The Finch West LRT represents one of Toronto ' s most expensive transit projects per kilometer , costing $ 3.7 billion for just 10.3 km A comprehensive examination of alternatives reveals significantly lower - cost Bus Rapid Transit BRT ) options that were never seriously evaluated during the 2007 2019 planning period Component LRT Actual High - Quality BRT Basic BRT with TSP Vehicles $ 144 180 M 18 LRVs @ $ 8 10 M $ 50 M 25 bi - articulated @ $ 2 M $ 40 M 30 articulated @ $ 1.3 M Guideway / Lanes $ 515 1,030 M ( embedded track , utilities , catenary ) $ 103 309 M ( dedicated asphalt lanes ) $ 50 100 M ( curb lanes , minimal reconstruction ) Stations $ 90 270 M 18 stations @ $ 5 15 M , level boarding ) $ 36 90 M 18 stations @ $ 2 5 M , level boarding ) $ 9 18 M 18 shelters @ $ 0.5 1 M Maintenance Facility $ 100 200 M ( specialized LRT facility ) $ 0 M ( use existing TTC depots ) $ 0 M ( use existing TTC depots ) Systems & Signals $ 200 300 M ( rail signals , communications , power ) $ 10 20 M TSP system , communications ) $ 5 10 M TSP upgrades ) 30 Year P 3 Financing $ 1,700 M ( financing premium , lifecycle ) $ 0 M ( public procurement ) $ 0 M ( public procurement ) TOTAL CAPITAL $ 3,700 M $ 199 469 M $ 104 168 M Cost per km $ 359 M / km $ 19 46 M / km $ 10 16 M / km Capacity ( pph / direction ) 6,300 6,000 10,000 3,000 4,000 Projected Speed 13.5 km / h ( actual ) 25 30 km / h ( with unconditional TSP 22 27 km / h ( with TSP 8 Finch West Transit : BRT vs LRT Cost Analysis and Missed Opportunities 1 Cost Comparison : BRT vs LRT for Finch West 10.3 km ) 1 ^2 ^3 ^4 ^5 ^6 ^7 What Was Evaluated in 2007 2019 The original Transit City plan announced in 2007 was explicitly LRT - focused from the start , including seven LRT lines totaling 120 km with Finch West among them No comprehensive BRT alternative was publicly evaluated during this phase The planning assumptions included an expected opening in 2015 ( later pushed to 2018) and lower initial cost estimates around $ 1.2 billion for construction Mayor Rob Ford attempted to cancel Transit City entirely in favor of subways During this period , transit planning was paralyzed by political debate about subways versus LRT , not BRT versus LRT The discussion centered on Ford ' s " subways , subways , subways " platform against the Provincial Liberal government ' s insistence on LRT as the funded option , with no serious consideration of optimized BRT alternatives When construction finally began in 2019, the project used a Public - Private Partnership P 3) delivery model The May 2018 contract award shows a fixed - price contract of $ 2.5 billion for a 30- year design - build - finance - maintain agreement There is no evidence of BRT alternatives being reconsidered at this stage The 2018 Value for Money assessment compared the P 3 LRT approach only against traditional public procurement of the same LRT design — not against BRT alternatives Toronto ' s transit debates have historically been " streetcar vs subway " or " LRT vs subway "— buses are perceived as inferior regardless of infrastructure quality The car - centric suburban political culture dismissed buses as " second class transit " The Transit City plan was explicitly designed as a " light rail renaissance " to prove LRT could work in Toronto BRT would have contradicted the ideological commitment to rail In 2007 2010, high - quality BRT systems like Ottawa ' s Transitway or Bogotá ' s TransMilenio weren ' t well - known in Toronto planning circles York Region Transit ' s Viva BRT wasn ' t yet operating at high frequencies Transit City Planning 2007 2010 2 1 2 3 2 Ford Era Cancellation & Revival 2010 2012 2 2 2 Project Resumption 2016 2019 3 4 3 4 3 5 Why BRT Wasn ' t Seriously Considered Political Rail Bias 6 7 7 Transit City Ideology 2 No North American BRT Precedents 8 Metrolinx ( provincial agency ) controlled funding and was committed to LRT technology across multiple projects Switching to BRT would have required renegotiating provincial commitments The real estate industry preferred rail for development certainty , and Transit City explicitly included transit - oriented development goals A 2010 2012 BRT alternative could have delivered opening by 2015 2017 2 3 year construction versus 6+ years for LRT ) at a cost of $ 200 400 million versus $ 3.7 billion — savings of $ 3.3 3.5 billion With comparable or better performance using unconditional transit signal priority , those savings could have funded BRT on 8 15 other corridors citywide The failure wasn ' t technical — it was institutional unwillingness to challenge the rail - centric planning paradigm combined with bureaucratic resistance to giving buses the same priority and infrastructure quality that rail receives automatically ⁂ Provincial Funding Lock - In Developer Influence The Missed Opportunity 1 9 https :// neptis org / publications / chapters / costs -0 https :// www ola org / sites / default / files / node - files / committee / report / pdf /2020/2020 02/42_1_ Metrolinx - L RT _ EN pdf https :// www pembina org / reports / toronto - transit - plan - march -31 11. pdf https :// stevemunro ca / wp - content / uploads /2019/08/ chapter _2. pdf https :// pw ttc ca /-/ media / Project / TTC / DevProto / Documents / Home / Public - Meetings / Board /2011/ May -11/ Reports / Opportunities _ for _ Im pdf https :// www youtube com / watch ? v =972 QO 2 A 0 p 64 https :// www pembina org / reports / toronto - transit - analysis - march -11- revised pdf https :// www toronto ca / legdocs / mmis /2012/ cc / bgrd / backgroundfile -45908. pdf https :// www canada ca / en / housing - infrastructure - communities / news /2017/06/ governments _ of _ canadaa ndontarioinvestinfinchwestlightrailtransit html