, excessive use of for ce by the police against protestors, threats of deportation of some individuals and raids on the homes of activists and human rights defenders. 14 In its response the Government reiterated its commitment to freedom of expression and assembly and other human rights standards, that only a few assemblies were banned or restricted as a measure of last resort for security reasons and that actions by the law enforcement authorities had been taken in line with relevant laws to tackle a small number of protestors who were increasingly violent. 33. During the visit of the Special Rapporteur the State and municipal officials provided further information. In North Rhine - Westphalia, 632 assemblies related to the Middle East conflict took place between October 7, 2023, and March 31, 2024. During this period, a total of eight assemblies were banned by the competent police authority. Seven of these eight assemblies took place after the m atter had been referred to the administrative court Berlin Police authorities advised that 1140 pro - Palestinian demonstra tions took place in Berlin between 7 October 2023 and mid - February 2026, and only 25 were prohibited due to security considerations, principally during the weeks immediately after 7 October 2023. The authorities reiterated that while most protestors were p eaceful, some resorted to violent and criminal activities and that the police response was commensurate with the circumstances and in compliance with the law. 34. Civil society representatives noted that over the past year bans have decreased while restrictions on protests continue to be imposed, ranging from where and how marches can take place to what symbols, slogans or languages can be used. They raised concerns about the reasonableness of the restrictions and pointed to the failure of the police to respond in a targeted way against the small numbers of those who commit violence while allowing others to protest peacefully. 35. Overall, there remains a major gap between the information received by the Special Rapporteur from affected individuals and reputable civil society organizations and from the authorities regarding police behaviour, restrictions, harassment, arrests and use of force against pro - Palestine activists, reflecting a lack of trust on both sides. It is noteworthy that the German Institute for Human Rights recommended an independent federal investigation of the use of excessive force by police against demonstrators at climate protests and Palestine solidarity protests. 2. Criminalization and securitization of expression 36. Between October 2023 and January 2026, the Berlin authorities brought more than 2,100 charges of “ propaganda ” offenses, including 994 incitement to hatred charges, related to Palestine activism. According to anecdotal evidence a significant number of the cases are being dismissed by the courts or dropped by the prosecution, often after negotiations with those arr ested, suggesting to the excessive use of criminal prosecution. 37. Many of the charges relate to the use of the slogan, “From the River to the Sea”, which was banned by the Ministry of Interior in November 2023 under section 86a of the criminal code (StGB) which prohibits the use of slogans or symbols of unconstitutional or te rrorist organizations. Courts have diverged greatly in cases related to the banned slogan, sometimes reaching different outcomes even within the same jurisdiction. This inconsistency has led to some absurd results. For instance, the Special Rappor teur heard about an activist in Düsseldorf who was acquitted by the court for shouting the slogan during a public assembly 14 AL DEU 2/2025; AL DEU 6/2025. A/HRC/ 62 / 67 /Add. 1 8 only to be told by the police soon afterwards that they would bring the same charges against him again should he repeat the slogan 38. T he legal uncertainty surrounding the banning of the slogan is incompatible with the requirements under international law for restrictions of freedom of expression. The Special Rapporteur felt there was some disquiet among the police and prosecutors themselves about the use of the ban as a basis for prosecution. The Federal Court of Justice is expected to rule on the question of w h ether the slogan constitutes a symbol of a terrorist organisation within the meaning of section 86a StGB in a pending appeal . The Special Rapporteur hopes the Court will provide legal clarity on the appropriateness of the criminalization of a slogan that is used widely for a variety of purposes by a range of different actors. 39. A general ban or criminalization for the mere utterance of a slogan is disproportionate and not in line with international human rights law. Whether or not a slogan is being used in a specific situation to signify intolerance or hatred against Jews or to i ncite violence or to indicate support for terrorism must be assessed on a case - by - case basis with careful contextual analysis to determine if the restriction is justified. 40. Advocacy and activism have been restricted not only through speech related offences but also through security measures usually applied to terrorist or criminal organizations. 41. The BfV has designated two regional groups, the Palestine BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement groups in Berlin and Bonn, as “suspected extremist” which makes it susceptible to domestic surveillance. The decision was based on the assessment that “some of its behaviour encompass incitement to violence and/or hatred against Jews or Israelis” and that its “ambiguous claims” to e nd “occupation and colonization” is a demand to end the State of Israel which attracts violent extremist organizations The BfV’s decision was also influenced by a non - binding resolution of the Bundestag in 2019 proclaiming BDS as antisemitic and calling for it to be denied access to public premises and financial support, and for Länder , cities and municipalities to adopt similar policies. The parliamentary resolution and decision of BfV have far reaching consequences for BDS. 42. In a joint communication to the German Government in 2024, the Special Rapporteur and several of her peers pointed out that the aims of BDS have clear support in international law, including in advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and numerous UN resolutions. 15 They noted that the European Court of Human Rights has held that BDS activities are a protected form of expression, distinguishable from antisemitism which is prohibited under international law. They pointed out that several German courts have held that r estrictions on BDS violate freedom of expression. The BfV’s decision and the parliamentary resolution on BDS have remained unchanged despite this weight of evidence and opinion. 43. On climate activism, over 4900 criminal cases were brought between July 2024 and June 2025. Several interlocutors asserted that the vast majority were engaged in non - violent civil disobedience and not serious or violent crimes as described in mainstream di scourse. A joint communication from the Special Rapporteurs to the Government in 2025 expressed concerns regarding the action taken by the authorities against activists of the climate action group Letzte Generation (Last Generation), including house ra ids, freezing of bank accounts, arrests, surveillance and charges under Section 129 of the StGB. 16 A trial is underway against several Letzte Generation activists in the Potsdam Regional Court. 44. A designation under Section 129 of the Letzte Generation would affect not only those directly involved but also potentially criminalize anyone who donates, volunteers, or provides media promotion for the group. The criminalization of climate justice activists and environmental human rights defenders could have a significant chilling effect on climate - related activism. 15 AL DEU 7/2024. 16 AL DEU 6/2024. A/HRC/ 62 / 67 /Add. 1 9 3. Unclear concepts and policies 45. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that vague, overly broad or undefined concepts and policies are driving the decisions to restrict and suppress freedom of expression. The lack of clarity or ambiguity restricts freedom of expression in ways that are not compatible with international law standards. 46. Firstly, the term “extremism” used by BfV has no legal definition although it forms the basis of the designation by the agency which can have profound implications for the rights of affected individuals or organizations. Organizations or individuals do not need to be engaged in criminal or violent activity in order to be classified. Classification relies often on scrutiny of speech which is not violent or criminal in itself but which may be politically contrary to the views of the Government. The risk o f bias in classifying such expressions is thus high. 47. The Government has claimed that the BfV activities do not impact fundamental rights and “even if fundamental rights were concerned” its activities would be lawful. 17 The Government stated that the BfV is obliged to apply international and national human rights standards, and its activities are proportionate as it is subject to oversight. 18 These broad assertions do not address the risks of unfettered discretion when a key concept on the basis of which BfV works – “extremism” – is left unclear and undefined. Furthermore, being classified as a “confirmed extremist threat” by the BfV has serious human rights implications. It can result in surveillance which affects a range of rights, including freedom of expression. In addition, t he classification by BfV can have a stigmatizing effect that has been acknowledged by the Administrative Court of Cologne to affect an individual or organization’s reputation and possibility to operate effectively in the public sphere. 19 48. Secondly, the definition of the concept of antisemitism is not clear. A key aspect of the confusion is whether criticism of Israel amounts to antisemitism. 49. The ability to criticize any State is foundational to the right to freedom of expression. The German Government has clearly stated that “legitimate criticism” of the State of Israel is not restricted as long as it does not challenge in any form Israel’s ri ght to exist. 20 Nevertheless, statements accusing Israel about genocide or war crimes in Gaza or the illegality of Israel’s occupation of Palestine or the Palestinians’ right to self - determination have led to protestors to be detained, speakers to be disinvited and artists to be denied funding on the ground that their criticism of Israel was antisemitic. 21 50. The confusion appears to arise from the IHRA “ working definition ” of antisemitism which specifies in its examples that “ manifestations might include the targeting of the State of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity.” The “ working definition ” , which the German Government adopted in 2017, is used by various entities in Germany as a quasi - legal means to restrict expression on grounds of antisemitism. 22 It was never intended to be used as a framework for regulating expression. It is overly broad, vague and equivocal, and fails to meet the three part test for restricting speech, as laid out in article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit ical Rights. 51. The Special Rapporteur has noted that the German Government applies the notion of “Israel - related antisemitism” and “anti - Zionist antisemitism”. For instance, the BfV names “Israel - related antisemitism” as an indicator for extremism and justification for s urveillance. Vague and malleable concepts of antisemitism create confusion and weaken the protection of rightsholders. 17 Ref.: Pol 381.70/57, Note No.: 89/2025. 18 Ref.: Pol 381.70/57, Note No.: 89/2025. 19 Verwaltungsgericht Köln, Beschluss vom 26. Februar 2026 , Az. 13 L 1109/25. 20 Ref.: Pol 381.70/57, Note No.: 89/2025. 21 Information received from civil society in submissions and meetings during country visit. See also Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (Germany , October 2025) Country report , AL DEU 6 /2025, Liberties Rule of Law Report Germany 2025 liberties.eu/f/wdp0 - h 22 A/79/319, paras. 79 – 81. A/HRC/ 62 / 67 /Add. 1 10 52. Antisemitism is religious and racial hatred of Jews that must be condemned. Under international law Israel is a State. By its very nature it is not a rights holder but a duty bearer. The practical consequence of the notion of “Israel - related antisemitism” is to suppress legitimate criticism of the State of Israel, not to enhance the protection of Jews from racial and religious hatred and intolerance. 53. A similar conceptual problem arises with Zionism, which is not an inherent characteristic of an individual or group but a political ideology, so it is wrong to equate anti - Zionism with antisemitism. Where there is concern in a specific situation that the t erm “Zionist” is being used as proxy for hate speech targeting Jews, then a contextual analysis should be made on a case - by - case basis in accordance with the standards set out in articles 19(3) and 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the guidance of the Rabat Plan of Action 23 4. Limits of political expression 54. The rise of the AfD party in recent elections has been met with sharply divided reactions across German society. On the one hand, its electoral gains are symptoms of deepening frustration with the mainstream political establishment. On the other hand, its anti - migrant, Islamophobic, anti - LGBTQ+ views coupled with the association of some prominent members and events with alarming ideologies and rhetoric, including Nazi - era references, have generated significant societal concern of its implications for Ge rman democracy. Alongside its growth, the resistance to it has also been strong, with interlocutors noting that in 2024 alone there were over 1450 demonstrations against right - wing parties. 24 55. The AfD believes that they are being censored by the authorities, targeted by biased and unbalanced media coverage and subjected to double standards in comparison to other political parties, and that such actions are affecting their participation in public life. However, t hey seem to ignore the clear principle of international law that freedom of expression, though expansive, is a limited right. 56. In 2024, the Ministry of the Interior banned the AfD - linked magazine Compact as an unconstitutional organization, alongside its designation as a “confirmed right - wing extremist” by the BfV. The ban was overturned in the courts, which found the magazine published anti - constitutional material but this did not comprise its entirety. In May 2025 some months after the national elections the BfV designated AfD as a “confirmed right - wing extremist” and subjected it to heightened surveillance. The classificatio n was immediately challenged and the Government voluntarily paused its use until the legal challenge was resolved. In February 2026 the Administrative Court of Cologne issued an injunction against the BfV’s use of the designation while the case remains ong oing, acknowledging the immediate and irreparable stigmatizing impact of a BfV designation. 57. The logic of the Government’s surveillance power appears to lie in the concept of “ Streitbare Demokratie ” or militant democracy as a strategy to tackle radicalization, in which measures are used by democratic states to restrict political rights in order to protect liberal democracy from radical movements. However, there are risks of executive overreach in curtailing political rights in the name of preserving democracy which must be addressed through a careful balancing of interests and strong independen t oversight and judicial remedy. The Special Rapporteur trusts the judicial system to respond to the complaint from AfD in light of the safeguards of Germany’s human rights obligations as well as the obligation to protect democratic institutions as set out in the Basic Law. 58. Another concern in relation to political expression is the right to criticise public officials. Section 188 of the German Cri