STATE OF WISCONSIN I N S U P R E M E C O U R T Case No. 2021AP 1673 STATE OF WISCONSIN ex rel. JOSHUA L. KAUL, Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin , Plaintiff - Appellant - Petitioner , v. FREDERICK PREHN , in his capacity as a person claiming to be a Member of the Wisconsin Natural Resources Board, Defendant - Respondent APPEAL FROM A FINAL DECISION AND JUDGMENT GRANTING DEFENDANT ’ S MOTION TO DISMISS, ENTERED IN THE DANE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, THE HONORABLE VALERIE BAILEY - RIHN, PRESIDING STATE OF WISCONSIN ’ S PETITION FOR BYPASS JOSHUA L. KAUL Attorney General of Wisconsin GABE JOHNSON - KARP Assistant Attorney General State Bar #1084731 COLIN A. HECTOR Assistant Attorney General State Bar #1120064 ANTHONY D. RUSSOMANNO Assistant Attorney General State Bar #1076050 Attorneys for Plaintiff - Appellant - Petitioner 2 Wisconsin Department of Justice Post Office Box 7857 Madison, Wisconsin 53707 - 7857 (608) 267 - 8904 (GJK) (608) 266 - 8407 (CAH) (608) 267 - 2238 (ADR) (608) 294 - 2907 (Fax) johnsonkarpg@doj.state.wi.us hectorca@doj.state.wi.us russomannoad@doj.state.wi.us 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ .... 5 ISSUES PRESENTED ................................ ............................ 6 RELIEF REQUESTED ................................ ............................ 7 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................ ................ 7 I. Prehn’s board term expired and the Governor appointed a qualified successor, yet Prehn refuses to leave office. ................................ ................................ ..... 7 II. The circuit court granted Prehn’s motion to dismiss based on its interpretation of this Court’s precedent, despite “very good reasons” under current statutes supporting Prehn’s removal. ............................... 9 ARGUMENT ................................ ................................ .......... 11 I. Bypass is warranted where an appeal satisfies this Court’s criteria for review, where this Court will ultimately review the matter anyway, and where there is a clear need to hasten the ultimate appellate decision. ................................ .............................. 11 II. Special and important reasons support this Court’s immediate review. ................................ ................................ 11 III. Granting bypass now will avoid unnecessary delay, as the issue presented is of ur gent importance and this Court will likely decide to review this appeal anyway. ............................... 15 CONCLUSION ................................ ................................ ....... 17 4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Attorney Gen. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. , 35 Wis. 425 (1874) ................................ ................................ 6 State v. Pierce , 191 Wis. 1, 209 N.W. 693 (1926) ................................ ........ 16 State ex rel. Martin v. Ekern , 228 Wis. 645, 280 N.W. 393 (1938) ............................... 6, 16 State ex rel. Pluntz v. Johnson , 176 Wis. 107, 184 N.W. 683 (1921) , j. vacated on other grounds sub nom. State v. Johnson , 176 Wis. 107, 186 N.W. 729 (1922) ............................... 5, 14 State ex rel. Thompson v. Gibson , 22 Wis. 2d 275, 125 N.W.2d 636 (1964) ............ 5, 10, 13, 14 Statutes Wis. Stat. § 15.07(1)(c) ................................ ................... 6, 7, 12 Wis. Stat. § 15.34(2)(a) ................................ ........................ 6, 7 Wis. Stat. § 17.01(13) ................................ ............................. 12 Wis. Stat. § 17.07(3) – (6) ................................ .......................... 6 Wis. Stat. § 17.20(2)(a) ................................ .................. 6, 9, 12 Wis. Stat. § 784. 04 ................................ ................................ ... 9 Wis. Stat. § 784.07 ................................ ......................... 5, 9, 16 Wis. Stat. § 801.02(5) ................................ ..................... 5 , 9, 16 Wis Stat. § 808.05(1) ................................ ............................. 11 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60(1)(a) ................................ ............. 11 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1) ................................ ................... 11 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r) ................................ .......... 11, 15 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r) (a) ................................ ...... 11, 13 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62 (1r)(c)3. ................................ .... 11, 13 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r) (e) ................................ ............ 13 5 INTRODUCTION The State of Wisconsin seeks bypass so this Court may address time - sensitive issues concerning a Natural Resources Board member’s refusal to leave office after his term expired. The circuit court acknowledged that the governing statutes and t he Wisconsin Constitution provide “compelling” bas e s for removing Defendant Frederick Prehn from office, but concluded that this Court’s decision in State ex rel. Thompson v. Gibson , 22 Wis. 2d 275, 125 N.W.2d 636 (1964), supports Prehn ’s continued holding over . The court therefore declined to give effect to the applicable statutes and constitutional principles This Court’s involvement is warranted now to resolve this discrepancy , as each day that passes inflicts further harm to the pub lic, with the rightful b oard member currently barred from taking her seat by Defendant Prehn’s refusal to step down A s a matter of practice, this Court ordinarily does not grant bypass until after appellate briefing is complete However , it should not f ollow that practice here , as this case warrants immediate attention for unusual reasons special to this matter First, the circuit court dismissed this action on the theory that a Wisconsin Supreme Court case, State ex rel. Thompson v. Gibson , tied th at court’s hands. If that is correct, only this Court, and not the court of appeals, can meaningfully address the issues presented. If that reading of Thompson is correct, it is also at odds with this Court’s holding in State ex rel. Pluntz v. Johnson , 176 Wis. 107, 184 N.W. 683, 685 (1921), j. vacated on other grounds sub nom. State v. Johnson , 176 Wis. 107, 186 N.W. 729 (1922) This Court’s review is then also needed to resolve that conflict. Second, the statute s governing quo warranto procedu re , Wis. Stat. § § 801.02(5) and 784.07 , contemplate expedited 6 proceedings, and for good reason. Wher e, as here, it is alleged that a state officer is usurping a position of substantial authority, it is of the utmost public importance that the legality of that action be resolved as soon as possible. Third and relatedly, this Court has on multiple occasions recognized that quo warranto proceedings are appropriately addressed to this Court in the first instance, since the question of an officer’s right to office is “ publici juris ,” relating to “the sove reignty of the state” and “the liberties of its people.” State ex rel. Martin v. Ekern , 228 Wis. 645, 280 N.W. 393, 394 (1938) (quoting Att orne y Gen. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. , 35 Wis. 425, 518 (1874) ) That acknowledges that this Court is an appropriate forum, especially where, as here, t he lower court has ruled that this Court’s precedent controls. In light of the weighty and time - sensitive issues presented , this Court should grant bypass now. ISSUES PRESENTED T he circuit court dismiss ed the State’s complaint seeking a writ of quo warranto and, in the alternative, a declaratory judgment against Defendant Prehn. That dismissal rested on two legal conclusions that implicate executive authority under the Wisconsin S tatutes and Constitution. The first issue is whe ther the expiration of Prehn’s fixed term of appointment on the Wisconsin Natural Resources Board created a vacancy subject to gubernatorial provision al appointment See Wis. Stat. §§ 15.07(1)(c), .34(2)(a), 17.20(2)(a) The second issue is whether the expiration of Prehn’s fixed term ended any “for - cause” protection that Prehn enjoyed , so that afte r his term expired he was removable by the Governor at pleasure See Wis. Stat. § 17.07 (3) – (6 ) 7 These issues implicate statutes that are fundamental to the proper functioning of Wisconsin government, an d which require this Court’s clarification for the system to operate as it should. These issues also implicate two core executive powers, and th is Court’s guidance is needed to avoid the separation - of - powers problems that result from Prehn’s position. F or one , the constitution gives the executive branch the exclusive power to “ take care that the laws be faithfully executed ” T he Legislature may not exert control over executive officers and the agencies they head by preventing their removal after a fixed ter m has ended . Second, removal is a core executive function, and the Legislature may not reserve for itself the power to control removal of an officer in charge of a core executive agency RELIEF REQUESTED Plaintiff - Appellant State of Wisconsin respectfully request s that this Court take jurisdiction of this appeal. If bypass is granted, the State request s an expedited schedule for briefing ( and if the court desire s , oral argument ) before this Court. STATEMENT OF THE CASE I. Prehn’s b oard term expired and the Governor appointed a qualified successor, yet Prehn refuses to leave office. The Wisconsin Natural Resources Board (the “ Board”) is made up of s even members appointed to six - year terms. See Wis. Stat. § 15.34(2)(a). Those terms “shall expire on May 1” of the final year. Wis. Stat. § 15.07(1)(c). Defendant Prehn was appointed on May 18, 2015, for a term expiring on 8 May 1, 2021. (Dkt. 17 :7 , Pet. App. 107 1 ) A nother Board member’s term (Julie Anderson) also expired on that date. ( Dkt. 17:7 , Pet. App. 107 ) In anticipation of the vacancies created by the expiration of Prehn’s and Anderson’s term s, Governor Evers announced his appointment s of Sandra Nas s and Sharon Adams to the Board . ( Dkt. 17: 7 – 8 , Pet. App. 107 – 08 .) Ahead of the expiration of her term, Anderson resigned on April 14, 2021, and Adams took office on May 1. ( Dkt. 17: 7 – 8 , Pet. App. 107 – 08 ) On April 30 , Naas also took the oath of office, the reby qualifying for the Board seat formerly held by Prehn. ( See Dkt. 56:7 , Pet. App. 199 .) Prehn, however, has refused to step down following the expiration of his fixed term . ( Dkt. 17: 8 , Pet. App. 108 .) It has been reported that Prehn consulted with legislative leaders’ offices and lobbyists when deciding not to vacate the office and to continue exercising the duties of the office of Board member (Dkt. 56:31 , Pet. App. 223 .) With the expiration of his t erm having come and gone, Prehn has continued to act as if he is still a Board member, including by voting on Board matters affecting the policies and acts of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). ( Dkt. 17:8 , Pet. App. 10 8 ) This occurred most recentl y at the August Board meeting , which involved various harvest regulations, land donations, a wolf hunt, phosphorus criteria, pollution discharge permits, and other matters. ( Dkt. 17:8 , Pet. App. 108 ) 1 Because the appellate record is not yet available, citations to the record refer to circuit court docket entries , with the most relevant documents also included in the accompanying appendi x. 9 Based on his public comments, it is anticipated that Prehn plans to continue to exercise the duties of a Board member at upcoming Board meeting s ( Dkt. 17:8 , Pet. App. 108 ) The State of Wisconsin, by its Attorney General, brought this quo warranto action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § § 784.04 and 801.02(5) to remove and exclude Prehn from the Board member office that he c urrently claims to occupy. (Dkt. 3; see also Dkt. 17 ; 56 , Pet. App. 101 – 44, 193 – 228 .) II. The circuit court granted Prehn’s motion to dismiss based on its interpretation of this Court’s precedent , despite “very good reasons” under current statutes supporting Prehn’s removal As required under the statutes governing quo warranto proce dure , see Wis. Stat. § § 784.07 and 801.02(5) , the circuit court expedited briefing and a decision on the State’s complaint . ( See Dkt. 6; 72:2 , Pet. App. 23 0 .) In support of the complaint, the St ate argued that the expiration of Prehn’s fixed term created a vacancy in the office; that Governor Evers appointed Naas to fill that vacancy pursuant to the provisional appointment statute, Wis. Stat. § 17.20(2)(a) ; that once Prehn’s term expired , Naas’s appointment wa s “in full force until acted upon by the senate ” ; and that she is presently authorized to “ exercise all of the powers and duties of the office to which [she] is appointed ” Wis. Stat. § 17.20(2)(a) ; ( s ee Dkt. 17:9 – 23; 56 :8 – 23 , Pet. App. 109 – 23, 200 – 15 ) Independent from the vacancy and appointment statutes, the State also argued that under the statutes governing removal, Prehn is current ly removable at the Governor’s pleasure since his “for - cause” tenure protection ended with the expiration of his term. ( See Dkt. 17:23 – 28; 56:23 – 28 , Pet. App. 123 – 28, 215 – 20 .) In support of these two statutory bases, the State argued that separation - of - powers principles mandate that 10 Prehn may not continue in office while the Governor’s lawful appointee stands ready and qualified to serve. The State argued that while the statutes are clear and require Prehn’s exclusion from office, any doubt must be resolved against Prehn’s position, which would violate the separation of powers by impermissibly restricting the Executive’s removal authority and aggrandizing the Legislature’s author ity over a core executive agenc y ( See Dkt. 17:29 – 41; 56:28 – 35 , Pet. App. 129 – 41, 220 – 27 .) Prehn moved to dismiss the complaint , arguing principally that Wisconsin common law and this Court’s decision in Thompson , 22 Wis. 2d 275, mandates that “there is presently no vacancy on the Board” and that he “ has the right to continue in office as a member of the Board de jure until the legislature confirms Ms. Naas’ appointment. ” (Dkt. 19:7 , Pet. App. 151 .) 2 The circuit court granted Prehn’s moti on to dismiss , holding that while “ there are very good reasons for concluding a ‘vacancy’ occurs when a person’s term is over, that is not for this Court,” which instead “must follow the precedent set forth in State ex rel. Thompson v. Gibson .” (Dkt. 72:2 , P et. App. 230 .) Notably, the court expressed serious doubts about the correctness of Prehn’s legal arguments , and also noted “compelling” constitutional considerations support ing his removal (Dkt. 72: 11, 16 – 17 , Pet. App. 23 9 , 244 – 45 ) Nonetheless, the court “ decline [d] to remedy one constitutional misstep with another by overruling the precedent of the S upreme C ourt .” (Dkt. 72:17 , Pet. App. 245 .) 2 Before the circuit court, two entities sought to intervene: th e Wisconsin Legislature and Hunter Nation, Inc. ( See Dkt. 8 ; 12 ; 15.) T he circuit court denied both motions. (Dkt. 58.) The Legislature appealed that decision. See Case No. 2021AP1610 This Court also may wish to take jurisdiction of that appeal, if the Legislature wishes to pursue it. 11 ARGUMENT I. Bypass is warranted where an appeal satisfies this Court’s criteria for review, w here this Court will ultimately review the matter anyway, and where there is a clear need to hasten the ultimate appellate decision Wisconsin Stat. § 808.05(1) provides that this Court may take jurisdiction of an appeal if “[i]t grants direct review upon a petition to bypass filed by a party.” Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.60(1) (a) provides that a party may file with this Court “a petition to bypass the court of appeals pursuant to s. 808.05 no later than 14 days following the filing of the respondent’s brief under s. 809.19 or response.” This Court’s internal operating procedures set forth circumstances where bypass is warranted: “A matter appropriate for bypass is usually one which meets one or more of the criteria for review, Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1), and one the court concludes it ultimately will choose to consider regardless of how the Court of Appeals might decide the issue s .” Wisconsin Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedures, § II.B.2. Additionally, “[a]t times, a petition fo r bypass will be granted where there is a clear need to hasten the ultimate appellate decision.” Id II. Special and important reasons support this Court’s immediate review Bypass is appropriate because t his appeal satisfies multiple criteria for review under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r) Primarily, a decision from this Court will help clarify and h armonize the law, since legal questions about the G overnor’s appointment and removal authority are extremely likely to recur unless this Court resolves this dispute. See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)(c)3. 12 Defendant Prehn interprets this Court’s decision in Thompson as stating a blanket rule that would grant him — and any other holdover in a fixed - term, appointive state office — “the right to continue in office as a member of the Board de jure until the legislature confirms [ a successor’s] appointment.” (Dkt. 19:7 , Pet. App. 151 .) Prehn’s view suffers multiple defects that, without this Court’s review and correction, are very likely to prevail among state officeholders seeking to extend their tenure s The first problem with Pre hn’s view is that it is contrary to the statutes governing vacancies, appointments, and removal. The statutes governing appointments to the Board provide a mandatory expiration date: “fixed terms of members of boards shall expire on May 1 and, if the term is for an even number of years, shall expire in an odd - numbered year.” Wis. Stat. § 15.07(1)(c). This mandatory expiration created a vacancy subject to the Governor’s appointment of a successor. Prehn’s view also runs counter to the statute governing gubernatorial provisional appointment s , Wis. Stat. § 17.20(2)(a). That statute authorizes the Governor to fill a vacancy by provisional appointment, with any such appointment being “in full force until acted upon by the senate.” Wis. Stat. § 17.20(2)(a). And while awaiting senate confirmation, as soon as a provisional appointee takes the oath of office, he or she “may exercise all of the powers and duties of the office to w hich [he or she] is appointed.” Id. ; see also Wis. Stat. § 17.01(13) (provisional appointee “qualifies for office” by “fil[ing] the required oath of office”). Prehn’s view also means that former officers like him would enjoy “for cause” protection after the expiration of his term, potentially indefinitely, as long as a friendly senate refuses to confirm his successor. Not only is this contrary to the default statutory rule limiting th e instances in which “for cause” protection is available, but it also raises significant 13 separation - of - powers concerns by transferring the executive’s removal authority to the senate. If Prehn’s view were to prevai l it is highly likely that individuals appointed to serve in offices across state government would seek to hold over indefinitely, just as Prehn has done . This Court’s prompt review is necessary to avoid the recurrence of this counter - textual, nonsensical result. See Wis. Stat. § (R ule) 809.62(1r)(c)3. This Court’s review is also needed because Prehn’s position raise s real and significant question s of state constitutional law. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)( a) ; ( s ee also Dkt. 72:2, 17 , Pet. App. 230, 245 ) As the circuit court highl ighted in its decision, there are “compelling” constitutional reasons why Prehn and a friendly senate cannot be allowed to thwart the Governor’s decision to remove a head of a core executive agency after that officer’s fixed term expired. (Dkt. 72:16 – 17 , P et. App. 244 – 45 .) That is because executive branch officials like Prehn share in the chief executive’s function of faithfully executing the laws U nder Prehn’s view, the Legislature ultimately controls his removal, and can keep him in place for as long as it likes. Allowing Prehn’s view to prevail would constitute a serious breach of the separation of powers and echoes the Founders’ fears of aggrandizement of power to the Legislature ( See Dkt. 17:37; 56:32 , Pet. App. 137, 224 .) T his Court’s review is also warranted because the Thompson decision is “ripe for reexamination.” Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r)(e). As the circuit court rightly acknowledged , current statutes and common sense support the conclusion that the expiration of Prehn’s fixed term created a vacancy subject to gubernatorial appointment. ( See Dkt. 72: 2, 6 – 14, 16 – 17 , Pet. App. 230, 234 – 42, 244 – 45 ) The only impediment to this textuall y supported, common - sense result is th at Thompson can be read as supporting the opposite result. 14 The circuit court expressly recognized this tension, confirming that a “logical interpretation of the statutes is that a fixed term appointment results in a vacancy after the term ends. However . . the Supreme Court has held otherwise [in Thompson ].” (Dkt. 72:11 – 12 , Pet. App. 239 – 40 .) Indeed, even Prehn admits that his Thompson - based argument — that no vacancy arises until after the senate confirms his successor — is “counterintuitive ” (Dkt. 19:6 , P et. App. 150 .) T he State has maintained throughout this litigation that current statutes — not Thompson — control and dictate that the expiration of Prehn’s fixed term (1) created a vacancy subject to the Governor’s provisional appointment ; and (2) ended Prehn’s for - cause tenure protection, making him removable at pleasure ( See, e.g. , Dkt. 17: 9 – 2 8 ; 56 :8 – 28 , Pet. App. 109 – 28, 200 – 20 .) Nonetheless, the State also acknowledg e s that Thompson can be read as stating a rule that conflicts with current statutes, and has indicated that this Court’s review may be necessary to revisit the rule stated in Thompson . (Dkt. 17:19 n.8 , Pet. App. 119 .) Not only do the parties and the circuit court seemingly agree with the apparent illogic of Thompson ’s rule in re lation to current statutes , that rule also is contrary to long - standing common - law principles and this Court’s other decisions This Court has held that although an incumbent may in some circumstances hold over after the expiration of his term, “there [is] nevertheless a vacancy in the office” that is immediately subject to appointment. Pluntz , 184 N.W. at 685. This Court’s decision in Thompson did not mention this rule, did not cite Pluntz , and did not explain how its holding comports with that longstan ding rule. See generally Thompson , 22 Wis. 2d 275. Thus, this Court’s intervention is needed to resolve th e conflict between its decisions in Thompson an d Pluntz 15 Given the likely recurrence of this type of dispute , the significant statutory and constitutional issues raised relating to e xecutive authority , and the need to reexamine Thompson , t his case meets the criteria for review under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r). III. Granting bypass now will avoid unnecessary delay, as the issue presented is of urgent importance and t his Court will likely decide to review this appeal anyway Bypass also is warranted because this Court will very likely choose to consider the issues presented regardless of how the c ourt of a ppeals might decide them. See Wisconsin Supreme Court Internal Operating Procedures , § II.B.2. Further, by nature, challenges to an office holder are urgent — harms accrue to the public each time a monthly Board meeting is held or the holdover takes any other official action As the circuit court explained, while “there are very good reasons” why the statutes should be applied as written to r equire Prehn to vacate, that court determined that it “must follow the precedent set forth in [this Court’s decision] in State ex rel. Thompson v. Gibson .” (Dkt. 72:2 , Pet. App. 230 .) The court of appeals could reach the same conclusion. In that event, the parties and the public will have waited far longer for this issue to be resolved , even though the statutes and precedent recognize that these disputes should be resolved quickly In t he meantime, the current holdover will continue to unlawfully participate on the Board 16 In addition, t he statutes governing quo warranto procedure mandate expedited proceedings to determine a contested right to a public office. See Wis. Stat. § § 784.07 , 801.02(5) . The circuit court acknowledge d this, both when initially scheduling this matter for expedited briefing and decision ( see Dkt. 3 ; 6) and when issuing its written opinion ( see Dkt. 72:4 , Pet. App. 232 ). The statutes’ provision for expedited proceedings demonstrates a strong policy in favor of promptly resolving the rights and titles to public office. This Court’s precedent recognizes the same. See, e.g. , State v. Pierce , 191 Wis. 1, 209 N.W. 693, 693 (1926) (and cases cited therein); see also Ekern , 280 N.W. at 394 This comports with common sense. Qu ickly resolving who rightfully holds an office in state government ensures that our government is operating lawfully and in accordance with current statutes — not inapplicable, superseded precedents, and, more importantly, not at the will of individual (form er) officeholders. Granting review now will avoid these delays and expedite this Court’s ultimate review of the important issues presented here. 17 CONCLUSION This Court should grant the petition, immediately take jurisdiction of this appeal, and set an expedited schedule for briefing ( and , if the court desires, oral argument ) Dated this 2 7th day of September, 2021. Respectfully submitted, JOSHUA L. KAUL At torney General of Wisconsin GABE JOHNSON - KARP Assistant Attorney General State Bar #1084731 COLIN A. HECTOR Assistant Attorney General State Bar #1120064 ANTHONY D. RUSSOMANNO Assistant Attorney General State Bar #1076050 Attorneys for Plaintiff - Appellant - Petitioner Wisconsin Department of Justice Post Office Box 7857 Madison, Wisconsin 53707 - 7857 (608) 267 - 8904 (GJK) (608) 266 - 8407 (CAH) (608) 267 - 2238 (ADR) (608) 294 - 2907 (Fax) johnsonkarpg@doj.state.wi.us hectorca@doj.state.wi.us ru ssomannoad@doj.state.wi.us 18 FORM AND LENGTH CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that this petition conforms to the rules contained in Wis. Stat. §§ (Rule) 809.19(8)(b), (bm) and 809.62(4) for a petition produced with a proportional serif font. The length of this petition is 32 85 words Dated this 2 7 th day of September, 2021. _________________________ GABE JOHNSON - KARP Assistant Attorney General CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH WIS. ST AT. §§ (RULE) 809.19(12) and 809.62(4)(b) (2019 – 20) I hereby certify that: I have submitted an electronic copy of this petition, excluding the appendix, if any, which complies with the requirements of Wis. Stat. §§ (Rule) 809.19(12) and 809.62(4)(b) (2019 – 20). I further certify that: This electronic petition is identical in content and format to the printed form of the petition filed as of this date. A copy of this certificate has been served with the paper copies of this petition filed with the court and served on all opposing parties. Dated this 2 7 th day of September, 2021. _________________________ GABE JOHNSON - KARP Assistant Attorney General