Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation This book examines the current debate on nuclear non- proliferation and disarma- ment, notably the international non-proliferation regime and how to implement its disarmament provisions. Discussing the requirements of a new international consensus on nuclear dis- armament and non-proliferation, this book builds on the three pillars of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT): non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It reviews the impact of Cold War and post- Cold War policies on current disarmament initiatives and analyses contemporary proliferation problems: how to deal with the states that never joined the NPT (India, Pakistan and Israel); how states that have been moving towards nuclear weapons have been brought back to non-nuclear-weapon status; and, in particu- lar, how to deal with Iran and North Korea. The analysis centres on the relation- ship between disarmament and non- proliferation in an increasingly multi-centric world involving China and India as well as the US, the European powers and Russia. It concludes with a description and discussion of three different worlds without nuclear weapons and their implications for nuclear-disarmament policies. This book will be of great interest to all students of arms control, strategic studies, war and conflict studies, and IR/security studies in general. Sverre Lodgaard is a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo. Routledge Global Security Studies Series editors: Aaron Karp, Regina Karp and Terry Teriff 1 Nuclear Proliferation and International Security Sverre Lodgaard and Morten Bremer Maerli 2 Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict Debating fourth-generation warfare Terry Terriff, Aaron Karp and Regina Karp 3 Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction Responding to the challenge Edited by Ian Bellany 4 Globalization and WMD Proliferation Edited by James A. Russell and Jim J. Wirtz 5 Power Shifts, Strategy and War Declining states and international conflict Dong Sun Lee 6 Energy Security and Global Politics The militarization of resource management Edited by Daniel Moran and James A. Russell 7 US Nuclear Weapons Policy After the Cold War Russians, “rogues” and domestic division Nick Ritchie 8 Security and Post- Conflict Reconstruction Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war Edited by Robert Muggah 9 Network Centric Warfare and Coalition Operations The new military operating systems Paul T. Mitchell 10 American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear Threat inflation since 9/11 Edited by A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer 11 Risk, Global Governance and Security The other war on terror Yee- Kuang Heng and Kenneth McDonagh 12 Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century The new disorder Stephen J. Cimbala 13 Political Economy and Grand Strategy A neoclassical realist view Mark R. Brawley 14 Iran and Nuclear Weapons Protracted conflict and proliferation Saira Khan 15 US Strategy in Africa AFRICOM, terrorism and security challenges Edited by David J. Francis 16 Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century Competing visions of world order Edited by Graeme P. Herd 17 The Globalisation of NATO Intervention, security and identity Veronica M. Kitchen 18 International Conflict in the Asia-Pacific Patterns, consequences and management Jacob Bercovitch and Mikio Oishi 19 Nuclear Proliferation and International Order Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Edited by Olav Njølstad 20 Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world? Sverre Lodgaard Nuclear Disarmament and Non- Proliferation Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world? Sverre Lodgaard First published 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2011 Sverre Lodgaard All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN13: 978-0-415-58634-4 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-84259-1 (ebk) This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. ISBN 0-203-84259-6 Master e-book ISBN Contents Abbreviations ix Introduction 1 PART I Power shifts and nuclear weapons 7 1 Power shifts and nuclear weapons 9 PART II The legacies of nuclear history and the requirements of a new consensus on non-proliferation and disarmament 41 2 The first nuclear era 43 3 Post- Cold War doctrines 53 4 A global consensus on non- proliferation and disarmament 76 PART III Proliferation problems and the role of nuclear disarmament 93 5 The three-state problem 95 6 Rollback experiences 115 7 Challenge from within: the case of Iran 133 viii Contents 8 How to understand North Korea 151 9 The relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation 168 PART IV Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world 193 10 Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world 195 Notes 223 References 239 Index 253 Abbreviations ABACC Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials ABM anti-ballistic missile ALCM air- launched cruise missile ANWFZ African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations BMD ballistic missile defence BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China BWC Biological Weapons Convention CBM confidence- building measures CD Conference on Disarmament CIA Central Intelligence Agency CPI Counter-Proliferation Initiative CTBT Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty CWC Chemical Weapons Convention DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea E3 Britain, France and Germany ECO Economic Cooperation Organisation EU European Union Euratom European Atomic Energy Community FMCT Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty G8 Group of eight leading industrial countries GCC Gulf Cooperation Council HEU highly enriched uranium HWR heavy- water reactor IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IBSA India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile ICJ International Court of Justice INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces INFCIRC Information Circular (IAEA) IRGC Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation LEU low- enriched uranium x Abbreviations LWR light- water reactor MAD mutually assured destruction MTCR missile technology control regime NAM non- aligned movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NFU no-first-use NGO non-governmental organisation NIE National Intelligence Estimate NNWS non-nuclear-weapon state(s) NPR Nuclear Posture Review NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group NWFW nuclear-weapon-free world NWFZ nuclear-weapon-free zone NWS nuclear-weapon state(s) P5 five permanent members of UN Security Council PASDARAN Iran Revolutionary Guards Corps PLA People’s Liberation Army (China) PSI Proliferation Security Initiative RevCon Review Conference (NPT) ROK Republic of [South] Korea SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SDI Strategic Defense Initiative SLBM submarine- launched ballistic missile SLCM sea- launched cruise missile SLOC Sea Line of Communication SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks SWF Sovereign Wealth Fund TLAM/N Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile/Nuclear TRR Teheran research reactor UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNMOVIC UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission (Iraq) VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties WMD weapons of mass destruction WMDFZ weapons- of-mass- destruction-free zone WTO World Trade Organisation Introduction When the Cold War drew to an end, the superpower leaders offered a vision of a world without nuclear weapons, in all earnest. They were heavily criticised both by their own establishments and by others, and the world was taken by surprise. Secretary of State George Shultz met the critics and proponents of status quo asking, “What’s so good about a world where you can be wiped out in thirty minutes?” On the twentieth anniversary of the 1986 Reagan–Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik, a group of former American statesmen revived the vision of a nuclear- weapon-free world (NWFW). The call was followed up by Barack Obama and leaders of other countries. In many parts of the world, states are waiting to see what comes of it. Elimination of nuclear weapons has been proposed before – the Baruch plan of 1946, the McCloy–Zorin proposal of 1961, the Reagan– Gorbachev attempt in Reykjavik in 1986, Rajiv Gandhi’s plan and plea before the UN General Assembly in 1988 – and those initiatives were short-lived. Will it fizzle out this time, too? Will the interests tied to nuclear weapon complexes hit back and reaffirm the relevance of nuclear arms? Mostly, other countries have not been negative, but they are cautiously waiting to assess the realism of it. Some take a grimmer view. They see the call as part of a double agenda, the real purpose of which is to sustain and enhance Western unilateral advantage. The synergies of disarmament and non-proliferation may stop smaller and weaker states from acquiring the “great equaliser” – a nuclear capability of their own – and new US conventional weapons that can instantly destroy targets all around the globe are more likely to be used than nuclear systems. In a world without nuclear arms, the United States may therefore be even more superior, for nobody can match its conventional strength. At low levels of offensive nuclear forces, improved US ballistic missile defences may, furthermore, create fears of first- strike capabilities. If the shield becomes increasingly effective, others may be threatened from a position of near impunity. Seen in one or more of these ways, nuclear disarmament is not a hallmark of progressive politics, but a change to maintain the dominance of the United States and the West. Change in order to preserve. The US unipolar moment was precisely that – a moment – yielding to a multi- centric world. Emerging powers wedded to state sovereignty, territorial integrity 2 Introduction and non-interference in internal affairs are changing the parameters of global geopolitics, and states in Asia, Africa and Latin-America cooperate more with each other to reduce their dependence on Western powers. Hence the debate about “the West and the World Without the West”. The systemic changes rede- fine fundamentally important questions of cooperation and conflict in interna - tional affairs. The role of nuclear weapons is embedded in international politics. Nuclear disarmament presupposes a cooperative approach to international security. Big power cooperation is of the essence; regional cooperation likewise. Disarmament initiatives must attend to the interests of the emerging powers and to the hopes, doubts and scepticisms of states on all continents: to be effective, the initiatives must be aligned with ongoing power shifts in the international system. Part I of this book tries to situate the functions of nuclear weapons in the context of sys - temic change, reviewing contemporary power shifts and geopolitical orientations and discussing their implications for nuclear disarmament (Chapter 1). The Cold War left important legacies that continue to influence nuclear weapon policies. Particularly noteworthy are the continuation of threat-based policies and nuclear deterrence doctrines, extended deterrence and policies of first- use included. President Clinton focused on the benefits of globalisation as much as on how to avert threats, but when the period of opportunity of the early 1990s was over, the politics of fear picked up again. To the extent that specific threats no longer sufficed to justify the maintenance of strong nuclear postures, they were arguably needed to defend against the unknown. In the mindset of the Cold War, uncertainties about the future had to be met by the strongest of weapons. Later, 9/11 put the terrorist threat up front; Saddam was turned into a threat beyond proportion; and Iran became a strong driver of threat-based pol- icies. The doctrines of nuclear deterrence therefore outlived the global rivalry and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union: they were adapted, but in essence maintained. Part II of the book starts with a review of these legacies (Chapter 2), followed by an examination of nuclear-weapon state (NWS) doctrines (Chapter 3). The obligation to disarm is inscribed in Art. VI of the NPT. Legally speaking, failure to take “effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament” does not necessarily amount to non- compliance by any particular state. Progress depends on the seriousness of all negotiating parties and is arguably beyond the powers of any single partici- pant. However, the political process that led to the NPT clarifies that Art. VI was conceived as part of a dynamic bargain to be implemented over time, erasing – in due course – the distinction between NWS and NNWS. Converging expecta - tions were created and a review mechanism was set up to facilitate abolition. Although no timeline was given, “cessation of the arms race at an early date ” left a sense of urgency. Art. VI therefore calls for negotiations in good faith. Attempts have been made to clarify the meaning of it and to make the commit- ments more explicit, binding and tangible. However, in the view of a great many parties to the Treaty, the results have been disappointing. Introduction 3 Another part of the grand bargain – the one in the title of the NPT: non- proliferation – has held up better than expected. In addition to the five NWS rec - ognised by the NPT, only four states have acquired nuclear weapons. Throughout the nuclear age, more than 20 states did “something” in the direction of a nuclear weapon capability at some point or other, but dropped the ambition or were stopped in their tracks. The first half of the 1990s was the golden age of non-proliferation: Russia became the sole heir of Soviet nuclear weapons; South Africa abandoned its weapons and joined the NPT; NPT membership increased considerably; the Conference of Disarmament agreed on a mandate for negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT); and by the time the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was convened, a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) was in sight. The US and Russian nuclear arsenals were significantly reduced. The Review Conference therefore came at the end of a period of good news, facilitating the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. At this point in time, non- proliferation seemed to be a winning proposition. That turned out to be flawed analysis. India, Pakistan and North Korea went on to test, and Iran became a state of growing proliferation concern. Proliferation concerns grew, disarmament negotiations came to a halt, big power relations deteriorated, and more functions were assigned to nuclear weapons in national military doctrines. The grand bargain from 1968 that led to the NPT came apart – until a new US government with high disarmament ambitions opened a new window of opportunity to revive it. Part II ends with an overview of the basic requirements of such a consensus (Chapter 4). Part III is devoted to the problems at the outskirts of the regime. It starts with an analysis of the three- state problem (India, Pakistan, Israel), and of the nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and India in particular (Chapter 5). It continues with a review and summary of lessons learnt from 27 cases of nuclear rollback, i.e. of states that have moved towards nuclear weapons at some time or other, but that dropped the ambition or were stopped in their tracks and rolled back to non-nuclear status (Chapter 6). The chapter reviews the explanatory power of realist assumptions and idealist perspectives, and con - cludes with a list of 16 propositions shedding light on what it may take to turn would- be proliferators back to non-nuclear status. These lessons are, in turn, used in analyses of the Iranian and North Korean problems (Chapters 7 and 8). Part III winds up with a discussion of the relationship between disarmament and non- proliferation (Chapter 9). In legal terms, the link between disarmament and non-proliferation is well established. More than anything else, the NPT review process has centred on the relationship between them, and the academic literature has excellent analyses of the subject. Therefore, the discussion in Chapter 9 is not conducted in the legal framework, but focuses on the political and military dimensions of the disarmament–non-proliferation relationship. Is disarmament important to align the three outliers to the non-proliferation regime? Is it important for purposes of rollback? Does it matter for North Korea and Iran? The other way around, how 4 Introduction important is non-proliferation for disarmament? How can the non-nuclear- weapon states (NNWS) contribute to nuclear disarmament by making their non- nuclear status more convincing? Special attention is paid to the distinction between disarmament as a process and disarmament as a state of affairs, and to the concept of rank disequilibrium, which appears to have strong explanatory power in cases like Iran and India. Looking ahead, the NPT is a regulatory mechanism for non-proliferation, dis- armament and peaceful uses all the way to zero. However, it says nothing about the precise meaning of zero and it is no more than a skeleton agreement, so new rules guiding the final approaches to a NWFW will be needed. This is the topic of the final Part of the book (Chapter 10), which starts with a discussion of the pros and cons of different versions of the vision. To what extent can a vision be a guide to action? All the way, due respect must be paid to the path dependency of nuclear disarmament. It would be pre- sumptuous to claim to know much about a world approaching zero: at that stage, the issues will be seen through lenses that are different from the contemporary ones. However, some force constellations are more dangerous than others, and much is known about the conditions of military stability. The chapter takes a closer look at their relevance for the structuring of nuclear disarmament, con- cluding with a concrete proposition regarding the final steps to a NWFW. The book is comprehensive in its coverage of disarmament and non- proliferation issues, but stays within the confines of the state paradigm. There is nothing about international terrorism. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy – the third pillar of the NPT – are referred to intermittently in some of the chapters, but not discussed at any length. The focus is on the other pillars: disarmament and non- proliferation. The notes and cross references are made in order to enable the readers to use single chapters without having to read the entire book. A preliminary version of Chapter 4 was presented at the Twentieth Anniver- sary Conference of Rajiv Gandhi’s disarmament speech at the United Nations in 1988 (Delhi, June 2008). Chapter 7 was first presented at the Nobel Symposium on “Peace, stability and nuclear order: Theoretical assumptions, historical experiences, future challenges”, Oscarsborg, Oslo, June 2009. Chapter 10 is a much expanded version of an article with the same title in Daedalus , Fall 2009. While working on the book I have been a visiting fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, Washington, DC), at the Tsinghua University (Beijing) and at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (Centre for Nuclear Studies (CNS), Monterey, California). I have benefited greatly from colleagues at all these places. My thanks go first of all to John Hamre, Li Bin and William Potter who hosted me and shared of their rich insights with me. I received financial support from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: I am grateful to Ambassador Kaare Aas, in particular, for his cooperation and encouragement in the early phases of the work. First of all, however, my gratitude goes to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), which I had the privilege to direct for ten years and which gave me optimal working conditions when I stepped down from the directorship. Introduction 5 I have benefited from comments by colleagues in many parts of the world – at conference tables and informally, in reference to conference papers and in free- wheeling discussions. I would like to thank Steven Miller, Oystein Noreng, Benoit Pelopidas, Leon Sigal, Nikolai Sokov and Aruni Wijewardane in particu- lar, for their inputs in the final stages of the work. The responsibility for the end result is mine alone. Like so many times before, Jan Risvik (NUPI) assisted me, competently and efficiently, language- wise and otherwise. Lala Kylycheva (CNS) assisted in the preparation of notes and references and in meeting other editorial requirements. Her professionalism and devotion has been impressive. Sverre Lodgaard Monterey and Oslo, March/April 2010 Part I Power shifts and nuclear weapons 1 Power shifts and nuclear weapons Disarmament, non-proliferation and the security environment Globalisation fosters interdependence and invites rule-based international insti- tutions. It raises the opportunity costs of hostilities and wars, and offers hope for a better-organised world where arms regulation is deemed to be in the common interest. However, state sovereignty remains a defining characteristic of the international system, and international organisations are usually asked to facili- tate cooperation between sovereign states. The security sector, in particular, is not bound by growing volumes of international interaction, but follows its own logic. At the beginning of the twentieth century, trade between European states was booming, but this did not prevent the First World War. Today, China is Japan’s largest market and Japan is China’s third largest, but they remain wary of each other as far as national security is concerned. Much the same applies to India and China. Growing interdependence has not led to political integration and the formation of security communities. The European Union, where eco- nomic cooperation did develop into political integration and cooperation on security and defence issues, is an exception in this respect. The framework conditions for nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation are further complicated by the ongoing shifts of power in the international system from the west to the east and south. The US hegemony is challenged. Histori- cally, such transitions have been fraught with tension. For the hegemon, the “second country” – the state that is next to it in the international power hierarchy – has been the main problem. If the “second country” is rising, it must be stopped in its tracks. Others watch such rivalries carefully, satisfied states rally - ing around the hegemon and dissatisfied ones tending to side with the challenger. For the US, the “second country” is primarily China. Even if the challenger aims at no more than equal status, what the hegemon sees is a trajectory that threatens to cross and overtake its own. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union said it aimed for no more than nuclear parity with the US, but the US had its eyes on capabilities that were rising faster than its own, leading to another round of intensified arms racing. China proceeds cautiously, stressing the peaceful nature of its development, while Americans debate their hedging