M ARCH 2020 1 I N T ERROREM E FFECT OF N ON C OMPETE A GREEMENTS E MPLOYEES F EAR E XTREME C ONSEQUENCES FOR B REACHING U NENFORCEABLE N ONCOMPETE A GREEMENTS : F INES , F EES & E VEN J AIL John M ichael Grant , Esq. A BSTRACT : Two different surveys suggest that 30 - 40% of responden ts believe that breaching a noncompete agreement results in being sent to jail Key findings include that r espondents also fear financial consequences. 68% of respondents fear being fined " thousands of dollars " by a reviewing court if found to be breaching a non - compete agreement The survey responses further suggest that the agreements the res pondents fear breaching would not even be deemed enf orceable , as many of the respondents had no access to trade secrets or confidential information , and few received increased payment in exchange for signing a noncompete agreement Thus, the evidence suggests that noncompete agreements exert an in - terrorem effect on employees , even when employees are likely boun d by unenforceable noncompete agreements. Thus, noncompete agreements are likely useful to employers seeking to discourage employee mobility even in nonenforcing jurisdictions , and even when employers decline to enforce such agreements in court. B AC KGROUND : Recently, there has been increased media 1 and regulatory 2 scr utiny on " noncompete" agreements ( agreements directly between such employers and their employees to not work for certain other employers for a period of time after separation ) 3 Moreover, i t has become apparent that employers' use of such agreements has no t been limite d to their high - income employees. 4 M any of th e existing “non compete” clauses are unenforceable, particularly those that involve workers without access to trade secrets, who aren’t being provided training in any unique skills, and who have no access to the use of confidential customer or sup plier lists. 5 Nevert heless, employers likely benefit from the in - terrorem 6 effect even unenforceable noncompete agreements have on their employees. In cases where courts have ultimately declared M ARCH 2020 2 noncompete agreements unenforceable, prior to the ultimate decision, employees were often strongly discourag ed from breaching the agreements through "cease and desist " letters or years' of expensive litigation. 7 Even if a noncompete agreement were deemed enforceab le under the relevant state law, a n enforceable non compete agreement usually results only in the enforcing court issuing a n in junction 8 preventing the employee from continuing to work for the competito r, the court does not “ fine ” or punish employees that breach such agreements Wh ile it is theoretically possible for employers to pursue l iquidated damages , such c laims are rare and carefully scrutinized 9 No S tate 's law would jail an e mployee that breaches a non compete agreement. 10 Nevertheless, t wo different online surveys 11 conducted using Survey Monkey , 12 one conducted in 2018 13 involving 275 participants , and one conducted in 2019 14 involving 101 participants , suggest that employees fear extreme consequences for breaching noncompete agreem ents. Moreover , many of the respondents report little exposure to trade secrets or confidential information , 15 and therefore , the agreements the respondents fear such extreme consequences for breaking are likely actually unenforceable. 16 K EY F INDINGS : I. The use of noncompete agreements appears to be widespread In the August 2018 survey, when asked the question , " Have you ever signed an agreement to not compete with a competitor of your employer? " 77 of 275 respondents [ 28 %] responded "Yes" 17 In the September 2019 survey, which was restricted to participants that earn less than $50,000 annually, 4 0 of 101 respondents [39.60%] respond ed " Yes" to the question : " Have you ever had to sign a non - compet e agreement at a job? " 18 M ARCH 2020 3 II. While employees report that they receive training , 19 many report that they have no access to any trade secrets , or confidential customer or supplier lists : In the 2019 survey , when asked the question , " Did your employer ever share with you trade secrets, patents, copyrights, confidential lists of its cus tomers or any other secret intellectual property ? " only 34 of 101 respondents [ 33.66 %] respond ed " Yes " 20 Of those that reported being bound by a noncompete agreement, 17 o f 40 respondents [ 42.5% ] ha d no access t o trade secrets or confidential customer lists 21 Thus, many of the non - compete agreements participants signed were likely unenforceable. 22 III. Employees fear large fines or having to forfeit their salar y if they breach a noncompete agreement to take a higher paying position : In the 2019 survey, when asked the question , " If a previous employer won a lawsuit against you for violating a non - compete agreement, are you worried that you would have to pay all of the salary from the new job to the old employer that made you sign the non - compete agr eement? " 48 of 101 respondents [ 47.52 %] respond ed "Yes " 23 In the 201 8 survey, when asked the question , " If you signed a contract when you started a job, that promised to not work for a competitor of your employer for one year after you quit, and if you broke that promise, would you be afraid of being fined thousands of dollars by a Court of Law ? " 189 of 275 respondents [68.73%] responded "Yes" 24 IV Most s hocking , an astoundingly high percentage of respondents fear being sent to jail if they violate a noncompete agreement : In the 2018 survey , 86 of 275 respondents [31.27%] responded "Yes" to the question "I f you signed a contract when you started a job, that promised t o not work for a competitor of your employer for one year after you quit, and if you broke that promise, would you be afraid of being sent to jail? " 25 M ARCH 2020 4 In the 2019 survey , when asked the question , " If an employer that made you sign a non - compete agreement won a lawsuit against you for violating that non - compete agr eement, are you worried that you would be sent to jail? " 40 of 101 respondents [ 39.60 %] respond ed "Yes " 26 V. Finally , t he in - terrorem effect appears to deter e mployees from consideri ng higher payi ng jobs, even significantly higher paying positions: When asked the question , " If you received a job offer to wor k for a competitor of your employer's, and you would be paid 5% more at the new job, but accepting the new job offer would violate a non - compet e agreement, would you take the job ?" 79 of 101 respondents [ 78.22 %] respond ed " No " 27 51 of 101 respondents [ 50.50 %] respond ed " No " to the question " If you received a job offer to wor k for a competitor of your employer's, and you would be paid 20 % more at the new job, but accepting the new job offer would violate a non - compete agreement, would you take the job? " 28 C ON CLUSION : Thus, the results suggest that non compete agreements discourage employees from pursuing better employment options even when those nonc ompete agreements are unenforceable. Importantly , the extreme negative consequences employees fear from breaching noncompete agreements likely enable such agreements to accomplish their intended effect , even when employers decline to enforce noncompete agr ee ments in court. While these survey sample sizes are smaller than would be ideal, and the ability to draw general conclusions from online surveys is limited , 29 this evidence suggests that m ore study on employees' perceptions of the consequences of breachi ng noncompete agreements is necessary. The results in these surveys suggest that noncompete agreements may be advancing employers' inte rest s even in nonenforcing jurisdictions , and even where the employer does not enforce such agreements M ARCH 2020 5 1 Noah Smith, Bloomberg Noncompete Agreements Take a Toll on the Economy (March 22, 2018) available at https://goo.gl/qi7GFf ; Exclusive: Amazon Makes Even Temporary Warehouse Workers Sign 18 - month Non - competes , The Verge (March 26, 2015) available at https://goo.gl/G7AUUo 2 Non - Competes in the Workplace: Examining Antitrust and Consumer Protection Issues (January 9, 2020) available at htt ps://www .ftc.gov/news - events/events - calendar/non - competes - workplace - examining - antitrust - consumer - protection - issues 3 See Office of Economic Policy U.S. Department of the Treasury, Non - compete Contracts: Economic Effects And Policy Implications, (March 20 16) ( “ Non - compete agreements are contr acts between workers and firms that delay employees’ ability to work for competing firms. ” ) avai lable at https://goo.gl/VrMHEp ; Council of Economic Advisors Issue Brief Labor Marke t Monopsony: Trends, Consequences, And Policy Responses (October 2016) available at https://goo.gl/f38Cnx 4 Matthew Johnson & Michael Lipsitz Why are Low - Wage Workers Signing Noncompete Agreements ? (December 14, 2017 ) citing E. Starr, N. Bishara, and J. Prescott, Noncompetes in the US Labor Force (2017) ( “ we find that 12% of those without a bachelor’s degree and earning less than $40,000 a year sign noncompetes. We also find that nearly 30% of the U.S. labor force is unaware of whether they have entere d i nto a noncompete, and that these individuals are more likely to be low - skilled and low - earning. ” ); Alan B. Krueger and Eric A. Posner, A Proposal for Protecting Low ‑ Income Workers from Monopsony and Collusion Brookings Institution: Hamilton Project (February 2018) available at https://goo.gl/TPyqpv ; Orley Ashenfelter, Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sec tor Working Paper #614 P RINCETON U NIVERSITY I NDUSTRIAL R ELATIONS S ECTION September 2017 available at https://goo.gl/ZRJyr7 ; Rachel Abrams, 7 Fast - Food Chains to End ‘No Poach’ Deals That Lock Down Low - Wage Workers , T HE N EW Y ORK T IMES (July 12, 2018) available at https://goo.gl/oN6CVs 5 See generally B RIAN M M ALSBERGER , C OVENANTS N OT TO C OMPETE , A S TATE - BY - S TATE S URVEY 9 TH E D B LOOMBERG BNA (2013) ; Evolution Markets, Inc. v. Penn y 23 Misc.3d 1131(A ) (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 2009)( “ As p ronounced by the New York Court of Appeals, “ [i]n order to be enforceable, an anticompetitive covenant ancillary to an employment agreement must be reasonable in time and area, necessary to prote ct the employer's l egitimate interests, not harmful to the pu blic, and not unreasonably burdensome to the employee ” (BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 389 [1999] ). The legitimate interests of an employer can be demonstrated where it is claimed that the employee is mi sappropriating employer trade secrets, mak ing use of confidential information, or where the employee's services are unique or extraordinary. Another legitimate interest of the employer is to prevent competitive use, for a time, of inform ation or relationsh ips which pertain peculiarly to the employ er and which the employee acquired in the course of the employment. In such a case, the employee has been enabled to share in the good will of a client or customer which the employer's over - all efforts and expendi tures created. The employer has a legitima te interest in preventing former employees from exploiting or appropriating the goodwill of a client or customer, which had been created and maintained at the employer's expense, to the employer' s competitive detri ment. In determining uniqueness the inquir y now focuses more on the employee's relationship to the employer's business than on the individual person of the employee. Thus, the fact that Penny may be a recent college graduate who is relat ively new to the Ev oMarkets' business and less important in t he overall scheme of things...is less important than the relationship that Penny had to EvoMarkets' business — being the most senior and experienced person on the Nuclear Fuel Desk and having acces s to important, sen sitive business information, which would b e valuable to a competitor. Once there is a finding of a protection of a legitimate business interest, reasonableness must be determined in accordance with the Court of Appeals' three - part test, which is a restrain t is reasonable if it: (1) is no greater t han is required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public ” ); see also Ticor Title I ns. Co. v. Cohen , 1 73 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1999) [summarizing New York law] ( “ We recognize that New York decisions reveal many situations where a particular employee was found not to be “ special, unique or extraordinary ” See Columbia Ribbon, 42 N.Y.2d at 50 0, 398 N.Y.S.2d 100 4, 369 N.E.2d 4 (salesmen here provide sta ndard services and are therefore not unique); Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N.Y. 312, 140 N.E. 708 (1923) (same); Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (192 3) (printers of fab ric designs not unique); Frederick Bros. Artists Corp. v. Yates, 271 A.D. 69, 62 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1st Dep't 1946) , aff'd without opinion, 296 N.Y. 820, 72 N.E.2d 13 (1947) (theatrical booking agent); Corpin v. Wheatley, 227 A.D. 21 2, 237 N.Y.S. 205 (4th Dep't 1929) (beauty par lor employee); Magid v. Tannenbaum, 164 A.D. 142, 149 N.Y.S. 445 (1st Dep't 1914) (traveling representative for tailors); Small v. Kronstat, 175 Misc. 626, 24 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup.Ct.1940) (skilled watch ar tisan). Yet, it still remains true that where M ARCH 2020 6 t he employee's s ervices are special, unique or extraordinary, then injunctive relief is available to enforce a covenant not to compete, if the covenant is reasonable, and even though competition does not involv e disclosure of trade secrets or confidential l ists. ” ) availab le at https://goo.gl/kDnzTq ; See generall y Michael A.E. Neville, Competing with Noncompetes: Increasing Restrictions on the Use of Employment Noncompetition Agreements in New York 13 B ROOK J. C ORP F IN & C OM L. (October 2018) ( “ Employers mus t also be prepared for a court to either nullify or modify any noncompete agreements it finds unenforceable ” ) available at https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/view content.cgi?article=1291&context=bjcfcl 6 Petition for Rulemaking to Prohibit Worker Non - Compete Clauses , O PEN M ARKETS I NSTITUTE ( March 20, 2019) citing Harlan M. Bl ake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete , 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 682 (1960)( “ For every cove nant that finds its way to court, there are thousands which exercise an in terrorem effect on employees who r espect their contractual obligations and on competitors wh o fear legal complications if they employ a covenantor, or who are anxious to maintain ge ntlemanly relations with their competitors. ” ). 7 Trimm v. Freese 51 Misc.3d 1217(A) (Sup. Ct. Ulster Cty. 2016) ( “ Plaintiff's counsel sent a cease and desist letter to Defendant. According to Plaintiff and his counsel's affirmation, Defendant presented her self at Plaintiff's counsel's office (before Defendant was represented) and acknowledged she had provided window c leaning services to her former clients. Defendant also admitted to owning a separate business listed on Angie's List with a new telephone numb er for the business, and stated she would remove it ... ORDERED that the branch of D efendant's cross - motion to vacate the TRO issued November 2, 2015, is GRANTED, in part, vacating the branch of the TRO restricting and enjoining Defendant from operating a wi ndow cleaning company within a 50 – mile radius of Kingston, New York or advertising her services in such area by social media, email, publication or otherwise, and all other relief is DENIED; and it is further *6 ORDERED that the branch of Defendant's cross - motion to file and serve a late Answer is GRANTED, and Defendant shall do so with in 30 days of the signing of this Decision and Order; and it is further ORDERED that Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause for a TRO is GRANTED, in part, restraining and enjoining Defendant, her associates, agents, and employees from contacting persons on the bu siness customer list as described in Plaintiff's affidavit by any means or manner whatsoever, and all other relief is DENIED. ” ) ; Natural Organics, Inc. v. Smith 12 Misc.3d 11 85(A) (Sup. Ct. Na ss au Cty 2006) ( “ This is an action against Wilbert Smith, a former employee of plaintiff Natural Organics, Inc. who was fired, and Nature's Way Pro ducts, Inc., a competitor of plaintiff who hired Smith six months after he was fired. Smit h's services include checking Nature's Way inventory and stocking shelves in health food stores and chains. There are no secret customer lists involved and only the b roadest allegations that Smith was privy to alleged trade secrets. ... In paragraphs “ 33 ” , “ 34 ” , “ 35 ” and “ 36 ” plaintiff alleges that it wrote to both Smith and Nature's Way demanding that they “ cease and desist ” violating the “ Non – Disclosure and Non – Competit ion ” Agreement ” ) ( dismiss ing causes of action as against defendant Smith and all causes o f action against defendant Nature's Way Products, Inc ) ; Delfino Insulation Co., Inc. v. Jaworowski , 55 A.D.3d 654 (2nd Dept. 2008) ( “ The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for breach of contract against its former employee, John J. Jaworows ki, for h is alleged breach of a noncompete agreement (hereinafter the agreement) which prohibited Jaworowski from seeking similar employment for a period of three years after leaving the plaintiff's employ ... The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that ... the r estraint on employment imposed by the agreement was “ no greater than is required for the protection of [its] legitimate interest ” ) [ Delfino took over five years , required extensive litigation , and while costs were awarded, attorney's fees were not. See Del fino Insulation Co., Inc. v. Jaworowski , 55 A.D.3d 654 (2nd Dept. 2008) ; see also Delfino Insulation Co., Inc. v. Jaworowski Docket No. 0004916/2003 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty. 2003) ] ; Natural Organics, Inc. v. Kirkendall , 52 A.D.3d 488 (2nd Dept. 2008 ) ( “ In an action, inter alia, for injunctive relief and to recover damages for breach of a covenant not to compete ... The defendant James A. Kirkendall worked for the plaintiff for approximately nine years selling vitamins and dietary supplements to specialized heal th food stores under the plaintiff's national brand name. When he was hired for the position, Kirkendall signed a nondi sclosure and noncompetition agreement for employees which prohibited employment with a competitor of the plaintiff for a period of 18 mon ths from the date of termination of employment ... Since there is no legitimate employer interest to protect, the noncompete agreement is unenforceable ” ) [ Natural Organics, I nc. took years , required extensive litigation , and while costs were awarded, attorn ey's fees were not. See Natural Organics, Inc. v. Kirkendall , 52 A.D.3d 488 (2nd Dept. 2008 )( “ plaintiff appeals (1) from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Warshawsky, J.), dated July 2, 2007, as granted the defendants' motion for sum mary judgment dismissing the complaint, and (2) from so much of a judgment of the same court dated August 10, 2007, as, upon the order, is in favor of the defendants and against it dismissing the complaint. ” ) ; see also Natural Organics, Inc. v. Kirkendall , 11 N.Y.3d 707 ( 20 0 8) ( leave to appeal denied ) ]. 8 See generally B RIAN M M ALSBERGER , supra note 5 ; See e.g. Hoffman v. Raftopol , 58 Misc.3d 1209(A) (Sup. Ct We st. Cty. 2018) ; See e.g. Novus Partners, Inc. v. Vainchenker , 32 Misc.3d 1241(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2011) 9 See e.g. Marshall & Sterling, Inc. v. Southard , 148 A.D.3d 1009 ( N. Y. 2 nd Dept. 2017) M ARCH 2020 7 10 See generally B RIAN M M ALSBERGER , supra note 5 11 The surveys u sed “audiences ” created through Survey Monkey The 2018 Surv e y audience included 275 partic ipants from throughout the United S t ates and the 2019 Survey included 101 participants from N e w York State , all reporting that they earned $50,000 annually. Both surveys used audiences that were balanced by Survey Monkey for gender No other filters were applied. For a guide provided by Survey Monkey on how “audiences ” work, see https://www.surveymonkey.com/mp/audience/how - audience - works/ 12 On the pros and cons of using S u rvey Monkey for use in so cial s cience research, see C. R. Massat, C. McKay, & H. Moses , Monkeying around: Use of S urvey M onkey as a T ool f or S chool S ocial W ork S CHOOL S OCIAL W ORK J OURNAL (2009) 33 (2) 44 - 56. 13 Survey on Non compete Agreements (August 2018) available at https://www.surveymonkey.com/results/SM - HWXR97ZT7/ 14 Survey on Non compete Agreements ( September 201 9 ) ( survey participa tion wa s restricted to th ose that earn less than $50,000 annually ) available at https://www.surveymonkey.com/results/SM - YT3P77ZT7 / 15 See 201 9 Surv ey, supra note 1 4 , Question 4 ( 67 of 101 respondents [ 66 .34 %] respond ed “ No ” to the question “ Did your employer e ver share with you trade secr ets, patents, copyrights, confidential lists of its customers or any other secret intellectual property? ” . Of those in the s urvey that signed a noncompete agreement, 17 of 40 respondents [ 42 .5 %] respond ed “ No ” to the question “ Did your employer ever share with you trade secr ets, patents, copyrights, confidential lists of its customers or any other secret intellectual property? ” See attached Summary Data Filtered by Response to Q1 (March 2020). 16 E ven for those that were exposed to confidential customer lists or trade secrets , to succeed on en forcing a noncompete an employer must show that the restriction is no broader than necessary to protect a legitimate employer interest. Thus, the employer would have to show that there exist trade se crets or good will that are likely to be appropriated wit hout the res triction, an d that the employee did not develop the good will and customer relationships themselves. Thus, even many of the agreements signed by those with access to trade secrets are unenforceable under New York law. S ee Aqualife Inc. v. Leib zon 50 Misc.3d 1206(A) (Sup. Ct. Kings C ty 2016) ( “ t he restrictive covenants ar e overly broad since they extend to all customers who received services from plaintiff or purchased products from plaintiff prior to or during the term of the individual defendan ts' IBO Agreements and Salesperson Agreements, even those defendants had never met, did not know about, and for whom they had done no work ” ) 17 See 2018 Surv ey, supra note 1 4 , Question 4. 18 See 201 9 Surv ey, supra note 1 4 , Question 1. 19 See 201 9 Surv ey , supra note 1 4 , Question 5. ( 73 of 101 respondents [ 72.28 %] respond ed “ Yes ” to the question “ Did you ever receive training at a job? [ beyond the usual introduction to a new job ] ” ) 20 See 201 9 Surv ey, supra note 1 4 , Question 4. 21 See 201 9 Surv ey, supra no te 1 4 , Question 4 ; s ee Summary Data Filtered by Response to Q1 supra note 14. 22 The 2019 survey was limited to those t hat earned less than $50,000 and therefore the survey almost certainly doesn't feature any participants with “ unique or extraordinar y ” skills under the common law. 23 See 201 9 Surv ey, supra note 1 4 , Question 8. 24 See 2018 Surv ey, supra note 1 3 , Question 2. 25 See 2018 Surv ey, supra note 1 3 , Question 1. 26 See 201 9 Surv ey, supra note 1 4 , Question 7. 27 See 201 9 Surv ey, supra note 1 4 , Question 9 28 See 201 9 Surv ey, supra note 1 4 , Question 10. 29 See Massat supra note 11. A UGUST 201 8 SURV EY To review each individual survey response , along with other details on the August 201 8 Survey, see https://www.surveymonkey.com/results/SM - HWXR97ZT7/browse/ Non-Compete Agreements SurveyMonkey 1 / 10 31.52% 87 68.48% 189 Q1 If you signed a contract when you started a job, that promised to not work for a competitor of your employer for one year after you quit, and if you broke that promise, would you be afraid of being sent to jail? Answered: 276 Skipped: 0 TOTAL 276 Yes No 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES Yes No Non-Compete Agreements SurveyMonkey 2 / 10 68.84% 190 31.16% 86 Q2 If you signed a contract when you started a job, that promised to not work for a competitor of your employer for one year after you quit, and if you broke that promise, would you be afraid of being fined thousands of dollars by a Court of Law? Answered: 276 Skipped: 0 TOTAL 276 Yes No 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES Yes No Non-Compete Agreements SurveyMonkey 3 / 10 70.29% 194 29.71% 82 Q3 If you signed a contract when you started a job, that promised to not work for a competitor of your employer for one year after you quit, and if you broke that promise, would you be afraid of having to pay thousands of dollars in legal fees? Answered: 276 Skipped: 0 TOTAL 276 Yes No 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES Yes No Non-Compete Agreements SurveyMonkey 4 / 10 27.90% 77 72.10% 199 Q4 Have you ever signed an agreement to not compete with a competitor of your employer? Answered: 276 Skipped: 0 TOTAL 276 Yes No 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES Yes No Non-Compete Agreements SurveyMonkey 5 / 10 0.00% 0 26.55% 73 22.55% 62 23.64% 65 27.27% 75 Q5 Age Answered: 275 Skipped: 1 TOTAL 275 < 18 18-29 30-44 45-60 > 60 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES < 18 18-29 30-44 45-60 > 60 Non-Compete Agreements SurveyMonkey 6 / 10 47.64% 131 52.36% 144 Q6 Gender Answered: 275 Skipped: 1 TOTAL 275 Male Female 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES Male Female Non-Compete Agreements SurveyMonkey 7 / 10 Q7 Household Income Answered: 275 Skipped: 1 $0-$9,999 $10,000-$24,999 $25,000-$49,999 $50,000-$74,999 $75,000-$99,999 $100,000-$124,9 99 $125,000-$149,9 99 $150,000-$174,9 99 $175,000-$199,9 99 $200,000+ Prefer not to answer 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Non-Compete Agreements SurveyMonkey 8 / 10 6.55% 18 10.91% 30 19.64% 54 20.00% 55 14.55% 40 10.55% 29 3.27% 9 2.55% 7 2.55% 7 1.09% 3 8.36% 23 TOTAL 275 ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES $0-$9,999 $10,000-$24,999 $25,000-$49,999 $50,000-$74,999 $75,000-$99,999 $100,000-$124,999 $125,000-$149,999 $150,000-$174,999 $175,000-$199,999 $200,000+ Prefer not to answer Non-Compete Agreements SurveyMonkey 9 / 10 6.93% 19 13.50% 37 12.77% 35 7.30% 20 25.55% 70 5.47% 15 8.39% 23 6.57% 18 13.50% 37 Q8 Region Answered: 274 Skipped: 2 TOTAL 274 New England Middle Atlantic East North Central West North Central South Atlantic East South Central West South Central Mountain Pacific 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES New England Middle Atlantic East North Central West North Central South Atlantic East South Central West South Central Mountain Pacific Non-Compete Agreements SurveyMonkey 10 / 10 43.64% 120 28.36% 78 0.00% 0 22.91% 63 4.00% 11 1.09% 3 Q9 Device Type Answered: 275 Skipped: 1 TOTAL 275 iOS Phone / Tablet Android Phone / Tablet Other Phone / Tablet Windows Desktop /... MacOS Desktop / Laptop Other 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% ANSWER CHOICES RESPONSES iOS Phone / Tablet Android Phone / Tablet Other Phone / Tablet Windows Desktop / Laptop MacOS Desktop / Laptop Other SEPTEMBER 201 9 SURV EY To review each individual survey response , along with other details on the September 2019 Survey, see https://www.surveymonkey.com/results/SM - YT3P77ZT7/browse/