The Finch West LRT represents one of the most catastrophic transit value - for - money failures in North American history : $ 3.7 billion spent over 18 years to deliver a system that operates only 1 minute faster than the bus route it replaced The project ' s 13.5 km / h average speed is 50% below projections and worse than global LRT norms , primarily due to weak signal priority implementation A comprehensive BRT alternative could have delivered superior performance at 7 32% of the LRT cost 14 32 x cheaper ) while opening 10 years earlier Speed Failure : The LRT averages 13.5 km / h compared to : Travel Time : End - to - end journey takes 38 minutes versus 39 minutes for the previous bus — a $ 3.7 billion investment for 1 minute saved Service Frequency Degradation : Operating at 6.5- minute peak headways and 10 12 minute off - peak versus more frequent previous bus service , raising questions whether transit actually improved Capacity Underutilization : System designed for 6,300 passengers per hour per direction but projected to carry only 2,250 pph by 2031 36% utilization , well below the threshold where LRT ' s capacity advantage justifies its cost premium Budget Escalation : Finch West LRT Comprehensive Failure Analysis and Alternative Solutions Executive Summary 1 2 3 4 Why the Finch West LRT Is a Failure Performance Catastrophe Projected performance : 27 km / h 3 Previous bus service : 14.8 km / h ( only 1 minute slower for full route ) 5 1 Global LRT systems : 25 30 km / h average 6 3 High - performance LRT Denver , Baltimore ): 39 42 km / h 7 2 1 8 9 10 11 Cost Overrun Disaster 2018 contract award : $ 2.5 billion 12 13 March 2025 budgeted cost : $ 3.585 billion 14 Cost per Kilometer : $ 359 million / km for 10.3 km — among the highest globally for at - grade LRT Value for Money Collapse : The 2018 VFM assessment projected $ 566 million in P 3 savings versus traditional procurement , but the $ 1.2 B overrun eliminated those savings and created approximately $ 634 million in net excess costs Despite $ 3.7 billion investment in dedicated infrastructure , the City of Toronto implemented only " conditional " transit signal priority instead of unconditional priority — the single decision that undermines the entire project How Conditional TSP Works : The Contradiction : The same Transportation Services department operates 420 TSP locations for streetcars and buses using unconditional priority , yet gave weaker priority to the $ 3.7 B LRT than to regular bus routes Leadership Structure : Fall 2025 total ( with lifecycle ): $ 3.7 billion 2 Overrun : 48% or $ 1.2 billion 2 14 2 15 2 The Signal Priority Sabotage 16 17 Priority activates only when vehicles run behind schedule 17 16 Schedules are then calibrated so vehicles are rarely flagged as " late " 16 Results in LRT vehicles still waiting at traffic lights for cars making left turns 18 8 Green light extensions limited to 30 seconds maximum , red light shortening to 15 seconds 19 17 17 18 Official Reasons Given by Transportation Services The Decision - Makers General Manager : Ashley Curtis , Transportation Services 20 Division : Professional civil servants ( traffic engineers , transportation planners ) controlling all 2,590 traffic signals across Toronto 21 22 Authority : Delegated by City Council under Highway Traffic Act and City of Toronto Act 23 24 Accountability : No performance oversight mechanisms ; staff cannot be directly removed by Council or Mayor 25 21 The April 2025 Congestion Management Plan report provided three official rationales for denying unconditional priority to the LRT 1. Schedule Adherence and Bunching Prevention Official claim : " Conditional TSP helps maintain schedule adherence " and " minimize bunching on the transit lines ". Reality check : This rationale is illogical for LRT operating on fully dedicated right - of - way with 6.5- minute headways Bus bunching occurs in mixed traffic when irregular delays cause vehicles to catch up to each other LRT on separated lanes with consistent station spacing doesn ' t experience this phenomenon — unconditional priority would inherently improve schedule adherence 2. Pedestrian Safety Official claim : Conditional TSP " maintains safety for pedestrians , ensuring that there is sufficient opportunity to allow pedestrians to safely cross the street and board transit ". Reality check : This makes no technical sense Pedestrian crossing times are set by pedestrian signal phases independent of whether transit receives priority Cities worldwide operate LRT with unconditional priority while maintaining safe pedestrian crossings through proper signal phasing The claim confuses signal priority ( green light extensions for transit ) with pedestrian clearance intervals ( amber / red time for pedestrians to finish crossing ). 3. Transfer Coordination Official claim : Conditional TSP " balances coordination between both east - west and north south transit transfers which will allow customers to safely transfer between bus routes and the LRTs ". Reality check : This reveals the actual priority — protecting crossing automobile traffic and connecting bus schedules over the rapid transit trunk line Transit advocates ask : " Who should get priority — thousands of transit riders or a couple of drivers making left turns ?". The City chose cars This justification admits Transportation Services is optimizing for local bus transfer convenience rather than trunk line speed , fundamentally misunderstanding rapid transit hierarchy where high - capacity trunk lines should receive absolute priority Professional Training Bias : Traffic engineers are trained to optimize vehicle throughput and minimize delay for all road users , viewing unconditional transit priority as creating " traffic chaos ". This mindset dates to the mid -1990 s when engineers " stymied all TTC attempts to enact traffic priority " out of concern for automobile flow Post - Amalgamation Car Culture : Since Toronto ' s 1998 amalgamation with suburban municipalities , the " Road Classification System " has prioritized automobile throughput on arterial Official Justifications for Conditional TSP 17 17 26 27 8 18 17 17 28 29 18 17 18 30 18 The Institutional Culture and Motives 31 19 roads , placing " the private automobile ... at the top of the hierarchy , with transit users , pedestrians and cyclists all relegated to secondary and tertiary roles ". Suburban Political Pressure : Outer suburban councillors " believe that increased car usage , and therefore expanded road capacity , is inevitable " and represent a dominant voting bloc Transportation Services staff respond to this political constituency rather than downtown transit riders Risk Aversion : Implementing aggressive transit priority represents operational change that could generate driver complaints , which bureaucrats prefer to avoid It ' s institutionally safer to maintain status quo than to test whether unconditional priority might actually improve overall traffic flow by moving more people in fewer vehicles Professional Ego and Lock - In : After decades defending conditional TSP approaches , admitting unconditional priority works better represents institutional embarrassment Staff have committed to a technical position and reversing course threatens professional credibility The Advocacy Campaign : TTCriders launched " Give Transit the Green Light " in April 2025, specifically calling for piloting unconditional TSP on new LRT lines and measuring actual performance before dismissing it Evidence Already Exists : Toronto already operates 420 TSP locations with unconditional priority successfully for streetcars and buses , demonstrating the approach works The City plans to expand to 800 unconditional TSP locations — but excludes the brand - new $ 3.7 B LRT infrastructure The Official Response : Transportation Services promised to " look at any appropriate opportunity for unconditional TSP " only after both LRT lines are complete and operational This backwards approach — opening lines with weak priority first , then maybe considering improvements later — suggests bureaucratic resistance rather than genuine technical caution Why No Pilot : Mayor Chow ' s Position : Mayor Olivia Chow publicly supported unconditional priority , stating " Would I give priority to 30 people versus two people ? Yes , I would ". She directed staff to report back on signal priority for Eglinton Crosstown in April 2025, but as of November 2025 no update had been released , suggesting staff non - compliance 31 31 32 19 18 19 The Pilot Program Denial 33 18 17 18 17 Political risk : A pilot proving unconditional TSP works would force staff to admit their approach is wrong and create pressure to expand network - wide 19 31 Suburban backlash : Even temporary reduction in car lane capacity could trigger political pressure from suburban councillors 34 31 Institutional inertia : Easier to maintain status quo than test whether decades of policy were suboptimal 19 Accountability vacuum : No external oversight body can force Transportation Services to conduct evidence - based pilots 35 25 36 8 34 Councillor Josh Matlow ' s Warning : Matlow urged Metrolinx for transparency , noting the lack of clear signal priority agreements contributed to construction delays and cost overruns , warning the same problems could plague operations Cost Component Amount Details Track Infrastructure $ 515 1,030 M Embedded rail installation , special trackbed foundation , drainage systems , utility relocation ( water , gas , electricity , telecom ), track switches and special work Overhead Catenary System Included above Overhead wire installation , power substations , electrical distribution network Vehicles $ 144 180 M 18 Alstom Citadis Spirit LRVs @ $ 8 10 M each , 48 m long , 292 passenger capacity Stations $ 90 270 M 18 stations @ $ 5 15 M each : level boarding platforms requiring precise track alignment , electrified ticket validation , weather - protected shelters with heating , accessibility features Maintenance Facility $ 100 200 M Specialized LRT maintenance facility with rail maintenance equipment , electrified rail connection , track infrastructure within facility , custom - built for Citadis Spirit model Systems Integration $ 200 300 M Rail signaling systems , communications network , power distribution , train control systems , SCADA monitoring Design & Engineering $ 100 150 M Professional fees , environmental assessments , geotechnical studies , utility coordination 30 Year P 3 Financing Premium $ 1,700 M Private financing costs , risk transfer premium , lifecycle maintenance obligations 68% markup over construction costs ) Construction Contingency & Overruns $ 600 800 M Actual overruns from $ 2.5 B contract to $ 3.7 B final cost TOTAL CAPITAL COST $ 3,700 M $ 359 M per kilometer Annual Operating Cost : Not publicly disclosed , but LRT operating costs typically $ 578 per thousand passenger - miles Construction Timeline : 6 years 2019 2025 , originally scheduled 4 years Total Project Timeline : 18 years from 2007 announcement to 2025 opening 37 Expanded Cost Breakdown : LRT vs BRT Alternatives Option 1 Finch West LRT Actual Implementation ) 38 39 40 14 41 14 42 38 12 12 15 2 2 11 43 2 44 2 Option 2 High - Quality BRT Dedicated Median Lanes ) Cost Component Amount Details Dedicated Busway $ 103 309 M Center - median asphalt lanes with concrete barrier separation , similar alignment to LRT but standard roadway construction , minimal utility relocation ( utilities remain under adjacent general - purpose lanes ) Station Infrastructure $ 36 90 M 18 BRT stations @ $ 2 5 M each : level boarding platforms ( elevated platforms matching bus floor height ), pre - payment fare zones , passenger shelters , real - time arrival displays , lighting and security Vehicles $ 50 M 25 Volvo 7800 Electric bi - articulated buses @ $ 2 M each , 25.6 m long , 300 passenger capacity ( exceeds LRT , zero - emission battery - electric Charging Infrastructure Included above Depot charging stations , electrical upgrades , backup chargers ( overhead opportunity charging at terminals would add $ 5 10 M Signal Priority System $ 10 20 M Unconditional TSP at all 18 intersections , vehicle detection / communication systems , signal controller upgrades , traffic management center integration Maintenance Facility $ 0 M Use existing TTC bus maintenance depots with minor charging infrastructure additions Passenger Information $ 5 10 M Real - time arrival displays , wayfinding signage , mobile app integration Design & Engineering $ 15 30 M Professional fees , traffic studies , environmental assessment Construction Contingency $ 20 50 M 10 15% contingency for unforeseen conditions TOTAL CAPITAL COST $ 239 519 M $ 23 50 M per kilometer Cost Savings vs LRT : $ 3,181 3,461 M 86 94% reduction ) LRT costs 7.1 15.5 x more than High - Quality BRT Annual Operating Cost : Approximately $ 700 900 per thousand passenger - miles for electric buses ( higher per vehicle than LRT but lower total for projected demand ). Construction Timeline : 2 3 years Projected Performance : 4 39 4 45 46 45 28 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 47 11 4 Average speed : 25 30 km / h with unconditional TSP 28 4 Capacity : 6,000 10,000 pph / direction ( matches LRT for projected 2,250 pph demand ) 48 49 Fleet flexibility : Buses redeployable to other routes as demand evolves 50 51 Cost Component Amount Details Curbside Bus Lanes $ 50 100 M Paint - delineated or curb - separated dedicated lanes along existing curbside , traffic signal adjustments , signage , minor curb adjustments Basic Stations $ 9 18 M 18 enhanced bus shelters @ $ 0.5 1 M each : covered waiting areas , seating , lighting , basic passenger information , no level boarding ( uses bus steps ) Vehicles $ 40 M 30 standard articulated electric buses @ $ 1.3 M each , 18.5 m long , 80 120 passenger capacity Charging Infrastructure Included above Depot charging with existing electrical infrastructure Signal Priority System $ 5 10 M Unconditional TSP at key intersections , simpler detection system Maintenance Facility $ 0 M Full integration with existing TTC bus operations Design & Engineering $ 5 10 M Reduced scope given simpler infrastructure Construction Contingency $ 5 15 M 10% contingency TOTAL CAPITAL COST $ 114 193 M $ 11 19 M per kilometer Cost Savings vs LRT : $ 3,507 3,586 M 95 97% reduction ) LRT costs 19.2 32.5 x more than Basic BRT Annual Operating Cost : Similar to Option 2, approximately $ 700 900 per thousand passenger - miles Construction Timeline : 1 2 years Projected Performance : Why LRT Track Costs 5 10 x More Than BRT Lanes : Option 3 Basic BRT Curbside Dedicated Lanes ) 4 52 4 45 45 28 4 4 4 4 4 2 47 4 Average speed : 22 27 km / h with proper TSP 3 6 Capacity : 3,000 4,000 pph / direction ( adequate for 2,250 pph projected demand ) 11 Trade - off : Curbside lanes suffer from right - turn conflicts , delivery trucks , parking enforcement issues versus median - aligned busways 53 54 Key Infrastructure Differences Explaining Cost Variance Utility Relocation : LRT embedded track requires relocating all underground utilities ( water mains , gas lines , electrical conduits , telecommunications fiber ) because rail requires Why LRT Stations Cost 5 15 x More : Why LRT Maintenance Facilities Cost $ 100 200 M vs $ 0 for BRT : Metric LRT High - Quality BRT Basic BRT Capital Cost $ 3,700 M $ 239 519 M $ 114 193 M Cost Multiplier vs BRT — 7.1 15.5 x more expensive 19.2 32.5 x more expensive precision alignment and utilities cannot remain under tracks BRT can build around existing utilities with minor adjustments 39 Foundation Requirements : LRT trackbed requires specialized concrete foundation and drainage systems to prevent track movement and flooding BRT uses standard flexible asphalt pavement over existing road base 38 4 Precision Alignment : LRT track must maintain millimeter - precision horizontal and vertical alignment for train wheelsets , requiring extensive surveying and specialized construction BRT lanes tolerate standard roadway tolerances 42 4 Electrification : LRT requires overhead catenary wire system with power substations every 2 3 km , electrical distribution network , and protective grounding BRT uses battery - electric buses with depot charging infrastructure already common to bus operations 40 45 Switches and Special Trackwork : LRT requires expensive rail switches , crossovers , and special trackwork at the maintenance facility connection , costing $ 2 5 M per switch BRT buses simply drive on regular roads to access depots 38 4 Platform Precision : LRT level boarding requires platforms built to exact height specifications ( typically 350 mm or 900 mm ) with millimeter - precision horizontal gap to ensure wheelchair accessibility Even small misalignments create unsafe gaps BRT platforms have more tolerance or can use bus ramps 42 14 4 Platform Length : LRT stations must accommodate 48 50 m vehicles with precision stop positions BRT stations can be shorter and use simpler bus pull - in designs 14 4 Electrical Integration : LRT stations require fare gates , validators , electrical heating , and lighting integrated with overhead power system BRT can use simpler solar - powered or standard electrical connections 14 4 Rail Infrastructure : LRT facilities require track connections , switches , inspection pits aligned with rail , wheel truing equipment , and specialized lifting equipment for rail vehicles 42 Single - Purpose : LRT facilities are custom - designed for specific vehicle models and cannot serve other transit needs 42 Electrical Systems : Rail maintenance facilities need electrified track throughout for vehicle movement and specialized high - voltage equipment 42 BRT Integration : Buses are maintained in standard vehicle maintenance bays using conventional automotive tools , allowing full integration with existing TTC bus operations 4 Cost - Benefit Summary Metric LRT High - Quality BRT Basic BRT Capital Cost Savings vs LRT — $ 3,181 3,461 M $ 3,507 3,586 M Network Coverage 10.3 km , single corridor Could build 7 15 corridors for same money Could build 19 32 corridors for same money Speed Performance 13.5 km / h ( actual ) 25 30 km / h ( projected ) 22 27 km / h ( projected ) Speed vs LRT — 85 122% faster 63 100% faster Opening Timeline 2025 18 years ) 2012 2015 8 10 years ) 2012 2014 7 8 years ) Time Savings vs LRT — 10 years earlier 11 years earlier Capacity 6,300 pph 6,000 10,000 pph 3,000 4,000 pph Demand 2031 2,250 pph 2,250 pph 2,250 pph Fleet Flexibility Fixed to route Redeployable network - wide Redeployable network - wide 2 Transit City Announcement 2007 : Ford Cancellation Era 2010 2012 : Project Revival and Procurement 2012 2018 : 1 ^44 ^28 Political and Legal Causes of Delays and Failure Political Timeline 2007 2016 Premier Dalton McGuinty and Mayor David Miller announced Transit City : 7 LRT lines totaling 120 km 44 Finch West scheduled to open 2015 44 No comprehensive BRT alternative publicly evaluated 44 14 Planning locked into " LRT vs subway " paradigm 44 Mayor Rob Ford cancelled entire Transit City plan in favor of " subways , subways , subways " 44 2+ years of political paralysis as provincial Liberals and City Council overrode Ford 44 Delay impact : 2 3 years , pushing construction start from 2011 to 2014 2015 44 Transit City eventually revived but with modified scope 44 Opening date pushed from 2015 → 2018 → 2020 → 2021 44 Public - Private Partnership model selected , adding financing complexity 12 May 2018 $ 2.5 B contract awarded to Mosaic Transit Group 13 12 Construction finally began 2019 8 years after originally planned 44 Why BRT Was Never Considered : Multi - Agency Jurisdictional Conflict : The project suffers from " structural incompetence " due to three - way split authority : This created coordination nightmares where each entity optimized for different goals : Builder Lawsuit August 2024 : Mosaic Transit Group Aecon consortium ) filed lawsuit against Ontario government alleging : Specific Legal Claims : Rail Ideology : Transit City was explicitly conceived as " light rail renaissance " to prove LRT could work in Toronto BRT would contradict ideological commitment 44 Suburban Bus Stigma : Post - amalgamation Toronto ' s car - centric culture viewed buses as " second - class transit " regardless of infrastructure quality 50 31 Provincial Funding Lock : Metrolinx controlled funding and was committed to LRT technology across multiple projects Eglinton , Finch , Sheppard East , Hurontario ). Switching to BRT would require renegotiating entire provincial transit strategy 55 Developer Pressure : Real estate industry preferred rail permanence for transit - oriented development certainty Developers won ' t invest around bus lanes that might be removed 56 39 No Precedent Awareness : In 2007 2010, TransMilenio Bogotá and other high - quality BRT weren ' t well - known in Toronto planning circles Ottawa ' s BRT Transitway existed but wasn ' t seen as comparable to rail 49 50 Legal and Contractual Failures 2018 2025 55 44 Metrolinx ( provincial agency owned by Ontario ): Owns LRT infrastructure , manages construction contracts TTC City of Toronto agency ): Will operate trains , responsible for service delivery City of Toronto Transportation Services : Controls all traffic signals Metrolinx : On - time , on - budget construction delivery TTC Operational efficiency and service quality Transportation Services : Automobile traffic flow preservation 57 Metrolinx " breached its contractual obligations " by entering separate TTC operations contract " inconsistent " with original design - build - finance - maintain agreement 57 TTC imposed late - stage operational demands not in original scope 57 Warning of " growing dysfunction , extensive delays and ballooning costs ... increasing on a near daily basis with a potential value of many millions of dollars " 57 57 Metrolinx failed to provide timely decisions on design changes TTC ' s operational requirements conflicted with as - built infrastructure Construction Quality Issues : Months after major construction ended : P 3 Contract Structure Failure : The 30- year P 3 was supposed to deliver : What Actually Happened : The P 3 model succeeded in transferring financial risk to private sector but failed to align operational performance incentives , as demonstrated by weak signal priority undermining the entire investment Eglinton Crosstown Parallel Failure : The similar Eglinton Crosstown LRT faces identical problems : This demonstrates the Finch West failure isn ' t isolated but reflects systemic institutional dysfunction across Toronto / Metrolinx transit delivery Lack of clear signal priority agreements created construction uncertainty City ' s traffic signal control decisions not coordinated with construction schedule 58 Multiple stations had damaged / broken glass platform walls Ongoing remedial work required lane closures causing traffic delays Transit analyst Steve Munro noted " basic flaws in project design and contract management " 59 15 12 Risk transfer to private sector Lifecycle cost optimization incentives $ 566 million savings versus traditional procurement 15 15 2 $ 1.7 billion financing premium 68% markup over construction costs ) 48% cost overrun eliminated promised savings No evidence lifecycle optimization occurred ( witness : conditional TSP implementation ) Net result : $ 634 million more expensive than theoretical traditional procurement 12 17 37 55 Crosslinx consortium sued Metrolinx over operational requirement conflicts 55 Years of delays pushing opening from 2020 → 2026 60 61 Councillor Josh Matlow demanding transparency on signal priority agreements 37 Same conditional TSP implementation planned despite $ 12.8 B cost 17 37 55 No Performance Oversight : Transportation Services operates with shocking lack of accountability : Failed Accountability Proposals : Toronto Region Board of Trade called in February 2025 for : Council hasn ' t acted on these recommendations The Evidence - Based Approach Not Taken : Transit advocates , Mayor Chow , and analysts like Steve Munro have consistently called for : Transportation Services refused , instead implementing conditional TSP from day one with vague promise to " look at opportunities " for improvement later This backwards approach reveals institutional resistance to evidence - based policy making Comprehensive Coverage Option : At $ 239 519 M per high - quality BRT corridor : Accountability Vacuum 25 35 No performance metrics : City doesn ' t measure or report whether signals achieve transit priority goals , only whether they " function " 22 No external review : Unlike building officials or safety engineers , traffic engineers face no review body for whether decisions align with City policy 35 Bureaucratic insulation : As civil servants , staff can ' t be directly removed by Council or Mayor 21 Council limitations : Council can direct staff through motions , but staff interpretation isn ' t enforceable short of specific by - laws 36 25 Cross - departmental " congestion czar " to review all decisions through congestion lens Accountability mechanisms for Transportation Services performance Integration between transit planning and traffic operations 25 32 33 18 Pilot unconditional TSP on new LRT lines Measure actual performance ( transit speed , traffic flow , safety ) Adjust based on data rather than theoretical concerns 18 17 The Opportunity Cost : What $ 3.7 Billion Could Have Delivered BRT Network Alternative 7 15 BRT corridors across Toronto for same $ 3.7 B 2 4 Transform entire city ' s transit network instead of single corridor Corridors could include : Eglinton , Sheppard , Steeles , Jane , Dufferin , Don Mills , Finch East , Kingston Road , etc 51 Basic BRT Option : At $ 114 193 M per curbside BRT corridor : Fleet Comparison : Timeline Advantage : TransMilenio Bogotá : Demonstrates BRT capacity potential Lyon , France : World ' s best - performing large - city tram network Zürich : 73 km tram network with high - frequency service Ottawa Transitway → Confederation Line : Relevant cautionary tale 19 32 BRT corridors across Toronto for same $ 3.7 B 2 4 Nearly complete citywide rapid transit network coverage LRT 18 vehicles serving single corridor 14 High - Quality BRT Alternative : 175 375 bi - articulated buses serving 7 15 corridors 45 46 Basic BRT Alternative : 570 960 articulated buses serving 19 32 corridors 45 Each bus redeployable as demand evolves 51 50 BRT opening : 2012 2015 ( staggered network buildout ) 4 LRT opening : 2025 2 Benefit : 10 13 years of improved transit service that didn ' t happen 4 2 Performance Comparison to Global Best Practices 48 49 Bi - articulated buses carrying 240 280 passengers Achieving 35,000 48,000 passengers per hour per direction 7 x Finch West LRT ' s 6,300 pph capacity Using : dedicated median lanes , unconditional signal priority , passing lanes , multiple loading berths 29 62 Comprehensive multimodal integration Full signal priority for trams Average speeds exceeding 25 km / h through dense urban areas 62 29 Strong signal priority implementation Integration with comprehensive transit hierarchy Proof that proper signal priority is essential to rail investment value Operated successful BRT for decades Converted to LRT / subway in 2019 Experienced significant reliability problems and delays Demonstrates BRT can provide long - term high - quality service Single corridor : 10.3 km serving Finch Avenue West only Locked technology : 18 LRVs based on 2013 2014 technology , locked in for 30+ years Minimal performance improvement : 1 minute faster than previous bus No network effect : Residents not on Finch Avenue receive zero benefit from $ 3.7 B investment Opportunity cost : $ 3.3 3.5 billion that could have transformed citywide transit not spent on alternatives The Finch West LRT represents compounding failures across political , institutional , legal , and technical dimensions : What Toronto Chose Instead 14 63 12 1 14 2 4 Conclusion : A Systems Failure Across All Dimensions Political Failure Rail ideology prioritized over evidence - based mode selection 31 44 8- year delay from Ford cancellation saga 44 No comprehensive alternatives analysis comparing BRT performance and costs 14 44 Provincial - municipal coordination dysfunction 55 Institutional Failure Transportation Services bureaucratic resistance to transit priority over cars 31 17 No accountability mechanisms for performance outcomes 35 25 Refusal to pilot evidence - based unconditional TSP despite existing successful implementation on 420 locations 18 17 Three - agency coordination breakdown Metrolinx - TTC City ) 55 57 Legal / Contractual Failure P 3 structure added $ 1.7 B financing premium without delivering promised optimization 12 15 Builder lawsuit over operational requirement conflicts 57 Construction quality issues requiring remediation 58 48% cost overrun eliminating VFM savings 15 2 $ 3.7 billion spent over 18 years to deliver : What could have been delivered instead : High - Quality BRT Option $ 239 519 M per corridor ) : Basic BRT Option $ 114 193 M per corridor ) : As transit analyst Reece Martin concluded , this represents " structural incompetence " where agencies and bureaucrats were " willing to change their profile pictures but not loudly advocate for strong signal priority "— the one policy change that would make the investment worthwhile The result : Toronto spent 7 32 times more than necessary to build a system slower than the bus it replaced , while forgoing the opportunity to transform the entire city ' s transit network ⁂ Technical Failure Conditional TSP implementation sabotaging the entire investment 16 17 13.5 km / h actual speed vs 27 km / h projected —50% performance shortfall 3 1 Capacity utilization only 36% at projected 2031 demand 10 The Corrected Verdict 1 minute of travel time savings 1 2 Service on single 10.3 km corridor 14 Performance worse than properly - implemented BRT At 7 32 x the cost of BRT alternatives ( not 2 3 x as initially stated ) 4 2 Opening 10 years later than BRT alternative 2 4 7 15 comprehensive BRT corridors transforming citywide transit 4 2 25 30 km / h average speeds with unconditional TSP 85 122% faster than LRT 28 Opening by 2012 2015, providing 10 13 years of improved service 4 Fleet flexibility to evolve with changing demand and technology 50 51 LRT cost 7.1 15.5 x more for inferior performance 2 4 19 32 BRT corridors creating near - complete citywide network 2 4 22 27 km / h average speeds 63 100% faster than LRT 3 Opening by 2012 2014, providing 11 13 years of improved service 4 Maximum network coverage and service reach LRT cost 19.2 32.5 x more for single - corridor service 2 4 64 44 https :// skytrainforsurrey org /2025/11/25/ toronto - new - finch - west - lrt - slower - than - bus / https :// www ctvnews ca / toronto / article / finch - west - lrt - officially - opens - with - free - rides - as - ttc - launches - first - new - transit - line - since -2002/ https :// www torontoenvironment org / lrtfaq https :// brtguide itdp org / branch / master / guide / why - brt / costs https :// stevemunro ca /2025/11/28/6- finch - west - schedules - travel - times - speeds / https :// policy tti tamu edu / strategy / light - rail - transit / https :// en wikipedia org / wiki / Light _ rail https :// nowtoronto com / news / its - going - to - be - slow - finch - west - lrt - set - to - open - this - week - but - riders - wo rry - about - speeds - infrequent - service / https :// stevemunro ca /2025/11/21/ line -6- finch - december -7 2025/ https :// assets metrolinx com / image / upload / v 1663240053/ Documents / Metrolinx / Finch - West - LRT FAQs - R evised - June 9. pdf https :// www worldtransitresearch info / research /534/ https :// www aecon com / press - room / news /2018/05/07/1428 Aecon - consortium - reaches - financial - close - on - Finch - West - Light - Rail - Transit - project https :// www infrastructureontario ca / en / news - 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IE 20.3 https :// nowtoronto com / news / toronto - councillor - josh - matlow - urges - metrolinx - for - transparency - as - egli nton - lrt - approaches - end - of - testing - period / https :// www youtube com / watch ? v =972 QO 2 A 0 p 64 https :// www reddit com / r / urbanplanning / comments / spq 3 na / are _ busways _ cheaper _ to _ build _ and _ mainta in _ than / https :// www alstom com / press - releases - news /2025/12/ alstoms - citadis - light - rail - vehicles - begin - service - toronto - canadas - finch - west - light - rapid - transit - lrt https :// en wikipedia org / wiki / Flexity _ Freedom https :// le utah gov / interim /2021/ pdf /00003441. pdf https :// journalistsresource org / economics / bus - versus - rail / https :// thelocal to / finch - west - lrt - metrolinx - northwest - toronto / https :// www urban - transport - magazine com / en / bus - electrification - a - comparison - of - capital - costs / https :// www volvobuses com / en / city - and - intercity / buses / volvo -7800- electric html https :// etatransit com / blog / ev - vs - hydrogen - buses - how - u - s - public - transit - agencies - are - navigating - the - zero - emission - transition / https :// www reddit com / r / transit / comments /1 bpy 5 sa / how _ can _ a _ bus _ rapid _ transit _ have _ headway _ of _6/ https :// www reddit com / r / transit / comments /17 ldm 9 m / the _ bogotá _ articulated _ buses _ the _ longest _ in _ the / https :// www reddit com / r / Hamilton / comments /1 e 7 bo 1 b / lrt _ vs _ electric _ buses / https :// spacing ca / toronto /2021/03/05/ lorinc - the - case - for - way - more - electric - buses / https :// www cdmsmith com / en / client - solutions / insights / breaking - down - bus - rapid - transit - lane - options https :// www halton ca / For - Residents / Roads - Construction / Municipal - Class - Environmental - Assessment - S tudies / Dundas - Corridor - Study - Brant - St - to - Bronte - Rd -(1 / ESR Chapter -4 5 Dundas - Corridor - Study https :// dot ca gov /-/ media / dot - media / programs / research - innovation - system - information / documents / fin al - reports / ca 09 0952- finalreport - a 11 y pdf https :// www cbc ca / news / canada / toronto / eglinton - crosstown - crosslinx - sue - ttc - delays -1.6844693 https :// medallioncorp com / how - the - finch - lrt - will - benefit - the - weston - and - finch - community / https :// globalnews ca / news /10779971/ finch - west - lrt - lawsuit - delays / https :// toronto citynews ca /2025/08/03/ finch - west - lrt - station - platforms - glass - damaged / https :// stevemunro ca /2025/10/23/ ontario - announces - testing - complete - for - finch - west - lrt / https :// toronto citynews ca /2025/12/05/ eglinton - crosstown - lrt - substantial - completion - ttc - metrolinx - ope ning / https :// globalnews ca / news /11563649/ eglinton - crosstown - lrt - open - weeks / https :// finance yahoo com / news / six - best - tram - systems - around -125608447. html https :// en wikipedia org / wiki / Alstom _ Citadis _ Spirit https :// nextmetro substack com / p / the - finch - lrt - and - our - mistakes