Hi William, Thank you very much for your commentary here. I appreciate it, as I'm sure Breht does, for my part because I see in it an opportunity to exercise the logic of antagonism and non-antagonism a little bit. In order to do that, I first want to make sure that we're on the same page about the claim that you've called into question, i.e. "that we're the first political movement/philosophy in history to try to consciously create the future”. I agree with your view of that claim wholeheartedly and will go further by saying that, if actually applied to actual reality, it is a grotesque travesty. For example, without the Irish Rebellion of 1798, I wouldn't be in Newfoundland (and/or probably wouldn't exist), and that rebellion took ten years of planning after ~600 years of oppression. All of this played out well before Marx, and even before the emergence of Hegel's mature system. There were philosophical texts about consciously creating the future, such as some of Kant's, for example, but none of them resembled what we now call dialectical materialism. Or, to go back to the 1300s, you can find that a fundamental task of humanity according to Thomas Aquinas is to build the future. Slave revolts, peasant revolts, debt revolts, rebellions and uprisings of all sorts from all over the world throughout all of history are very common occurrences and all of them are more-or-less conscious efforts to create the future, or at least a future. All that said, I was unable to find the sentence “we're the first political movement/philosophy in history to try to consciously create the future”. I was, however, able to find the sentence “We really are the first people in history, broadly speaking, to understand the development and then consciously be able to take it into our own hands", and that seems to me to be the only possible source sentence for the sentence in your comment, i.e. the target sentence in your comment. I can certainly see a family resemblance between these sentences, however, I would be very uncomfortable saying that they are substantively identical. To sort that out, we would have to have Breht weigh in on the matter and tell us whether he meant by his sentence what is signified in the sentence in your comment. I would be very surprised if he said that he did, however because I have heard Breht point out on the show before that the various indigenous societies who have suffered under European colonization in these lands have epistemological and ontological categories all their own that we haven't even begun to wrap our heads around yet. So, while I can't speak for Breht, to my mind the target sentence's sense stands to contradict the source sentence's sense antagonistically. What is non-antagonistic here, I would suggest is that, despite the contradiction at the level of phrasing, is the underlying agreement that I am sure you share: to claim that nobody before us ever consciously tried to create the future is a) wrong and b) a vehicle of hubris. ⁂ To pivot, a little, however, I would like to critically analyze the source sentence to consider how, beyond anyone's intentions, language inherently forces us into difficulties that we have to resolve through criticism and self-criticism. This is not a criticism of Breht's having said it, but rather a criticism of the language itself regardless who uses it. First: the referential scope of the word “we” is probably the most difficult to define in any language that uses personal pronouns and does not simply indicate person, number, etc. in verb morphology. Once the referential scope of “we” has exceeded a pretty small number of people, it gets harder and harder to define. For example, I have recently been researching the history of a town in Newfoundland called Port Union which, between 1908-1924, was built, maintained, and governed by the members of the Fishermen's Protective Union. During their rise and zenith, they made incredible material gains for their member-citizens, putting St. John's to shame. In their fall, however, it is easy to see an inadequate consciousness of historical existence. They grasped the antagonistic relationship between the fishermen and St. John's banking/merchant class; however, they did not grasp it as a dialectical contradiction both driving and driven by much larger dialectical processes. On the other hand, in reading texts, listening to podcasts, etc., about indigenous liberation, I have seen instances in which people from various indigenous nations in the 19th and 20th centuries have observed, to settlers, that the very material basis of settler society is unsustainable and will eventually undo itself. The observations I have read about were made, in each instance, without any reference whatsoever to Marxism. Nonetheless, this is a far superior level of historical consciousness than that of the FPU's, which traded in at least some of the concepts of Western political-economic theory. Thus, in our source sentence, who above would more properly belong to the “We” in question? I would argue it's the latter. This dramatically complicates the sense of our source sentence, it seems to me, and that is a good thing. Second: we face a semantic problem in the term “history”. It is derived principally from the Greek verb ἵ στημι (hístēmi), which means “I make stand”, or “I set up”, or even “I weigh” (something). The French historian Paul Veyne has written some very interesting stuff about the epistemological and ontological implications of that fact, which I won't get into for the sake of brevity. I will simply note that, for those of us who belong to the European development, to be “in history” is basically to belong to a material process going back to ancient Mesopotamia, and that that process is unthinkable without the development of writing in service of administering political-economic processes. Because settler states have not ceased attacking indigenous nations, we unfortunately do not have a lot of avenues for doing comparative analyses between Greco-Roman concepts like “history”, “epistemology", “ontology”, etc., and linguistic items in the various indigenous languages that used to prevail in these lands before European colonization. This is part and parcel of our inability to begin, as Breht has observed before, wrapping our heads around their concepts and categories. (Or, perhaps, to whatever is analogous in those languages to things like “concept” and “category” in languages like ours.) ⁂ I'll stop here to simply observe that, even in the source sentence, the very features of language itself force us, if we are to be responsible materialists, into a self-critical position by default. That is why I'm enthusiastic about bringing analytic philosophy to the table in a more structured way in my conversations with Breht. At its best, it offers us powerful tools, such as a concept like “referential scope” that can help us become conscious of the impositions placed on us by language itself, which does not simply express or reflect consciousness at all. Like every other mode of matter that is not consciousness, language exceeds the mode of matter we call consciousness. Anyway, I hope that this was a helpful reply. I applaud you for your vigilance in checking against chauvinism and thank you sincerely again for your intervention in the comments here! I apologize in advance for any errors I have committed in this text. I'm really glad that you enjoy Breht's and my episodes together. In solidarity, Matthew