1 Astructuralism Value and Valuation 23/08/2026 - 0 6 /09 /2026 , 16/10/2026 - 1 8 /10/2026 1 – The Phenomenon of Value Value, irrespective of the context in which the term is used, certainly is a bizarre phenomenon. It applies to a vast number of distinct and seemingly unrelated cases , such that its general definition in use is either extraordinarily broad or extraordinarily blurry. An individual could be said to 'value' a relationship . They hold it close to their heart. They may make personal sacrifices for either the other individual or for the sake of the social bond between them selves and the other individual. They may value it for associated feelings of emotional stability , or simply for the longevity of the relationship such as one between childhood friends. They may value it for personal benefit, or apparent feelings of platonic or romantic love, or for sex, or whatever one's mind responds positively (or for the more masochistically aligned, negatively) to. Regardless of the circumstances, regardless of whether we interpret the relationship to be beneficial to either party, or whether it appears to cause either party harm, it can sti ll be said to be valued. W ithin common usage, value does not merely apply to individuals either. A community may value a particular tradition or holiday. The discussed connotations apply to this as well , with a potential added bonus of immense social pressure from those around you to participate . Value also extends further than purely social activities and relationships . A community may also value gold or platinum or other such pretty metals when times are affluent, or perhaps value food significantly more following several failed harvests and a neighbouring war making food imports borderline impossible. The value of material is not necessarily a social phenomenon either. Even within the same community, given a relative absence of starvation, an individual may value rice over bread – their taste buds prefer the individual grains over a single , airy 2 dough. Individual #2 however might enjoy the sensation of a soft white bloomer on their tongue and would therefore value bread over rice . An interesting thing to note here is that in the case of material value, value has an ability to cause items to be ranked preferentially and, upon the introduction of exchange, with regards to each other despite the items potentially being radically different in terms of function, scarcity, necessity, or in other such factors . Someone might say that one loaf of bread is equivalent in value to six hundred grains of rice , or that one 16GB stick of DDR5 RAM is equivalent in value to two kidneys and a lung . What might be considered even more interesting, is that this equivalence, one which is partially influenced by individual preference, can be accepted and mediated by all of society. Value can even be extended to include more abstract notions, such as the value of moral propositions , the value of life, language, experience and truth. Again, this is still considered a matter of value. The exa ct same term is utilised across each of these different scenarios and situations. The idea of numerically comparing the value of life to that of truth is, at best, uncomfortable. Is it worth taking someone's life in order to preserve truth? What is this worth dependent on? Is there a certain threshold of truth - value or life - value after which the answer to the question changes? A question like this is by no means a simple one to answer. A CIA task force may spend days agonising over such a question : "Do we kill the spy? Is th eir life more valuable than the truths which they hold? We must make a decision at some point!" , and yet we will readily make such valuations and distinctions regarding other forms of the supposedly identical phenomenon which is value. We would readily (yet regrettably) spend the two kidneys and a lung needed for a precious, precious stick of DDR5, and value our close familial , romantic or sexual relationships over those of an acquaintance we occa sionally chat to about the weather, or the stock market, or other such trivial matters , in an instant . The single word that is value clea rly is not always applied in the same ways. It clearly has several meanings , several potential contexts, several connotations and effects and influences. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume (or at the very least explore the idea) that what we call "value", is actually an aggregation of several distinct p henomena, each of which carry different functions and uses , each of which needing to be investigated regarding their apparent independence before our discussion of value as either one or as a set of phenomena is able to continue. 3 2 – The Apparent Forms of Value As we have established, value appears to contain several distinct notions of itself. We have already touched on the differences between each of these forms to some degree, but it is worth establishing provisionally, only for the sake of this investigation, exactly what each form constitutes. Potentially the most common use of "value" in description is that which relates to material items , such as the aforementioned kidneys, bread, rice and DDR5 RAM. This specific "mode" of value, that which allows commensuration of such goods , so that n of x is worth m of y , is best described as economic value. The exact nature of this value has been debated frequently throughout history, most notably in Karl Marx's Das K apital , however this is largely irrelevant to the conversation at this time. What is important is that economic value , in some way, shape or form, exists and e xert s some influence on the individual and society. The commensurative effect of economic value does not appear to translate quite so easily to other apparent forms . The CIA taskforce will not say that a given truth is worth a given number of lives and hence we must distinguish the notion of value regarding truth, life, and other such concepts , from that of economic value. Value, in these senses, tends to regard what is right, correct, worthy, or desirable, and hence will be designated as normative value Normative value also seemingly has the distinction of being largely reliant on universal claims, especially regarding that of the value of life or related concepts . For the taskforce to be sure of their claim that, as per usual, the spy must be killed as their life is not worth the truth which they now understand, they must be asserting that the life of the spy is universally le ss valuable to those who their death may concern, than the truth is to those who would benefit from a knowledge of it. However, not all immaterial forms of value necessarily involve any sort of universal assertion, such as the value held by individuals in their relationships, or perhaps in sentimental items. Such items are valuable for one's own life, in terms of an individual's emotional state, their health, or feelings of security . This "holistic value" is different to the Normative value which we have discussed. On the other hand, an immaterial form of value may make some form of universal assertion which does not concern what is right or correct. A mode of value which takes a social form t hat, while possibly applied 4 to physical objects, does not exist within a sole individual's perception of said object. Instead, it is applied by society as a whole. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is money, however the value of several actions, items and phenomena are equally produced by society. Power, communication, movement and sex are all, in some way, valued socially in addition to any economic, normative, holistic, or object - attracted value which they provide. V alue which is attached to objects can be further divided into two forms. The first of which being instrumental value. The value of such an item arises and is dependent on from its status as a mea ns to causing or producing something else A hammer may be valuable to an individual who wishes to put a nail in a board or break the kneecaps of an unfortunate rival. It may not , however, be valuable to a worker who needs to mend a crack in the pavement . This differs from the notion of intrinsic value, an object which has value simply by its status, or nature, as an object. It is difficult to conceive of such an object without involving another form of value which has already been established. Gold, in an offhand comment, may be described as valuable simply because, without further thought, it simply appears to be. However, upon closer inspection , its value really comes from a combination of social value and holistic value. This does not mean though that we should reject intrinsic value outright. After all, we can say precisely the same thing about any other object. A relationship seems to hold primarily holistic value; however, it is undeniable that relationships, in particular those of a certain form ( cis het monogamous romantic relationships ) do hold some form of social value, as well as often pertaining to instrumental value. It is therefore wrong to say, even though we have been able to distinguish certain forms of value from each other, that these forms are entirely independ ent and hence relate to totally different concepts, rather than a single term: value. This is precisely why we cannot reject intrinsic value outright either, it may exist independently of us. It could, in theory, be impossible for us to conceive, and instead have its existence expressed through other f orms of value which are intelligible to us. I do not believe this to be the case, but that cannot be determined alone from differentiating forms of value from each other. In fact, no theoretical form of val ue can necessarily be rejected purely from these differentiations alone. It is quite likely that the list we have constructed is not 5 comprehensive and is missing several potential distinct forms from those which we have already discussed. And yet, it is still quite likely that these theoretical unexplored forms will not entirely constitute the apparent value of a given object or relation. No matter what, we cannot deny that , despite its vast potential contextualisation and connotations, there is some reason why we classify each of these forms of value as value . We seemingly cannot stipulate its definition based purely on how it differs from other things which we call value. This should not mean though, that we continue to use the exceedingl y broad definition of value found in day - to - day life. There clearly are different forms of value, which still act and function differently from one another. Therefore, it is worth investigating value not simply through the forms it takes, but through the processes which generate such forms: valuation. 3 – Evaluative Process es Attempting to determine what value is metaphysically, be it an intrinsic property of an object, an arbitrary construct, or a functional relationship between objects, is impossible at the current state of the discussion which we have established . Doing so would require several loaded ontological claims that do not need defending currently. This essay should not become a neurotic pile of jargon and shit . After all, we are only investigating value. A superior methodology with which we will determine the nature of value, assu ming that there is a nature of value , is one of change and process. This forces us to consider what actually happens upon valuation of an item. First and foremost, the valuation of an item immediately distinguishes it from the objects around it. In order to be aware of the value of an item, in any form which we have discussed , it must be differentiated from the items around it or the items related to it. We distinguish acquaintances from friends and friends from family and so on and so forth , and apply value to each of them accordingly. We are able to value rice over bread or DDR5 RAM over a kidney because we are aware of the diff erences between the two items and are then able to va lue them accordingly . This reveals to us another function of valuation , that being the ability to rank alternatives according to it. This naturally extends itself to other individuals recognising or contesting said ranking, which then 6 transforms itself into the social and institutional valuations we have discussed, such as money , or power, or relationships. Furthermore, valuation may influence future behaviour. If we value rice over bread, then if we are forced to decide between acquiring or preserving the two, we would naturally be inclined to choose the rice. This is not necessarily reliant on a specific reason. We may prefer the taste of the bread to the rice and hence, in an offhand comment, refer to the bread as more valuable to us than the rice, however ultimately if we do decide to choose the rice , it would imply a greater value. For example, it may be more nutritionally beneficial. It may also have a subcon scious or unexpressed form of value associated with it. This should not be interpreted to mean though that value will always inform action. Rational action is a separate debate, and assuming that it automatically follows from whatever constitutes our cognition and decision - making without prior discussion is naive. However, our interpretations of value do align closely enough with corresponding actions such that it is fair to assume value does influence our action. Again, this is by no means a comprehensive list of the functions of value. However, it does provide several insights into what va lue actually is. It is inseparable from (although not necessarily intrinsic to) cognition , as in, the effects it brings require a form of differentiation and recognition Nevertheless, it continues to produce practical and social consequences beyond our recognition of its existence . Therefore, value as a form that we can interact with cannot be understood as a static entity which acts and produces independently of cognition and interpretation, but rather as the subject of a process through which items acquire the significance to us which we have depicted earlier in this essay. The question regarding w hether this process itself reveals ontological value, produces it objectively, or produces it contingently, remains unanswered. 4 – The Valuer Clearly, value has a number of effects and related processes, many of which appearing to act contingently on our own interpretations of value, conscious or 7 otherwise. It would be quite easy (too easy, I would argue) to then go on to say that value i tself is therefore produced contingently. For example, there are several apparent features of value, some of which we have discussed alread y and some of which we are yet to tackle. For example, the ease at which institutions appear to encode value into certain relations , such as the aforementioned items of money, sex, power and such, may be interpreted as an indication that value is largely intrinsic, and we do in fact only discover it. Similarly, some item s appear to be consistently valuable. Food has always been valuable, shelter has always been valuable, emotional comfort has always been valuable. Again, the consistency at which these specific relations of value appear to a rise may indicate that these items and relations have an encoded value. Why else would they remain so stable, despite the grand shifts in society which we have seen over time? Perhaps one way of determining the deeper nature of value is to work backwards; to assume that we have an object which is valued by an individual in certain ways, alongside a generic constructed world a round it, with other individuals, items and the like. We can remove elements of this world one at a time, and see which parts, if any, of our formulation of value appear to persist. I have an apple. This apple has value because, at the very least, I value this apple. Why do I value it, you might ask? It is simple. It is tasty , and it makes me happy when I eat it. It therefore has holistic value; my emotional state im proves upon eating the apple . Yummers . The apple also provides me with energy and nutrients. It lets me live for longer , it lets me keep doing the things I enjoy doing in my free time, and it therefore also holds some element of instrumental value. Its ho listic value is also potentially compounded by this; people might themselves find their emotional state is benefited by my continued existence, or at the very least the absence of my death. So yes, the apple certainly does have value in this scenario. Let us first remove my valuing of the apple by applying two new constraints to this imaginary world. Firstly, I do not like applies. They taste absolutely fucking awful. I would rather gouge my eyes out with a teaspoon than come within a foot of one of those be astly, blasphemous fruits. Secondly, I do not need the apple. There is now also a second food, which is significantly more nutritionally beneficial and 8 calorically dense than the apple is, to the extent at which it is able to sustain me for a considerable length of time – a great enough length of time such that I will never need that apple specifically. It appears as though now all the value which we have just applied to the apple no longer ex ists. Does this mean that the apple therefore no longer has any value? Possibly not. Someone else in our imaginary apple world might also love apples , and that same person might also be on the brink of starvation. The only food which co uld possibly save them from their imminent death is the magical valuable apple. So long as they know of the existence of the apple, or are even able to conceive the existence of such an apple, they can apply value to the apple in quite the same way that we did not long ago. Therefore the existence of a value for the apple, or any item for that matter, is not necessarily merely dependent on a single individual's interpretation or potential use for it, but rather the existence of any individual who holds such a use. This should not be mistaken to imply anything regarding the ontological nature of value necessarily though , since we have not yet established anything objective regarding its nature. The f act that an item may have value to a single agent does not mean that this value exists independently of an agent with said value also applying to the item relative to said agent. This idea of the value existing independently of an agent and still applying to them can be tested further with our imaginary world by removing any knowledge of the apple, along with any potential conception of the apple's existence. Now, absolutely nobody wants the apple. Nobody is viewing it as tasty and holistically valuable , and nobody is viewing it as instrumentally valuable because to understand its use as food one must first know of its existence. Just to reiterate, nobody knows of its existence. Does the apple only now lose its value? Again, possibly not. Someone, at any point in time, may learn of the existence of the apple, and its delicious crisp flavour, and the shit - inducing dietary fibre in its glistening skin. If the potential for its value is enough for it to be valued, then the apple will indeed always have that value. However, this is somewhat circular. Ultimately the value of the apple is still dependent on the cognition of an agent and therefore it is impossible to assert value as anything more than immanent and contingent through this line of argument – the most fundamental explanation being posited here for value is purely epistemic and conditional, not ontological. 9 Alternatively, however, we might say that it is not valuable until someone values it. This is in line with the conclusion that we have just drawn, and whilst not definitively provable either way currently, it at the very least does not contradict any of th e properties of value which we have established so far unlike the attempted previous objective conclusion. There is still one way here for value to persist, and that is the mere capacity of the apple to satisfy a need, irrespective of whether an individual recognises it. This is what was meant by our previous brief discussion of intrinsic value. It is value that exists independently of us, and is expressed through other, apparently contingent, forms of value. Again, this does not prove the nature of value as being one way or the other, however it is a useful constraint for later discussion. These conclusions are further confirmed by even further extensions of t he experiment. Instead of only removing individuals who can conceive of an apple, we should remove all being s who are capable of valuing an item from existence. Upon doing so and subsequently asking whether anything retains value in such a universe. If we say that items do, then we continue towards the "satisfaction of a need" form of objective value , where the actual ability of objects interacting with one another is what provides value irrespective of a human observer (or otherwise). If we say that items do not retain value, then we continue down the path of contingent and relational value. This specific form of the experiment also however raises another potential conclusion, that being the idea that the question itself no longer makes sense. Value is dependent on valuing beings in the first place. This arguably collapses back into "value is created contingently" however, so we will not pursue a discussion of it. 5 – The Valued The experiment which we have just carried out can also be flipped in the opposite direction. We cannot assume to have made every conclusion we possibly can at this point since our experiment still took some things for granted ; things which are by no means necessarily true . For exa mple, we took valuation to precede value, we took the value which we applied to the apple to be "correct" , hell, we even took the apple to exist objectively as a tasty or disgusting fruit with either plenty or no nutritional benefit. If we are attempting 10 to determine what value is at its most fundamental level, then this simply is not good enough. Such assumptions must themselves be removed. Again, this must take the form of us inverting the experiment (or else we would literally remove everything from the imaginary world, which is obviou sly of no use to us). Our previous valuing of an apple was dependent on valuation. The valuation either creates or discovers value. The alternative to this is, as implied by "discovery", that the value exists prior to the valuation, and that the qualities of the object which create that value are what lead to its valuation. For example, I could own an object with substantial historical significance. It could be a portrait or a statue or anything like that. However, I do not value it. I do not know of its signi ficance, and I am the only person who knows of its existence. Therefore, it is safe to say that in this scenario value has been created totally independently of recognition and interpretation, correct? No. It is not. Claiming that such an object has historical value still presupposes two things. The first being that an object's historical status will automa tically provide it value . Its historical status does not necessarily imply anything regarding its material function and use, which we have determined to be necessary for mind - independent value previously. The second is that, similarly to our last experiment, there will be an individual who is capable of valuing such an item. Again, if there is not, the question does not make sense. If there is no knowledge of the item's history at all, and no way of determining such knowledge, then it can 't be valued. There is no way of recognising its value and therefore it is potentially impossible for us to know if such a value exists. By saying that the item does have historical value within this world specifically (not merely within an extra - dimensional observatio n of the world) , there must be some potential valuer wh o can apply their historical knowledge to the object. This only confirms our previous conclusions. If value is innate to an object, it cannot come from information regarding the object, and value could potentially arise from the valuing process itself. There are only a few more distinctions and conclusions we must make before we attempt to solve this overarching subjective/objective question . The first of these concerns the idea of potential mistakes regarding valu ation. An individual could value something for a "false" reason, for example, they may believe that 11 an item has historical value (we will presuppose its existence for the time being ) and therefore value it highly. However, they later come to realise that the item is a modern copy, or a fake, or is in some way no longer considered historically valuable. What has happened here? One possibility is that the object lost its value when the truth was discovered. This is in line with our judgement that historical value must arise from the evaluative process , rather than being embedded within an object . However, given that in this world there are other individuals who can conceive of historical value, another possibility is that the object did not lose its value, because it never had that value in the first place. The owner merely mistook its value beca use they did not ac tually know the property of the object which provided its value. Despite its value being generated, the original owner was still "incorrect" regarding its value. Therefore, even if value arises through evaluation, it may still carry at the very least elements of objectivity. This will be dealt with in significant detail later in the essay – do not mistake the content of the next few sections as a rejection of objective value. The final distinction we must make can best be observed by imagining a relationship between two individuals, Xavier and Yasmin . Yasmin values her relationship with Xavier a lot. It provides her immense emotional benefit, and even some material benefit when Xavier is feeling benevolent enough to buy Yasmin a gift on her birthday. Does this automatically make the friendship valuable? What if Xavier can't stand Yasmin , and does not value the friendship himself? Does this make the relationship not valuable? Clearly there is an impasse here. How can we de termine the value of a relationship if two contradictory propositions exist and both supposedly hold equal merit? Can they both be correct, or is there some underlying resolution here? There is no ne cessary path for either innate or constructed value to take, nor with subjective value. However, given that two contradictory objective positions cannot be true at the same time (objective irrespective of perspective, as we will later const ruct objective value to be), there must be a solution here. This potential solution , specifically whether value is subjective or objective, will be explored later. ruct objective value to be), there must be a solution here. This potential solution will be explored later. 12 6 – Disagreements The biggest methodological problem with our conception of value now lies within a potential intersubjectivity, the potential for two individuals to disagree on their valuation of an item. This is not a problem in the traditional sense. It is not something which must be removed from the framework which we are generating, after all it is still compatible in some way with all of the potential formulations which we have derived so far. We have touched very briefly on why this is the case. However, "disagreement", like value itself, is a broad term. It is therefore well worth clarifying precisely what a disagreement on valuation consists of, and what it entails. The simplest form of a disagreement, in a relevant sense, is as succinct as "N likes apples, M dislikes apples". It seems here, owing to value's tendency to allow us to rank alternatives and make personal statements regarding items, that apples have obtained two different values at the same time. Again, there is nothing necessarily wrong with this. However, it is vague. We learn nothing about why they have come to these apparently contradictory conclusions. It could be as s imple as a crude repulsion. The apple possesses some aesthetic characteristic which makes it utterly disgusting to person M , a reflexive impulse in the mind which drives them to avoid apples at all costs . There could, obviously, also be a conscious element to such a disagreement. The two indi viduals believe the apple has differing properties and hence value it differently. They may also agree on the properties of the apple, however value said properties differ ently and hence value the apple differently. As with t he several other experiments we have conducted so far, this appears to tell us exceedingly little about the actual nature of value. If anything, it only co mplicates the topic even more. In having realised that valuations of the same items can differ, all we have done is establish that valuations will not necessarily indicate the true and actual value of the item being valued, as alluded to in previous sections. The notion, therefore, that person N values object X for Y reason does not entail that X is valuable for Y reason. The first statement is entirely dependent on N 's relation both to X and to other items which may affect the effe ct that Y has on 13 N 's valuation. The nature of X's actual value does not follow from any evaluation at our current understanding , and so it is here that our investigation into valuation itself must end – at least temporarily. However, we have not yet exhausted our exploration of disagreement . Perhaps a continuation of this will provide new pathways for valuations to take. Disagreement, upon more than a second of consideration, is more complex than the aforementioned crude or subjective battle between N and M which was just discussed. We can, as we have done before, invert the situation again. N and M may both value the apple. They may conclude that it is worth a given amount of money , or bartering for, or fighting for to an apparently equal degree . Though they may not believe so for the same reasons. One may value it to such a degree due to its nutritional benefits, and the other may do so because it tastes good. They are not necessarily disagreeing over the valuation of the object (at least the expression of said valuation), but what constitutes the valua tion and therefore what constitutes the value. Disagreement does not merely concern the actual valuation of an object; it may concern the value of the object itself; the reasons for its valuation. The source or the magnitude or the criteria for its value Individuals may disagree over the actual conditions which produce an items value , irrespective of how said value is actually derived. Mind you, this does not only apply to items which explicitly affect an individual. Two third parties may observe a friendship from afar, knowing very little or possibly even nothing about either the inner workings of the relationship or the individuals who constitute it. And yet, the third parties may still well hold radically differen t interpretations of the friendship. One may consider it valuable and the other may consider it not only worthless but actively harmful to one or both parties within the friendship. Despite knowing next to nothing, they have both established a conclusion regarding the relationship. They may observe the exact same thing, and yet still arrive at differing conclusions regarding the nature of the relationship. There is a third element here in our valuing sequence – that of interpreti ve consequences. The same knowledge of an item, and the same valuation of certain conditions (such as a relationship making two individuals happy being viewed as positive and/or an indicator of v alue) still do not ensure an identical view on the value of the item itself. An 14 apparent disagreement on value may actually not be a disagreement regarding value, nor a disagreement regarding the facts of an item nor the value of these facts, but a disagreement of inferred under standing. There is a disagreement of what is the case in a sense, not what is valuable. There is also a potential "meta - evaluative" disagreement, regarding what makes a valuation correct in the first place. This can be scaled to apply to entire societies. Say one society regards a given practice as highly valuable, while another regards it as totally worthless. The valuation is, again, different. But there is no information regarding the reason for this difference. It may be any of the three which we have discussed, or potentially another reason which has not been discussed for the sake of th e length of this essay. This reason itself may be intersubjective within each society . No matter how deep we d ig , and no matter how hard we try and resolve value and reconcile it with valuation, disagreement only seems to further separate the valuation of an item from its value. The gap remains, and so does our problem. People valuing items differently appears, at a glance, to be significant evidence for subjectivism however i n actuality it tells us absolutely nothing about the ontology of value which we have searched for so desperately. Perhaps the answer, while currently inaccessible, could be reached through a different perspective on disagreement. Despite the disagreement telling us nothing about the value of the object itself, it can tell us an awful lot about the valuation. If we are able to resolve these disagreements; determine why they arise and perhaps under what conditions they can be deemed correct or false, we may be able to return to value and determine its status in reverse. 7 – Relationality The general direction of the investigation so far, that which has ran us in circles and has only disappointed our desire for a quick and easy conclusion, has been to investigate the conditions of valuation and then attempting to derive value from those. We did, to some extent, discuss the forms of value itself, however we neglected to consider where exactly in an object the value lies. We will, to 15 keep you on your toes, now consider a pear. We have discussed the potential forms of value which a fruit of this class may hold, so where exactly is that value held? Is it in its mass? Well, obviously a pear of no mass (or exceedingly little mass) will hold little value, but after a point a pear of a very very large mass and a pear of an unfathomable mass may as well hold the same value despite having differing properties. Furthermore, we can see that the mass of the pear alone does not give it value. Take a pear with a mass similar to that of a large boulder, and then compare its apparent value with that of a large boulder with a similar mass to our pear, specifically a boulder which has been dropped on your hous e, your car, or your cat (whichever you find the most valuable to be). They definitely don't have the same value, and therefore the value cannot be said to exist within the mass of the pear. The mass, at the very least, simply isn't an adequate explanation for the pear's value. Hm. That isn't very useful . Okay, how about its chemical composition? That certainly appears to provide it with some value. The sugars and fibre are certainly useful for our digestive system so of course that is where the value lies, correct? N o. Look more closely at what we have just described. The pear is useful for our digestive system Its chemical composition is not valuable in itself, its value is wholly dependent on its relation to our digestive system, to our cells needing glucose to respire and our colon using fibre to push out shit , as well as our teeth and stomach being able to digest the pear. The pear's value in this sense does not arise from what it is alone (an intrinsic property) but rather due to how it interacts with other items (a relational property or a property of a relation). From what we have discussed, and upon further consideration you may do in your own time, it would appear as though all material properties which appear to constitute value only appear to do so due to their relation to another item. A pear which is useful to us materially may not be to an alien species which respires by burning hydrogen and shits due to lead irritating their extraterrestrial dige stive tract. However, value may not be material. Therefore, we must attempt to derive what the case must be for value to belong to our mega/micro pear independently of its relations , and hence determine whether value itself is entirely relational, entirely intrinsic and merely appearing to be relational, or perhaps both. 16 We can return here to our previous discussion of our app le and a disagreement on its value when considering the conditions under which it exists. At one point, it may appear to be valuable for various reasons due to various conditions, and at another it may not be valuable for different reasons due to different conditions. We will not spend much time on this specifically here, since all we are doing here is demonstrating that the valuation changes. Therefore, we must establish how the value itself changes. An intrinsic account of value would require the actual value of the item to remain unchanged irrespective of the conditions which the item finds itself under. Let's imagine a universe once again which has no beings capable of valuation The only thing that matters here is the significance of an object. This same apple, despite not being consciously valued by anybody, still "functions" so to speak as a tool. Under normal conditions, such as in an autumnal valley in rural France, the apple will fall from its tree, rot away, and embed its seeds into the ground to grow for next year. There is value here in a sense, since the apple was created for a supposed purpose (either ensured by its origins through evolution and its ability to lead to the reproduction of the tree, or for some other more teleological reason), a purpose which will quite likely be carried out. If this apple were sent to mars, this value would vanish, despite the absence of a valuer. The apple has no means of decomposition due to the immediate death of any bacteria which were on its surface, nor does it have any means of reproducing the tree whic h it came from. The physical properties of the apple are unchanged, and so is the valuation of that object, that being the absence of a valuation. And yet, there is still a mechanism by which the value of the item changes. Its value cannot be said to be intrinsic. If value were an intrinsic property, changes in the relations of the object should not be capable of altering the object's value (unless they changed the state of the object itself). We can see here that value cannot fully be explained by considering the object itself as a subject. If we take our apple or our pear or our boulder and simply place it in a void, in what way can it have value? In the potential for future objects within the void? Does that not itself presuppose a future relation for our value to arise from? 17 Relationality as we have described it should not be reduced to context alone. It is not a case of how valuable something appears; this only affects valuation which is not useful to us currently. Instead, the relation it self is what makes the object itself valuable. The key is only valuable in a functional sense if it has a lock to open, irrespective of whether the agent needs to open the lock or not. In fact, this also may expose a smuggling of relationality into the discussion of value itself. (An apple is valuable) may itself be semantically expanded into: (An apple is valuable)(valuable for a human who needs to shit and respire) We can omit the term which describes the relation, but this is only because the relation itself is implied b