Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility Claus Dierksmeier Translated by Richard Fincham Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility Claus Dierksmeier Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility Published in German by Published by Transcript Qualitative Freiheit – Selbstbestimmung in weltbürgerlicher Verantwortung, 2016. ISBN 978-3-030-04722-1 ISBN 978-3-030-04723-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04723-8 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018964905 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019. This book is an open access publication. 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This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Claus Dierksmeier Institute of Political Science University of Tübingen Tübingen, Baden-Württemberg, Germany Translated by Richard Fincham American University in Cairo New Cairo, Egypt v Note on Translation I am very pleased to have had the opportunity to translate Professor Claus Dierksmeier’s monograph, Qualitative Freiheit: Selbstbestimmung in weltbürgerli- cher Verantwortung (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2016) from the original German into American English. The tremendous breadth and depth of this work nonetheless presented some unusual challenges for the translator, both because of the manner in which, for large parts of it, the author connects a quite technical discussion of the intricacies of late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century German philosophy with a more contemporary discourse on globalization ethics and also because of its inter- disciplinary nature – the discussion seamlessly gliding back and forth between top- ics within metaphysics, ethics, political theory, and economics. In translating such a work, it soon became apparent that it was neither possible nor desirable to employ the kind of consistency in the translation of technical terms that one might expect from, say, the translation of a treatise by a long-since-departed eighteenth-century philosopher or an academic journal article by a contemporary economist. These challenges have, however, been circumvented by the fact that our author took a very active role in the translation process. The initial drafts of this translation were thor- oughly reviewed and amended by Professor Dierksmeier, while that subsequent iteration was further reviewed and amended by the translator. Professor Dierksmeier’s (American) wife, Laura, also thoroughly reviewed the manuscript, so as to convert some of the native inflections of the (English) translator into terms and expressions more familiar to an American readership. The final version of this translation thus emerged as the result of a “dialectical process” and is one in which all involved are now confident that all technical terminology, either for which there is no direct – natural – English equivalent or which could – potentially – prove ambiguous (hence admitting of mistranslation), has upon each specific occasion of its use and in accor- dance with its particular context been translated with the best possible English- language term to convey the author’s meaning and intension. In translating the discussions of the work of Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte constituting the first quarter of this study, I was fortunate enough to have at my disposal for consultation authoritative translations of the works of all of these authors. The publication in the same year as the German-language version of this vi monograph of the Lectures and Drafts on Political Philosophy volume within The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant series meant that it was possible for all quotations from Kant to follow these highly regarded Cambridge Edition translations. These editions translate Kant with a rigorous terminological consis- tency and an emphasis on literalness. As previously discussed, I do not consider these to be desirable virtues in translating Professor Dierksmeier himself when he is speaking in his own voice. But since these editions both aim to recreate – as far as is possible – for the English-language reader the experience of reading Kant in the original and are now employed within the vast majority of English-language Kant scholarship, I decided to ensure that all of the quotations from Kant conform with those in the Cambridge Edition translations. The English translations of Fichte’s works have (so far) not enjoyed the same uniform format, and a good many of his works (especially those composed after 1800) have yet to be translated into English. Nonetheless – in the vast majority of cases – where good-quality recent translations already exist, those translations have similarly been employed here. Mostly, that has meant quoting from Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) – but Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993) and J. G. Fichte and the Atheism Dispute (1798–1800) (Routledge, 2010) have also been quoted from where appropriate. In spite of the guidance that the aforementioned works could provide, however, probably the greatest challenge facing this translation was the translation of the German Recht , the multifarious compound nouns including this term, and the adjec- tives derived from it, such as, e.g., rechtlich and rechtmäßig . Whereas “ ein Recht auf ” and the plural “ Rechte ” quite evidently correspond to the English “a right to” and “rights,” respectively, there is no English term that naturally and unambigu- ously corresponds to “ das Recht ” in quite the same way. One possibility would of course be to translate “ das Recht ” as “law,” just as the term Naturrecht would seem most obviously translated as “natural law” and the adjective widerrechtlich most adequately translated as “unlawful.” Nonetheless, translators of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German philosophy almost invariably reject this solution, fear- ing its capacity to obscure the conceptual connection between “ das Recht ” and “ die Rechte ,” as well as due to concern about the ambiguous instances of the term Recht (where it is not clear whether the former or the latter sense is intended) within the writings of their long-since-departed authors. Accordingly, a consensus seems to have arisen among such translators that “ das Recht ” is most adequately translated simply as “right.” And indeed, this is the approach taken within the Cambridge Edition translations of Kant’s Rechtslehre , the translations of Fichte’s Grundlage des Naturrechts and Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (as is of course apparent from their respective titles, Foundations of Natural Right and Elements of the Philosophy of Right ), and the translation of K. C. F. Krause’s Das Urbild der Menschheit – which remains to this day the only one of Krause’s works to have ever been published in English translation. The price that is paid for consistency and lack of ambiguity, however, is that this solution can, at times, lead to phrases and expres- sions which sound unduly abstract and unnatural in English (and, indeed, this is something that readers may possibly perceive as they read through some of the Note on Translation vii quotations from Kant and Fichte within this volume). Whereas this may well be a price worth paying when translating long-departed authors who we are hardly able to ask about the precise meaning of any potentially ambiguous expression they employ, it soon became clear that using the same approach to translating those pas- sages in which Professor Dierksmeier speaks within his own voice to show what Kant and Fichte are able to offer contemporary discussions within political theory and economics would produce an English-language discourse sounding intolerably artificial and unnatural. This problem was, however, fortunately obviated by the fact that Professor Dierksmeier is very much still alive and, as such, he could decide for himself about the most appropriate translation of these terms within the specific contexts in which they are employed. A pragmatic approach has thus been adopted here, with the result that although “ das Recht ” and “ rechtlich ” are translated as “right” and “rightful” within discussions of their use within eighteenth-century philosophical texts, when the discussion turns to contemporary sociopolitical and economic questions, the terms are – where appropriate – more often than not trans- lated as “law” and “lawful” or “legal,” respectively. Hopefully this pragmatic approach has resulted in a text that will prove accessible to both historians of phi- losophy and those more interested in contemporary sociopolitical questions. Another potential problem facing this translation concerned the most adequate translation of the terms Verstand , verständig , and Verständigkeit on the one hand and the terms Vernunft , vernünftig , and Vernünftigkeit on the other. The former terms are typically used to describe the kind of thinking employed within mathe- matics, whereas the latter terms are typically used to describe the kind of thinking we employ when addressing moral questions – as well as the problems of metaphys- ics . This becomes an ossified technical distinction within the works of Kant as well as his late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophical successors. As English- language scholars of these figures will be well aware, however, it has long since been established by almost unanimous consensus that, when translating Kant or Hegel, for example, these terms are best captured by the distinction between under- standing and reason . Hence such scholars would no doubt expect to find “ Verstand ” translated as “understanding,” “ verständig ” as “understandable,” “ vernünftig ” as “rational,” and “ Vernünftigkeit ” as “rationality.” Once eighteenth- and nineteenth- century philosophy enters into a serious discourse with twentieth-century political theory and economics, however, the aforementioned orthodoxy can no longer be maintained. The problem emerges insofar as more recent rational choice theorists, utility theorists, or game theorists – or anyone who reduces the human being to the homo economicus model – precisely use the adjective “rational” to describe self- interested utility-maximizing behavior which conforms to, and can be predicted in terms of, mathematical algorithms. Within a discourse upon such theories, verstän- dig thus becomes synonymous with the German adjective “ rational ” and is thus, obviously, best translated as “rational,” and “ Verständigkeit ” thus becomes synony- mous with “ Rationalität ” and is thus best translated as “rationality.” Within this study, therefore, the vitally important distinction between Verstand and Vernunft had to be expressed within terms perhaps contrary to the expectations of English- language scholars of German philosophy in order to prevent that important Note on Translation viii distinction from being lost. Accordingly, within this translation, one frequently finds “ Verstand ” translated as “ratio,” “ verständig ” as “rational,” and “ Verständigkeit ” as “rationality.” Meanwhile, “ Vernunft ” is still – as everyone would expect – trans- lated as “reason,” but “ vernünftig ” is translated as “reasonable” and “ Vernünftigkeit ” as “reasonableness.” Exceptions to this rule occur only within the discussions of specific passages from Kant and Fichte within the first sections of the text; other- wise it is applied throughout the whole of the book. Again, I hope that these deci- sions have resulted in a text that will be accessible and understandable by all of the various audiences for which it is intended and directed. Finally, I would like to thank Hans Földeak and the late Christina Stockinger for assisting me with some of the initial drafts of this translation. I would also like to thank the American University in Cairo for providing me with faculty support grants enabling me to spend two summers in Tübingen to work on this translation. Cairo Egypt Richard Fincham in Summer 2018 Note on Translation ix Contents 1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 1 1.1 Why Think About Freedom? .............................................................. 1 1.1.1 Freedom and Globality........................................................... 4 1.1.2 Freedom and Everyday Life ................................................... 10 1.1.3 Freedom and Academic Philosophy ....................................... 14 1.2 Why Not Negative Versus Positive Freedom?.................................... 17 1.2.1 The History of the Distinction................................................ 18 1.2.2 Current Use of the Concept of Freedom ................................ 24 1.2.3 Some Outstanding Developments .......................................... 29 1.3 How Should We Talk About Freedom? .............................................. 33 1.3.1 Metaphysical Theories of Freedom ........................................ 34 1.3.2 Quantitative Theories of Freedom.......................................... 37 1.3.3 Qualitative Theories of Freedom............................................ 40 2 Metaphysics of Freedom ........................................................................... 45 2.1 Reflexive Freedom (Immanuel Kant) ................................................. 47 2.1.1 How Much Metaphysics Does Freedom Require?................. 47 2.1.2 Outer Freedom: The Good and the Law................................. 55 2.1.3 Social Rights?......................................................................... 60 2.1.4 Societal Self-Regulation......................................................... 65 2.2 Directive Freedom (Johann Gottlieb Fichte) ...................................... 72 2.2.1 Epistemology and Metaphysics of Law ................................. 75 2.2.2 Social Philosophy ................................................................... 88 2.2.3 Economic Philosophy............................................................. 92 2.2.4 Socialism Versus Social-Democracy ...................................... 99 2.3 Participative Freedom (Karl Christian Friedrich Krause) .................. 103 2.3.1 Reception, Context, and Method ............................................ 106 2.3.2 The Freedom of Nature and of Humanity .............................. 112 2.3.3 Private and Public Interest...................................................... 126 2.3.4 Procedural Policy in Global Responsibility ........................... 138 2.4 Results and Implications .................................................................... 153 x 3 Quantitative Freedom ............................................................................... 159 3.1 Liberal Allocation (Friedrich August von Hayek) ............................. 166 3.1.1 Genesis of the Neo-Liberal Concept of Freedom .................. 167 3.1.2 Validity of the Neo-Liberal Concept of Freedom .................. 170 3.1.3 Legal and Political Philosophy............................................... 174 3.1.4 Economic and Social Philosophy ........................................... 178 3.2 Liberal Distribution (John Rawls) ...................................................... 185 3.2.1 Approach and Method ............................................................ 186 3.2.2 Transcendental or Transactional Freedom?............................ 191 3.2.3 Relativist Versus Dogmatic Liberalism .................................. 197 3.2.4 Whose Freedom?.................................................................... 206 3.3 Results and Implications .................................................................... 213 4 Qualitative Freedom ................................................................................. 223 4.1 Fair Freedom (John Kenneth Galbraith) ............................................ 226 4.1.1 Democratized Economics....................................................... 227 4.1.2 Democratic Economy ............................................................. 230 4.1.3 Critique of Neoclassical Economics ...................................... 233 4.1.4 Critique of Neoliberal Economic Policy ................................ 240 4.2 Responsible Freedom (Amartya Sen) ................................................ 245 4.2.1 Critique of the Neoclassical Paradigm ................................... 247 4.2.2 Critique of Reductionist Concepts of Freedom...................... 256 4.2.3 Freedom Through “Capabilities” ........................................... 261 4.2.4 Cosmopolitan Freedom .......................................................... 267 4.3 Results and Implications .................................................................... 272 5 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 281 5.1 Review ................................................................................................ 282 5.2 Insights ............................................................................................... 300 5.3 Outlook............................................................................................... 315 Acknowledgments ........................................................................................... 333 Literature ......................................................................................................... 337 Contents 1 © The Author(s) 2019 C. Dierksmeier, Qualitative Freedom - Autonomy in Cosmopolitan Responsibility , https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04723-8_1 Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Why Think About Freedom? Freedom is a fascinating idea. It empowers and encourages all human beings towards a dignified life. More and more individuals and institutions appeal to the idea of freedom in order to overturn repressive life-circumstances. No one needs to explain the value of freedom to the oppressed. Wherever freedom is absent in prac- tice, it is seldom lacking a cherished place in theory. The institutionalized con- sciousness of freedom, political liberalism, often grows in synch with the obstacles facing freedom. But to identify and combat the lack of freedom is easier than shaping liberties already won. Wherever the harsh, black shadow of oppression is swept aside, the bright white light of freedom is refracted within the prism of the most multifarious ideas of liberty. The black and white of freedom fighters becomes replaced by the more nuanced ideological tinges of open societies. Within their colorful array of social and political blueprints, there resides both opportunities and dangers for lib- eralism. For within open societies, the once unquestioning urge for freedom now inexorably gives rise to the urgent question: Which freedom and whose freedom is to be upheld when the freedoms of some collide with the freedoms of others? Freedom is constantly called upon to strengthen or to weaken certain conven- tions, to commend or to condemn individual, corporate, and collective practices, and to legitimize as well as to criticize political systems. Defenders just as much as detractors of the status quo alike, by invoking the selfsame ideal, are bringing to Freedom is indivisible, and when one man is enslaved, all are not free. John F. Kennedy A genuine liberal will emphasize as crucial the complete correlation between the means used and the consequences that follow. John Dewey 2 light tensions within the idea of freedom. Does the freedom of the environmental campaigner have priority over economic freedom or vice versa? Does that of the champion of direct democracy have priority over that of the friends of parliamentary representation? Should religious liberty have priority over the freedoms of nonbe- lievers? Ought we to prioritize the freedom of those living today over that of coming generations? How are we to deal with the ecological damage and social side effects that unfettered economic freedom produces? How is economic freedom related to political freedom? Do they require and strengthen one another, or does the one in fact undermine the other? Might there be an excess of certain freedoms? These questions stimulate vital deliberations: Do we adequately grasp the idea of freedom as such when equating it with a decrease of limitations and an increase in options? Or does freedom have immanent boundaries? Must even rules of fairness and commands of responsibility be considered as a diminution of freedom? Or do they rather articulate a desire for a freedom in and for sustainable ways of living? Are voluntarily chosen commitments negations or manifestations of freedom? In short, as soon as freedom no longer fights with constraint and compulsion, liberalism begins to struggle with itself. Having eaten from the tree of knowledge and having learned the bitter lesson that the freedom of a few can ruin the presup- positions for the freedom of others – of everyone – liberal thinking lost its inno- cence. In its lack of social, moral, and ecological reflection today’s liberalism is confronted by its own original sin and deplores the loss of its former paradise of moral clarity. The haste with which many liberals these days reach for moral fig leaves bespeaks their embarrassed state of original ethical nakedness. From now on, it seems, the friends of freedom must make their home in a world endangered by freedom itself. Henceforth liberalism must live by the sweat of its brow and earn its bread through a reform of its own idea and ideal of freedom. The present work endeavors to contribute to this reform. Reading this volume will be easier if one is from the outset clear about where this intellectual journey is going. For this reason, I would like, right at the beginning, to confess that this book is intended for various target-groups and therefore argues at different levels. The aims and tone of the presentation change precisely for this reason. First, I wish to give a new direction to the academic discourse concerning the philosophy of freedom. The main part of this book, up until and including Chap. 4, is dedicated to this purpose. Second, I wish to provide momentum to a morally, socially, and ecologically sustainable liberalism, which is the focus of the last chap- ter of the book. Both aspects, however, are essentially connected. The applied part requires academic foundations for its legitimacy and, conversely, the theory requires practical application in order to establish its relevance. Yet those people who are theoretically dedicated to the idea of freedom are not always the same as those who practically care about the vicissitudes of liberalism. As a consequence, I have attempted to compose this study in such a way that it does not require everyone to work with academic meticulousness. All of the theoretical chapters therefore end with a section emphasizing their respective “results and implications.” Readers primarily interested in the practical consequences of my investigation will, by consulting these sections, be well prepared for their ultimate presentation in Chap. 5. 1 Introduction 3 The academic aim of the book is easily enough stated, but not so quickly cashed out. First of all I wish to clarify the idea of freedom conceptually by readjusting the common distinction between negative and positive freedom into the dialectical con- ceptual dichotomy of quantitative and qualitative freedom (as is detailed in Sect. 1.2). I describe this dichotomy as dialectical since a closer consideration of both categories shows that, first, earlier theories of freedom are able to be conclusively traced back to those two categorical determinations whereby, second, a hierarchical ordering and prioritizing of quantitative and qualitative aspects arise so that, third, it becomes clear how the one uniform idea of freedom can be legitimately differenti- ated – from place to place as well as from one time to another – within different ways of living freely. The perspective of quantity and quality chosen here is not entirely new. 1 Mainly we find the quantitative preoccupation championed in theories of “negatively- liberal,” libertarian or neo-liberal origin. 2 Conversely, the conception of qualitative freedom has some similarities with the concept of “positive freedom” (about which there is more in Sect. 1.2.3), although it is to be clearly distinguished from it as a result of its important procedural dimension. Qualitative freedom does not wish to stipulate ex cathedra which freedoms should apply to certain people and certain groups, but rather authorizes those respectively affected to come to an agreement themselves about that stipulation – in forms which could be justified in the name and interest of the freedom of all mankind. This aspect – the irreversible globality of the idea of freedom – is something which I shall expound on presently (in Sect. 1.1.1). 1 Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), Erich Fromm (1890–1980), and Theodor Adorno (1903–1969) talk of qualitative aspects of freedom, but not in a technical sense. In these thinkers, the concept of ‘qualitative freedom’ surfaces only occasionally but is not systematically worked out. Certainly, even as early as 1979, Charles Taylor introduced “qualitative discriminations” within the philoso- phy of freedom, but he did not extend these ideas into a self-contained theory, see Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” in Alan Ryan & Isaiah Berlin, The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 177– 193. It should also be noted that, unlike what might be supposed by judging the book by its cover, Matthew Kramer in no way arrives at a theory of qualitative freedom, but rather attempts to trace back all qualitative dimensions of the idea of freedom to quantitative aspects (“the perimeter of a person’s latitude,” “the extent,” “the numerical expressions,” etc.) and then trace these back to a theory of negative freedom (“the sheer physical proportions”) (Matthew H. Kramer, The Quality of Freedom [New York: Oxford University Press, 2003], 7–11). Yet in theoretical philosophy (looking for an alternative to debates about determinism versus indeterminism) the concept of qualitative freedom has already been tried out in Thomas Buchheim, Unser Verlangen nach Freiheit kein Traum sondern Drama mit Zukunft (Hamburg: Meiner, 2006). In regard to the practical philosophy in the foreground of this investigation and in systematic opposition to conceptions of quantitative freedom, the conception of qualitative freedom has up to now, as far as I am aware, not yet been worked out. I myself have, however, already sketched my own position in some essays, above all in: Claus Dierksmeier, “Qualitative oder quantitative Freiheit,” Rechtsphilosophische Hefte 12 (2007), 107–119; as well as in Claus Dierksmeier, “Welche Freiheit?”, Liberal, Vierteljeahreshefte für Politik und Kultur 4 (2010), 9–13; and in Claus Dierksmeier and Michael Pirson, “The Modern Corporation and the Idea of Freedom,” Philosophy in Management , 9:3, 2010, 5–25. 2 For a definition and critique of “negative freedom” see Sect. 1.2. For the use of “neoliberal” see note 119. 1.1 Why Think About Freedom? 4 The sociological, economic, and political aims of this study are connected in their intention of realigning liberalism: from a theory often only insufficiently reflecting upon its moral, social, and ecological responsibility to a conception which makes the idea of freedom’s immanent cosmopolitan obligation the center of its argumentative elaboration. I discuss this motivation in more detail in the following two sections of this chapter. 1.1.1 Freedom and Globality Our little blue planet is home to all humankind – and is also increasingly perceived as such. Yesterday’s surroundings ( Umwelt ) are increasingly turning into today’s lifeworlds ( Mitwelt ), which noticeably impacts upon all local activities. Our actions here and now influence the living conditions of distant peoples and future genera- tions. In addition to tribal leaders and local communities, regional subcultures and nation states, communes and clans, sheikdoms and states, fanatics and fundamental- ists, ever more novel actors appear upon the world stage: Colossi of business and luminaries of science, media and militia, donors and sponsors, refuges and rock- stars, hackers and whistleblowers, social networks as well as civil society move- ments all enter in the action and flux of the world. No longer restricted to the local level, the strands of activity so initiated mesh into a fabric ever more difficult to penetrate. The mutable stasis of formerly stable powers yields increasingly to the immutable dynamics of fluctuating forces. Thus the global exchange of commodi- ties, information and people changes the face of the earth with breath-taking speed. Humanity communicates, travels, and trades more freely today than ever before. One has ever easier access to news, commodities, and contacts. Global information, encounters, and incitements, which, still in the late nineteenth century, were the prerogative of a few learned travelers like Alexander von Humboldt, are now a mat- ter of course to a constantly increasing number of world citizens. Speeded up by exponentially increasing exchange of information, innovative conventions rapidly take root. In the blink of an eye, lifestyles and idols from the most obscure corners of the planet or internet populate our global consciousness. The broadening of the views and insights as well as the increasing exchange of world-views ( Weltbilder ) and self-images ( Selbstbilder ) have encouraged and empowered many to liberate themselves from obsolete ways of life, to try other paths, and to begin something new: both within their communities and also by turning their backs upon them. – It is evident that this enhances the freedom of many, although, obviously, not all people. This gain in options has a price. That the new communication media levels phys- ical distances is one person’s blessing and another’s curse: Little remains private, practically nothing is local anymore; and where the citizens of this world are not controlling their information, their informational self-determination becomes a con- 1 Introduction 5 stantly endangered good. Likewise, economic freedom in a global economy, unre- strained by global governance contains enormous opportunities, but also serious risks: If left unprotected against the ice-cold wind of global profit seeking, many biological systems vanish, customs disappear, political orders fall, and languages die out. Although there has always existed a cross-cultural exchange of commodities and information, our age differs dramatically from previous epochs. We live in a world no longer only of globalization , but rather of globality . In a world that in many respects is already cosmopolitan, since we increasingly devise private activities, local business dealings, and national politics with reference to their worldwide reception. Like it or loathe it, our interests are bound up with the interests of other persons and states. The domestic affairs of distant countries have long since devel- oped into matters of national security. And the crises of the global commons (the over-fishing of the seas, the warming of the climate, the consumption of fossil fuels, etc.) are transforming yesterday’s national foreign policy into today’s global domes- tic politics ( Weltinnenpolitik ). 3 History has made us all cosmopolitans. Whether by means of global epidemics or as a result of the epilepsies of the world market – we cannot but acknowledge that our actions produce remote effects as unforeseeable as they are unintended. Although single processes of globalization can still be slowed, stopped, and even reversed, this does not hold for the general trend. The breadth and depth globalization has already assumed compels us already to think in terms of the category of globality: A calculation on the planetary scale, the assessment of a long chain of consequences, an anticipation of world-wide developments. Therefore, whether we slow or stop any future impetus towards glo- balization, the fundamental change of paradigm remains: away from locally bounded economic and political bookkeeping and towards the perspective of globality. Wherever the later significance of our activities surpasses our earlier intentions, we must face the following: Whatever we now bequeath the planet might be fully deciphered only in the future, but the responsibility for our message to coming gen- erations already rests with us presently. This situation – the globality and intertem- porality of the consequences of our actions – changes radically how freedom is experienced, perceived, and conceived. The extension of its responsibility towards the planetary as well as the future dimension forces itself upon the contemporary consciousness as an imperative of sustainability. Since freedom has an effect beyond the culturally familiar boundaries of space and time, it also must itself be evaluated beyond them. Whoever acts globally must act with cosmopolitan responsibility. 3 See Peter Dudy, Menschenrechte zwischen Universalität und Partikularität: Eine Interdisziplinäre Studie zur Idee der Weltinnenpolitik (Münster: Lit, 2002); Scott Jasper, ed., Securing Freedom in the Global Commons (Stanford, Califoria, 2010); and Kirstin-Maike Müller, Konzepte einer Weltinnenpolitik (Hamburg: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg, 1999). 1.1 Why Think About Freedom? 6 Global crises and problems force humanity to search for common solutions. The implementation of these solutions, however, often demands global institutions, and those institutions usually only work efficiently when founded upon common val- ues. Yet, the more the current search for global moral criteria increases, the more suspicion many sense in regard to the values so summoned. Some shun every uni- versalism and fear it might produce a global world order with uniform procedures crushing all cherished diversity. For reasons of cultural sensibility and moral empa- thy, should we not rather prefer the regional over the universal imperative? Should we not therefore support a cultural relativism of values and norms? Certainly, an enforced world-monoculture that with uniform procedures did vio- lence to all diversity is undesirable. In the age of globality, however, a relativistic stance, according to which each and everyone sees only their own norms as valid, is just as inappropriate. Wherever human beings interact, there is the threat of conflicts which require arbitration. Only at the utmost risk to our surroundings ( Umwelt ) and lifeworld ( Mitwelt ) can we live out our freedom without coordination. Only at the cost of the deepest mistrust on all sides can freedom dismiss all bounds and refuse every universal stricture. Where everyone is at once party and judge there is a threat of eternal strife. Each increase in the possibility of conflict enhances the yearning for the reality of arbitration. In lockstep with the effects of private as well as collective politico-economic activity, the law must thus gradually develop beyond the bounds of national legal systems. And since every judiciary requires a legislative body and this, in turn, requires an executive, economic globalization creates the demand for a politically lawful globalization. 4 Yet, at the same time, laws and courts on their own cannot put things right. As the sword of the law often proves too short and at other times too coarse a weapon, juridical coercion ( Zwang ) must be supported by moral impulse ( Drang ). Actions reflect attitudes – and thus up to now no legal-system has sur- vived, which was not also morally legitimated, complemented, and differentiated. Law and morals, although distinct, can only be successful when they are working together. We thus have to consider what mediates between the particular and the universal, between families and state, between morality and law. The intermediary level of civil-society must be investigated in its own moral forms, differing from context to context. Whether freedom be granted in societies, organized in companies, chan- neled by networks, charged within movements, whether it manifests itself in trends, rites, or customs, in each such case and scenario, it comes with a certain, specific responsibility: an ethical dimension, which while closely corresponding with moral- ity and right, does not culminate within them. Only when this intermediary level of ethicality ( Sittlichkeit ) is likewise included, can fair and sustainable structures for mankind’s economic networking and political striving be established ( aufzubauen ) and – catering differently to different contexts and cultures – extended ( auszubauen ). 4 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006). 1 Introduction 7 Freedom must be balanced and differentiated by responsibility in three differing ways: On the micro-level of individual morality, on the meso-level of social conven- tions and norms, as well as on the macro-level of general law. All three levels – those of the individual, those of the associations, as well as those of governments – point towards the cosmopolitan framework they operate in. What affects all must also be effected by and in the interests of all. More than ever before, our thinking today therefore requires a moral compass for cosmopolitan questions, which adjusts and aligns morality, ethicality ( Sittlichkeit ), and law, notwithstanding their necessary functional differences. Our joint world requires a unifying ethos ( Ethos ). While it was hitherto the hallmark of moral idealists to call for a use of freedom according to universalizable maxims, as if we were accountable to “the entire world,” now even self-declared realists recognize as the bellwether of the present that our enlightened self-interest increasingly overlaps with the precepts of moral cosmopolitanism . In amazement, the hardcore empiricist notices how an idealistic ethic ( Ethik ) proves itself to be a realistic meth