Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918

Rights for this book: Public domain in the USA. This edition is published by Project Gutenberg. Originally issued by Project Gutenberg on 2007-11-14. To support the work of Project Gutenberg, visit their Donation Page. This free ebook has been produced by GITenberg, a program of the Free Ebook Foundation. If you have corrections or improvements to make to this ebook, or you want to use the source files for this ebook, visit the book's github repository. You can support the work of the Free Ebook Foundation at their Contributors Page. The Project Gutenberg eBook, Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers, by Anonymous This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org Title: Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918 Author: Anonymous Release Date: November 14, 2007 [eBook #23473] Language: English ***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LECTURES ON LAND WARFARE; A TACTICAL MANUAL FOR THE USE OF INFANTRY OFFICERS*** E-text prepared by Al Haines Transcriber's note: There is no author cited on the book's title page; however, the book's spine shows "A Field Officer" Page numbers in this book are indicated by numbers enclosed in curly braces, e.g. {99}. They have been located where page breaks occurred in the original book. For its Index, a page number has been placed only at the start of that section. Footnotes have been renumbered sequentially and moved to the end of their respective chapters. The book's Index has a number of references to footnotes, e.g. the "( note )" entry under "Boer War." In such cases, check the referenced page to see which footnote(s) are relevant. LECTURES ON LAND WARFARE A TACTICAL MANUAL FOR THE USE OF INFANTRY OFFICERS An examination of the Principles which underlie the Art of Warfare, with illustrations of the Principles by examples taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre November 1-11, 1918 London William Clowes and Sons, Ltd. 94 Jermyn Street, S.W.1 1922 First printed March, 1922 {vii} PREFACE The Lectures in this volume are based upon the official Text-books issued by the Imperial General Staff and upon the works of recognised authorities on the Art of Warfare. The aim of the Author is to examine the Principles which underlie the Art of Warfare, and to provide illustrations from Military History of the successes which have attended knowledge and intelligent application of Text-book Principles, and of the disasters which have accompanied ignorance or neglect of the teaching provided by the Text-books. The "dry bones" of the official publications are clothed with materials which may be supplemented at will by the student of Military History, and the Lectures may thus, it is hoped, be of assistance to Infantry Officers, either in the course of their own studies, or as a convenient groundwork upon which the instruction of others may be based. The scope of the work may be gathered from the Table of Contents and from the Index, and it will be seen that the general Principles underlying the Art of Warfare are included in the scheme, while advantage has been taken of the revision of the official Text-books to incorporate in the Lectures the lessons gained from the experience of leaders in the Great War. Upwards of 230 citations are made of "Battle incidents," and, as an example of the Author's methods, attention may perhaps be directed to the reinforcement of the Text-book Principle of co-operation and mutual support by the citation of an instance, on the grand {viii} scale, by Army Corps (during the First Battle of the Marne ), and on the minor scale, by tanks, bombers, aircraft, and riflemen (during the First Battle of the Somme ); to the successful application of established Principles by the Advanced Guard Commander at Nachod , and to the neglect of those Principles by "Jeb" Stuart at Evelington Heights , and by the Prussian Advanced Guard Commanders in 1870; and to the value of Musketry Training by instancing the successes achieved at the Heights of Abraham , at Bunker Hill , Coruña , and at Fredericksburg , which were repeated during the Retreat from Mons and at the Second Battle of the Somme While every effort has been made to achieve accuracy in citation, and to avoid ambiguity or error in the enunciation of Principles, the Author will be very grateful if his readers will notify to him (at the address of the Publishers) any inaccuracies or omissions which may come under their notice. LONDON, March, 1922. {ix} TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGES CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF BATTLES CITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv-xvii PUBLICATIONS CITED IN THE LECTURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix THE ART OF WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 Principles of War—Popular fallacies—Authorities quoted in support of Fixed Principles (Gen. B. Taylor, C. S. Army; Marshal Foch; Marshal Haig)—Necessity for Study (Gen. Sir E. B. Hamley; Marshal French; Marshal Foch; Napoleon)—"Common Sense" (Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis; General Grant)—"Higher Ranks" Fallacy (Col. Henderson; Gen. Sir E. B. Hamley)—Necessity for Study proved (Col. Henderson). STRATEGY AND TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23 Definitions—Theatre of Operations the Kingdom of Strategy; Field of Battle the Province of Tactics—Tactics subservient to Strategy (Lord Roberts's Advance; First Battle of Somme; First Battle of Cambrai; Gen. Lew Wallace at the Monocacy; Marshal Grouchy at Wavre)—Moral—Idiosyncracies of leaders (Napoleon at Austerlitz; Wellington at Sauroren; Lee and Jackson versus Abraham Lincoln)—National Moral (Foch, quoted)—Discipline and Mobility (Battle of Hastings)—Marching Power (Stonewall Jackson)—Time—Weather—Health—Human Nature (Fabius and Roman people; McClellan and his Government; Thomas at Nashville; Roberts in South Africa)—The Spirit of France ("Nous sommes trahis" of 1870 and cheers of the poilus in 1917)—Great Britain—America—Lord Roberts's previous warning ("Germany strikes when Germany's hour has struck")—Col. Henderson on moral of British and American troops—"The Contemptible Little Army"—The New Armies (Tribute from Marshal Haig endorsed by Marshal Foch)—Changes in Methods of Warfare—Value of official Text-books. THE BATTLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-32 The Battle is the "only argument" of War—Characteristics of the Battle (Issue uncertain; Human factor; Value of Reserves; Superiority at point of Attack)—Lee's "partial attacks" at Malvern Hill of no avail—Phases of the Battle—Information and the Initiative (Salamanca; First Battle of the Marne; Battle of Baccarat)—Development of the Battle (Surprise; "Like a bolt from the blue" as at Chancellorsville or First Battle of Cambrai; Marshal Foch on value of Surprise)—The Decisive Blow—Arbela. {x} HOW BATTLES ARE INFLUENCED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33-44 Commander's influence by his Orders and by his employment of Reserves—Subordinates must "bring to fruit the scheme of the higher command"—The "fog of battle"—Information—Co-operation (on grand scale at First Battle of the Marne; on minor scale at Gneudecourt)—Fire Tactics—Value of withholding fire (Heights of Abraham; Bunker Hill; Fredericksburg; Retreat from Mons)—Enfilade and Reverse Fire (The Bluff in Ypres Salient)—Movement—Advancing under Fire—Withdrawing under Fire in "Delaying Action"—Holding on (Untimely surrender at Soissons; Stubborn defence at First and Second Battles of Ypres; Trônes Wood; Bourlon Village; Polygon Wood; Givenchy)— Covering Fire—Fire and Movement inseparably associated. TYPES OF BATTLE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45-50 Three distinct systems—The Defensive Battle seldom effects positive results (Gettysburg; Fredericksburg)—The Offensive Battle (Marlborough; Frederick the Great; Napoleon; Wellington; Grant; Franco-Prussian War; Battle of Blenheim described)—The Defensive-Offensive Battle (Marengo; Austerlitz; Dresden; Vittoria; Orthez; Toulouse; Waterloo; Final Battles of the Great War; Battle of Waterloo described)—Opportunities for "restoring" the battle (Antietam)—Chancellorsville a great Defensive-Offensive Battle—Passing from the "guard" to the "thrust" (Second Battle of the Marne). THE ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51-69 Culminating point of all manoeuvres—Quick decision required or "Position Warfare" will supervene—Second Battle of the Somme—Methods of Attack—Two plans—Decisive blow on pre-determined spot or in direction ascertained by fighting—Strength of the Attack—Disposition of the Troops—Forward Body, Supports and Local Reserves—General Reserve—The Commander's Plans—The Position of Assembly (Banks's single column defeated by Forrest in Red River Valley)—The Attacking Force (St. Privat; Plevna)—The Decisive Attack—Advantages and Disadvantages of Frontal and Flank Attacks—Decisive Attack must be followed up (Gettysburg; Chattanooga)—Detailing the Units—Artillery in Attack (Verneville; Colenso; mobility and protection of modern Artillery)—Cavalry in Attack (Appomattox and Paardeberg; Ramadie; Bagdadieh; Gaines's Mill; Gettysburg; First Battle of Cambrai; Battle of Amiens; Second Battle of Le Cateau; Archangel Front; Battle of the Sambre)—Royal Engineers—Medical Arrangements—Supply—Commander's Position—Battle Reports—Reorganisation and Pursuit ("Success must be followed up until the enemy's power is ruined.") FORMATION OF INFANTRY FOR THE ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70-75 The Platoon (Square and Diamond Formations; Ground Scouts; Flank Scouts; Behind a Barrage)—The Platoon Commander ("Appreciating the situation")—The Company—The Company Commander—The Battalion—The Battalion Commander (Personal examples; Monchy le Preux; Battle of Cambrai; Second Battle of the Somme). {xi} DEFENSIVE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76-97 Counter-attack the soul of Defence—Reasons for adopting defensive attitude (Chancellorsville)—Defensive-Offensive Battles (Marengo, Austerlitz, and Waterloo)—Obligatory Defensive—(Nachod; Thermopylae; Horatius Codes; Second Battle of the Somme; Rorke's Drift; Le Quesnoy)—V oluntary occupation for future use (Salamanca; Soissons; Hal and Tubize)—Delaying Action—The Offensive Spirit—Defence in Modern Warfare—Inventions have strengthened the Defence (Quotations from Marshals Foch and French and from "F. S. R.")—Position Warfare and its characteristics—Entrenchments (Torres Vedras)—Defensive Systems—Choosing a position (Framework of artillery and machine guns filled in with defensive posts manned by Infantry)—The Outpost Zone—The Battle Position—The "Semi-Permanent" System—Pill-boxes and Concrete Forts—Common characteristics of Defensive Action—The Active Defence—Position must suit plans—Must not be too extensive or too narrow (Condé-Mons-Binche Line; Retreat from Mons; Ypres)—Field of Fire—Flanks—Cover—Artillery positions—Depth—Lateral Communications—Lines of Withdrawal—Changes of Base (Retreat from Mons; Seven Days' Battle; Campaign in the Wilderness)—Luring victorious enemy away from battlefield (Grouchy at Wavre)—Line for Decisive Counter-Attack (Ramillies; Belgians behind River Gette)—Dividing the Troops—Troops to hold the Position—Rôle of Local Reserves (Talavera; Fredericksburg)—General Reserve for Decisive Counter-Attack (Spottsylvania)—Artillery positions—Division into Sectors—Position of General Reserve (Second Battle of the Somme)—Position and Action of the Cavalry (Roliça, Chancellorsville; Gettysburg; Sadowa; Rezonville; Balaclava; First Battle of Le Cateau; Retreat from Mons; Cugny; No German Cavalry available in Second Battle of the Somme to counteract defensive action of British squadrons)—Rallying Place—Reorganisation and Pursuit after Decisive Counter-attack. PROTECTION AND RECONNAISSANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98-101 Marshal Foch on "Surprise"—Detachments provided to protect Main Body—Close connection between Protection and Reconnaissance—Radius of Reconnoitre increased by Aircraft—Position Warfare (Air Photographs; Observation Posts; Patrols; Raiding Parties; Entrenchments; Box Respirators; Camouflage)—Manoeuvre Warfare (Protection from Aircraft; Advanced Guard; Flank Guard; Rear Guard; Outposts). THE ADVANCED GUARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102-113 "I never expected it" a disgraceful admission—Every moving force requires a Guard—Strength (Numbers employed depend upon size of force protected and tactical situation; Strategical Advanced Guard enables Tactical Advanced Guard to be reduced)—Distance—In Advances (Dash and resolution required but interests of Main Body paramount)—In Retreats—Training must be realistic—Tactical Principles (Vanguard for Reconnaissance; Main Guard for Resistance; Communication essential; Error at Sulphur Springs; Success at Fredericksburg and First Battle of the Marne; False tactics of Prussian Advanced Guards in 1870-1871; Excellent work at Nachod)—Advanced Guard Problems (seven examples, including "Jeb" Stuart at Evelington Heights). {xii} FLANK ATTACKS AND FLANK GUARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114-118 Vulnerability of Flanks and necessity for Guards—Who furnishes them—Tactics similar to those prescribed for Advanced Guards—Lines of Communications—Convoys—Raids on the Lines of Communications (Gen. Turner Ashby; "Jeb" Stuart; Stonewall Jackson's skill; Col. Madritov's Raid; Sannah's Post; Ramdam). THE REAR GUARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119-128 Nature of Rear Guard work—Strength—Composition— Distribution—Distance—Tactical Principles (Rear Party watches; Main Guard fights for Time; Sannah's Post)—Training—Eye for Ground (Napoleon; Gen. R. E. Lee)—Examples of Rear Guard Work (First Battle of Le Cateau and the Retreat from Mons; Second Battle of the Somme; Les Boeufs; Le Quesnoy; Roliça; Coruña; Value of Musketry; Bristow Station; J. V Moreau). OUTPOSTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129-140 Outposts prevent interference with plans and provide security by Observation and Resistance—Strength—Observation (Aircraft; Mobile Patrols; Outpost Companies)—Resistance (Infantry, Artillery, and Machine guns; Sentry Groups, Piquets, Supports, and Reserves)—Distance (Effective fire of various arms the controlling factor)—Outpost Commander—Information and Orders—The Outpost Line of Resistance—The Outpost Company (Piquets, Supports, Detached Posts, Reserves; the Piquet Commander; Patrols; Sentry Groups)—Day and Night Work—Disasters through neglect of Tactical Principles (Chateau of Chambord; Tweefontein)—Battle Outposts (Broenbeek; Fredericksburg). TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141-143 Reconnaissance for Attack—Intelligence Officers—Reconnaissance by Raids—Position Warfare—Reconnaissance for Defence—Position Warfare. NIGHT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144-154 Reason for Operations by Night (Secrecy; Frederick the Great's Coat)—Night Marches (Direction; Protection; Secrecy; Connection)—"Rules of Thumb"—Night Advances (Surprise; Direction; Position of Deployment; Connection)—Night Assaults (First Battle of the Somme; Serre Hill; Vimy Ridge; Messines-Wytschaete; Villers Brétonneux; Morlancourt; Spottsylvania)—Limitations of Night Assaults—Smoke and its advantages and disadvantages—Successful and unsuccessful Night Assaults (Rappahannock Station—Peiwar Kotal—Tel-el-Kebir; Stormberg; Magersfontein)—Position of Deployment—Distinguishing Badges, etc.—Watchword—Precautions against Checks—Secrecy—"Rules of Thumb." {xiii} FIGHTING IN CLOSE COUNTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155-163 Restrictions on view and on movement—Advantages for Attack against Defence—Savage Warfare (Isandhlwana; Rorke's Drift; Tofrik; Toski; Teutoberger Wald)—Civilised Warfare (Villages and Woods attract troops; Gravelotte; Spicheren; Worth; the Wilderness; Sedan; Defence of Bazeilles; Noisseville)—Attack on Woods (Tanks; Gauche; Villers Guislain; Messines)—Advancing from captured position—Defence of Woods—Fighting patrols—Attack on Villages (Tanks; Light Mortars) —Defence of Villages (Delaying Action; Providing a "funnel"). CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VARIOUS ARMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164-177 Close combination of all arms required—Infantry (Extent and limitations of mobility; the decisive arm in battle; the Rifle and Bayonet; the Lewis gun; Ranges of rifles and machine guns; Grenades; Hand Grenades; Rifle Grenades; Light Mortars; Machine guns)—Mounted Troops (Cavalry; Mounted Rifles; Cyclists)—Artillery—Light Artillery (Pack Guns; Pack Howitzers; Horse Artillery: Field Guns; Field Howitzers)—Light Guns against Aircraft and Tanks—Medium Artillery—(Medium Guns; Medium Howitzers)—Heavy Artillery (Heavy Guns; Heavy Howitzers)—Super-Heavy Artillery (Super-Heavy Guns; Super-Heavy Howitzers)—Table of Artillery Ranges—Mortars and Light Mortars—Royal Engineers—Tanks—Aircraft (Aeroplanes; Kite Balloons)—Gas—Smoke. OPERATION ORDERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178-179 Orders should be written when possible—Should be "fool proof"—Ambiguity to be avoided—The enemy are . . . My intention is . . . You will—Initiative not to be hampered. INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181-189 {xv} CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF BATTLES PAGES Defence of Sublician Bridge (Legendary) 77 Pass of Thermopylae (B.C. 480) 77 Battle of Arbela (B.C. 331) 32 ——— Cannae (B.C. 216) 14 Defeat of Varus by Arminius (A.D. 9) 156-157 Battle of Stamford Bridge (Sept. 25, 1066) 12 ——— Hastings (Oct. 14, 1066) 11-12 ——— Blenheim (Aug. 2, 1704) 46-47 ——— Ramillies (May 23, 1706) 46, 91 ——— Malplaquet (Sept. 11, 1709) 46 ——— Leuthen (Dec. 5, 1757) 46 Heights of Abraham (Sept. 13, 1759) 38 Battle of Bunker Hill (June 17, 1775) 38 ——— Ettlingen (July 9-10, 1796) 128 ——— Marengo (June 14, 1800) 47, 76 ——— Hohenlinden (Dec. 3, 1800) 128 ——— Austerlitz (Dec. 2, 1805) 9-10, 47, 76, 125 ——— Jena (Oct. 14, 1806) 125 ——— Roliça (Aug. 17, 1808) 95, 127 ——— Coruña (Jan. 16, 1809) 127-128 ——— Talavera (July 27-28, 1809) 92 Lines of Torres Vedras (Oct.-Nov. 1810) 82-83 Battle of Salamanca (July 22, 1812) 27, 78 ——— Vittoria (June 21, 1813) 47 ——— Sauroren (July 28, 1813) 10 ——— Dresden (Aug. 26-27, 1813) 47, 89 ——— Orthez (Feb. 27, 1814) 47 Defence of Soissons (March 3, 1814) 41, 78 Battle of Toulouse (April 10, 1814) 47 ——- Quatre Bras (June 16, 1815) 48 ——— Ligny (June 16, 1815) 8, 47, 90-91 ——— Waterloo (June 18, 1815) 8, 47-48, 76, 79 ——— Wavre (June 18-19, 1815) 8, 91 ——— Balaclava (Oct. 26, 1854) 96 Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1862) 3, 4, 12, 117 Battle of McDowell (May 8, 1862) 12 ——— Cross Keys (June 6, 1862) 117 Seven Days' Battle (June-July, 1862) 14, 90 Battle of Gaines's Mill (June 27, 1862) 14, 65 ——— Malvern Hill (July 1-3, 1862) 15, 25-26, 65, 112, 117 {xvi} Battle of Evelington Heights (July 3, 1862) 112-113 ——— Bull Run (2) (Aug. 28, 1862) 12 ——— Antietam (Sept. 17, 1862) 14, 15, 48 ——— Fredericksburg (Nov. 15, 1862) 14, 22, 38, 46, 92, 108, 139-140 ——— Chancellorsville (May 2-3, 1863) 12, 30, 48, 76, 95, 117 ——— Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863) 15, 45, 61, 95-96, 117 ——— Sulphur Springs (Oct. 12, 1863) 108 ——— Bristow Station (Oct. 14, 1863) 128 ——— Rappahannock Station (Nov. 7, 1863) 151 ——— Chattanooga (Nov. 25, 1863) 61-62 ——— Pleasant Hill (April, 1864) 59 ——— The Wilderness (May 12, 1864) 90, 93, 97, 117, 125-126, 149-150, 158 ——— Monocacy (July 8, 1864) 7 ——— Nashville (Dec. 15-16, 1864) 15 ——— Appomattox (April 9, 1865) 15, 64 ——— Nachod (June 27, 1866) 18, 77, 110 ——— Sadowa (July 3, 1866) 96 ——— Spicheren (Aug. 6, 1870) 108-109, 158 ——— Worth (Aug. 6, 1870) 109, 158, 159 ——— Colombey (Aug. 14, 1870) 109-110 ——— Rezonville (Aug. 16, 1870) 96 ——— Gravelotte (Aug. 18, 1870) 158 ——— Verneville (Aug. 18, 1870) 63 ——— St. Privat (Aug. 18, 1870) 60 ——— Noisseville (Aug. 31, 1870) 159 ——— Sedan (Sept. 1, 1870) 16, 159 ——— Metz (Oct. 27, 1870) 16 ——— Chambord (Dec. 9, 1870) 138 ——— Plevna (Dec. 10, 1877) 60 ——— Peiwar Kotal (Dec. 2, 1878) 151 ——— Isandhlwana (Jan. 22, 1879) 78, 156 ——— Rorke's Drift (Jan. 22, 1879) 77-78, 156 ——— Tel-el-Kebir (Sept. 13, 1882) 153-154 ——— Tofrik (March 22, 1885) 156 ——— Toski (Aug. 3, 1889) 156 ——— Adowa (Feb. 26, 1896) 22 ——— Stormberg (Dec. 10, 1899) 152 ——— Magersfontein (Dec. 10-11, 1899) 152 ——— Colenso (Dec. 15, 1899) 63 ——— Ramdam (Feb. 13, 1900) 118 ——— Paardeberg (Feb. 27, 1900) 16, 64 ——— Sannah's Post (March 31, 1900) 118, 124 ——— Tweefontein (Dec. 24, 1901) 138 ——— The Yalu (May 1, 1904) 117-118 The Great War Battle of Le Gateau (Aug. 1914) 126 ——— River Gette (Aug. 1914) 91 Condé-Mons-Binche (Aug. 22-23, 1914) 87 Battle of Charleroi (Aug. 23, 1914) 88 ——— Baccarat (Aug. 25, 1914) 28 Retreat from Mons (Aug. 1914) 19, 38, 87-88, 90, 96, 127, 165 {xvii} First Battle of the Marne (Sept. 1914) 27-29, 36-37, 52, 108 First Battle of Ypres (Oct. 20-Nov. 20, 1914) 19, 20, 41-42, 88 Second Battle of Ypres (April 22-May 18, 1915) 20, 42, 176 Defence of Verdun (Feb.-Aug. 1916) 7, 16 Battle of Ypres Salient (March 2, 1916) 39 First Battle of the Somme (July 1-Nov. 18, 1916) 7, 13, 22, 37, 42, 53, 148, 171, 175, 176-177 Battle of Serre Hill (Feb. 10-11, 1917) 148-149 ——— Messines (June 7, 1917) 20, 149, 160 Chemin des Dames (April-July, 1917) 16 Battle of Vimy (April 9, 1917) 149 ——— Arras (April 9-June 7, 1917) 170 Monchy le Preux (April 14, 1917) 75 Third Battle of Ypres (Sept. 26, 1917) 42-43, 139 Battle of Broenbeek (Oct. 9, 1917) 139 First Battle of Cambrai (Nov. 20, 1917) 7, 30, 42, 66, 75, 160 The Piave Line (Italy) (Nov. 25, 1917) 7 Second Battle of the Somme (March 21-April 11, 1918) 20, 34, 43, 52-53, 56, 66, 75, 77, 78, 95, 96, 126-127, 174 Battle of Villers-Brétonneux (April 24-25, 1918) 149 ——— Morlancourt (June 10, 1918) 149 Second Battle of the Marne (July 18, 1918) 49 Battle of Amiens (Aug. 8-13, 1918) 21, 66 ——— Bapaume (Aug. 21-Sept. 1, 1918) 21 ——— Havrincourt and Epehy (Sept. 12-18, 1918) 21 Second Battle of Cambrai (Sept. 27-Oct. 5, 1918) 21, 170 Battle of Flanders (Sept. 28-Oct. 14, 1918) 21 Second Battle of Le Cateau (Oct. 6-12, 1918) 21, 66, 96 Battle of the Selle (Oct. 17-25, 1918) 21 ——— Sambre (Nov. 1-11, 1918) 21, 65, 67 Armistice Day (Nov. 11, 1918) 65, 169 Mesopotamia Battle of Ramadie (Sept. 27-29, 1917) 64 ——— Bagdadieh (March 26, 1918) 64-65 North Russia Archangel Province (Aug.-Sept. 1918) 66-67 {xix} PUBLICATIONS CITED IN THE LECTURES "Field Service Regulations," Parts I. and II. "Infantry Training," Parts I. and II. CLERY, Major-General Sir C. F., K.C.B.: "Minor Tactics." CREASY, Sir Edward: "Fifteen Decisive Battles at the World." FOCH, Maréchal Ferdinand: "Principles of War." FRENCH OF YPRES, Field-Marshal Earl, K.P.: "1914." GRANT, General Ulysses S., United States Army: "Memoirs." HAIG OF BEMERSYDE, Field-Marshal Earl, K.T.: "Sir D. Haig's Dispatches." HAKING, Lieut.-General Sir R. C. B., G.B.E.: "Staff Bides, etc." HAMLEY, General Sir E. B., K.C.B.: "Operations of War." HENDERSON, Colonel G. F. R., C.B.: "Stonewall Jackson." "The Science of War." NAPIER, Sir William Francis Patrick, K.C.B.; "History of the Peninsular War." "OLE LUK-OIE." See SWINTON. SWINTON, Major-General E. D., C.B.: "The Green Curve." TAYLOR, General R., Confederate States Army: "Destruction and Reconstruction." {1} LECTURES ON LAND W ARFARE THE ART OF WARFARE "The Art of War, like every other art, possesses its theory, its principles; otherwise, it would not be an art."—MARSHAL FOCH. The Art of War, like any other art, is based upon certain fixed principles, and there is no short cut which hurries the student to his goal. The long and laborious line of study is the only safe way, and there are many pitfalls to be avoided on the road. One of these pitfalls is dug by those who maintain, whenever a new war breaks out, that all previous warlike knowledge must be thrown on the scrap-heap and attention paid only to the problems of the hour. Another is the alluring trap that Warfare is "merely a matter of common sense"; and a third is the oft-expressed idea that knowledge is required of the General, and that compliance with orders is sufficient for the Subaltern Officer. KNOWLEDGE OF PRINCIPLES ESSENTIAL.—With regard to the first of these difficulties, the opinions of recognised authorities on the Art of Warfare may be consulted. "The cardinal principles on which the art of war is based are few and unchangeable, resembling in this the code of morality; but their application varies with the theatre of the war, the genius and temper of the people engaged, and the kind of arms employed" (General R. Taylor, C.S. Army). "Although the manifold inventions of modern times have given to warfare {2} a wider scope and fresh materials, it remains obedient to the same laws as in the past; but it applies these laws with means more numerous, more powerful, and more delicate" (Marshal Foch). "This war has given us no new principles; but different mechanical appliances—and in particular the rapid improvement and multiplication of aeroplanes, the use of immense numbers of machine guns and Lewis guns, the employment of vast quantities of barbed wire as effective obstacles, the enormous expansion of artillery, and the provision of great masses of motor transport—have introduced new problems of considerable complexity concerning the effective co-operation of the different arms and services. Much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery already working" (Marshal Haig). The laws of war are not in themselves difficult to understand, but their successful application on the field of battle requires that they should be carefully studied and considered in all their aspects. "The mind can only be trained to this by close study of campaigns, and by the solution of definite problems on maps and on the ground" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). "A lifelong experience of military study and thought has taught me that the principle of the tactical employment of troops must be instinctive. I know that in putting the Science of War into practice it is necessary that its main tenets should form, so to speak, part of one's flesh and blood. In war there is little time to think, and the right thing to do must come like a flash—it must present itself to the mind as perfectly obvious " (Marshal French). The same idea is expressed by the Generalissimo of the largest victorious force that was ever controlled by one mind. "Generally speaking, grave situations partially obscure even a bright intellect. It is therefore with a fully equipped mind that one ought to start in order to make war or even to understand {3} war. No study is possible on the battlefield; one does there simply what one can in order to apply what one knows. In order to do even a little one has to know a great deal, and to know it well. . . . The right solution imposes itself; namely, the application, according to circumstances, of fixed principles. . . . Incapacity and ignorance cannot be called extenuating circumstances, for knowledge is within the reach of all" (Marshal Foch); and in the words of Napoleon's own maxim: "The only way to learn the art of war is to read and re-read the campaigns of the great captains." THE "COMMON-SENSE" FALLACY.—The fallacy that warfare is "merely a matter of common sense" has been exposed by Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, in his contrast of the conduct of the American Civil War of 1861-1865, when it was controlled by President Lincoln and his Cabinet in Washington, and when it was handed over without reserve to a professional soldier in the field (General Grant). Few mortals have possessed "common sense" in greater abundance than Abraham Lincoln, and yet he permitted interference with his generals' plans, which were frequently brought to nought by such interference, and but for a like hindrance of the Confederate generals by Jefferson Davis this well-intentioned "common sense" would have been even more disastrous. "Men who, aware of their ignorance, would probably have shrunk from assuming charge of a squad of infantry in action had no hesitation whatever in attempting to direct a mighty army" (Henderson, "Stonewall Jackson"). In June, 1863, the Confederate Armies were scattered from Strasburg (in the Valley) to Fredericksburg (in Spottsylvania); General Hooker, commanding the Army of the Potomac in the field, begged to be allowed to attack Lee's Corps in detail. Success was certain, but permission was refused. The one and only idea of the Federal Government was to keep the Army of the Potomac between Lee and the Federal Capital. {4} THE "HIGHER RANKS" FALLACY.—The same writer has also protested vehemently against the idea that the practice of strategy in the field is confined to the higher ranks. "Every officer in charge of a detached force or flying column, every officer who for the time being has to act independently, every officer in charge of a patrol, is constantly brought face to face with strategical considerations; and success or failure, even where the force is insignificant, will depend upon his familiarity with strategical principles" ("The Science of War"). In the same way, General Sir E. B. Hamley, in "The Operations of War Explained," points out that a commander who cannot look beyond the local situation is not competent to command a detachment, however small. In addition, it must be remembered that superior knowledge of the art of war, thorough acquaintance with duty, and large experience, seldom fail to command submission and respect. Troops fight with marked success when they feel that their leader "knows his job," and in every Army troops are the critics of their leaders. The achievements of Jackson's forces in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 were almost superhuman, but under Stonewall Jackson the apparently impossible tasks were undertaken and achieved. General Ewell, one of Jackson's commanders, stated that he shivered whenever one of Stonewall's couriers approached him. "I was always expecting him to order me to assault the North Pole! But, if he had ordered, we should have done it!" THE NECESSITY FOR STUDY.—It is not pretended by any sane writer that study alone will make a perfect officer, for it is universally recognised that no amount of theoretical training can supply the knowledge gained by direct and immediate association with troops in the field; nor is it claimed that study will make a dull man brilliant, or confer resolution and rapid decision on one who is timid and irresolute by nature. But "the quick, {5} the resolute, the daring, deciding and acting rapidly, as is their nature, will be all the more likely to decide and act correctly in proportion as they have studied the art they are called upon to practise" ("The Science of War"). Theory, applied to the profession of arms, is to some a word of most obnoxious sound, but it is obnoxious only to those who refuse to listen to the advice, or to take warning from the practice, of Napoleon, of Wellington, of Foch, and of many of the most famous generals of history. "A man thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of Napoleon's warfare would hardly fail in all circumstances to make his enemy's communications his first objective; and if Wellington's tactical methods had become a second nature to him it would be strange indeed if he were seduced into delivering a purely frontal attack. . . . The same tactical principles regulate the combat of a large force and a small, and it is the thorough grasp of the principles, combined with courage and coolness, that makes a capable leader, whether of a platoon or an army corps" ("The Science of War"). {6} STRATEGY AND TACTICS DEFINITIONS.—Strategy and Tactics have often been treated by non-military writers as if they were independent branches of the soldier's profession, but while they may indeed be separately defined it will be found in practice that they cannot be separately considered. The theatre of operations is the kingdom of Strategy, the province of Tactics is the field of battle, but when the battlefield is reached it so far transcends in importance every other point in the theatre of operations that no tactical end is worth aiming at in preference to striking with all available strength at the field force of the enemy, and this, it will be seen, is the goal of all strategical combinations. "Strategy must ever be striving for Tactical success; Tactics must ever keep in mind the Strategical situation and must constantly aim at creating fresh Strategical opportunities. Tactics without Strategy resembles a man without legs; Strategy without Tactics is like a man without arms" (General Sir E. B. Hamley). "To seek out the enemy's armies—the centre of the adversary's power—in order to beat and destroy them; to adopt, with this sole end in view, the direction and tactics which will lead to it in the quickest and safest way: such is the whole mental attitude of modern war. No Strategy can henceforth prevail over that which aims at ensuring Tactical results, victory by fighting" (Marshal Foch). Local successes on the field of battle often have effects that are felt throughout the theatre of operations Lord Roberts's advance on Pretoria relieved the pressure on Kimberley in the west and on Ladysmith in the east, and these centres are upwards of 300 miles apart. The {7} First Battle of the Somme (July 1, 1916) not only relieved the pressure on Verdun but held in position large enemy forces which would otherwise have been employed against our Allies in the East. General Byng's surprise attack at Cambrai (November 20, 1917) was followed by a determined counter-attack by the Germans on November 30, which appeared to nullify the results achieved from November 20 to 25; but "there is evidence that German divisions intended for the Italian theatre were diverted to the Cambrai front, and it is probable that the further concentration of German forces against Italy was suspended for at least two weeks at a most critical period, when our Allies were making their first stand on the Piave Line" (Sir D. Haig's Dispatches). A tactical defeat may sometimes be risked to serve a strategic end. In June, 1864, General Hunter was operating with a Federal army in the Shenandoah Valley, and owing to shortage of supplies was forced to fall back. In so doing he uncovered the National Capital, and General Early was sent by the Confederate Commander-in-Chief to capture Washington. General Grant took immediate steps to protect the capital by the dispatch of troops, and to further this end, General Lew Wallace,[1] on his own initiative, confronted Early's corps at the Monocacy on July 8, 1864. He met the enemy and was defeated, but he delayed Early's corps until the troops sent by Grant were in position. "If Early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent. General Wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him, a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory" (Grant's "Memoirs"). A tactical success may be not only useless, but actually inopportune, if it is out of accord with the plans of the higher command. On the morning of June 18, 1815, Marshal Grouchy was in {8} pursuit of the Prussians whom Napoleon had defeated on June 16 at Ligny. Although urged "to march to the sound of the cannon" (at Waterloo), Grouchy pushed on eastwards, where he found Thielmann's Prussian Corps of 16,000 men holding the passage across the Dyle at Wavre. The Battle of Wavre was begun at 4 p.m. on June 18, and by 11 a.m. on the next day Grouchy was victorious. But his victory was barren. His tactical achievement was useless to the higher command and had exposed his own force to considerable danger. As he sat down to pen a vainglorious dispatch to the Emperor, he received the news that Napoleon was a fugitive and the Imperial Army defeated and scattered. Grouchy's feeble and false manoeuvres had permitted Blücher to join forces with Wellington. To the Emperor's dismay it was the Prussians who came from the eastward to the sound of the cannon: "C'est les Prussiens qui viennent!" MORAL.—It is seen that Strategy may be defined as the art of concentrating troops at the required strength, at the required time, at the required place, for the purpose of overthrowing the enemy's main armies; while Tactics may be defined as the art of arranging and handling troops so concentrated for the purpose of defeating the enemy when encountered. But although Strategy may be considered as the art of bringing an opponent to battle, and Tactics as the art of defeating him in action, there are excluded from these definitions many considerations which influence a commander in the field. The art of war does not commence with a strategical reconnaissance from the air, or the saddle, to ascertain whether, and if so in what locality and in what strength, hostile troops are being concentrated. From information so obtained, the physical force of an enemy may indeed be determined; but "in war (said Napoleon) moral force is to the physical (that is, to numbers and {9} armament) as three to one," and upwards of a hundred years later the same idea has again been expressed. "To understand war you must go beyond its instruments and materials; you must study in the book of history, conscientiously analysed, armies, troops in movement and in action, with their needs, their passions, their devotions, their capacities of all kinds. That is the essence of the subject, that is the point of departure for a reasonable study of the art of war" (Marshal Foch). And while dealing with moral force it must be remembered that the moral force of opposing leaders of nations or of armies is at least as important as that of the nations or armies themselves, for a war is a struggle between human intelligences rather than between masses of men. "There have been soldiers' battles but never a soldiers' campaign" ("The Science of War"). "It was not the Roman legions which conquered Gaul, it was Caesar. It was not the French Army which reached the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne" (Napoleon). A commander must, therefore, take into account the character, the moral fibre, as well as the ability and the means at the disposal of his adversary. He must project his mind to his adversary's council chamber, and putting himself in his place must conjecture how a man of that character and of that ability will act under the given circumstances. History supplies many examples of mental activity of this kind.[2] Napoleon predicted the impetuous onset of the Russian left wing against his right at Austerlitz , Dec. 2, 1805, because he knew the temperament of the Tsar Alexander. At Austerlitz, the most brilliant of all his battles, Napoleon had 70,000 troops and was confronted by 80,000 Austrians and Russians drawn up on the Heights of Pratzen. His plan was to draw the weight of the Russian attack against his right—which was so disposed as to invite the headstrong and {10} self-confident Tsar "to administer a lesson in generalship to Napoleon"— and then to launch a superior attack against the Heights, which contained a village and a knoll, the key to the position; and finally to hurl his General Reserve in a decisive counter-attack on the Russians when they were involved in battle with his right wing. When the rattle of musketry and booming of the g