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If you are not located in the United States, you'll have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. Title: The Essays of Adam Smith Author: Adam Smith Editor: Joseph Black James Hutton Release Date: December 28, 2018 [EBook #58559] Language: English *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ESSAYS OF ADAM SMITH *** Produced by Ed Brandon from material at the Internet Archive T H E E S S A Y S O F A D A M S M I T H Transcriber’s Note This version is based upon texts kindly provided by the Internet Archive and the Hathi Trust. The main resource can be found here. Footnotes Most footnotes in the text are indicated by an asterisk. Here they are numbered within each work and placed at the end of paragraph in which they occur. One footnote in the first essay is numbered; it is here given as 1*. Corrections Corrections (or queries) are flagged by dotted red underline, on mouse-over revealing the original. Other matters Greek text is marked by orange underlining, on mouse-over revealing a transliteration. Page numbers have been rendered in-text in red. Other original printing conventions have been followed, except for left quotation marks at the start of every line of quoted text. Some links have been inserted to provide for cross-references within the text. Infelicities and mistakes here are the transcriber’s fault. E S S A Y S ON I M O R A L S E N T I M E N T S ; II A S T R O N O M I C A L I N Q U I R I E S ; III F O R M A T I O N O F L A N G U A G E S ; IV H I S T O R Y O F A N C I E N T P H Y S I C S ; V A N C I E N T L O G I C A N D M E T A P H Y S I C S ; VI T H E I M I T A T I V E A R T S ; VII M U S I C , D A N C I N G , P O E T R Y ; VIII T H E E X T E R N A L S E N S E S ; IX E N G L I S H A N D I T A L I A N V E R S E S . BY A D A M S M I T H , L L . D . F . R . S . , Author of the ‘Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.’ LONDON: A L E X . M U R R A Y & C O . , 3 0 , Q U E E N S Q U A R E , W. C . 1872. LONDON: BRADBURY, EVANS, AND CO., PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICE. A DAM S M ITH , the author of these Essays and of the ‘Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,’ was born at Kirkaldy, June 5, 1723, a few months after the death of his father. He was a sickly child, and indulged by his mother, who was the object of his filial gratitude for sixty years. When about three years old, and at the house of Douglass of Strathenry, his mother’s brother, he was carried off by tinkers or gipsies, but soon recovered from them. At the burgh school of his native town he made rapid progress, and soon attracted notice by his passion for books, and by the extraordinary powers of his memory. His weakness of body prevented him joining in athletic sports, but his generous and friendly temperament made him a favourite with his schoolmates; and he was noted then, as through after life, for absence in company and a habit of speaking to himself when alone. From the grammar school of Kirkaldy, he was sent, in 1737, to the University of Glasgow, whence, in 1740, he went to Baliol College, Oxford, enjoying an exhibition on the Snell foundation. When at Glasgow College, his favourite studies were mathematics and natural philosophy, but that did not long divert his mind from pursuits more congenial to him, more particularly the political history of mankind, which gave scope to the power of his comprehensive genius, and gratified his ruling passion of contributing to the happiness and the improvement of society. To his early taste for Greek generally, may be due the clearness and fulness with which he states his political reasonings. At Oxford he employed himself frequently in the practice of translation, with a view to the improvement of his own style, and used to commend such exercises to all who cultivate the art of composition. He also cultivated with the greatest care the study of languages; and his knowledge of them led him to a peculiar experience in everything that could illustrate the institutions, the manners, and the ideas of different ages and nations. After a residence at Oxford of seven years, he returned to Kirkaldy, and lived two years with his mother, engaged in studies, but without any fixed plan for his future life. He had been originally destined for the Church of England; but not finding the ecclesiastical profession suitable to his taste, he took chance of obtaining some of those moderate preferments, to which literary attainments lead in Scotland. Removing to Edinburgh in 1748, he read lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres, under the patronage of Lord Kames; and when in Edinburgh became intimate with David Hume. In 1751 he was elected Professor of Logic in the University of Glasgow; and, the year following, he became Professor of Moral Philosophy there; a situation he held for thirteen years, and used to look back on as the most useful and happy of his life; and, though but a narrow scene for his ambition, may have led to the future eminence of his literary character. In delivering his lectures, Mr. Smith trusted almost entirely to extemporary elocution. His manner, though not graceful, was plain and unaffected, and he never failed to interest his hearers. Each discourse consisted commonly of several distinct propositions, which he successively endeavoured to prove and illustrate. At first he often appeared to speak with hesitation; but, as he advanced, the matter seemed to crowd upon him, his manner became warm and animated, and his expression easy and fluent. His reputation as a philosopher attracted a multitude of students from a great distance to the University; and those branches of science which he taught became fashionable, and his opinions were the chief topics of discussion in the clubs and literary societies of Glasgow. While Adam Smith became thus eminent as a public lecturer, he was gradually laying the foundation of a more extensive reputation by preparing for the press his System of Morals; and the first edition of his Essays appeared in 1759, under the title of T HE T HEORY OF M ORAL S ENTIM ENTS Of this essay, Dugald Stewart remarks, ‘that whatever opinion we may entertain of the justness of its conclusions, it must be allowed to be a singular effort of invention, ingenuity, and subtilty; that it contains a large mixture of important truth, and has had the merit of directing the attention of philosophers to a view of human nature, which had formerly in a great measure escaped their notice; and no work, undoubtedly, can be mentioned, ancient or modern, which exhibits so complete a view of those facts with respect to our moral perceptions, which it is one great object of this branch of science to refer to their general laws; and well deserves the careful study of all whose taste leads them to prosecute similar enquiries. These facts are presented in the most happy and beautiful lights; and when the subject leads him to address the imagination and the heart, the variety and felicity of his illustrations, the richness and fluency of his eloquence; and the skill with which he wins the attention and commands the passions of his readers, leave him, among our English moralists, without a rival. Towards the close of 1763, Mr. Smith arranged to visit the continent with the Duke of Buccleugh, returning to London in 1766. For the next ten years he lived quietly with his mother at Kirkaldy; and in 1776, accounted to the world for his long retreat, by the publication of his ‘I NQUIRY INTO THE N ATURE AND C AUSES OF THE W EALTH OF N ATIONS .’ In 1778, Mr. Smith was appointed a Commissioner of Customs in Scotland, the pecuniary emoluments of which were considerable. In 1784, he lost his mother. In 1788, his cousin, Miss Douglass, died, to whom he had been strongly attached; and in July, 1790, he died, having, a short while before, in conversation with his friend Riddell, regretted that ‘ HE HAD DONE SO LITTLE .’ [Above biographic notes and literary opinions have been abridged from a paper on ‘The Life and Writings of Adam Smith,’ by Professor Dugald Stewart, of Edinburgh, 1793—A. M.] ADVERTISEMENT TO THE SIXTH EDITION. S INCE the first publication of the T HEORY OF M ORAL S ENTIMENTS , which was in the beginning of the year 1759, several corrections, and a good many illustrations of the doctrines contained in it, have occurred to me. But the various occupations in which the different accidents of my life necessarily involved me, have till now prevented me from revising this work with the care and attention which I always intended. The reader will find the principal alterations which I have made in this New Edition, in the last Chapter of the third Section of Part First; and in the four first Chapters of Part Third. Part Sixth, as it stands in this New Edition, is altogether new. In Part Seventh, I have brought together the greater part of the different passages concerning the Stoical Philosophy, which, in the former Editions, had been scattered about in different parts of the work. I have likewise endeavoured to explain more fully, and examine more distinctly, some of the doctrines of that famous sect. In the fourth and last Section of the same Part, I have thrown together a few additional observations concerning the duty and the principle of veracity. There are, besides, in other parts of the work, a few other alterations and corrections of no great moment. In the last paragraph of the first Edition of the present work, I said that I should in another discourse endeavour to give an account of the general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions which they had undergone in the different ages and periods of society; not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law. In the Inquiry concerning the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations , I have partly executed this promise; at least so far as concerns police, revenue, and arms. What remains, the theory of jurisprudence, which I have long projected, I have hitherto been hindered from executing, by the same occupations which had till now prevented me from revising the present work. Though my very advanced age leaves me, I acknowledge, very little expectation of ever being able to execute this great work to my own satisfaction; yet, as I have not altogether abandoned the design, and as I wish still to continue under the obligation of doing what I can, I have allowed the paragraph to remain as it was published more than thirty years ago, when I entertained no doubt of being able to execute every thing which it announced. ESSAYS BY ADAM SMITH ON PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS ADVERTISEMENT BY THE EDITORS. T HE much lamented author of these Essays left them in the hands of his friends to be disposed of as they thought proper, having immediately before his death destroyed many other manuscripts which he thought unfit for being made public. When these were inspected, the greater number of them appeared to be parts of a plan he once had formed, for giving a connected history of the liberal sciences and elegant arts. It is long since he found it necessary to abandon that plan as far too extensive; and these parts of it lay beside him neglected until his death. His friends are persuaded, however, that the reader will find in them that happy connection, that full and accurate expression, and that clear illustration which are conspicuous in the rest of his works; and that though it is difficult to add much to the great fame he so justly acquired by his other writings, these will be read with satisfaction and pleasure. JOSEPH BLACK. JAMES HUTTON. CONTENTS. THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS. P A R T I OF THE PROPRIETY OF ACTIONS. PAGE C. I . Of the Sense of Propriety 9 C H. I . Of Sympathy 9-13 C H. II . Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy 13-16 C H. III ., IV . Of the manner in which we judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of the Affections of other Men, by their Concord or Dissonance with our own 16-23 C H. V . Of the amiable and respectable Virtues 23-26 C. II . Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety 26 C H. I . Of the Passions which take their Origin from the Body 26-30 C H. II . Of those Passions which take their Origin from a particular Turn or Habit of the Imagination 30-32 C H. III . Of the unsocial Passions 32-37 C H. IV . Of the social Passions 37-39 C H. V . Of the selfish Passions 39-41 C. III . Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Approbation in the one State than in the other 42 C H. I . That though our Sympathy with Sorrow is generally a more lively Sensation than our Sympathy with Joy, it commonly falls much more short of the Violence of what is naturally felt by the Person principally concerned 42-47 C H. II . Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks 47-56 C H. III . Of the Corruption of our Moral Sentiments, which is occasioned by this Disposition to admire the Rich and the Great, and to despise or neglect Persons of poor and mean Condition 56-60 P A R T II OF MERIT AND DEMERIT; OR, OF THE OBJECTS OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT. C. I . Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit—Introduction 61 C H. I . That whatever appears to be the proper Object of Gratitude, appears to deserve Reward; and that, in the same Manner, whatever appears to be the proper Object of Resentment, appears to deserve Punishment 61-63 C H. II . Of the proper Objects of Gratitude and Resentment 63-65 C H. III . That where there is no Approbation of the Conduct of the Person who confers the Benefit, there is little Sympathy with the Gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no Disapprobation of the Motives of the Person who does the Mischief, there is no sort of Sympathy with the Resentment of him who suffers it 65-67 C H. IV . Recapitulation of the foregoing Chapters 67-68 C H. V . The Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit 68-70 C. II . Of Justice and Beneficence C H. I . Comparison of those two Virtues 70-75 C H. II . Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the Consciousness of Merit 75-78 C H. III . Of the Utility of this Constitution of Nature 78-84 C. III . Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions— Introduction 84-85 C H. I . Of the Causes of this Influence of Fortune 85-88 C H. II . Of the Extent of this Influence of Fortune 88-95 C H. III . Of the final Cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments 96-99 P A R T III OF THE FOUNDATION OF OUR JUDGMENTS CONCERNING OUR OWN SENTIMENTS AND CONDUCT, AND OF THE SENSE OF DUTY. C H. I . Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self- disapprobation 99- 102 C H. II . Of the Love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; 102- and of the Dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness 118 C H. III . Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience 118- 137 C H. IV . Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the Origin and Use of general Rules 137- 142 C H. V . Of the Influence and Authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity 142- 150 C H. VI . In what Cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole Principle of our Conduct; and in what Cases it ought to concur with other Motives 150- 158 P A R T IV OF THE EFFECT OF UTILITY UPON THE SENTIMENT OF APPROBATION. C H. I . Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility bestows upon all the Productions of Art, and of the extensive Influence of this Species of Beauty 158- 165 C H. II . Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility bestows upon the Characters and Actions of Men; and how far the Perception of this Beauty may be regarded as one of the original Principles of Approbation 165- 171 P A R T V OF THE INFLUENCE OF CUSTOM AND FASHION UPON THE SENTIMENTS OF MORAL APPROBATION AND DISAPPROBATION. C H. I . Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our Notions of Beauty and Deformity 171- 176 C H. II . Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments 176- 187 P A R T VI OF THE CHARACTER OF VIRTUE.—INTRODUCTION, 187. C. I . Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence 187- 192 C. II . Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the Happiness of other People—Introduction 192- 193 C H. I . Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our Care and Attention 193- 201 C H. II . Of the Order in which Societies are by Nature recommended to our Beneficence 201- 208 C H. III . Of universal Benevolence 208- 210 C. III . Of Self-command 210- 233 onclusion of the Sixth Part 233- 236 P A R T VII OF SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. C. I . Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments 236- 237 C. II . Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue—Introduction 237 C H. I . Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety 237- 260 C H. II . Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence 260- 265 C H. III . Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence 265- 271 C H. IV . Of licentious Systems 271- 278 C. III . Of the different Systems which have been formed concerning the Principle of Approbation—Introduction 279 C H. I . Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love 279- 281 C H. II . Of those Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation 282- 284 C H. III . Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation 285- 290 C. IV . Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the practical Rules of Morality 290- 304 ONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE F ORMATION OF L ANGUAGES 305- 325 ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS. E P RINCIPLES WHICH LEAD AND DIRECT P HILOSOPHICAL I NQUIRIES, AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE H ISTORY OF A STRONOMY 325- 326 S EC. I . Of the Effects of Unexpectedness, or of Surprise 326- 329 S EC. II . Of Wonder, or the Effects of Novelty 329- 337 S EC. III . Of the Origin of Philosophy 338- 342 S EC. IV . The History of Astronomy 342- 384 E P RINCIPLES WHICH LEAD AND DIRECT P HILOSOPHICAL I NQUIRIES, ILLUSTRATED BY THE H ISTORY OF THE A NCIENT P HYSICS 385- 395 E P RINCIPLES WHICH LEAD AND DIRECT P HILOSOPHICAL I NQUIRIES, ILLUSTRATED BY THE H ISTORY OF A NCIENT L OGICS AND M ETAPHYSICS 395- 405 F THE N ATURE OF THAT I MITATION WHICH TAKES PLACE IN WHAT ARE CALLED THE I MITATIVE A RTS 405 Part I ., 405-415. Part II ., 415-432. Part III 432- 434 F THE A FFINITY BETWEEN M USIC, D ANCING, AND P OETRY 435- 438 F THE E XTERNAL S ENSES 438- 439 Of the Sense of Touching, 439-444. Of the Sense of Tasting, 444-445. Of the Sense of Smelling, 445. Of the Sense of Hearing, 445-450. Of the Sense of Seeing 450- 468 F THE A FFINITY BETWEEN CERTAIN E NGLISH AND I TALIAN V ERSES 468- 473 THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS Part I .—Of the Propriety of Action. S E C . I . — O F T H E S E N S E O F P R O P R I E T Y C HAP. I .— Of Sympathy. H OW selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it. As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of