1 / 117 The Myth of NATO's Alleged No- Enlargement Pledge to Russia Introduction CHAPTER 1 : Origins of the Betrayal Narrative CHAPTER 2 : Declassified Conversations CHAPTER 3 : Understanding Diplomatic Negotiations CHAPTER 4 : Personal Memoirs CHAPTER 5 : Alleged US Security Guarantees Before the Treaty · Genscher’s Public Speech at Tutzing on 31 January 1990 · Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s Conversation with James Baker on 2 February 1990 · Genscher’s Conversation with Douglas Hurd on 6 February 1990 · James Baker’s Conversation with Eduard Shevardnadze on 9 February 1990 · James Bakers’ Conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev on 9 February 1990 · James Baker’s Letter to Kohl on 10 February 1990 · Helmut Kohl’s Conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev on 10 February 1990 · Douglas Hurd’s Conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev on 11 April 1990 · James Baker’s Report to President Bush on 4 May 1990 · Manfred Wörner’s Address in Brussels on 17 May 1990 · James Baker’s Conversation with Michael Gorbachev on 18 May 1990 2 / 117 · Francois Mitterrand’s Conversation with Michael Gorbachev on 25 May 1990 · Francois Mitterrand’s Letter to George Bush on 25 May 1990 · The Washington Summit on 31 May 1990 · Margaret Thatcher’s Conversation with Michael Gorbachev on 8 June 1990 · Gorbachev’s Conversations with Helmut Kohl on the 15th of July 1990 · George Bush’s Phone Call with Michael Gorbachev on the 17th of July 1990 CHAPTER 6: NATO’s Expansion was NOT a Topic of Discussion CHAPTER 7: Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany CHAPTER 8: An Agreed Minute CHAPTER 9: US Security Guarantees After the Treaty · The James Dobbins Cover Note of the 25th of October 1990 · Dobbins’ Revised NATO Strategy Paper for Discussion at a Sub-Ungroup Meeting on the 22nd of October 1990 · Ambassador Rodric Braithwaite’s Diary Entry on 5 March 1991 · The Russian Supreme Soviet Delegation’s Conversation with Manfred Woerner in June/July 1991 CHAPTER 10: Regarding NATO’s Political Transformation CHAPTER 11: 'Gorbachev’s Issue' with Germany's Membership in NATO CHAPTER 12: European Expansion of NATO Inconceivable in 1990 CHAPTER 13: The Turning Point for NATO Expansion in 1995 CHAPTER 14: The Myth Continues CHAPTER 15: Answering Putin CHAPTER 16: Answering Lavrov CHAPTER 17: Answering Primov 3 / 117 CHAPTER 18: Answering Matlock CHAPTER 19: Answering McNamara CHAPTER 20: Answering Cohen CHAPTER 21 : Answering Kiriakou CHAPTER 22: Answering Shifrinson CHAPTER 23: Answering Sharma CHAPTER 24: Answering Gates CHAPTER 25: Answering Adamishin CHAPTER 26: Summary Statement CHAPTER 27: The Professors CHAPTER 28: The Politicians CHAPTER 29: The Political Commentators CHAPTER 30: Moscow State University Frequently Asked Questions Observations Outstanding Footnotes References Introduction "The Kremlin claims the West broke a promise it made in the 1990s not to expand NATO and is now using this claim to justify threats to invade Ukraine." (Sauvage, 2022; DW News, 2022a) This "narrative of Western betrayal has featured prominently in Moscow’s rhetoric for decades." (Sauvage, 2022) Putin's Claims According to Russian President, Vladimir Putin (1952-), "NATO took advantage of Russian weakness after the collapse of the Soviet 4 / 117 Union to enlarge its east, in violation of promises allegedly made to Moscow by Western leaders." (Pifer, 2014) The West's supposed violation of a pledge not to enlarge NATO has long figured as a key element in Putin’s narrative about [and against] the military alliance. During his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Putin accused Western powers of violating a solemn pledge by considerably enlarging NATO – most notably with the Baltic countries joining the Alliance in 2004: “And we have the right to ask: against whom is this [NATO] expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our Western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? ... I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said, at the time that: ‘the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.’ Where are these guarantees?” (Snider, 2023; Sauvage, 2022; Pifer, 2014; The Washington Post, 2007) Putin returned to the subject in his March 18, 2014, Kremlin speech justifying Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea: “... they [Western leaders] have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed before us an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO’s expansion to the east, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders.” (Pifer, 2014) Adamishin’s Claims According to Anatolii Adamishin (1934-), who was Soviet deputy 5 / 117 foreign minister in 1990, “we were told during the German reunification process that NATO would not expand.’’ (Kramer, 2009a) Lavrov’s Claims According to Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov (1950-), the United States had “made a commitment not to expand NATO” and had “repeatedly broken this commitment ” in the years since. (Kramer, 2009b; Show, 2008) Primov’s Claims In 1997, “when it came to sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act – a treaty intended to finally establish a relationship between the alliance and Russia – Russia’s foreign minister, Yevgeni Primov, again raised the issue of Secretary Baker’s empty promises.” (The Military Show, 2023) In other words, “There seems to be a lingering belief in Moscow, that the West tricked the former Soviet Union by breaking promises made in 1989 and 1990, at the end of the Cold War, prompting Putin to accuse the West of going back on its assurances that NATO would not expand to the East, ultimately shattering this alleged agreement.” (The Military Show, 2023) This idea also found its way to the United States. Matlock’s Claims 6 / 117 According to Jack F. Matlock Jr (1929-) , former U.S. ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1990, Gorbachev received a ‘‘clear commitment that if Germany united, and stayed in NATO, the borders of NATO would not move eastward.’ ’ (Kramer, 2009a) McNamara’s Claims According to former U.S. Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara (1916-2009), ‘‘the United States pledged never to expand NATO eastward if Moscow would agree to the unification of Germany.’’ (Kramer, 2009a) Cohen’s Claims According to Dr. Stephen F. Cohen (1938-2020), former Professor of Politics at Princeton University, “NATO expansion represents the following to Russia: ... It represents a profoundly broken promise to Russia, made by the first Bush, that in return for a united Germany, NATO would not expand eastward. This is beyond any dispute. People say, ‘Well they never signed a treaty’. But a deal is a deal. The United States gave its word, unless you are shysters. And ‘if you don’t get it in writing, we will cheat you’? We broke our word. And when Putin and Medvedev say, publicly, to Madeleine Albright and others, ‘We, Russia, feel deceived and betrayed’, that’s what they are talking about.” (Cohen, 2010) Kiriakou’s Claims 7 / 117 According to former CIA intelligence officer and whistle-blower, John Kiriakou (1964-), “When Putin first became president he floated the idea of Russia joining NATO. And Clinton’s said, Ýeah, we do not really like that idea very much.’ So he [Putin] said, ‘OK, if you don’t let Russia into NATO, at least don’t allow any of the countries on our border to join NATO.’ And Clinton said, ‘that we can agree too.’ Next thing you know, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland, all joined NATO, directly on the Russian border. And he [Putin] is like, ‘Hey, you promised us, that you would not let any of these countries join NATO.’ [To which Clinton responded] Áh, sorry we changed our minds, you know strategic planning and all.’ Then when Obama becomes president, at a Summit with Putin, Putin said ‘I spoke with Clinton years ago, about Russia joining NATO, it is something that we would like to explore.’ And Obama said, ’We don’t think that is going to happen.’ And he [Putin] said, ‘ÓK, well you guys lied to me about these other countries joining NATO, so don’t allow Ukraine to join NATO. This is gonna be a serious problem otherwise.’ And he [Obama] is like, ‘ÓK ok, we won’t.’ And then Joe Biden becomes president, and he’s like ‘Oh you know Ukraine would be a great addition to the NATO union.’ And the Russians said, ‘We had enough.’” (Veil of State, 2025) Shifrinson’s Claims According to Dr. Joshua Shifrinson, Professor of International Relations at Boston University, “The U.S. broke its assurances and these commitments that had been made... In February of 1990, in a series of meetings, U.S. and West German leaders very openly said that if the Soviet leadership consented to German reunification, and unified Germany remaining in NATO, then NATO would not expand 8 / 117 one inch to the East.” (DW News, 2022a) Shifrinson also claimed, that “nothing was written down” (DW News, 2022a) Gates’ Claims Likewise, Former CIA Director Robert Gates (1943-) criticised the U.S. for “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.” (Gates, 2000; Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017) Sachs’ Claims According to American economist, Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, “In 2007, Putin made the right speech in Munich, where he said that [Soviet President Mikhail] Gorbachev was promised in 1990 that NATO would not expand, that U.S. Secretary of State [James] Baker promised that NATO would not move an inch east.” (Dunda, 2024) In other words, Sachs is of the opinion that Putin spoke the truth, when during his speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Putin accused Western powers of violating a solemn pledge by considerably enlarging NATO. Finally, this idea also found its way to India. Sharma's Claims According to Indian news anchor, Palki Sharma, it was during the 1990 discussions surrounding the reunification of Germany, that “Mikhail Gorbachev had one condition: that NATO must not expand eastward, that it must not enter Russia’s security sphere. The U.S. officials agreed, but the terms were never written down. You could 9 / 117 argue that this was a mistake. Until a promise is codified it means nothing really. Having said that, a betrayal is a betrayal.” (WION, 2022) What all of these folks have in common is the belief that “the Clinton administration reneged on that commitment ... when it decided to expand NATO to Eastern Europe.” (Kramer, 2009a) Is that true? Let us take a closer look. Origins of the Betrayal Narrative “Much of the controversy about this issue stems from a few conversations held in the first half of February 1990, just after the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The talks took place amidst unprecedented political manoeuvring in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), where parliamentary elections were due to be held on March 18, 1990. Of particular relevance are the conversations between Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990 and a conversation between West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Gorbachev the following day. Also of great importance are the talks between Kohl and Gorbachev in Moscow and Stavropol in July 1990.” (Kramer, 2009a) and the “comments recorded by the journalists Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott” (Kramer, 2009a) According to Shifrinson (DW News, 2022a) and Sharma (WION, 2022) these conversations were never written down. That is FALSE These conversations were, in fact, recorded. 10 / 117 If it was true, that these diplomatic conversations took place, during which “promises” were made, yet nothing was written down (DW News, 2022a; WION, 2022), and no treaty was ever signed (Cohen, 2010), how could Cohen, Shifrinson and Sharma possibly know anything about the terms and conditions of these alleged “promises” - or did they simply take Putin’s word for it?! Declassified Conversations “Logs of those conversations have since been declassified” (DW News, 2022a), that is, “the American, German, and Russian records from these, as well as other talks and meetings pertaining to German reunification, have become available.” (Kramer, 2009a) 1 These declassified conversations, which we will be discussing in chapter 5, were made available online via the National Security Archive (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017); National Security Archive, n.d.a, n.d.e, n.d.f, n.d.h, n.d.i, n.d.j, n.d.k, n.d.l, n.d.m, n.d.n, n.d.o, n.d.p, n.d.q, n.d.r, n.d.s, n.d.t, n.d.u, n.d.v; Nitze, 1990), etc. Understanding Diplomatic Negotiations “Understanding the twists and turns of these negotiations is crucial to understanding today’s contested narratives.” (Goldgeier, 2019) On the one hand, Putin and Lavrov, along with their apologists Blanton, Cohen, Gates, Savranskaya, Shifrinson, Sharma and others, would have us believe that the proposals, made during these negotiations, should be considered promissory. 11 / 117 According to Dr. Shifrinson, despite the fact that “Nothing was written down ... Political understandings and commitments of this sort, diplomatic commitments, carry a lot of water in politics. This is how we ended the Cuban missile crisis. And if it didn’t matter, why would we have diplomats talk to each other?” (DW News, 2022a) On the other hand, James Baker (1930-), Steven Pifer (1953-), Philip Zelikow (1954-), Kramer and myself, deny that the proposals, made during these negotiations, could be framed as promissory “diplomatic commitments”, since: According to Kohl, these discussions were “developing dynamically” (National Security Archive, n.d.f) According to Gorbachev, they were ‘playing around with ideas, weighing it from various points of view’ (National Security Archive, n.d.f) At one point Gorbachev even suggested, that he and “Mr. Federal Chancello” , that is Helmut Kohl (1930-2017), “play around” with the idea that “one part of the state was in NATO, and the other in the WTO.” (National Security Archive, n.d.f) By 6 February 1990, during Genscher’s meeting with Douglas Hurd, Genscher wasn’t quite sure “whether the GDR would get through to the elections on 18 March” (National Security Archive, n.d.h), and “did not believe what Madrow said about German neutrality reflected his master’s voice.” (National Security Archive, n.d.h) Likewise, Hurd was unsure as to “the Soviet position” , inquiring of Genscher, “How did they now stand on the presence of their troops in the GDR and US troops in the FRG?” (National Security Archive, n.d.h) Hurd also confirmed that “there were several areas where the Allies and partners needed to get into discussion, namely over NATO, Community membership, Four Power issues and the 12 / 117 CSCE.” (National Security Archive, n.d.h), and that they had to “begin to think about these questions even if [they] could not yet take discussions forward.” (National Security Archive, n.d.h) Also on the 6th of February, while reporting back to President Bush on the discussions of some 120 representatives from eastern and western Europe attending the “Forum for Germany”, US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Nitze (1907-2004), stated that while during “the first day of the conference, the majority view appeared to be, that [German] unification would and should take time” , that “an agreement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO would be required” , that such an agreement would include “the withdrawal of both East and West troops from a unified Germany” , and that “If the Warsaw Pact were dissolved, NATO would also be dissolved.” (Nitze, 1990), “At the end of the conference, the consensus view had radically changed.” (Nitze, 1990) By 9 February 1990, during Baker’s conversation with Shevardnadze, Baker repeatedly referred to his ‘feelings’ and what he was ‘thinking’ about, ‘raising possibilities’ , ‘exploring certain points’ , and making ‘suggestions’ , while being “all for a discussion on this” . (National Security Archive, n.d.i) By 9 February 1990, during Baker’s conversation with Gorbachev, Baker was still not sure whether the Soviet Union would favour a U.S. military presence in Europe, following German unification. “All our allies and East Europeans we have spoken to have told us that they want us to maintain a presence in Europe. I am not sure whether you favor that or not.... would you prefer a united Germany outside of NATO that is independent and has no US forces or would you prefer a united Germany with ties to NATO and assurances that there would be no extension of NATO’s current jurisdiction eastward?” (National Security Archive, n.d.j) 13 / 117 By 11 April 1990, Gorbachev himself still “doubted whether the Supreme Soviet would agree to Germany being part of NATO.” (National Security Archive, n.d.k) By 25 May 1990, during Mitterrand’s conversation with Gorbachev, Gorbachev was still “playing around” with ideas, like “establishing cooperation between the WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization] and NATO” (National Security Archive, n.d.o) where “a United Germany would not belong only to the WTO or only to NATO” (National Security Archive, n.d.o), or alternatively that, like France at the time, a “united Germany could be a member of the political organization of NATO, but not a part of its military structures.” (National Security Archive, n.d.o) By 31 May 1990, at the conclusion of the Washington Summit, Gorbachev suggested that when asked “if our positions moved closer, [the participants] could say that we had a serious and useful exchange of opinions, and that now we understand each other’s approaches and positions better. Besides that we could add that during the discussion we proposed ideas, which require additional consideration.” (National Security Archive, n.d.p) By 8 June 1990, Powell reported that during Thatcher’s conversation with Gorbachev, it became clear that “Gorbachev’s views on Germany and NATO” were “obviously still evolving.” (National Security Archive, n.d.q), since even by the end of this conversation, “Gorbachev said that he could support most of what the Prime Minister had said.” (National Security Archive, n.d.q) That “by talking things through, he felt that they were making progress.” (National Security Archive, n.d.q) That “they should agree to put their Foreign Ministers to work on these new concepts and try and come up with a coherent formula.” (National Security Archive, n.d.q) 14 / 117 By 15 July 1990, when discussions surrounding a treaty between the Soviet Union and a unified Germany kicked off, Gorbachev made it very clear that his suggestions were “not [even] a draft” . And, likewise, Kohl made it very clear that his suggestions were his “own thoughts” , and therefore “not submitted for discussion to the federal government.” (National Security Archive, n.d.r) And it was Gorbachev who at this point suggested that “as we are preparing the treaty, we must take reciprocal steps, clarify positions so there are no misunderstandings. Some positions have already crystallized, the rest can be worked through.” (National Security Archive, n.d.r) And this , to answer Shifrinson (DW News, 2022a), is exactly “why diplomats talk to each other” , namely to exchange opinions, ascertain positions, discuss options, and solidify decisions. Anybody, who would suggest that any proposal made during these exchanges should be considered promissory by default, are clueless as to the processes (and protocols) of diplomatic relations, as well as the content of these discussions, which we will be reviewing in chapter 5. While it is true that the 13-day Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, were largely resolved through diplomatic discussions, the discussions themselves were never considered "diplomatic commitments" , as Shifrinson would have us believe. (DW News, 2022a) The U.S.'s diplomatic commitments were codified in a formal letter from President Kennedy to Khrushchev, accepting the implicit terms of his October 26 letter [a U.S. non-invasion pledge in exchange for the verifiable departure of Soviet nuclear missiles]. (Hershberg, 1995) 15 / 117 That said, diplomats do not have the authority to make promises, or sign agreements, on behalf of their state without proper authorisation. Track One Diplomacy is governed by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as well as Customary International Law, ensuring that any agreements are binding and reflect the official position of the states involved. Finally, IF all of the proposals, contained within these recorded conversations, were to be considered promissory "diplomatic commitments" , every one of the participants would be guilty of numerous "broken promises" , including the Soviet Union. Yet, Shifrinson would have us believe, that despite never working as a diplomat, he understands these processes, protocols and conversations, better than the experienced diplomats involved (DW News, 2022a), namely James Baker (1930-), Steven Pifer (1953-), Philip Zelikow (1954-), and Gorbachev himself. Personal Memoirs Apart from the declassified conversations, “nearly all of the major participants in the high-level diplomacy that led to German reunification have written memoirs, which collectively enrich the declassified records and fill in key gaps.” (Kramer, 2009a) 2 As with all memoirs, these books need to be used with caution and to be cross-checked against declassified documents and against other memoirs. (Kramer, 2009b) Sources of Clarity 16 / 117 Together, the recent declassifications and personal memoirs “finally allows for clarification on the basis of contemporaneous records” (Kramer, 2009a), since “they show what Soviet politicians were told by western leaders like German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl; NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Woerner; and the famous words of U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, ‘not once inch to the east’...” (DW News, 2022a) Alleged US Security Guarantees Before the Treaty According to Dr. Savranskaya, Dr. Blanton, and others, the declassified “discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and ... subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.” (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017) While it is true, that at least Genscher’s personal suggestion “about not wanting to extend NATO” (National Security Archive, n.d.h), and Mitterrand’s personal wish to “gradually dismantling the military blocs” (National Security Archive, n.d.o), “applied to other states beside the GDR” (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017), none of the conversations promised to limit NATO’s expansion, as will be demonstrated below. That said, let us take a closer look at Shifrinson’s “great question of what was and was not promised in 1990.” (DW News, 2022a) Genscher’s Public Speech at Tutzing on the 31st of January 1990 17 / 117 The first “concrete” evidence cited by Savranskaya and Blanton, derives from a major public speech on German unification by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on 31 January 1990, during which Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’” and that, “Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’” (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017) In other words, they believe that Gorbachev was “misled about NATO’s expansion” (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017), because Genscher was of the opinion that NATO should rule out expanding closer to the Soviet border. That is TRUE, but Genscher’s “proposal” (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017) or “vision” (National Security Archive, n.d.g), that NATO “should” rule out any expansion of its territory towards the east, can in no way be misconstrued as a “promise” from NATO, that they “would” rule out expanding towards the east. Genscher did not speak for NATO. And proposals are not promises. While individual member states can make statements or take positions, these do not automatically become the official position of NATO, unless they are agreed upon by all members through the North Atlantic Council, which is the principal decision-making body within NATO. (Wikipedia, n.d.l) 18 / 117 That said, when Genscher suggested, that “NATO should rule out an expansion of its territory towards the east” (National Security Archive, n.d.g), he was referring to [the German Democratic Republic (GDR) [East Germany], that is, “any attempt to extend ‘NATO military structures’ to the territory of today’s GDR” (National Security Archive, n.d.g) Genscher’s concern was that “any attempt [or suggestion] to extend ‘NATO military structures’ to the territory of today’s GDR, would block German unity.” (National Security Archive, n.d.g), since that would be considered an “impairment of Soviet security interests” While reasonable, Genscher’s fears were quickly dispelled, when during his May 25 th conversation with Mitterrand, Gorbachev made it very clear, that the Soviet Union were “not against an American presence in Europe” (National Security Archive, n.d.o), since “their presence [was] necessary” (National Security Archive, n.d.o), because “it [was] already widely understood that there is a need for some kind of center for the prevention of crisis situations in Europe” (National Security Archive, n.d.o), and even expressed the possibility of the Soviet Union joining NATO. (National Security Archive, n.d.q) It is also important to note, that Genscher’s speech at Tutzing was followed by nine months of negotiations, which resulted in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany and an “Agreed Minute” (National Security Archive, n.d.b), which allowed a reunified Germany, with NATO membership, to deploy foreign NATO troops, within the former GDR [East Germany], at their own discretion. 19 / 117 Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s Conversation with James Baker on the 2nd of February 1990 Savranskaya and Blanton also cited a conversation between Genscher and Baker on the 2 nd of February 1990], during which Genscher said that under his plan “NATO would not extend its territorial coverage to the area of the GDR nor anywhere else in Eastern Europe.” (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017) In other words, they believe that Gorbachev was “misled about NATO’s expansion” (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017), because Genscher suggested that NATO should not expand into the GDR [East Germany], or anywhere else in Eastern Europe. Again, as Savranskaya and Blanton themselves confirmed, this was Genscher’s plan. (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017; Secretary of State to US Embassy Bonn, 1990) Genscher did not speak for NATO. And proposals are not promises. While individual member states can make statements or take positions, these do not automatically become the official position of NATO, unless they are agreed upon by all members through the North Atlantic Council, which is the principal decision-making body within NATO. (Wikipedia, n.d.l) It is also important to note, that Genscher’s conversation with Baker was followed by nine months of negotiations, which resulted in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany and an 20 / 117 “Agreed Minute” (National Security Archive, n.d.b), which allowed a reunified Germany, with NATO membership, to deploy foreign NATO troops, within the former GDR [East Germany], at their own discretion. Genscher’s Conversation with Douglas Hurd on the 6th of February 1990 Savranskaya and Blanton also cited Douglas Hurd’s conversation with Hans-Dietrich Genscher on the 6 th of February 1990, wherein Genscher suggested that “The Russians must have some assurance that if, for example, the Polish Government left the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join NATO the next.” (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017) In other words, they believe that Gorbachev was “misled about NATO’s expansion” (Savranskaya & Blanton, 2017), because Genscher suggested that the Russians should have assurances that when countries leave the Warsaw Pact, they would not join NATO. While it is TRUE, that “Genscher ... talked about not wanting to extend NATO that applied to other states beside the GDR” (National Security Archive, n.d.h), Genscher’s wishes should not be mistaken for NATO’s position. While individual member states can make statements or take positions, these do not automatically become the official position of NATO, unless they are agreed upon by all members through the North Atlantic Council, which is the principal decision-making body within NATO. (Wikipedia, n.d.l)