THE COST OF A AEROSPACE ENGINEERS INTEGRTIY The Case of Michael Neely vs The Boeing Company © All Rights Reserved – For Publication only by the consent of the Author, Whistleblower Michael Neely Michael Neely 1 is a former Boeing Project Engineer who became a prominent whistleblower and legal challenger regarding the Boeing C ompany's safety and design practices. He has worked in the Aerospace Industry for over 40 years for most of the top U.S. Government contractors of which he worked for Boeing for 20 years beginning in 1995. Neely’s Career at Boeing At the time Boeing terminated Neely he was a Level 5 Project E ngineer (PE- 5) based in Huntsville Alabama working primarily on Military contracts . In 2014 he was assigned to a high - stakes temporary commercial aircraft project in Everett, Washington, involving the Boeing 777X. His specific focus was the Electrical Load Management System (ELMS) —often referred to as the "nerve center" of the aircraft's electrical system. This system is critical for functions like fuel management, fire extinguishing, and passenger oxygen deployment. Whistleblowing and Safety Concerns During his work on the 777X, Neely raised several serious concerns: ● Design Feasibility: He reported that a plan to adapt a power - distribution system from previous 777 models with "minimal changes" was neither feasible nor safe. ● Validation Issues: He alleged that Boeing was releasing invalidated or defective system requirements to contractors , specifically GE Aviation in England who was on contract to design, build and deliver an operational ELMS system to Boeing. ● Safety Culture: Neely claimed his managers ignored his warnings and prioritized profit and schedule over regulatory adherence and safety. The DNA of Neely’s Safety Complaints c ross ed into all Boeing Commercial Aircraft, including the 737MAX; Neely’s safety of design complaints have direct DNA correlation to the 737MAX crashes, and other Boeing commercial aircraft safety issues. Neely was the ONLY Whistleblower who raised Safety complaints prior to the 737MAX crashes, that over time would be proven direct coorelation to the cause of the 737MAX crashes. Neely’s Technical Concerns Raised at Boeing Michael Neely’s specific technical concerns revolved around the massive increase in electrical demand for the 777X compared to the legacy 777- 300ER. While Boeing management initially pushed for a "minimal change" approach to the Electrical Load Management System (ELMS), Neely’s audit revealed that the new aircraft’s requirements made a simple carry - over design impossible. 1 Michael Neely vs. Michael J. Neely - It is worth noting that he is sometimes confused with Dr. Michael J. Neely , a prominent professor of Electrical Engineering at USC. While both are experts in their fields, the Boeing engineer's legacy is specifica lly tied to aviation safety and the 777X program. THE COST OF A AEROSPACE ENGINEERS INTEGRTIY The Case of Michael Neely vs The Boeing Company © All Rights Reserved – For Publication only by the consent of the Author, Whistleblower Michael Neely Technical Discrepancies: 777 vs. 777X The following table highlights the technical jump that Neely argued necessitated a complete redesign rather than a minor update. Feature Legacy 777 - 300ER New 777X (777- 9) Impact of Change Power Capacity Baseline standard 30% Increase Requires larger main and APU generator outputs. Backup Power Standard BUC/BUG 2x Power Generation Doubling backup power requires more robust distribution. System Subscribers Baseline electrical load Significantly higher More sensors, LEDs, and avionics drawing power. Footprint Goal Baseline size Same Volume/Weight Neely argued cramming 30% more power into the same box was a major risk. Neely’s Findings on "System Validation" Neely’s most serious technical allegation was about the validation process . In aviation engineering, "validation" ensures that a requirement is correct, complete, and feasible before it is sent to a manufacturer to be built. 1. "Blind" Design ,The "Legacy" Conflict: Boeing management reportedly wanted to use the power - distribution d esign from the original 777 with "minimal changes" to save time and money. After a month - long audit, Neely concluded this was impossible because the 777X’s power requirements and modern safety regulations had evolved too much. Neely alleged Boeing was sending unvalidated requirements to GE (the contractor for the ELMS). He argued that if the requirements themselves were defective, GE would be building a "brain" for the aircraft that was flawed by design. 2. Regulatory Violation (14 CFR § 25.1309): This federal regulation requires that systems perform their intended functions under all "foreseeable operating conditions." Neely contended that because Boeing hadn't properly validated the 777X's higher electrical loads, they couldn't pr ove the plane would remain safe during a system failure or emergency. 3. The "Copper Bird" Conflict: Boeing relied on "Copper Bird" testing (a ground - based iron- bird rig with actual wiring and components). Neely argued that these tests were being used to find the design requirements rather than verify them, which he saw as a dangerous reversal of engineering protocol. Legal Disputes and Termination THE COST OF A AEROSPACE ENGINEERS INTEGRTIY The Case of Michael Neely vs The Boeing Company © All Rights Reserved – For Publication only by the consent of the Author, Whistleblower Michael Neely Neely was terminated from Boeing in March of 2016 for what Boeing claims as a reduction in force (RIF) of “one”, Neely . This led to a series of legal battles: ● Retaliation Claims: Court records show that Neely began raising design safety issues in December 20 14, not only one time but a total of eleven complaints both internally to Boeing Ethics and HR, and externally to Government agencies before Boeing terminated him on a RIF of “one” March of 2016. Neely timely filed Whistleblower complaints to DOT, FAA, SEC, DOL and EEOC for race and age discrimination; and retaliation. After his termination Neely filed two lawsuits against Boeing, one in Federal Western District court of Seattle WA, and the other through the U.S. DOL Secretary OSAH who handles aircraft safety . Neely’s safety complaints fell under the AIR 21 (whistleblower protection) with complain ts of fraud under Sarbanes- Oxley Acts through the U.S. DOL - OSHA, in all alleging he was fired in retaliation for raising safety complaints. ● Neely’s Liberal Lawyers Destroyed his case, Lied : Neely, never having any experience his entire life dealing with personal legal issues such as this, hired a law firm out of Birmingham Alabama, who in return hired a law firm in Southern California who primarily took the lead on amended complaints, motions and filings to court initially in San Francisco, CA who changed the venue to Seattle, WA where Neely’s two law firms hired a third law firm in Seattle. Neely quickly learned the deep seeded liberal routes of these law firms, the infighting prompted the California and Alabama law firms to be dismissed so the LGBTQ Seattle law firm could take control. Suffering through two years of tolling for fee growth, Boeing agreed to mediate offering a severance pay amount to settle. Neely rejected. Two months later Boeing offered $1,700,00.00 to settle. Neely agreed under one condi tion that Boeing showed they were correcting the Safety issues Neely complained of. Boeing rejected and Neely rejected the settlement on the grounds of peoples lives were way more important than agreeing to “shut - up” money. Three months later while Neely w as taking depositions of Boeing executives, managers, and engineers, the first of two 737MAX crashed killing 346 people. ● Democrat Controlled Congress Contacts Neely ; Cover s- Up Evidence : In 2019 after the second 737MAX crash, Neely was contacted by the Democrat Majority 116th Congress House of Representatives under Nancy Polosi, Aviation Sub - committee Democrat Majority Lead requesting an interview regarding his Safety complaints at Boeing. In Neely’s first exposure with the political world, he quick ly realized the Democrats were positioning to blame the newly elected President Trump and his administration for the 737MAX crashes and assure that the Democrats took all credit for all the resolutions that took years. Neely was interviewed twice, attended three congressional House and Senate meetings in Washington, DC, and spoke with numerous political and industry leaders, BUT the Democrat lead committee DINIED Neely from testifying before congress because he was a Republican Trump supporter. The THE COST OF A AEROSPACE ENGINEERS INTEGRTIY The Case of Michael Neely vs The Boeing Company © All Rights Reserved – For Publication only by the consent of the Author, Whistleblower Michael Neely Democrat s sought out specific liberal Democrat Whistleblowers, industry leaders and even specific 737MAX victims’ families to support the Democrats agenda to secure power of resolution while undermining the minority Republican representatives. Neely was the ONLY p er- 737MAX crash Safety Whistleblower whose complaints would be proven tied to the cause of the 737MAX crashes. ● Neely Proved Boeing Violated all Applicable Laws; Schemed and Perjured: Court records show that Neely provided direct evidence that Boeing gave him high annual performance evaluations for his entire 20 year career while working at Boeing , including his last year when Boeing was filing complaints and being retaliat ed against through Boeing’s schemed termination . Neely produced court records that showed Boeing could not “fire” him because they had no legitimate reason , so the only way Boeing could terminate him was through a schemed RIF of “one” . Neely produced direct evidence showing his manager specifically hired a HR specialist after he began filing safety complaints, who during legal deposition admitted she “was hired to scheme Neely’s termination”. Then Neely produced direct evidence showing that the RIF process involves conducting a collegial evaluation HR and managers to evaluate employees for a down - select for RIF . Neely’s evidence showed that his RIF evaluation came from the same managers and HR that he raised complaints against, further showing highly bias subjective RIF conclusion. As part of the RIF process Boeing takes into consideration if an employee has a security clearance, which Neely did. Holding a security clearance favors an employee for retention during a RIF process. During trial, Neely produced evidence that some of the employees which Neely was evaluated against and not selected for RIF did not hold a security clearance like Neely did. In addition, his manager who was part of selecting Neely for RIF, perjured in his testimony in deposition that Neely “ did not ” have a security clearance , lied, and the courts did nothing . Neely also produced direct evidence that his manager’s office administrator was the one who made the errors of improperly expensing alcohol reimbursements, not Neely. This raised a suspicion that Neely’s manager coercing his of fice administrator to falsify expensing records. Even after the office administrators errors were corrected, Neely’s manager and newly hired HR representative administered Neely a Corporate Corrective Action scaring Neely’s record as part of its scheme fo r RIF of “one”. Neely clearly evidenced to the courts that Boeing maliciously devised a scheme in violation of numerous laws to terminate him for his Whistleblowing safety and various other violations that a any unbiased jury would have favored an d awarded Neely in these cases. ● Boeing’s Defense: Boeing leveraged a common legal scheme to undermine Neely’s employment performance arguing that his termination was due to performance issues, including a lack of interpersonal skills, violation of the company's alcohol reimbursement policy during travel, and budget cuts due to a "surplus" of engineers of “one” , and won THE COST OF A AEROSPACE ENGINEERS INTEGRTIY The Case of Michael Neely vs The Boeing Company © All Rights Reserved – For Publication only by the consent of the Author, Whistleblower Michael Neely both cases!!!! ● 9 th District Seattle/9 th Circuit of Appeals Court Rulings: In March 2019 just days of the second 737MAX crash killing a total of 346 people, the 9 th District Federal Court of Seattle WA denied Neely trial by jury through Summary Judgment in favor for Boeing. Neely appealed to the 9 th Circuit with no avail as the three panel liberal appellant court ignored Neely’s evidence that clearly should have overturn the Summary. It obvious the liberal Seattle Federal Court and 9th Circuit Court of Appeals abused their judicial authority to uphold the law, ignoring Neely’s direct evidence that conclusively showed without any doubt that any nonbiased jury would find Boeing guilty of violating all the applicable laws Neely raised. Neely writ to the U.S. Supreme Court who denied he aring. ● U.S. Department of Labor Court Ruling: In May of 2019 Neely’s the U.S. DOL ALJ heard the case held at the FAA office in Des Moines, WA . Within the first day of a seven day hearing, the ALJ abused his judicial authority stripping Neely of crucial evidence already submitted before the trial without contention from Boeing . Specifically , one crucial piece of evidence was Neely’s Aviation Safety E xpert witness who delivered a damning report to the court to testify that Neely’s safety complaints attributed to the cause of the 737MAX crashes. The ALJ “ordered” Neely’s expert report and testimony removed from record and denied testimony regarding the 737MAX relations. The ALJ’s abuse of judicial authority continued through the entire trial as Neely was left defenseless witnessing liberal authority destroy his case. The ALJ ordered Neely to reduce his amount of questions and in some instances during exa mination denied questions and answers. Neely objected and took exception to all of the ALJ’s adverse ruling[s]. After two more strenuous years of post trial arguments, the U.S. DOL , alike the 9 th Circuit, dismissed Neely’s retaliation claims concluding tha t Boeing provided sufficient evidence that he would have been laid off regardless of his whistleblowing activities , BUT upheld his Safety claims. It’s obvious to the blind that these rulings were prejudice , undermined and abused judicial authority of upholding the law so as to assure Neely would not prevail . Neely alleges Boeing’s counsels along with the powers of money were used to coerce the Judicial system for the outcome , and deny Neely retribution. Since leaving Boeing, Neely has continued to act as an independent aviation expert, collaborating with groups to challenge the FAA and Boeing on the transparency and safety of aircraft certification (including the 737 MAX). Neely Exposed Boeing’s Lack of Safety Culture Michael Neely’s case provides a detailed look into the "systemic friction" between engineering THE COST OF A AEROSPACE ENGINEERS INTEGRTIY The Case of Michael Neely vs The Boeing Company © All Rights Reserved – For Publication only by the consent of the Author, Whistleblower Michael Neely safety and corporate production goals at Boeing during the development of the 777X. Here are the specific technical findings he raised and the deeper details of his legal battles. Neely’s Advocacy for Aviation Safety Continued Since his departure from the Industry , Neely has shifted from an internal whistleblower to an external advocate. ● FOIA Lawsuits: He has provided expert testimony in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuits against the FAA. He argues that the FAA and Boeing are using "proprietary information" claims to hide technical data that should be public for safety verification. ● 737 MAX Scru tiny: Along with other experts like Captain "Sully" Sullenberger, Neely has pushed for more transparency in how the 737 MAX was ungrounded, claiming that without seeing the raw testing data, independent experts cannot confirm the plane's safety. The Fallout Force d FAA, Regulatory, and Oversight Changes In the years following the concerns raised by Michael Neely, the FAA significantly overhauled its oversight of the 777X certification. The agency moved away from its previous "hands - off" approach, whic h had heavily delegated authority to Boeing, and instead implemented a much more rigorous and independent verification process. Neely’s specific warnings about "unvalidated requirements" and the misuse of legacy designs hit at the very heart of how aircra ft are certified. In response to cases like his and the 737 MAX crisis, the FAA fundamentally rewrote the "playbook" for safety. The core of this change is found in 14 CFR § 25.1309 , the regulation Neely frequently cited, and the Aircraft Certification, Sa fety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA) of 2020. 1. Mandatory Disclosure of "Safety Critical Information" One of Neely’s biggest complaints was that Boeing was hiding flawed system requirements from both contractors and the FAA. ● The New Rule: Under the ACSAA, Boeing is now legally required to disclose all "safety- critical information" to the FAA. This includes any system whose failure could be hazardous or catastrophic. ● No More "Proprietary" Shields: Companies can no longer easily hide technic al flaws by labeling them as "proprietary business secrets" during the certification process. 2. Standardizing System Safety Assessments (SSA) Neely argued that Boeing was taking shortcuts by using old 777 data for the 777X. To stop this, the FAA issued a massive update to the safety assessment standards. THE COST OF A AEROSPACE ENGINEERS INTEGRTIY The Case of Michael Neely vs The Boeing Company © All Rights Reserved – For Publication only by the consent of the Author, Whistleblower Michael Neely ● The Change: The FAA moved to standardize the System Safety Assessment (SSA) process. It now requires that any "amended" aircraft (like the 777X, which is technically a derivative of the 777) be evaluated against modern safety standards, not just the rules from when the original plane was built in the 1990s. ● Cumulative Effect: The FAA now looks at the cumulative effect of all changes. Neely’s concern was that adding 30% more power capacity (the 777X) while keeping 30 - year- old distribution boxes (the 777) created a new, unstudied risk. The new regulations force Boeing to prove the w hole system works together, not just the new parts. 3. Ending the "Self - Correction" Culture Neely alleged that his managers ignored his reports because they were under pressure to meet deadlines. The FAA has implemented two major structural changes to fix this culture: Feature Old Method (Pre - Whistleblower) New Method (Post - 2020/ACSAA) Delegation Boeing employees (Designees) approved most designs for the FAA. FAA Retained Authority: FAA engineers now personally sign off on high - risk systems like the ELMS. Feedback Loops Whistleblowers had to rely on internal Boeing ethics lines (which Neely felt were ineffective). Direct FAA Line: A new, independent whistleblower office within the FAA allows engineers to bypass company management entirely. Human Factors Assumed pilots would always react perfectly to a system failure. Realistic Testing: Safety assessments must now account for "average" pilot reaction times and the potential for "alarm fatigue" during electrical failures. 4. The "Validation" Mandate Neely’s specific claim was that Boeing was asking GE to build systems based on unvalidated requirements ● The Fix: The updated Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309 - 1B (finalized around late 2024/2025) now explicitly mandates that requirements must be validated (proven correct) before they are verified (proven that the part meets the requirement). This closes the loophole Neely identified where Boeing was "testing to find the design" instead of "designing then testing." THE COST OF A AEROSPACE ENGINEERS INTEGRTIY The Case of Michael Neely vs The Boeing Company © All Rights Reserved – For Publication only by the consent of the Author, Whistleblower Michael Neely As of 2026, these regulations are the primary reason the 777X has faced such long delays; the FAA is now requiring "ground - up" proof for systems that Neely warned were being dangerously grandfathered in. Key Changes in 777X Oversight The 777X is the first major Boeing aircraft to be certified under the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA) , passed by Congress in 2020. This law specifically addresses the failures identified by whistleblowers like Neely. ● Formati on of a Technical Advisory Board (TAB): The FAA created an independent board of experts —separate from the primary certification team —to review the 777X. This ensures that a "second pair of eyes" examines safety- critical systems like the Electrical Load Man agement System (ELMS) that Neely flagged. ● Reduced Delegation (ODA Reform): In the past, the FAA allowed Boeing employees (acting as FAA "designees") to approve many designs. For the 777X, the FAA has "retained" authority over more items, meaning FAA engine ers—not Boeing employees — must personally sign off on critical safety assessments. ● Systemic Safety Assessments: The FAA now requires Boeing to perform "airplane - level" safety assessments. This addresses Neely’s concern that Boeing was looking at systems in isolation (like a single "legacy" box) rather than how the massive 30% increase in electrical load affected the entire aircraft's safety network. Neely’s Impact on the 777X Timeline These changes have directly contributed to the years of delays for the 777X. 1. Re- Validation of 30 - Year- Old Concepts: Because Neely and others argued that Boeing was using outdated data, the FAA has forced Boeing to re - validate systems that were originally designed for the 1990s - era 777. 2. The "Uncommanded Pitch" Event: In late 2020, a 777X test flight experienced an "uncommanded pitch event" (the nose moved unexpectedly). Because of the heightened scrutiny post - whistleblowers, the FAA halted certain certification steps for months until Boeing could prove the software and electric al architecture were fully understood. 3. Late - Stage Type Inspection Authorization (TIA): Boeing did not receive its major "Phase 3" flight test approval until late 2025. This phase includes the exact systems Neely worked on: avionics, electrical systems, and the APU (Auxiliary Power Unit). Summary of Boeing Impacts and Delivery Status As of early 2026, Boeing is still in the middle of this rigorous "re- learning" process. The company recently took a $4.9 billion charge due to 777X delays, with the aircraft now not THE COST OF A AEROSPACE ENGINEERS INTEGRTIY The Case of Michael Neely vs The Boeing Company © All Rights Reserved – For Publication only by the consent of the Author, Whistleblower Michael Neely expected to enter commercial service until 2027 . The case of Michael Neely highlights a shift in aviation: what was once considered a "routine update" to a plane is now treated by the FAA as a high- risk engineering challenge requiring full transparency. NEELY’SLEGACY WILL LIVE ON FOREVER Michael Neely’s legacy within the aerospace industry is that of a technical whistleblower who prioritized safety and engineering integrity over corporate expediency. A veteran engineer with over 20 years at Boeing, Neely became a key figure in the internal and legal debates surrounding the development of the 777X. His legacy is defined by three primary areas: 1. Whistleblowing and Safety Advocacy When his internal warnings were ignored, Neely took the risk of escalating his concerns. He filed formal internal complaints in 2015 and eventually filed a complaint with the Federal Aviation Administ ration (FAA) in 2016. ● The Legacy of Transparency: Following his departure from Boeing, Neely continued to advocate for aviation safety. He provided expert declarations in high - profile legal cases (such as those led by groups in Washington DC ) to push for greater transparency in the FAA’s certification processes for the 737 MAX and 777X. ● Legal Battle: Neely filed a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit against Boeing. While the courts eventually sided with Boeing (citing performance issues and a reduction in fo rce), Neely’s case remains a frequently cited example in discussions about the "silencing" of engineers within the company's corporate culture. 2. Impact on Engineering Ethics Neely is often cited symbol izing the "Old Boeing" engineering culture —where technical accuracy was paramount —clashing with a modern, "bottom - line" corporate strategy. His legacy serves as a case study in engineering ethics , specifically regarding: ● The duty of an engineer to report unvali dated or partially validated requirements. ● The personal and professional risks involved in challenging large- scale industrial projects Personal Impacts Neely neither asked, nor received anything for giving up his career, health and wealth doing the right thing in attempts to save lives. He alleges he witnessed the true corrupt Democrat Party inner workings, corrupt Judicial System, corrupt judges, clerks, attorneys, and the Power of Money from big corporations used to pay - off all to undermine the law! Neely alleges he is ostracized and blacklisted from the Aerospace Industry and continues to fight the continuing attacks on his livelihood from those responsible.