Chinese Philosophy of History 170 slanderous chronicle shows that he is actually a scandalmonger or slanderer. In a broader sense, shide means not so much the virtue as the morality of a historian, which only sometimes may be deemed good. Never can a historian be a mere ‘prisoner of events’ ⛪һᖩҏ wèi shì yì yě . It is historical events themselves that make people happy or sad, and that are right or wrong, which gives rise to some unrestrained emotions in the historian, namely the physical flow and accumulation of qi , resulting in such and such feelings. These feelings are translated into a work and it is them, not the style itself, that attract readers. Therefore, one cannot leave this process to take its course, but one has rather to cultivate shide in accordance with the principle of reality, Heaven and the meaning of history, or simply – Dao. Emphasizing the almost physiological aspect of the impact of feelings and valuation on the work of the historian ( qi is said to flow through blood vessels directly to the historian’s heart-mind), Zhang adds that historians are often unaware of the way their mind-hearts work, so it should finally be brought to light. 219 Zhang Xuecheng wants to show that focus only on the narrative language (typical for Ming philosophers of historiography) or the events alone 220 ignores the role of all the unconscious evaluations which are rooted in natural feelings and precede the recording of events, something that Western hermeneutics calls ‘pre-judgements’. 221 The hermeneutic analogies are here largely justified, for Zhang Xuecheng is vitally interested in the issue of interpreting and understanding historical works from a modern perspective. The essay On Breadth and Conciseness ঊ㌴ Bóyuē reads as follows: When reading books and researching the past, there are moments in which we experience original insights that will not change for the rest of our lives. In the learning process, we encounter the most subtle feelings: reading books and examining the past we have moments of joy, as well as of sadness, when we suddenly cry because of what we cannot understand (. . .) Today people do not study these things and do not match the ancient ones. Not because they are not equal to their abilities, but because circumstances have changed (. . .) This is the first difference between people today and in the past. In addition, since the functions of the official and the teacher have been separated, people rely only on written records as the source of their practice: Dao no longer manifests itself in concrete things, and its course is no longer embodied in the duties of the officials. This is the second difference (. . .) Heavenly time and human affairs, the present and the past cannot be reconciled by force. It is something that cannot be overcome with human strength or wisdom (. . .) As far as Dao is concerned, it should be grasped in its entirety. When emotions are enriched with suffering and joy, anger and pleasure, when understanding the circumstances will be extended by penetrating changes, [leading to] obtaining knowledge that is extensive, but not dispersed, succinct but not stark, such knowledge will be clean and stable, and maybe then it will be possible to approach Dao: Dao of what has passed and what will come. 222 The starting point of Zhang Xuecheng’s distinctive hermeneutics is the belief in a radical difference between the interpreter who lives in the present times and the Individual and History 171 interpreted ancient work or historical figure. The process of the degeneration of Dao certainly did not lead to a better understanding of the past. Human emotions are involved in understanding characters and words from the past, which – insofar as they are cleansed – can get closer to the original, interpreted object. In practice, however, we tend to veer between the miscomprehension and pre-judgements that we adopt for life. The above description suggests that understanding the past is ultimately an individual matter, just as human emotions are individual. Zhang Xuecheng emphasizes, however, that ‘what makes human emotions valuable is that we can understand each other by sharing joy’. In other words, emotions are common and comprehensible to all people. The problem is rather to capture them based on their expression, namely their traces ( ji ). And so it is with people in the future who will look at us in the same way as we look at those from the past. 223 Based on the understanding 䀓 jiě of common emotions, on the grounds of the existing sources-traces, the historian makes inferences ᧘ tuī that relate to the ultimately incommunicable and ineffable н㜭䀰㠷ᮨ㘵 bùnéng yán yu ˇ shù zhě historical experience of participating in events. The participants would, paradoxically, be unable to describe their situation; for example, those who experienced the tyranny of Jie would be at a loss for words to have it recorded in full. 224 Temporal distance is therefore a condition for the interpretation of history. With time, along with the course of history, these inferences accumulate, 225 thereby creating a tradition of interpretation. Such an accumulation of interpretation can be treated as progress. In addition to the increase in knowledge, an important feature of this progress is also the correction of the previous mistakes. 226 Tradition understood in this way is obviously a burden, because every author tries – within his own abilities – not to repeat what has been said before him. 227 An even greater mistake is to stop at fragmentary analyses and refrain from conscious and comprehensive interpretation in the expectation that our descendants will accomplish this. 228 This raises the question of how to make such an interpretation. According to Zhang Xuecheng, first of all one should be respectful ᮜ jìng towards the interpreted figures, which manifests itself in due concentration and control of one’s qi , and then one needs to equip oneself with empathy ᚅ shù , which does not mean indulgence, but it is the ability to put oneself in place of the people from the past ⛪ਔ Ӫ䁝䓛 wèi gu ˇ rén shè shēn . Even if one understands the epoch in which the ancients lived, without understanding their own individual perspectives 䓛㲅 shēnchu ˇ their writings should not be discussed. 229 At the same time, one should be careful not to let empathy transform into an anachronism, resulting in imputing to the ancient the views they would not have hypothetically accepted. In this way, one does not deal as much with the people from the past as with one’s own views. 230 This raises, of course, the question, of whether we ever really deal with people from the past or rather that we only imagine that we are in their place. As Ivanhoe argues, Zhang Xuecheng believes that in an ideal situation, on the basis of shared human nature, we are able to understand people from the past. In this respect Zhang gets close to the standpoint of Collingwood, for both thinkers believe that we can understand people from the past to the same extent as they understood each other 231 (and even better in terms of the description of their experiences). Nivison reminds us, however, that Zhang Xuecheng would not accept Collingwood’s idea that history is a history of