Week 10 The Many-Sided Nature of Reality Jaina Metaphysics Take this survey of your stances on Indian metaphysics: https://pollev.com/amitc289 These options might feel a bit limited... a bit “one-sided” (ekānta)… Mahāvīra and the Jainas to the rescue: Reality is “many-sided”, “multi-faceted” (anekānta) Mahāvīra (540-468 BCE) Became a śramaṇa renunciate at age 28 Unlike the Buddha, he valued extreme asceticism achieved omniscience at 40; became the 24th of Jaina “ford-maker” (tīrthaṅkara) across the river of saṃsāra Buddha: Adopted a “Noble Silence” towards metaphysics: Mahāvīra: Did not adopt the Buddha’s “Noble Silence” towards metaphysics: Jaina metaphysics: Two types of substance (dravya): Conscious selves (jīva); unconscious matter (ajīva) substances have: unchanging essential qualities (guṇa) changing modes (paryāya) Jaina metaphysics: There is a plurality of selves (ātman) consciousness is its essential attribute It both experiences objects (bhoktṛ) and acts (kartṛ) The self is inherently: omniscient, omnipotent, formless, blissful Jaina metaphysics: There is a plurality of selves (ātman) These inherent attributes are obscured by the substance of karma. Karma : ātman :: dust : mirror Karma clings to the ātman, pollutes & obscures its pure nature ātman takes on the shape and size of its body all living things have an ātman Bondage to saṃsāra = partly caused by ignorance of the self’s true nature, i.e., pure and omniscient knowledge (kevala-jñāna) Liberation: Purify the self by removing karmic dust: – block the influx of new karma by ceasing to act – use extreme asceticism to exhaust the karma that remains The Five Great Vows of Jaina monks: 1. ahiṃsā = non-violence Non-injury to all life-forms (including yourself) in action, speech, and thought 2. satya = truthfulness abstain from lying and harmful speech 3. asteya = non-stealing don’t take what isn’t given 4. brahmacarya = sexual chastity 5. aparigraha = non-attachment renounce possession of worldly objects ahiṃsā = non-violence Ācārāṅga Sūtra (oldest Jaina text) Problem: How can a Jaina eat? Answer: Very carefully Violence = the careless removal of life ahiṃsā = non-violence Ācārāṅga Sūtra (oldest Jaina text) Problem: How can a Jaina eat? Answer: Best not to sallekhanā = ritual self-starvation dispassionate & compassionate Anekāntavāda Entities have: infinite number of attributes infinite number of relations to other entities Anekāntavāda Trying to describe this infinitely complex structure leads to disagreements, contradictions Anekāntavāda Trying to describe this infinitely complex structure leads to disagreements, contradictions: “The self exists” vs. “The self doesn’t exist” “Reality is permanent, eternal, unchanging” vs. “Reality is impermanent, momentary, total flux” Anekāntavāda These statements are all true in a sense, from a certain perspective (naya) e.g., The same person can be: a parent (from his child’s perspective) a child (from his parent’s perspective) a teacher (from his student’s perspective) a student (from his teacher’s perspective) – no contradiction here Jainas: “Existence is characterized by emergence, perishing, and duration.” Substances are enduring and changing, in certain respects... e.g., substances endure through changes in modes (paryāya), possess unchanging essential attributes (guṇa) – no contradiction here Jainas: “Existence is characterized by emergence, perishing, and duration.” Substances are enduring and changing, in certain respects... ekāntavādas over-emphasize one side of reality – reality = unchanging permanence (Advaita Vedānta) reality = momentary flux (Abhidharma Buddhists) The standpoint (naya) of generality: See all things in terms of what’s common This person is similar to all other persons Ekāntavādas: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika – one universal property of personhood Advaita Vedānta – one universal Being The standpoint (naya) of particularity: See all things in terms of their distinctness This person is dissimilar to all other persons Ekāntavādas: Abhidharma Buddhism – all similarity is unreal all real things are utterly unique particulars Ekāntavādas are partly right… but also partly wrong. All non-omniscient perspectives are limited… Error = not realizing one’s own perspective is limited But, this doesn’t lead to skepticism/mere relativism... there is one right view = the omniscient perspective of the liberated Jina, who knows the infinite complexity of reality → as captured in Jaina metaphysics Ekāntavādas are partly right… but also partly wrong. All non-omniscient perspectives are limited… Error = not realizing one’s own perspective is limited But, this doesn’t lead to skepticism/mere relativism... there is one right view = Syādvāda syāt – “it might be”, “it may be”, “it could be” Jainas: “syāt” = “conditionally”, “in a certain sense” saptabhaṅgī - the logical system of sevenfold predication 1. From one point of view, x is true. 2. From one point of view, x is false. 3. From one point of view, x is true & false. 4. From one point of view, x is non-assertible. 5. From one point of view, x is true & non-assertible 6. From one point of view, x is false & non-assertible 7. From one point of view, x is true & false & non-assertible 1. From one point of view, a pot exists; it’s a real substance. 2. From one point of view, a pot does not exist; e.g., it’s not a pen, on Mars…. 3. From one point of view, a pot exists & doesn’t exist. – no contradiction here (3) involves “successive” assertion = the (Jaina) perspective in which 4. From one point of view, the pot is non-assertible One explanation: (4) involves “simultaneous” assertion Pot exists & doesn’t exist in the same sense – this can’t be asserted. The notion of “pot” can’t be used to express a contradiction 4. From one point of view, the pot is non-assertible Another explanation: Certain perspectives are neutral, indeterminate e.g., From the perspective of physics, “Killing is wrong” is non-assertible, inexpressible
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