RARE EARTH FRONTIERS RARE EARTH FRONTIERS From Terrestrial Subsoils to Lunar Landscapes Julie Michelle Klinger CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON Copyright © 2017 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 2017 by Cornell University Press Printed in the United States of Ameri ca Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Klinger, Julie Michelle, 1983– author. Title: Rare earth frontiers : from terrestrial subsoils to lunar landscapes / Julie Michelle Klinger. Description: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017012446 (print) | LCCN 2017014409 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501714603 (epub/mobi) | ISBN 9781501714610 (pdf) | ISBN 9781501714580 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781501714597 (pbk. : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Rare earth metals—Social aspects. | Rare earth metals— Political aspects. | Rare earth metals—China—Inner Mongolia. | Rare earth metals— Brazil—Amazonas. | Lunar mining. Classification: LCC TN490.A2 (ebook) | LCC TN490.A2 K56 2017 (print) | DDC 553.4/94—dc23 LC record available at https : // lccn . loc . gov / 2017012446 Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possi ble in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further informa- tion, visit our website at cornellpress . cornell . edu. To the people of Bayan Obo, and Baotou, whose waters, soils, and bodies have borne a burden few outside of rare earth mining regions can imagine; to the people of S ã o Gabriel da Cachoeira; to those devoting their lives to more just and sustainable regimes of rare earth production and consumption; this work is humbly dedicated to you. List of Illustrations ix Acknowl edgments xi Introduction: Welcome to the Rare Earth Frontier 1 1. What Are Rare Earth Ele ments? 41 2. Placing China in the World History of Discovery, Production, and Use 67 3. “Welcome to the Hometown of Rare Earths”: 1980–2010 103 4. Rude Awakenings 137 5. From the Heartland to the Head of the Dog 165 6. Extraglobal Extraction 199 Conclusion 229 Appendix: Methodologies and Approaches 243 Notes 251 References 265 Index 309 Contents ix Figure 1. Global rare earth oxide production 2 Figure 2. Research sites examined in the present work, 2010–2015 2 Figure 3. Price index for selected rare earth oxides compared to copper and gold, 2003–2013 3 Figure 4. Various frequently referenced periodic tables with highlighted rare earth ele ments 42–43 Figure 5. Map of global rare earth deposits identified by the United States Geo- logical Survey, 2015 64 Figure 6. Location of Baotou in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China 68 Figure 7. Location of Baotou City and Bayan Obo Mining District within Baotou Municipality 69 Figure 8. Photo from an Inner Mongolia Daily front page article on women’s committee progress, June 12, 1952 89 Figure 9. An editorial comic on the back page of the Inner Mongolia Daily , March 5, 1952 90 Figure 10. Photos from a special to the Inner Mongolia Daily , titled “Young Women Build Socialism!,” June 12, 1953 91 Figure 11. A life-size diorama at the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Mu- seum in Hohhot, Inner Mongolia 94 Figure 12. Satellite image of industrial geography of Baotou City and vicinity 116 Figure 13. Rare earth export quotas in tonnes, 2000–2014 131 Figure 14. Location of Arax á and Cabe ç a do Cachorro 167 Figure 15. Detailed map of land demarcation and principle ethnicities in Cabe ç a do Cachorro 171 Figure 16. Adaptation of two slides showing mineral deposits, key mineral reserves, and indigenous territories 174–175 Figure 17. Location of lunar KREEP, lunar landing sites, and deeded plots 203 Illustrations xi The creative and often surprising ways that people get involved in a project of this scope would, I suspect, be worthy of its own novel, but with these few words I wish to acknowledge those principal characters without whose support this book would not be. To Michael Watts, Nathan Sayre, Harley Shaiken, Paola Bacchetta, Richard Walker, and You-tien Hsing at the University of California, Berkeley, and to Kenneth Pomeranz, at the University of Chicago. Thank you for your kind mentorship. To those who hosted me at various research institutions throughout the dura- tion of this project, a special thank you to Alexandre Barbosa at the University of S ã o Paulo Institute of Brazil Studies; to Wu Baiyi at the China Academy of Social Science Institute of Latin American Studies; to Liu Weidong at China Academy of Science Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research; to Bi Aonan at the China Academy of Social Science Research Center for Chinese Borderland History and Geography; to Yang Tengyuan at the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region University; to Ingo Richter, Sabine Berking, and Stefanie Schafer of the Irmgard Coninx Stiftung at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. With- out the ‘home away from home’ that you provided, this work could not have been accomplished. For funding, it has been an honor to have this research supported by the East Asian Career Development Professorship Award at Boston University, the Na- tional Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program, the Univer- sity of California, Berkeley Department of Geography, and the Irmgard Coninx Stiftung in Berlin. To those who provided the critical administrative support to keep this enter- prise running, thank you to Elaine Bidianos, Christian Estrella, and Noorjehan Khan at Boston University, and thank you to Marjorie Ensor and Natalia Von- negut at University of California, Berkeley. To my excellent research assistants, thank you to Tara Moore at Boston Uni- versity and Wang Xingchen in Inner Mongolia and Beijing for helping me track down all manner of archival sources. For typing support while I recovered from an injury to both of my arms, thanks to Jenna Hornbuckle and Nick Scheepers. For excellent graphic design work, thank you to Molly Roy. For all manner of technical support, thank you to Nick Bojda. Acknowl edgments xii AcKnowl edgMents To my circle of writers, thank you for your companionship and solidarity, especially Noora Lori, Jessica Stern, Manjari Miller, Saida Grundy, Ashley Farmer, Cornel Ban, Kaija Schilde, and Renata Keller. To my dear friends and fellow ge- ographers, for your camaraderie and companionship over the years, especially Shaina Potts, Zo ë Friedman- Cohen, Meleiza Figueroa, Annie Shattuck, Mary Whelan, Aharon de Grassi, Anne Bitsch, and Danny Bednar. To those whose love and hospitality provided a warm respite amid the more intense periods of fieldwork, thank you. To Ward Lynds and Zhang Yazhou, my dear friends of fifteen years in Changchun. To Brendan and Angela Acord in Bei- jing, my beloved bon vivants . To Jeffrey Warner, Yang Weina, and Zhao Qiuwan in Shanghai. To Gustavo Oliveira in Bras í lia, and to my dear Brazilian family, whom I had the good fortune of encountering in both Brazil and China. our long con- versations, celebrations, and laughter sustain me. Renato, Dulcinea, Daniela, Guilherme, Kika, Manuela, Anahi, and most of all, Jos é Renato Peneluppi Jr. To my intellectual godparents, mentors, and dear friends, Joshua Muldavin and Monica Varsanyi. Thank you for lighting my way and sharing so much of your lives with me, from Beijing to New York City. To my family, thank you for your love, encouragement, and zest for adven- ture. As long as I can remember, you’ve told me to go far, be brave, have fun, and do the right thing. I will always do my best to make you proud. To my dear spouse, life partner, and best friend, Nick Bojda. Thank you for every single conversation, for circling the globe with me, and for not only endur- ing long absences but cheering me through them. Your love and support mean the world to me. Portions of chapters 1 and 2 appeared in earlier form in “Historical Geogra- phy of Rare Earth Elements. From Discovery to the Atomic Age,” The Extractive Industries and Society 2, no. 3 (2015): 572–80 Portions of chapters 1 and 3 are reprinted from “The Environment-Security Nexus in Contemporary Rare Earth Politics,” in The Political Economy of Rare Earth Elements. Rising Powers and Tech- nological Change, edited by Ryan David Kiggins (New York: Macmillan, 2015), 133–55. Thank you for supporting my scholarly work. Finally, I am immensely grateful for the support provided by my editor, Jim Lance, and the publishing team at Cornell University Press. Thank you for your stewardship over this project. All translations in the text are my own, as are any remaining errors or short- comings. Except where indicated in the text, this book uses metric measure- ments. Large volumes are measured in tonnes, the singular of which is a unit of mass equal to 1,000 kilograms. These are not to be confused with the American ton , which is a unit of mass equal to 907.2 kilograms, or 2,000 pounds. RARE EARTH FRONTIERS 1 Introduction WELCOME TO THE RARE EARTH FRONTIER non- availability means that resource conflict is an immediate threat with negative short- and long-term geostrategic consequences. — Rare Earth Elements World Report (June 21, 2012) the prob lem we face on earth is that beyond their scarcity, these ele ments are not evenly distributed throughout the world. we need to disrupt this market. By finally being able to reach the Moon and harvest the resources that are there, we can overcome the scarcity of rare earth elements and create the infrastructure necessary for innovation to continue. — Naveen Jain, Founder of Moon Express (May 24, 2012) Unfortunately, “strategic metals” are among those perennially misunderstood policy issues with strange lives of their own. the myth of shortage simply refuses to die. — Russell Seitz and Jerry Taylor (July 28, 2005) Rare earths are not rare. Because they were unknown at the time of their discovery— as most things are—they were presumed to be rare. Such faulty thinking would shape the politi cal life of these elements from the moment they were first identi- fied in 1794 until the present. It is true that rare earths are so thoroughly integrated into our everyday lives that just about everything would grind to a halt without them. They enable both the hardware and the software of contemporary life to be lighter, faster, stron- ger, and longer ranging. The incredible array of essential applications will be dis- cussed later, but the good news is that rare earth elements are not at all rare on earth. These seventeen chemically similar elements, distinguished by their excep- tional magnetic and conductive properties, abound in Earth’s crust. The bad news is that minable rare earth deposits coincide with all sorts of other hazard- ous elements: uranium, thorium, arsenic, fluoride, and other heavy metals. Yet even this is insufficient to explain our contemporary circumstances, wherein 97 percent of global production concentrated in China in 2010 (see figure 1). 140,000 Global Rare Earth Oxide Production China USA Other 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 Production, metric tons 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 0 FIgURe 1. Global rare earth oxide production. Sources: Data compiled from Information Office of the State Council (2010); Orris and Grauch (2013); and United States Geological Survey (2016). Image by Molly Roy. San Francisco Bay Area Mountain Pass Important site examined in text Western Lunar Highlands Kvane eld Berlin, Germany Helmand Province, Afghanistan Bayan Obo Hohhot Beijing Lianyungang Shanghai Sydney Baotou Bethesda, MD & Washington, DC São Gabriel da Cachoeira, Cabeça do Cachorro Manaus Brasilia Araxá Primary eld research site Rio de Janeiro Interviews and/or archival research São Paulo U N I T E D S T A T E S R E S E A R C H S I T E S , 2 0 1 0 – 2 0 1 5 B R A Z I L E A R T H ’ S M O O N G R E E N L A N D C H I N A A U S T R A L I A FIgURe 2. This map indicates research sites visited in 2010–2015, with the exception of the Moon. Source: Image by Molly Roy. IntRodUctIon 3 Against this situation, unexpected alliances have emerged to attempt mining rare earths in impossible places. The second decade of the twenty-first century saw campaigns to mine rare earths in the most forbidding of frontiers: in ecologically sensitive indigenous lands in the Amazon, in war-torn Afghan i stan, in protected areas of Greenland, in the depths of the world’s oceans, and even on the Moon. Currently, rare earths elements are mined and processed in ways that generate tremendous harm to surrounding environs and their inhabitants. In my primary research sites, the abandoned homes and noxious waterways provided visi ble evidence of the costs of mining for global consumption without regard for local landscapes and lives. Less visi ble but more profound were the devastating effects on the bodies of people living nearby and downstream of these operations. Can- cers, birth defects, and the decomposition of living people’s musculoskeletal sys- tems: these constitute an epidemiological crisis affecting some two million people in northern China and many others living former rare earth production sites in Southern California, Malaysia, and Central Asia. There are readily available alternatives to this devastating state of affairs. Since 2010, some firms have invested in building the industrial capacity to expand more sustainable production practices. Researchers on three continents have launched initiatives to improve recycling techniques. All of this is supported by growing 15,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 11,000 10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 Lanthanum Neodymium Dysprosium Copper Gold Dec 2003 June 2004 Dec 2004 June 2005 Dec 2005 Price in US Dollars June 2006 Dec 2006 June 2007 Dec 2007 June 2008 Dec 2008 June 2009 Dec 2009 June 2010 Dec 2010 June 2011 Dec 2011 June 2012 Dec 2012 June 2013 Dec 2013 0 FIgURe 3. Price index USD/kg for selected rare earth oxides, 2003–2013, compared to copper and gold. Prices rebased to 100 for fourth quarter of 2003. Source: Bartekova (2014). Image by Molly Roy. 4 IntRodUctIon movements of people committed to cleaning up the lifecycles of our everyday technologies. With unprecedented public awareness of these elements and their importance, the time would seem ripe to make our systems of rare earth produc- tion and consumption greener, safer, and more reliable. But we have not yet risen to the occasion. In fact, until relatively recently, few knew what rare earths were or why they mattered. Even fewer demonstrated con- cern over the tremendous harms generated by contemporary rare earth produc- tion practices. Fewer still were those contemplating how we are all implicated and endangered not only by the devastation wrought by their production but also by alarmist reactions to our contemporary situation. In 2010, this began to change. What happened? The Situation and the Questions In late September 2010, China’s military blocked a routine shipment of rare earth elements to Japan. What was initially an inde pendent maneuver at a single port fa cil i ty by the People’s Liberation Army in the ongoing tensions between the two countries came to be interpreted by the international community as China flexing its geoeconomic muscle. China’s foreign ministry intervened to resume shipments in November 2010 and later denied that such a disruption had taken place. But the rude awakening had already happened (Areddy, Fickling, and Shirouzu 2010; Bradsher 2010; Hur 2010). China then provided over 97 percent of the global supply of rare earth elements on which nearly every industrial country depends, and for which there were no synthetic alternatives. Although annual global consumption remains at a relatively modest 120,000 tonnes (Castilloux 2014), 1 rare earth elements define modern life. Without them, the technologies on which we rely for global communication, transportation, medicine, and militarism, as well as nuclear, petroleum-based, and renewable energy production would not exist. Sudden supply disruptions had never occurred since the elements had become so thoroughly embedded in contemporary life. Over a decade prior to the 2010 incident, China’s central government began implementing policies to curb rare earth production in response to alarming en- vironmental crises in mining regions, and to enforce export quotas to mitigate against the perceived threat of resource exhaustion (Chen 2010). The first dis- cernible effect of these policies occurred in 2008, marking the first year in which exports decreased relative to the previous year (Zepf 2013). Then between 2008 and 2011, prices increased as much as 2,000 percent for some elements. For ex- ample, dysprosium, an element used in commercial lighting, lasers, and hard drives, rose from US$110/kg in 2008 to US$2,031/kg in 2011 (see figure 3). As an IntRodUctIon 5 indicator of how this affected downstream industry, one study found that the price increases between July and September 2011 reduced the net income of a major hard drive producer in the United States by 37 percent (Monahan 2012). Others reported “a chilling effect” on renewable energy start-ups in the Euro-American world (Bradsher 2011a), while still others claimed that dependence on China for materials used in critical defense applications posed a “national security threat” to the United States and allied countries (Coppel 2011). Prices began rising in 2008, but not until late 2010 did China’s monopoly come to be seen as a global threat, prompting market panic and unleashing waves of speculation, prospecting, and bellicose political discourse across the world (Cara- menico 2012; Z. Chen 2011; Fulp 2011). It was no longer invisible within the global economic status quo prevailing since the 1980s. Rare earth mining and processing, and increasingly, the production of critical technological components, followed the trajectory of many global industries as they concentrated in China in search of cheaper labor and fewer environmental regulations. During the latter decades of the twentieth century, the deindustrialization of much of the West intersected with its mirror opposite in China: massive state-directed initiatives of integrated scientific and industrial development in certain strategic sectors. The result of these intersecting processes is the contemporary East Asian dominance in heavy industry and manufacturing that defines the present. But rather than address the issue in a substantive or historically informed manner, Anglophone commenta- tors unleashed a sensationalist maelstrom describing the concentration of rare earth production in China as a “stranglehold” (Evans-Pritchard 2013) that threw the world into “crisis” (Bourzac 2011) and constituted a “threat” (Hannis 2012) to the national security and economic stability of downstream countries (Portales 2011). In such a framing, the actual origins of China’s rare earth monopoly were obscured by accusations of conspiracy and geopoliti cal posturing. The situation prompted a flurry of dramatic responses and counterstrategies across the globe. 2 For example, since the crisis of 2010, economic officials within the United States, European Union (EU), and Japan acknowledged that their dependence on China’s rare earths arose from longer-term shifts in the global division of labor, whereby dirty industry relocated to China and then undersold Western firms to the point of their bankruptcy. Several elected officials publicly advocated for national plans to revive domestic industries in the Ameri cas (Ben- nett 2010; Clancy and Banner 2012). Although such initiatives would have re- quired significant politi cal and technological capital, the urgency of the period between 2010 and 2013 inspired efforts to restore domestic capacity through rather creative means, as illustrated by the Brazil and US cases examined in chap- ter 4. But at the same time, the United States, EU, and Japan filed a WTO suit against China’s production and export quotas in order to preserve the very global