Scandal and Democracy Scandal and Democracy Media Politics in Indonesia S o u t h east A sia P ro g ram Pub lications an imprint of Cornell University Press It h aca and London Mary E. McCoy Southeast Asia Program Publications Editorial Board Mahinder Kingra ( ex o icio ) Thak Chaloemtiarana Chiara Formichi Tamara Loos Kaja McGowan Copyright © 2019 by Cornell University The text of this book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 4.0 International License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. To use this book, or parts of this book, in any way not covered by the license, please contact Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress.cornell.edu. F irst published 2019 by Cornell University Press Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: McCoy, Mary E., 1968– author. Title: Scandal and democracy : media politics in Indonesia / Mary E. McCoy. Description: Ithaca : Southeast Asia Program Publications, an imprint of Cornell University Press, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018029443 (print) | LCCN 2018032259 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501731051 (pdf) | ISBN 9781501731068 (epub/mobi) | ISBN 9781501731037 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781501731044 (pbk. : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Mass media—Political aspects—Indonesia. | Press and politics— Indonesia. | Press—Indonesia—Influence. | Democratization—Indonesia. | Political corruption—Indonesia. | Indonesia—Politics and government—1998– Classification: LCC P95.82.I5 (ebook) | LCC P95.82.I5 M43 2019 (print) | DDC 302.2309598—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018029443 Cover image by Hengki Irawan, illustrator for the Jogja Daily newspaper. To my mot h er, Kat h ryn E. Pixley, w h o raised me wit h a love of readin g and writin g and to my fat h er, Edward E. Pixley, w h o ta ugh t me to vent u re into t h e u nknown Acknowled g ments ix Note on Spellin g and Personal Names xi Introd u ction: Understandin g Democratic Consolidation 1 Chapter 1 Ori g ins of Media Controls 15 Chapter 2 Dele g itimatin g A u t h oritarianism 33 Chapter 3 S uh arto’s Fall 53 Chapter 4 Reformasi 67 Chapter 5 Media in Retreat 85 Chapter 6 Bali g ate and All t h e Gates 107 Chapter 7 Scandal and Democratic Consolidation 121 Chapter 8 Media and Civil Society 139 Appendixes 161 Notes 167 Index 203 C ontents T h e warmt h and g enerosity of all of t h ose w h o h elped me in my researc h and writ- in g contin u ally amazed me, and I apolo g ize to anyone I fail to mention h ere. In partic- u lar, I wo u ld like to t h ank my advisers at Nort h western University—Jim Ettema, Tom Goodni gh t, Jim Sc h woc h , and Je ff Winters—for t h eir enco u ra g ement, s ugg estions, and caref u l readin g s of di ff erent drafts of t h is project. As t h e work contin u ed, friends and collea gu es—Gwen Walker, Erin Cantos, Denise Lam b , D u ncan McCar g o, S u san Zaeske, Ro b Asen, Marty Med hu rst, and Karen Re bh oltz— g ave h elpf u l comments on my revised drafts. I am especially inde b ted to E u nsook J u n g , w h o s u pported t h e proj- ect at critical moments and aided in t h e vis u al concept u alization of my ar gu ment, and C h arlotte Frascona, w h o h elped me t h ink t h ro ugh vario u s c h allen g es at eac h sta g e. I owe special t h anks to all w h o g ave me t h eir time and provided insi gh ts in inter- views and ot h er conversations t h ro ugh o u t my year of fi eldwork in Jakarta and Manila. For s h arin g t h eir fi les and allowin g me an inside perspective on t h e workin g s of t h eir or g anizations, I am g ratef u l to Her u Hendratmoko, L u kas L u warso, Ezki S u yanto, and Ac h mad Ta ufi k of Aliansi J u rnalis Independen (AJI); t h e sta ff of Ramako-FM; Haris Ja uh ari and Despen Omp u s u n ggu of Ikatan J u rnalis Televisi Indonesia (IJTI); S. Leo Bat ub ara, Asep S u nara Martadiredja, and H. M. P u rnowo of Serikat Pener b it S u ratka b ar (SPS); I g nati u s Haryanto and R u sdi Marpa u n g (Ucok) of Lem b a g a St u di Pers & Pem b an gu nan (LSPP); Lin Ne u mann of t h e Committee to Protect Jo u rnal- ists (CPJ); Andreas Harsono of Instit u t St u di Ar u s Informasi (ISAI); B u diman S. Hartoyo of Persat u an Wartawan Indonesia Reformasi (PWI-Reformasi); K u k uh San- yoto of Masyarakat Pers dan Penyiaran Indonesia (MPPI); Hinca Pandjaitan of t h e Media Law Center; Ade Armando of t h e University of Indonesia; Ma g dalena Dal u as of TVRI; Irawati Prati g no of AC Nielsen; Il h am Bintan g of Persat u an Wartawan Indone- sia (PWI); Syams u l Ma’arif of Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI); and t h e mem b ers of t h e Jakarta Media Center. For t h eir h ospitality and insi gh ts w h ile I was in Jakarta, many t h anks to Alwi Da h lan, Aristides Katoppo, Atmak u s u ma h Astraatmadja, Bam b an g Harym u rti, C hu s- n u l Mar’iya h , Daniel D h akidae, Dede Oetomo, Djafar Asse g a ff , Eka Sitor u s, G u narso K u s u modinin g rat, Is h adi S.K., Joesoef Isak, Jo h n McBet h , K. Basrie, Kat h leen Reen, Marsillam Simanj u ntak, Miriam Nain gg olan, M.S. Z u lkarnaen, Parni Hadi, Riza Pri- madi, Rosi h an Anwar, S u mita To b in g , Trimoelja Soerjadi, Wimar Witoelar, Xanana G u smão, and Y u li Ismartono. T h anks also to Teri Caraway, Bet h Drexler, and Bronwyn C u rran for t h eir val u a b le friends h ip d u rin g o u r year of livin g t h ro ugh t h e t u rmoil and revelry of post-S uh arto Indonesia. In Manila, I also b ene fi ted g reatly from t h e co u nsel of S h eila Coronel, Melinda Q u intos de Jes u s, and Helen Mendoza. M u c h love and g ratit u de to Jakarta friends Del fi na Y u niara, Te guh Dewa b rata, and Dameria Nain gg olan, w h o ta ugh t me so m u c h and h elped me in more ways t h an I can b e g in to name h ere. Warm t h anks also to my Jakarta researc h assistants, Sora, Eva, Hera, Sylvia, Y u li, Fenty, Y u ni, R u lly, and Joy, for all t h eir work clippin g , fi lin g , and transcri b in g A cknowled g ments x Acknowledgments As t h e project moved toward p ub lication at Cornell University Press, I received two inval u a b le reports from anonymo u s reviewers t h at served as my roadmap to revi- sions. In t h is process, Sara h E. M. Grossman proved an ideal editor, b ot h providin g enco u ra g ement and pressin g me toward completion. W h en t h e b ook went into pro- d u ction, Karen Hwa, senior prod u ction editor at t h e press, and t h e b ook’s copy editor, Florence Grant, were b ot h assid u o u s and t h o ugh tf u l. Finally, and most importantly, I owe an enormo u s de b t to my parents, Kat h ryn and Edward Pixley; my hu s b and, Alfred McCoy; my in-laws, Mar g arita Piel McCoy, Mar g arita Candace Gro u nd, and Marcella Pixley; and my b rot h er, Step h en Pixley, for b ein g t h e a u dience t h at g ave my writin g meanin g , and to my c h ildren, Me g and Cyr u s, for comin g into my life in t h e middle of t h is project and b rin g in g me h appiness on even t h e h ardest days. N ote on S pellin g and P ersonal N ames Names in t h is b ook, wit h certain exceptions, are spelled u sin g t h e post-1972 sys- tem (Ejaan yan g Disemp u rnakan). Exceptions incl u de t h ose t h at appear in q u ota- tions from ot h er so u rces and names of a u t h ors in t h e notes w h o u se t h e old spellin g Wit h t h e new system, t h e name of Indonesia’s fi rst president, for example, is spelled “S u karno” instead of “Soekarno,” “Soesanto P u djomartono” b ecomes “S u santo P u jomartono,” and “Ak b ar Tandj u n g ” b ecomes “Ak b ar Tanj u n g .” Also, as Western news so u rces freq u ently point o u t, many Indonesians, s u c h as t h e former president S uh arto, g o b y only one name. T h ese cases are indicated in b rackets [one name] in t h e fi rst reference to t h e person. For Indonesians wit h m u ltiple names, t h ere is no standard practice for s h ort- ened references. Instead, u se of t h e fi rst, middle, or last part of t h eir f u ll names, or a nickname, varies b y individ u al. For example, t h e former minister of information, M uh ammad Y u n u s Yos fi a h , is called “Pak [Mr.] Y u n u s,” w h ile t h e former director g eneral of press and g rap h ics, H. Dailami, is called “Pak Dailami,” and t h e former h ead of Kompas , Jako b Oetama, is called “Pak Jako b .” For t h e sake of simplicity, after t h e fi rst reference to an individ u al b y h is or h er f u ll name, s ub seq u ent references u se t h e last component of t h e person’s name, w h ic h in t h e United States wo u ld b e called t h e s u rname. For example, t h e Golkar leader Ak b ar Tanj u n g is commonly called “Ak b ar” or “Pak Ak b ar,” bu t in t h is b ook I refer to h im as “Tanj u n g ” after t h e fi rst ref- erence. Nota b le exceptions incl u de t h e former president Me g awati S u karnop u tri, w h o is referred to in s h ort references as “Me g awati” or “President Me g awati.” Scandal and Democracy I ntrod u ction: U nderstandin g D emocratic C onsolidation W h ile democracy in t h e lon g r u n is t h e most sta b le form of g overnment, in t h e s h ort r u n, it is amon g t h e most fra g ile. —Madeleine Al b ri gh t, speec h delivered at t h e conference “Towards a Comm u nity of Democracies,” Warsaw, J u ne 26, 2000 In May 1998, as t h e Indonesian capital of Jakarta smoldered from days of riotin g , arson, and gu n fi re, t h e a g in g a u tocrat President S uh arto resi g ned after more t h an t h ree decades in power. Wit h t h e nation slippin g toward b ankr u ptcy and separatist revolts simmerin g in remote provinces, h is vice president, Bac h ar u ddin J u s u f (B. J.) Ha b i b ie, took o ffi ce, named a new ca b inet, and promised democratic reforms. Less t h an two weeks later, sixty s u pporters of t h e once-o u tlawed Alliance of Independent Jo u rnalists (Aliansi J u rnalis Independen, AJI) g at h ered to disc u ss preventin g a ret u rn of a u t h oritarian media controls, a de fi nin g iss u e not only for t h ese jo u rnalists bu t for t h e entire reform movement. In marked contrast to t h e secrecy once req u ired to avoid police raids, or g anizers of t h is g at h erin g invited television crews to fi lm t h eir proceedin g s, and a top o ffi cial from t h e once-feared Ministry of Information served as a speaker. In anot h er si g n of a new era, w h en t h ese jo u rnalists later marc h ed from t h e ministry to t h e state-sponsored Indonesian Jo u rnalists Association, instead of arrestin g t h em, t h e police led t h e way. W h ile t h e mood of t h is for u m re fl ected t h e e u p h oria sweepin g t h e co u ntry, many were still wary. T h e editor of t h e En g lis h -lan gu a g e Jakarta Post , S u santo P u jomar- tono, posed a critical q u estion: Had t h e movement for press freedom tri u mp h ed j u st b eca u se S uh arto was no lon g er president? He reminded h is a u dience of t h e das h ed expectations of 1966, w h en General S uh arto, after deposin g h is a u tocratic predeces- sor, h ad lavis h ed special attention on t h e media b efore s h iftin g to t h e repression t h at marked most of h is ten u re. T h e lesson, P u jomartono said, was t h at t h o ugh Indonesia was once a g ain enterin g a new era, t h e media co u ld rely on neit h er laws nor t h e g ov- ernment’s “pity” to safe gu ard t h eir f u t u re. Jo u rnalists, moreover, were still h a u nted b y t h e gh osts of lon g repression and deference to t h e fallen re g ime. 1 T h e h ead of AJI, L u kas L u warso, ec h oed t h ese concerns, pointin g o u t t h at news o u tlets in t h is h eady climate were b e h avin g j u st as t h ey h ad t h ree decades earlier, openly re bu kin g t h e o u t g oin g re g ime. Yet h istory h ad s h own t h e Indonesian press to b e no st u rdier as a pillar of democracy t h an a pile of wood tossin g a b o u t in t h e ocean. Given its freedom, h e said, c h an g in g metap h ors, t h e press b ellows a bu sively b efore silently b owin g in t h e face of press u re. Citin g yet anot h er metap h or favored b y t h e p ub lis h er Jako b Oetama, h e compared t h e press to a cra b w h o q u ickly retreats w h en 2 Introduction pelted wit h stones. 2 At some point d u rin g t h eir str ugg le for s u rvival u nder S uh arto, mem b ers of t h e press h ad lost t h eir nerve and, in t u rn, h ad ta ugh t t h is fear to t h e Indonesian people—perpet u atin g , conscio u sly or not, t h e power of t h e re g ime. 3 Now, after so many years of accommodatin g New Order dictates, L u warso said h e was not s u rprised t h at many in b ot h media and g overnment feared t h at removin g restraints wo u ld lead to c h aos. T h is was nat u ral, h e said, j u st as it is nat u ral for one w h o h as b een in t h e dark for a lon g time to b e afraid of t h e li gh t. B u t if t h e mentality of t h e nation’s leaders did not c h an g e, and if t h e press itself did not demand com- pre h ensive le g al reforms, “t h is era animated b y t h e spirit of reform will b ecome an a b s u rd repetition of t h e past.” 4 T h e views expressed in t h is for u m o ff er a snaps h ot of t h e c h allen g es t h e Indo- nesian media wo u ld face d u rin g t h e co u ntry’s transition to democracy, revealin g t h e bu rden of Indonesia’s a u t h oritarian past as well as t h e promise of its democratic f u t u re. As eyewitnesses to t h e nation’s t u r bu lent h istory, many of t h ese jo u rnalists h ad already seen t h e overt h row of an earlier dictators h ip g ive way to S uh arto’s t h irty years of a u t h oritarian r u le, t hu s lendin g g ravity to L u warso’s warnin g t h at t h e c u rrent spirit of reform co u ld b e “an a b s u rd repetition of t h e past.” S uh arto’s New Order h ad lasted two f u ll g enerations b y em b eddin g itself in constit u tion, law, and bu rea u cracy, w h ile insertin g itself into t h e lan gu a g e, media, and mentality of ordinary citizens and ed u cated elites, jo u rnalists incl u ded. T h e pervasiveness of a u t h oritarian val u es wit h in Indonesian society, moreover, meant t h at democratic reform wo u ld req u ire not only re g ime c h an g e bu t also a transformation of t h e co u ntry’s political c u lt u re—t hu s lend- in g partic u lar si g ni fi cance to t h e work of t h e media. Glob a l Con te x t T h o ugh t h eir foc u s was Indonesia, t h ese jo u rnalists were addressin g t h e c h ief pro b lem facin g similar democratic transitions worldwide: an in h erent tendency to revert to a u t h oritarian r u le. Over t h e past q u arter cent u ry, as crowds h ave toppled dozens of dictatorial re g imes from Manila to Berlin, from Warsaw to Cairo, we h ave learned a simple lesson: democratic u prisin g s are relatively easy, almost common- place, bu t s u ccessf u l transitions to end u rin g democracies are di ffi c u lt and rare. T h e moment of re g ime c h an g e sparks tremendo u s h ope amon g b ot h participants and international o b servers w h o anticipate t h e emer g ence of a more open, democratic society. Yet once a dictator h as fallen, t h e most di ffi c u lt q u estion remains: How will t h e newly democratizin g nation avoid reversin g co u rse, revertin g to a u t h oritarian sol u - tions for t h e da u ntin g pro b lems b ro ugh t b y t h e transition? In Eastern E u rope, central Asia, and m u c h of t h e Middle East, t h is q u estion h as g ained increasin g salience as one democratic transition after anot h er h as g iven way to renewed a u t h oritarian r u le. Indeed, t h e tendency toward reversal is evident in any environment w h ere t h e condi- tions t h at ena b led a u t h oritarianism are still in place. In Indonesia’s transition, s u c h conditions incl u ded j u dicial corr u ption, electoral fra u d, a politicized military, elite rent seekin g , and exec u tive mac h inations to retain power. Rat h er t h an fl eein g into exile, moreover, S uh arto ceded power to a h andpicked s u ccessor and retired to h is l u x u rio u s compo u nd in Central Jakarta to enjoy h is g randc h ildren, h is pet ti g er, and access to an estimated $40 b illion in accr u ed assets. 5 T h o ugh tainted b y t h e re g ime’s corr u ption, S uh arto’s political mac h ine h ad not lost power. Instead, wit h h is loyal proté g é at t h e h elm, S uh arto’s lon g -r u lin g Golkar party retained control of b ot h t h e exec u tive and t h e le g islat u re, providin g a ready pat h Understanding Democratic Consolidation 3 to reversal as t h e co u ntry str ugg led to la u nc h democratic reforms. T h e roots of t h e New Order’s a u t h oritarianism, moreover, ran deep, and most of t h e mec h anisms t h at h ad ena b led t h e exec u tive to concentrate political and economic power were still in place—mec h anisms t h at for decades h ad restricted media freedom, c h ecked opposin g centers of power, and t h ere b y b locked t h e circ u lation of leaders h ip. In retrospect, t h e co u ntry’s democratic transition was far more precario u s t h an many realized. Despite t h ese ina u spicio u s b e g innin g s, Indonesia’s democratization h as per- sisted, twice passin g Sam u el H u ntin g ton’s b enc h mark of two consec u tive elections for assessin g a transition’s lon g -term via b ility. 6 After two fi tf u l decades of c h an g e, Indonesia now o ff ers some lessons, as t h e world’s lar g est M u slim-majority nation, for more recent democratic transitions, nota b ly t h e Ara b Sprin g of 2011–13. W h ile myriad forces can promote or impede democratization, Indonesia’s experience indi- cates t h at a transition’s consolidation or reversal depends, to a s u rprisin g extent, on t h e role of t h e media—a set of actors w h ose freedom is widely reco g nized as a de fi nin g attri bu te of modern democracies bu t w h ose centrality in c h eckin g reversal remains only partly u nderstood. Ac t o r s v er sus F a c t o r s Followin g t h e s u ccession of transitions startin g in t h e 1970s t h at Sam u el H u n- tin g ton terms democratization’s “t h ird wave,” a vast literat u re h as emer g ed address- in g t h e q u estion of w h y some democratic transitions s u cceed and ot h ers fo u nder, w h y some lead to “democratic consolidation” w h ile ot h ers eit h er fail o u tri gh t or settle into a state of pse u dodemocracy t h at often masks an atavistic a u t h oritarianism. 7 Wit h in t h is literat u re, st u dies of transitions tend to foc u s on two b road t h emes: actors and factors. Takin g t h e latter approac h , analysts s u c h as H u ntin g ton and Ro b ert Da h l h ave so ugh t to explain t h e ori g ins and o u tcomes of transitions wit h a series of factors of varyin g complexity, incl u din g g lo b al economic trends, levels of modernization, or g eopolitical forces. 8 Wit h o u t disco u ntin g t h eir val u e, ot h ers, s u c h as J u an Linz, h ave critiq u ed factor- b ased analyses as overly static, foc u sin g on t h e “social, economic, and c u lt u ral correlates of sta b le re g imes in a g iven moment of time, [rat h er] t h an on t h e dynamic processes of crisis, b reakdown, and re-eq u ili b ration of existin g re g imes or t h e consolidation of new ones.” 9 S u c h st u dies also tend toward an almost teleolo g ical portrayal of democratization as a p h enomenon t h at, once in motion, will contin u e of its own accord u nless b locked b y h ostile forces or u nfavora b le circ u mstances. T h ose w h o foc u s on actors, b y contrast, look at t h e interplay of political leaders and social sectors in a process t h at leads to eit h er reversal or consolidation, depend- in g on t h e reso u rces and strate g ies t h ese actors employ. In t h e aftermat h of t h e Cold War, resid u al elements from a u t h oritarian re g imes, w h et h er military or civilian, h ave b een persistent so u rces of resistance to democratization. Similarly, in Indonesia after S uh arto, reversal was not an a b straction bu t a process promoted b y actors determined to avoid acco u ntin g for past derelictions and to preserve privile g es, w h et h er political o ffi ce, g overnment contracts, or protected markets. T h ese actors formed a disparate alliance of re g ime cronies, inc u m b ent o ffi cials, and military leaders w h o coalesced aro u nd t h e Golkar party, w h ic h h ad dominated parliament u nder S uh arto and pre- served m u c h of its in flu ence after h is fall. Wit h in t h is democratization literat u re, t h e military, as t h e sole actor wit h t h e raw coercive power to lead a reversal, merits t h e close attention it h as received. Indeed, 4 Introduction in t h e latter h alf of t h e twentiet h cent u ry, militaries in developin g societies tended to b e ve h icles for t h e esta b lis h ment of, or reversion to, a u t h oritarianism. Yet w h en atavistic forces are so entrenc h ed t h at t h e inevita b le tendency is toward reversal, t h e primary concern is not w h o h as t h e power to lead a ret u rn to a u t h oritarian r u le, bu t rat h er w h o h as t h e means and motivation to resist. T h ose w h o do are often identi fi ed as reformists, democratic actors, or simply democrats. T h ey mi gh t incl u de jo u rnalists as well as st u dents, intellect u als, non g overnmental or g anizations, opposition political parties, or even mem b ers of t h e military. Amon g t h ese many actors, h owever, mem- b ers of t h e news media are u niq u ely positioned to co u nter t h e forces of reversal and f u rt h er democratic consolidation. S u c h was t h e case in Indonesia, alt h o ugh t h ere t h e syner g y b etween media actors and civil society h as b een, and likely will contin u e to b e, t h e critical force in decidin g democracy’s f u t u re. D e moc rat iz at ion a nd the M e di a From t h e earliest democratization sc h olars h ip, t h ere h as b een g eneral a g reement t h at freedom of t h e press, or t h e media more b roadly, is necessary to bu ildin g a mod- ern democracy, primarily t h ro ugh promotin g g overnment acco u nta b ility and servin g as a key ve h icle in citizens’ comm u nication of political preferences. M u c h of t h is older literat u re, h owever, tends to treat s u c h freedom in t h e b inary terms of presence vers u s a b sence. In t h e 1990s, sc h olars b e g an examinin g t h e media as a more dynamic force bu t g enerally foc u sed on t h eir role in re g ime c h an g e. 10 W h ile t h is b ook addresses t h e media’s in flu ence in S uh arto’s downfall, its emp h a- sis is on t h e critical consolidation p h ase d u rin g democratization. In t h is second p h ase, t h e main concern is not t h e cessation of a u t h oritarian r u le bu t rat h er t h e reversi b ility of democratization and c h allen g es in bu ildin g democratic instit u tions. 11 N u mero u s sc h olars h ave examined t h e post-1999 wave of democratization. Many of t h ese h ave foc u sed on t h e conditions cond u cive to media s u pport for democratization. Some h ave taken a primarily empirical approac h , and ot h ers h ave b een predominantly prescrip- tive, o u tlinin g w h at news o u tlets should do to stren g t h en democracy w h ile critiq u in g media failin g s in speci fi c political contexts. 12 By contrast, t h is vol u me examines w h at media o u tlets act u ally do, or are in h erently inclined to do, t h at h elps ward o ff reversal in practice. T he N e ws M e di a ’s Uniqu e Rol e In t h eir di u rnal responsi b ilities, mem b ers of t h e media di ff er little from ot h er professionals. B u t t h e news o u tlets t h ey serve stand apart from ot h er sectors, in part b eca u se t h e services t h ey provide are distinctive. In prod u cin g and disseminatin g news and commentary on p ub lic a ff airs, t h ey are t h e only sector w h ose primary jo b is to o b serve, record, and analyze t h e actions of ot h er players and so inform t h e p ub lic. Media actors in democracies may not c u t deals and form coalitions to t h e same extent as ot h ers, bu t individ u ally and collectively, intentionally and h ap h azardly, t h ey s h ape t h e environment in w h ic h ot h er actors make decisions and for g e alliances, a ff ectin g in m u ltiple ways t h e calc u lations of contendin g forces. Moreover, simply b y reportin g on key players and u nfoldin g events, t h e media h elp impose transparency on b ot h , alert- in g t h e p ub lic to developments a ff ectin g power relations and g eneral welfare. B u t as Indonesia’s democratic transition ill u strates, in s h apin g t h is decision- makin g environment, t h e media’s most critical f u nction may b e t h eir contri bu tion Understanding Democratic Consolidation 5 to w h at t h e political t h eorist Adam Przeworski h as descri b ed as t h e instit u tionaliza- tion of u ncertainty—a process t h at serves as b ot h a force for democratization and a critical deterrent to reversal. 13 In most societal contexts, t h e word “ u ncertainty” car- ries a h ost of ne g ative connotations. In Indonesia, for decades S uh arto’s relentless campai g n a g ainst s u spected Comm u nists created a climate of fearf u l u ncertainty amon g ordinary people ever v u lnera b le to c h ar g es of s ub version. T h ro ugh o u t t h e New Order, t h e re g ime itself faced w h at Andreas Sc h edler calls t h e “twin u ncer- tainty” of a u t h oritarian r u le—t h e “instit u tional insec u rity” all a u tocrats face in maintainin g power and “informational u ncertainty” exacer b ated b y t h e repression of civil li b erties. 14 In S uh arto’s last years, u ncertainty over w h o wo u ld s u cceed h im hu n g like a clo u d over m u c h p ub lic disco u rse. Followin g Przeworski, my analysis treats u ncertainty not as a g eneral state or a type of a b sence bu t as a central element in r u led- b ased, yet open, democratic contestation t h at yields o u tcomes u nknowa b le in advance. At t h e start of democratization, myriad c h an g es introd u ce far more u ncertainty into t h e political arena t h an co u ld h ave b een tolerated u nder a u t h oritarianism. T h e emancipation of t h e p ub lic sp h ere exposes everyone—reformers as well as t h e old gu ard—to new forms of criticism. T h e democratic process itself, for all its promises of fairness and incl u sion, o ff ers no gu arantees t h at o u tcomes will satisfy all partici- pants. In t h e face of democratization’s h ei gh tened u ncertainty, even t h ose committed to reform in principle may lose t h e co u ra g e to allow democratic o u tcomes in practice. T h e c h allen g e for reformers in any posta u t h oritarian society is mana g in g t h e insec u - rity felt b y t h ose wit h t h e power to derail t h e transition wit h o u t allowin g reform itself to fo u nder. Przeworski addresses t h is pro b lem b y ar gu in g t h at democratization s h o u ld b e u nderstood as t h e instit u tionalization of contin u o u s con fl icts and, sim u ltaneo u sly, “t h e process of instit u tionalizin g u ncertainty” in h erent in democratic contestation. He compares t h is u ncertainty to t h e certainty t h at c h aracterizes a u t h oritarian r u le, in w h ic h some g ro u ps (often t h e military) h ave t h e power to manip u late t h e resol u tion of con fl icts to protect t h eir interests. W h ile t h ose o u tside t h e r u lin g circle may face considera b le u ncertainty, h e contin u es, t h ose close to t h e re g ime “ h ave a h i gh de g ree of control . . . in t h e sense t h at t h ey are not forced to accept u ndesira b le o u tcomes.” In a democracy, b y contrast, “no g ro u p is a b le to intervene w h en o u tcomes of con fl icts violate t h eir self-perceived interests.” 15 Democracy, in s u m, is a form of g overnance t h at s ub jects all players to u ncertainty. Paradoxically, w h at lends sta b ility to democracy’s contin u o u s c hu rn of contesta- tion is t h at o u tcomes of individ u al contests are always, to some de g ree, indetermi- nate. “In a democracy,” Przeworski explains, “no one can win for once and for all: even if s u ccessf u l at one time, victors immediately face t h e prospect of h avin g to str ugg le in t h e f u t u re.” 16 By t h e same lo g ic, t h is indeterminacy also gu arantees t h at no defeat is ever fi nal and t h ere will b e a c h ance to play a g ain. Under a u t h oritarianism, t h ere is a strikin g ly symmetrical inversion of t h ese principles. Indeed, a u t h oritarianism is g enerally marked b y an o b sessive p u rs u it of sec u rity t h ro ugh predetermined o u tcomes—w h et h er in elections, t h e distri bu tion of g overnment contracts, or co u rt cases. Once esta b lis h ed, a u t h oritarian re g imes s u rvive b y a ff ordin g t h is freedom from u ncertainty to colla b oratin g elites. In addition, as lon g as a re g ime can control t h e o u tcomes of most contests, t h ere is little reason to main- tain t h e mec h anisms of indeterminacy t h at promise f u t u re open ro u nds. Only w h en an a u t h oritarian g rip weakens and a co u ntry’s political sit u ation is in flu x does t h e