1 Polycracy in the National - Socialist ruling s ystem Contents 1. History and ascent of the term polycracy ................................ ................................ ................... 1 2. The basic model: Führer above rivalling actors ................................ ................................ ........... 3 3. Occurrence, outcomes, and interpretations of polycratic relationships ................................ .... 5 4. The position of polycracy in National - Socialist thought ................................ .............................. 7 5. Conclusions ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 8 Polycracy , a word of Greek origin , literally and traditionally signifies the rule of many Save this general definition, t h e term has become a basic concept for the analysis of the National - Socialist ruling system. Furthermore, there are suggest ions that polycracy is specific for the National - Socialist setting and delimits it from other ruling systems. 1 Categorization and importance of the term are not fully settled and ha ve to be explained in their main aspects 1. History and ascent of the term pol y cra c y Before the emergence of the social science s in the 19 th century, polycracy was used in its plain , traditional sense. Decisive for the development of the word’s meaning seem s to have been the change in word usage in the German - speaking countries. The first recognizable connotation of polycracy was implied the opposite of autocracy and monarchy : I n 1821, for example, the Jena law professor Carl Ernst Schmid designated “ aristocratic and democratic states ” as “ polyk rati sch ” 2 In the context of the inter - war period and the Weimar R epublic , P oly k ra tie change d its meaning again : Now , it pointed to crisis phenomena of liberal democracy. Around 1930, intellectuals such as Johannes Popitz , Carl Schmitt , and Franz L. Neumann drew attention to deficits of political coordination and lack of equal oppo rtunity due to agg lomerations of power. 3 In regard t o social economy, they attested a n un controlled “ P oly k ra tie ” of public establishments. In a broader view, political p arties, lobbying associations , and public enterprises had gained power over delimited fields of interest, t hereby impeding the general parliamentary and governmental work However, t his special criticism became obsolete in 1933 with the establishment of the Third Reich as it was not considered responsible “P olykratie ” was n o t use d anymore, particular ly not in order to assess the new ruling system. After the Second World War, the dictatorships of Nazi Germany and the Soviet - Union were commonly analyzed under the concept of totalitarianism , 4 which in t endency was understood as a strict monolithic ruling. Actually, in 1933 - 1935, Germany had undergone a comprehensive organizational transformation . In the course of the seizure of power by the National - Socialists and the construction of the Third Reich , the liberal plenty of associations of the Weimar Republic had been reduced substantial ly. Among the establishments for one 1 {Court 2019 #6709D: 15} 2 {Schmid 1821 #6664D: 58} 3 {Court 2019 #6709D: 2 – 4} ; {Neumann 1966 #5215D: 44 – 45} 4 Reference to INS article on totalitarianism. 2 and the same purpose , ide a l - typ ically only one remained owing to liquidation of the rest This was true for entrepreneurial associations 5 and labor representation s Organizations that until then had been independent and politically free - floating were assigned to larger offices as their new supervis or y instances . These were usually state ministries or bodies of the National - Socialist German Workers P arty (NSDAP) This happened to various kinds of associations and clubs ranging from professions to leisure and sports. However, th e clear assessment of totalitarianism for the Third Reich came into doubt when N S - party and government were scrutinized more thoroughly. This happened by the 1960s and 1970s , mark ing the appearance of polycracy as a new analytical concept 6 I t bec a me evident that the Führer of Reich and nation , Adolf Hitler, was only supposed to be the absolute dictator at the top of a strict administrative hierarchy . Instead, more and more political sectors of the Third Reich were being detected, in wh ich actors disputed competencies despite the leadership of Hitler In 1960 and 1969 , the German scholars Gerhard Schulz and Martin Broszat stated a “ polycracy of the departments” within the National - Socialist government. 7 In 197 6 , Peter Hüttenberger presented a broader reflection what polycracy could mean in the context of ruling in the Third Reic h. 8 Later on, a large number of research papers addressed the aspect of inter - institutional rivalr ies Such phenomena were found in a multitude of political fields and time spans of National - Socialist ruling I n the specific literature, however, it still remains unclear wh ich status should be assigned to the subject of polycracy. I n 2018 , Rüdiger Hachtmann discussed four possible answers to this question: simple t erm, conceptual approach, closed theory and /or open issue of scientific debate 9 While Hachtmann tended to theory , Anthony Court and Ulrike Kistner in 2019 treated the subject as an a mbiguous concept w h i ch necessarily remain ing “ under - theori s ed ” 10 A s early as 1978, Karl D. Bracher had qualified the polycracy thesis as “ exaggerated ” and refused its obvious perspective of a “pluralism in the Nazi dictatorship”. 11 In 1989, Dieter Rebentisch conceded the existence of polycratic phenomena, but doubted the capacity of polycracy as a political system. 12 In 199 3 , Karl Heinz Roth criticized the “polycracy theorists” because of the ir neglect of social and class rule issues. 13 For Bernhard Gotto in 2006, polycracy was only a “ commonplace of research ” 14 The lowe st profile in this regard has been kept by Micha e l Burleigh , who in 2000 denied any special importance of p olycracy for the Third Reich deeming this feature typical for “many other modern governments and organisations” 15 Thus, the ratings range from valuable theory to simple banality, whereby most historians give some apprecia tion to polycracy as a research concept. 5 Reference to my INS article The Organic Order of the Economy 6 {Hüttenberger 1976 #5796D: 417 – 42 2 } 7 {Schulz 1974 #6754D: 279} {Broszat 1969 #6843D: 363} 8 {Hüttenberger 1976 #5796D: 417 – 420} 9 {Hachtmann 2018 #5666D: 3} 10 {Court 2019 #6709D: 1} 11 {Bracher 2017 #6860D: VII} 12 {Rebentisch 1989 #6853D: 14} 13 { Roth 1993 #4980D: 21} 14 {Gotto 2006 #6888D: 28} 15 {Burleigh 2001 #6757S: 156 – 157} 3 Another open question is the origin of polycracy in its usage for the Third Reich or, more precisely, to what extent i t should be attributed to Franz L. Neumann (1900 - 1954). In 1942/44, this exiled German lawyer had published “Behemoth”, a comprehensive study on the “ structure and practice of National Socialism ” with a focus on governance, rule, and law. During the first decades after the Second World War, the attention to Neumann and his works had been moderate , wh ich began to change in the 1970s. Researchers on Neumann, and then also adherents of the polycracy concept, started to examine his “Behemoth” more thoroughly. There t hey found the term polycracy and in the subsequent text an analysis of the National - Socialist ruling system that was brilliant for its time So, in several research contributions between the 1970s and 1990s, Neumann and polycracy were mentioned at rather short intervals 16 Since the turn of the century , the contention has come up that Neumann was the father of the polycracy thesis on National - Socialist ruling. 17 Straightforward or with some reservations, it was as s erted that Neumann , if not literally then analogously , had understood the National - Socialist ruling system as polycratic The sole proof – Neumann’s 1942/44 book “Beh emoth” – is only an apparent one, the result of a misinterpret ation : I n the first chapter of Behemoth , Neumann indeed mentioned “polycr a cy ”. 18 But this was in the context of the late Weimar Republic N o where in the whole Behemoth book, Neumann used “ polycracy ” for a Third Reich phenomenon Albeit he had identified “four distinct groups [... of] the German ruling class: big industry, the party, the bureaucracy, and the armed forces” 19 , Neumann’s analysis was a bit different from polycracy. So, he had stated a relative autonomy and self - administration of the power centers implying the avoidance of conflicts inside of them. I n 1999, Jürgen Bast complained about a n incorrect reception of Neumann’s pluralism concept , which was not identical with polycracy 20 Th us, Neumann could be regarded as the founder of a more sophisticated research on National - Socialist ruling. But he should not be seen as the originator of the present polycracy approach , as his seeming paternity was con cluded from false premises 2. The basic model : Führer above rivalling actors Polycracy b etween Third Reich instances was an apparent contrast to a totalitarian basic structure. T he first studi es on National - Socialist dictatorship which attest ed loosened institutional ties did so in regard to the state apparatus However, t his was contrary to Franz Neumann ’s 1944 thesis of the “ bureaucracy” as a closed power group As to the ministries of the Nazi government , the historians Schulz and B r oszat in 1960 and 1969 recognized a severe disorder in the allocation and clarity of competencies. Until today, a large number of studies follow ing this approach have scrutiniz ed further areas of administration. The se works confirm ed the detection of , at least , temporarily loosened legal and power relations in the Third Reich 16 E.g. {Schäfer 1977 #6854D: 682 – 691} { Kershaw 1989 #6847C: 65 – 66} 17 {Hachtmann 2018 #5666D: 4} {Court 2019 #6709D: 6, 8 } {Iakovou 2009 #6710D: 429 , 435 } 18 {Neumann 1966 #5215D: 44} 19 {Neumann 1966 #5215D: 361} 20 {Bast 1999 #6773S: 7} 4 From the outset, the researchers on polycracy not only focused on the c onflicts and tensions between actors of the same level . They also emphasized the crucial role of the respective superior , wh o on the supreme level was Hitler, the Führer. 21 On lower tiers, it was usually a n other Nazi personalit y , who was more or less influential Hitler and many of his party functionaries tended to disrespect existing administrative hierarchies instead giv ing instructions to persons they trusted and found apt Often t hey install ed special commissioners out side of the regular apparatus to promote their goals 22 In fields of his special interest , t he Führer endeavored to grant the commissions personally 23 Consequently, t he officers honored in such a way felt encouraged to act more aggressive ly and even to contradict t heir next superiors. Expert literature widely agreed that Hitler’s personality fostere d polycracy in the Third Reich. Ambitious enough to claim the highest possible rank, the Führer had to cope with inadequacy H e was large ly uneducated , notwithstanding the authorship of his influential book “Mein Kampf”. H itler despised academics for the ir claim of superior knowledge 24 He also disliked t o study files, which was the basis of a ny thorough governmental and a dministrati ve work 25 Hitler glossed over his intellectual deficits by metaphysical notions from his self - made ideology : He maintained that the essence of National - Socialism could not be fully grasped through books and reading, but essentially through personal empathy and experience. 26 Apparently, Hitler’s self - conception determined hi s attitude as regent. In particular , he practiced a personalized style of rule whereby he could enfold his charismatic capacity towards others 27 The officials, executives , and experts , who were commissioned in this way, did the detail work for him. The leader cult he had installed gave him an aura of infallibility. As a result , the Führer was granted the last interpretation of every issue, independent of the available facts. Since Hitler himself did not have sufficient knowledge of all subject areas, the coordination became incomplete. The same effect had his ignorance of hierarchies on his commissions 28 Both factors enhanced uncertainties and conflicts of competence, i.e. polycracy. For Hitler, this system was probably the best way o f rul ing , because it simultaneously compensated the imperfect ion of his personality and gave him unlimited power. First ly , the Führer had commissioned away th ose portions of government work that were unpleasant to him. Second ly , he had maximized his rank by institutin g the position of a Führer , who had to be asked in the case of dissents among followers 29 In the scholarly discourse, h owever, the correlation of Hitler to polycracy ha s not been explained uniformly Some historian s contended a conscious strategy of the Führer to divide and rule, while others saw a n 21 Reference to INS article on Führer or Hitler. {Mommsen 1981 #6852D: 43 - 72 } 22 {Hachtmann 2018 #5666D: 9 - 1 4 } 23 { Mommsen 1981 #6852D: 57} {Jüngerkes 2011 #6798I: 279} 24 {Ullrich 2013 #6819I: 431 – 432} 25 {Keller 2010 #6779D: 47} {Mommsen 1981 #6852D: 59} 26 Reference to IN S article on National - Socialist metaphysics 27 { Thamer 2018 #6823D: 195} 28 {Nolzen 2011 #6793S: 125 – 130} 29 {Wehler 2003 #6790D: 624 – 625} 5 instinctive, in the last instance ideological attitude. 30 In the extreme, polycracy was thought possible even without a ny closer involvement of Hitler 31 The last component of the customary model of polycracy was mobilization : 32 Impatient and activist leaders animated their functionaries and followers. This was the engine driving the polycratic mechanics of decision and execution. The result was a fast moving machine , which led to many , often comprehensive social changes. However, i n the literature there has been no real consensus about the concrete valuation of the effects : Was it rather modernization 33 or barbarism 34 and chaos? 3. Occurrence , outcomes , and interpretations of pol y cra tic relationships Historic research on the Third Reich has found a large number of relationships that could be regarded as polycratic. In a society under permanent change , again and again situations a rose in which several instances acted in a reas of unde termined responsibility However, historic research on National - Socialist rule has not advanced to a n approved periodization of polycracy Clear cuts were almost impossible , since the history of the Third Reich was permeated by institutional conflicts. P hases of co mprehensive power change s were certainly prone to unsettled competencies among the new instances . For this, the Machtergreifung of 1933/34 and the conquest of foreign countries 1939 - 42 are good examples, a s they indeed have led to a number of successful investigations 35 These pointed out tensions between National - Socialist actors taking over liberal establishments or substituting alien institutions. But the times in between and after (1934 - 39, 1942 - 45) were not at all free fro m competition conflicts. On the contrary, major National - Socialist organizations fought against each other for supremacy. In 1933/34, the Reichsnährstand (Reich Farmer Association) under Walther Darré had gained a strong position. His claims for autonomy were an obstacle for the development of other Third Reich institutions, such as the Gaue (NS party districts), the Hitler Youth, and the German Labor Front 36 This led to permanent conflicts until 1939, when an alliance of other high Nazi official contained Darré ’s ambition s In 1933, the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF) had been established under Robert Ley to overcome the contradictions between capital and labor. It comprised all kinds of working people, employees as well as entrepreneurs and freelancers. Consequently, i n 1934/35, the DAF claimed primacy over the ministries of labor and economics. The latter two rejected, and the subsequent conflict negotiations w ere settled by compromise Through a Führer decree, i.e. the Leipzig agreement of March 1935, the DAF conceded to leave the issues of industry and wages to the respective Reich ministries. 37 But this did not fu l ly pacify the dis sents , and new conflicts arose in subsequent years 30 {Rebentisch 1989 #6853D: 16 – 17} 31 {Hüttenberger 1976 #5796D: 417} 32 Reference to INS article on mobilization 33 Reference to INS article on modernization 34 Reference to INS article on barbarism 35 {Court 2019 #6709S: 9 – 1 5 } 36 {Wehler 2003 #6790D: 702 - 70 7 } 37 {Volckart 2003 #6712D: 191 – 192} {Roth 1993 #4980D: 70} 6 The original thesis of polycracy suggested high degrees of aggressiveness resulting in chaos , losses, and the regime’s self - weakening. Several early case studies had confirm ed this conception. However, later research often contradicted such far - going generalization s . It was Hildebrand in 1981 who refused the extreme interpretation of a weakening of the Third Reich by polycratic fragmentation. Instead , “ the associated decentrali zation of power functions and the resulting elastic structure of Nazi statehood were rather decisive elements of an astonishing self - stabilization of the regime below the Führer ”. 38 At the same time, British historian s , su ch as Robert Cecil and Alan Milward , opposed the contention of a “ progressive self - destruction of the Natio nal - Soc ialist system of rule, which was not capable of rational political problem - solving and [...] took the ‘ flight forward ’ in to ever new aggressions ” 39 For this, the performance of the Third Reich in many sectors was considered too obvious Nevertheless, the chaos , damage , and radicalization thesis of polycracy was still maintained for some time, so by Hans Mommsen, who in 1989 stated “the dissolution of the political system of the Third Reich”. 40 Since the beginning of the 21 st century, the conduct of German offices in countries occupied in Second World War has been investigated. The results did not really confirm the thesis of mutual conflict and chaos. Instead , the units in question attained cooperation accompanied by benefit sharing cu lminating in corruption. 41 In 2013, Oliver Werner criticized the thesis of “polycratic chaos” as one - sided. 42 Summarizing recent research, he stated that the multitude of “ regional and local administrations contributed much more to the Third Reich ’s war capability ” than otherwise expectable. In 2017, Thomas Schaarschmidt listed a number of cases , in which polycratic actors had arrived to large ly peaceful and fruitful relatio ns. Concerning the Third Reich, h e claimed to have found “ new models of governance evolved from the chaotic competition [...] of traditional administrations, party structures and newly created special institutions ” 43 Furthermore , the contention sometimes made that polycracy increased or at least preserved its intensity during the Third Reich can be considered disproved There is evidence that both the consent to it and its actual practice decreased. So, i n the 1940 s , o fficials of the Third Reich became more and more dis pleased with polycracy. In a memorandum of a bout 1942, distributed within the N SDAP , party professionals compl ained about the resources wasted in the organization al apparatus Persistent d isputes over competenc i e s had not only affected the upper tiers of the party , but also had reached the local level 44 Besides, p olycracy had r u n into problems under pressure of the war economy. Under armaments minister Albert Speer and his assistant from the economics ministry Hans Kehrl, a comprehensive dismantling of polycracy took place between 1942 and 1944. First, t he highly dysfunctional in terference from the separate Armaments O ffice (Rüstungsamt) was abolished and its duties were taken over by the Speer ministry. 45 In the armaments industries, t he status of 38 {Hildebrand 1981 #1764D: 79} 39 {Mommsen 1981 #6818D: 1 7 } 40 {Mommsen 1989 #6657D: 3 0 – 40 } 41 {Court 2019 #6709S: 9 – 14} 42 {Werner 2013 #1649D: 217 – 218} 43 {Schaarschmidt 2017 #6871D: 218} 44 {Wehler 2003 #6790D: 632} 45 {Fröhlich 2018 #5860D: 41 9 – 420} 7 the entrepreneurial bodies was strengthened at th e expense of the militaries 46 In the general economy, a comprehensive system of rationing agencies for the purpose of allocatin g scarce goods was set up 47 In d oing so, the cartel system (that had been so typical o f Germany) was abolished by liquidation of the relevant bodies or their transformation to other purposes. Undoubtedly, polycratic dynamics caused unwanted losses of resources, i.e. human lives and material resources The reasons for these failures were manifold. They included pursuit of supremacy , a lack of coordination , and mutual blockades. Around 100 SA members were murdered in the Röhm purge of 1934. Hitler had seen the danger of a left rebe llion. He had or dered this assault within the given polycracy to prevent a change in the balance of power. 48 The anti - Semitic pogrom of the Reichskristal l nacht in 1938 caused great financial losses. This was an un wanted s ide impact from the realm of Joseph Goebbels, Reich Ministry of Propaganda, on the interests of Hermann Göring, Commissioner of the Four Year s Plan for the e conomy. While terror against the Jews was approved , the extensive damage to buildings had not been agreed upon and anticipated by Goering. The losses amounted to 25 million Reich marks and reduced the foreign currency stock due to necess itated glass imports 49 The most embarrassing failure of the National - Socialis t policy m ust have been the Reich s reform , pursued since 1933 . Th e p lan had been to replace the Weimar federalism ’s dysfunctional union states ( Länder ) with t he better tailored G au districts of the NSDAP However, t he ambitious p roject was the focus of so many divergent interests that it barely made any progress and was quietly halted when the war broke out. 50 4. The p osition of polycracy in National - Socialist thought P olycracy was not a n explicit notion of National - Socialist thought. But the fact s , namely polycratic processes and constellations, w ere nevertheless known. Contemporary comments on them allow a placement of the phenomenon with in the field of National - Socialist ideology , because the core components of polycracy , social Darwinism 51 and the organological principle 52 can be identified. For example , i n Mein Kampf of 1925/26, Hitler had addressed the problem of organizational progress despite uncertainty H e start ed with a number of spirited doers with competing concepts. If in such a situation “the rightness or wrongness of a path” seem ed unclear, “the free play of forces should be given free rein [and] the final determination [...] should be entrusted to the unmistakable proof of visible success” 53 Th at was just the combination of Let things grow and The superior will prevail Hitler under stood this fight for the best solution as a fair contest among personalities. Apparently, these principles were recognized, shared, and more or less applied by the earl y National - Socialist movement. Th at was made clea r by the above mentioned party 46 {Gross 2018 #5201D: 275} 47 {Müller 1999 #1609S: 88 - 90, 95} 48 {Longerich 2019 #6826S: 368 – 391} 49 {Nagel 2018 #6743D: 15 2 } 50 {Bracher 1960 #6904D :609 - 611 } {Bundesarchiv #5425S: R 43 – II/494a} 51 Reference to INS article on Social Darwinism 52 Reference to my INS article The Organic Order of the Economy 53 {Hitler 2016 #5496I: II/1287} 8 memorandum of a bout 1942 , which combined criticism with a retrospect ive praise. “ The principle of letting it grow until the stronger prevails has certainly been the secret of the movement's amazing development and achievement .” 54 But now, “ delimitation of competences ” should be preferred to “f ighting it out ”. The next important commands of National - Socialist ideology in terms of polycracy were the leader principle and the soldierly as well as folkish attitude 55 Th is mobilization gave the roughly assembled polycratic vehicle direction and drive. Other commands, such as the strive for national greatness , classless society or anti - capitalism , were not in the same way relevant . However, the complex of race p olicy and its consequences was a popular target definition for activities in polycratic settings 5. Conclusi ons P olycracy is a common category of historic research on National - Socialist ruling. Its status is not yet finally clarified. Its application , which was often insufficiently relativized , has met with criticism. Recent research suggests that polycracy in the Third Reich was a phenomenon in transition from looser, more chaotic forms to firmer , more routine mechanisms of checks and balance s Polycracy is to some extent distinctive for the Na tional - Socialist milieu or system because it was much more characteristic for the Hitler dictatorship than for f ascist Italy or Spain under General Franco. Due to the incomplete present state of polycracy research , sooner or later a development towards a comprehensive theory of Natio nal - Soc ialist rul ing might occur . Polycracy could be integrated then alongside neglected other , particularly social aspects such as class relations. 54 Cited by: {Wehler 2003 #6790D: 632} 55 Reference to INS articles on Leader principle, Soldierly attitude, and Folkish consciousness.