Garber 1 Applying R2P To the Anfal Genocide; Respecting Soverignity, Saving Lives How do you prevent genocide? How do you atone for one? With something as abhorrent as the destruction of a people, military intervention is often the first response that comes to mind. It is seen as justified in the face of horrors and even as a life-saving response. But what if there was another way? This paper will examine the works of both Evans and Mamdani and apply them to Iraq. The Anfal genocide of the Kurdish people will be examined in the context of these authors. Honoring both points of view, non-military applications of R2P will be explored, and how R2P can be applied in a way that preserves national sovereignty, even in the direst of human rights abuses. The argument will be made that national sovereignty is for the people, and the nation as a continuous entity, not the current despot or authoritarian. A light defense of superpower policing will be conducted, with the pitfalls therein noted. Iraq: A Brief Contemporary History Iraq was a part of the Ottoman Empire until the dissolution of the empire and subsequent partitioning by the Allied Powers following World War I. The partitions included Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. French and British in colonial ownership, the lines were drawn in such a way that theories persist about their true nature being to ensure tension in the region. Iraq had previously been divided into three vilayets (administrative areas of the empire); Mosul Vilayet, Baghdad Vilayet, and Basra Vilayet. After partition, Iraq was a part of the waning British empire until independence was granted to King Faisal in 1932. After Faisal’s death in 1933. The death of the king led to a number of unstable monarchies, a coup, and a subsequent British invasion of Iraq during World Garber 2 War II. in 1958 the July 14 revolution occurred. A military rule with strong socialist leanings, two counter-coups followed, eventually leading to the Ba’ath party president, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Saddam Hussein gradually took power from al-Bakr, and Hussein assumed the presidency in 1979. Anfal Genocide The Anfal Genocide began in 1988 and was an eight-stage attack on the Kurdish people. Occurring at the end of the Iran-Iraq war (also known as the Persian Gulf War in the U.S), estimates state up to 182,000 Kurds were killed. The campaign’s official justification was to nullify Kurdish resistance elements, which had allied themselves with Iran. Both systematic executions and chemical weapons were used to this end. The Iraqi army were the perpetrators of the genocide, with the action closer to the German Holocaust in execution than the Rwandan case of neighbor against neighbor. Like many genocides, the actual murders were preceded by relocation of the Kurdish people to mujamma'at , shoddily constructed complexes that were for all intents and purposes, concentration camps. The preceding actions and methodologies are important to cement the Anfal campaign as genocide and not a legitimate military action. Civilians, including children, were killed indiscriminately and by indiscriminate methods such as sarin gas (it is important to note that the production and stockpiling of sarin was still legal under international law until the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993). Western reaction to the Anfal genocide was muted, due to the west’s support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. The U.S president at the Time, Ronald Regan, ignored and downplayed the actions of the Iraqi government. When the use of Garber 3 chemical weapons against the city of Halabcha was revealed, President Regan muddied the waters by laying the blame for the use of chemical weapons dually on Iran and Iraq. Of further concern is the legitimation that the U.S gave to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran beginning in 1983, having supplied them intelligence which was then used for targeting 1 . The U.S Congress did not attempt to pass sanctions on Iraq until 1988. These sanctions spelled out that the Anfal campaign was a genocide, but the Regan administration successfully fought them, and the bill did not pass. In this way, the U.S is indirectly responsible for the Anfal Genocide. As to what could have been done differently and how R2P could have helped save lives, an analysis of opinions on R2P is first required. Evans, R2P, Iraq Gareth Evans is a major advocate of the R2P doctrine. In his book, Understanding the Right to Protect , he lays out the doctrine steps. There is an advisement period where the state is offered assistance in correcting its behavior towards its citizens. Second, there is a pressure campaign. Economic persuasion such as embargoes may be placed,and political pressure where sanctions against individuals or the nation as a whole may be levied. Finally, and only if all else fails, is military intervention justified. Evans writes at length about the place of military action as only a last resort. Importantly for the premise of this paper, sovereignty and its preservation are discussed at length. R2P predicates its actions on the citizen’s ultimate sovereignty; crimes against humanity impinge upon this sovereignty. Though not stated directly, Evans seems to state that state legitimacy flows from the preservation of this citizen Garber 4 sovereignty. 1 Finally, Evans states quite importantly that rebuilding is a vital part of any R2P intervention, whether of an economic, political, or military nature. This tenet of rebuilding is a cornerstone of this paper’s ultimate analysis. Evans defends R2P forcefully, as an important doctrine for a safer, more just world. Defending the doctrine does not mean defending its use, however. The Libyan invasion of 2011, though touted as an R2P case, has been deemed a failure of the doctrine by Evans and others. Imperfect application does not equal unuseful protocol. In a pure Evansian application of R2P, how would the Anfal genocide have been addressed? One could make the argument that military intervention - Evans last resort - may have come into play. This theory could be well-founded, due to the uncompromising nature of authoritarian leaders like Saddam. But Evans would surely take softer steps first. For example, using American intelligence sharing as a carrot would have been a strong motivator to the Saddam Regime. With Kurdish relocation having taken place since the 1970s, the United States had the capability to know plainly what was taking place in Iraq. Economic sanctions could also be effective, and in-line with R2P. However, if we accept the notion that only broad-base, populace harming economic sanctions would be effective, the question is raised about how much harm is justified in the cessation and prevention of genocide. This concern is an effective segue into an analysis of the thoughts of a prominent R2P critic, Mahmood Mamdani. Mamdani, R2P, Iraq 1 U.S.-Iraqi Relations and the Kurdish Genocide , National Public Radio, August 22, 2006 Garber 5 Mahmood Mamdani is a prominent and respected critic of the R2P doctrine. His concerns stem greatly from the theory that R2P is a tool of neocolonialism and general power to be lorded by the great powers over weaker nations. In Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish? Mamdani goes on to say that internationally-prescribed justice as a whole is problematic, and focuses on punitive, rather than restorative justice. In this way, Mamdani is a strong proponent of state sovereignty. He references the South African model of restorative justice as a way to equally refute R2P, and internationally-prescribed justice as a whole. In South Africa after the fall of Apartheid, a “forgive but do not forget” approach was taken. Broad criminal penalities were not administered, in exchange for exhaustive structural change. The argument could be well-made, as Mamdani would surely do, that Evansian style-R2P doctrine applied to South Africa would have resulted in a punitive justice, and thus a fractured society for generations. So what would the Mamdani doctrine be in regards to the Anfal campaign? Surely there would be a meeting of the stakeholders. As unfathomable as a discussion between the genocidaire and the victims may seem, such a coming together seems necessary for Mamdani-style justice. However, the problem of Saddam seems to be just that, a problem. Can honest dialogue be had with authoritarians? If we follow the premise that such dialogue could not be undertaken with Saddam, this does not mean Mamdani’s logic fails. With the vast structural change that a post-genocide society would require, one could accurately say that Saddam would need to be disposed. This raises a similar challenge to the Evans situation - how much pain is acceptable for a Garber 6 society if it avoids genocide? Authoritarians do not step aside lightly. The problems with both the Evans and Mamdani approaches applied purely lead to the idea that a middle ground between these academics is the way forward, and would have meant justice and lives saved in Iraq. Saving Lives, Preserving Sovereignty, Reaching Justice International intervention is an affront to state sovereignty. Even if intervention can ultimately mean a state remains sovereign, in its outset is an insult to the self-determination guaranteed by the Westphalian system. The 2003 invasion did Iraq no favors. Though free of an authoritarian, Iraq is now unstable, and arguably, not sovereign. More than 182,000 Iraqi civilians have died due to the war that began with the invasion 2 , greater the upper estimates of death in the Anfal genocide. An invasion of Iraq in the 1970s as Kurds were moved to mujamma'at , or in 1988 after the Halabcha gas attacks would not have been the correct approach. Neither would any approach that would cause lasting harm to Iraq’s sovereignty. Would this have meant negotiating with Saddam, the authoritarian genocidaire? Possibly so. Preserving sovereignty is not done for the benefit of a nation’s ruler, it is for the benefit of the people, and the nation as a continuum. Trade deals could be struck in return for Kurdish security guarantees, third countries could host meetings between Iraqi army generals and the Peshmerga. An oil embargo could have been applied at the first sign of Kurds being moved to camps. Any array of international non-military pressure could have been applied in return for greater Kurdish representation in government. Kurd-Iraqi schools could be set up, the oil wealth that the Kurdish Autonomous Region had been locked out of could be granted in the 2 2 IRAQI CIVILIANS , Neta C. Crawford, Watson Institute, Brown University, updated November 2018 Garber 7 form of reparations. All these interventions can be summed up as international restorative justice. Not of the ICC ilk, but more so a big tent South Africa approach. There are two major problems that this paper has not yet addressed. They are Saddam, and Kurdish independence. Negotiations with Saddam would be vital in the beginning, but envisioning true change with an authoritarian is a fools errand. Saddam would have to be removed from power, but how to do this? Yet another coup? Astroturfing? Financial support of opposition parties? Forced regime change is messy, unpredictable, and is understandably branded neocolonialist. For the national continuum and the people, however, such would be justified. A non-military removal of Saddam at the first signs of genocide, or at least the knowledge by Saddam that such was a possibility, could have saved lives and paved the way for the restorative justice described above. Restorative justice measures taken in the 1970s as the Kurds were being moved to camps could have averted Saddam’s rise to power altogether. Kurdish independence is a more difficult issue to theorize a resolution to. What is a greater blow to the sovereignty of a nation than losing territory? One could argue that any claim to a territory is lost as soon as it is granted such a nebulous title as “semi-autonomous”. Furthermore, it is likely that the Kurds would not be content with the resource-starved region of Iraq they were granted, and would demand more (Kurdish claims to territory in Turkey and Syria are not considered for the purposes of this paper). It is here that this paper sides most strongly with Evans. The sovereignty of a people comes before the sovereignty of the nation. If a people request self-determination, they Garber 8 are entitled to such. Though this would be detrimental to Iraq the state and its remaining citizens, peoples sovereignty must come first. One great criticism of this approach comes back to Mamdani. The nations most able to exert the pressure required are the great powers. As this power is exerted, it is not separate from foreign policy. Does this exertion equal a Pax Americana, Russica, Europa, or Sinica? Perhaps. Genocide, wholescale extermination, instantly becomes an international concern upon its existence. In the Evansian school of thought, one could argument that the moment the state partakes in extermination, they lose their sovereignty due to their impingement upon the sovereignty of people within its borders. It is certainly a denial of human, and civil rights. If a state provides neither of these to a subset of its people by choice, what legitimacy does it have as a sovereign power? Genocide is like a leak in the ship - it must be dealt with and it must take precedence over all else. Superpower peace is fraught with its own dangers, but superpowers have responsibility proportional to their power. Conclusion In conclusion, neither international punitive justice nor purely internal solutions are acceptable remedies against or consolation for acts of genocide. International action in general is fraught with risk, and neocolonialism must be guarded against. Genocide is a national illness, with community as the cure. How do people so far apart as to seek to destroy one another enter into dialogue? It requires a South Africa style commitment to betterment. What helps this process is an international community willing lend to an Garber 9 ear, let cooler heads prevail, and operate as a planet of human beings, not island nations.