IMAGINATION, COGNITION AND PERSONALITY, Vol. 18(3) 205-220, 1998-99 NORMAL DIMENSIONS OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY WITHOUT AMNESIA ROBERT G. KUNZENDORF MELISSA CROSSON ANTOINETTE ZALAKET JEROLD WHITE ROBERT ENIK University of Massachusetts Lowell ABSTRACT A survey for distinguishing the normal and pathological dimensions of multiple personality—the Personal Situations Survey (PSS)—was developed by the authors and tested on 209 college students. Scale A of the PSS was designed to measure Multiple Self-Identity, was normally distributed, and was positively correlated with the normal Absorption/Imagination factor of the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES). Scale B was designed to measure Multiple Self-Control, was normally distributed, and was positively correlated with the normal Absorption/Imagination factor of the DES. Scale C was designed to measure Recall Amnesia/Source Amnesia, was skewed significantly to the right, and was positively correlated with the pathological Amnestic Dissociation and Derealization/Depersonalization factors of the DES. These results suggest that Multiple Self-Identity and Multiple Self-Control are normal dimensions of multiple personality, and that Recall Amnesia/Source Amnesia is the truly pathological dimension of multiple personality. Discussion focuses on the implication that, in Dissociative Identity Disorder, pathological amnesia for trauma is simply superimposed on any pre-existent normal manifestations of Multiple Self-Identity and Multiple Self-Control. 205 © 1999, Baywood Publishing Co., Inc. Multiple Personality Disorder or Dissociative Identity Disorder is generally deemed to be the most severe dissociative disorder, in which trauma not only induces amnesia but also fragments personality [1-5]. Our own alternative thesis is that trauma only induces amnesia (in those who are predisposed to dissociate [6]) and that multiple personality without amnesia is a normal individual differ- ence upon which dissociative reactions to trauma may be superimposed. The possibility that multiple personalities are normal, so long as they can be self-consciously remembered, has previously been suggested by Harter and Hartmann. In Harter’s view, it is not unusual for the normal adolescent to experience himself or herself as different people in different situations [7]. And in Hartmann’s schema of thin- and thick-boundaried personalities, it is not unusual for the normal adult with thin boundaries to “see one’s identity as flexi- ble, changing over time or according to the situation” [8, p. 43]. Moreover, the old DSM-III-R syndrome of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) had diagnos- tic criteria corresponding to multiple self-identity and multiple self-control, but none corresponding to dissociative amnesia [9], and studies found 30 percent to 50 percent of people with MPD to be “high-functioning” [10, p. 291]. Our the- sis predicts that many more, totally normal people with multiple personalities, but no amnesia, never even come to the attention of the clinical psychological establishment. In order to test the latter prediction, we developed a survey for distinguishing the normal and pathological dimensions of multiple personality, and tested its validity in the current research. On this survey, the Personal Situations Survey (PSS) in Appendix A, each subject rates 31 personal situations on three different scales (Scales A-C) which reflect the three dimensions of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) in DSM-IV [11]. Scale A measures the extent to which the sub- ject’s “sense of self . . . is different” across situations, and thus, reflects the Multi- ple Self-Identity dimension of DID (DSM-IV diagnostic criterion A). Scale B measures the extent to which “a different part of [the subject] controls [his or her] behavior” across situations, and thus, reflects the Multiple Self- Control dimen- sion of DID (DSM-IV diagnostic criterion B). Scale C measures the extent to which “significant events in . . . life seem impossible to recall or seem not to be real ” across situations, and thus, reflects the Recall Amnesia/ Source Amnesia dimension of DID (DSM-IV diagnostic criterion C). The Scale C definition of amnesia was based on recent evidence 1) that dissociative amnesia is commonly manifested as source amnesia [1, 12, 13] and 2) that recall amnesia, when it does occur, is reducible to source amnesia [14, 15]. To the extent that Multiple Self-Identity and Multiple Self-Control are normal dimensions of multiple personality, Scale A and Scale B of the PSS should be normally distributed and should be positively correlated with normal dissocia- tion. Conversely, to the extent that Recall Amnesia/Source Amnesia is a patho- logical dimension of multiple personality, Scale C of the PSS should be skewed to the right and should be positively correlated with pathological dissociation. 206 / KUNZENDORF ET AL. Normal dissociation is commonly defined as “becom[ing] absorbed or involved in imagination [and] setting aside . . . the constraints of ordinary reality” [16, p. 104], and is commonly observed in children with no current or subsequent psychopathology [17, 18]. Endeavoring to restrict normal dissociation to chil- dren, Putnam asserts that “imaginary companionship is an excellent example of a [dissociative] phenomena that children normally engage in, but that would be considered abnormal for adults” [18, p. 179]. Such an assertion, however, ignores the fact that many religious adults with no psychopathology experience God as their imaginary companion. Two studies have even documented normal dissocia- tion, without pathological dissociation, in religious mystics who ritualistically imagine themselves being possessed by spirits [19, 20]. In the current research, we employed two measures of normal dissociation: Hartmann’s Boundary Questionnaire (HBQ), and the Absorption/Imagination factor (AI) on Bernstein and Putnam’s Dissociative Experience Scale (DES) [8, 21, 22]. Ross’s other two DES factors—Amnestic Dissociation (AD) and Derealization/Depersonalization (DD)—served as measures of pathological dis- sociation [22]. Recent research has confirmed that DES factor AI is more indica- tive of normal dissociation (e.g., more highly correlated with Tellegen and Atkinson’s Absorption Scale [23]) and is less indicative of psychopathology than DES factors AD and DD [20, 24-26]. Thus, our thesis specifically predicts that the PSS dimensions of Multiple Self-Identity and Multiple Self-Control, inasmuch as they are normal dimensions of multiple personality, should correlate more highly with the normal HBQ trait of thinness and the normal DES factor of Absorption/Imagination. METHODS Procedure After handing in an Informed Consent Statement, each subject filled out three paper-and-pencil surveys: the Personal situations Survey (PSS), developed for this research and reproduced in Appendix A; Bernstein and Putnam’s Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) [21]; and Hartmann’s Boundary Question- naire (HBQ) [8]. As noted above, the PSS instructs subjects to rate thirty-one personal situations on three scales: Scale A, representing the Multiple Self-Iden- tity dimension of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID); Scale B, representing the Multiple Self-Control dimension of DID; and Scale C, representing the Recall Amnesia/Source Amnesia dimension of DID. Subjects The subjects for this research were randomly sampled from General Psychol- ogy classes at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, and were tested in group settings. Two hundred nine subjects completed the questionnaires. MULTIPLE PERSONALITY / 207 RESULTS Computation and Interpretation of Scores From each subject’s PSS responses, scores on Scales A, B, and C were com- puted. Scale A was designed to measure the Multiple Self-Identity dimension of DID (DSM-IV diagnostic criterion A), and was scored by averaging the subject’s thirty-one 4-point ratings on this first PSS scale. Scale B was designed to mea- sure the Multiple Self-Control dimension of DID (DSM-IV diagnostic criterion B), and was scored by averaging the thirty-one ratings on this second PSS scale. Scale C was designed to measure the Recall Amnesia/Source Amnesia dimen- sion of DID (DSM-IV criterion C), and was scored by averaging the subject’s 4-point ratings on this third PSS scale. Higher scores on Scales A, B, and C, respectively, approach or meet DID diagnostic criteria A, B, and C [11]. From each subject’s DES responses, Ross’s three factor scores—AI, AD, and DD—were computed [22]. Factor AI, measuring Absorption/Imagination, was scored by averaging the subject’s 0 to 100 percent ratings on twelve DES items (nos. 2, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25). Factor AD, measuring Amnestic Dissociation, was scored by averaging the subject’s ratings on four DES items (nos. 3, 4, 5, and 8). Factor DD, measuring Derealization/ Depersonalization, was scored by averaging the 0 to 100 percent ratings on five DES items (nos. 11, 12, 13, 27, and 28). On all three factors, higher scores are indicative of greater dissociation: However, on Factor AI, higher scores are indicative of normal dissociation and, on Factors AD and DD, higher scores are indicative of pathological dissociation [24-26]. From each subject’s HBQ responses, two scores were computed. The HBQ Total, encompassing many different boundaries (between mental states, between physical activities, between self and other), was scored by summing the subject’s 0 to 4 ratings of 138 HBQ items. The Self-Coherence Subscale, focusing on boundaries of self-identity, was scored by summing the 0 to 4 ratings of Galvin’s eighteen logically keyed HBQ items (nos. 25, 29 with ratings inverted, 38, 50, 53, 61, 64, 73, 82, 83, 85, 92, 93, 130, 134 with ratings inverted, 136, 138, and 143) [27]. On both the HBQ Total and the Self-Coherence Subscale, higher scores are indicative of thinner boundaries. Normal and Skewed Distributions Figure 1 depicts the probability distributions for Scale A, Scale B, and Scale C of the PSS. Figure 2 depicts the probability distributions for Factor AI, Factor AD, and Factor DD of the DES. Eighteen two-tailed t -tests were employed to analyze these distributions and, based on Bonferroni procedures, alpha-levels of .0028 were adopted. In Figure 1, Scale A and Scale B appear to be normally distributed, and Scale C appears to be skewed to the right. The descriptive statistic for skewness— g 1 — 208 / KUNZENDORF ET AL. MULTIPLE PERSONALITY / 209 Figure 1. Probability distributions for Scales A, B, and C of the Personal Situations Survey. 210 / KUNZENDORF ET AL. Figure 2. Probability distributions for the AI, AD, and DD factors of the Dissociative Experiences Scale. approaches zero for normal distributions and becomes positive for distributions skewed to the right; the descriptive statistic for kurtosis— g 2 —approaches zero for normal distributions, becomes negative for platykurtic distributions and posi- tive for leptokurtic distributions. Inferential statistics confirm that Scale A is dis- tributed normally ( g 1 = 0.46, t = 2.73; g 2 = –0.14, t = 0.44), that Scale B is also distributed normally ( g 1 = 0.26, t = 1.54; g 2 = –0.55, t = 1.64), and that Scale C is skewed significantly to the right ( g 1 = 0.83, t = 4.94, p < .0028; g 2 = 0.86, t = 2.56). Furthermore, the mean score on Scale C ( M = 1.61, SD = .49) is signifi- cantly lower than the mean score on Scale A ( M = 2.05, SD = .50, t = 12.44, p < .0028) and is significantly lower than the mean score on Scale B ( M = 2.07, SD = .47, t = 15.63, p < .0028). The mean score on Scale A and the mean score on Scale B do not differ significantly ( t = 1.16). Thus, whereas high Multiple Self-Identity scores on Scale A and high Multiple Self-Control scores on Scale B are distributed normally, high Recall Amnesia/Source Amnesia scores on Scale C are not normal. In Figure 2, Factor AI appears to be normally distributed, whereas Factor AD and Factor DD appear to be skewed to the right. Indeed, inferential statistics con- firm that Factor AI is distributed normally ( g 1 = 0.32, t = 1.90; g 2 = –0.48, t = 1.44), that Factor AD is skewed right and leptokurtic ( g 1 = 2.10, t = 12.49, p < .0028; g 2 = 6.18, t = 18.46, p < .0028), and that Factor DD is skewed right and leptokurtic ( g 1 = 1.48, t = 8.81, p < .0028; g 2 = 1.52, t = 4.56, p < .0028). Moreover, the mean score on Factor AI ( M = 40.0, SD = 19.2) is significantly higher than the mean score on Factor AD ( M = 12.3, SD = 14.7, t = 24.76, p < .0028) and is significantly higher than the mean score on Factor DD ( M = 16.5, SD = 19.1, t = 20.59, p < .0028). The mean score on Factor DD is, also, significantly higher than the mean score on Factor AD ( t = 4.22, p < .0028). Thus on one hand, high Absorption/Imagination scores (like high Multiple Self-Identity scores and high Multiple Self-Control scores) are distributed nor- mally. On the other hand, high Amnestic Dissociation scores and high Derealization/ Depersonalization scores (like high Recall Amnesia/Source Amnesia scores) are simply not normal. Linear, Partial, and Nonlinear Correlations Table 1 presents the matrix of correlations among the three PSS scales, the two HBQ scores, and the three DES factors. Twenty-eight two-tailed tests of signifi- cance were employed as inferential statistics for these linear correlations and, based on Bonferroni procedures, alpha-levels of .0036 were adopted. In Table 1, it is noteworthy that none of the three PSS scales—A, B, or C— correlates significantly with the HBQ Total. At the same time, each of these three scales correlates significantly with the HBQ’s Self-Coherence Subscale. Thus, a high score on any of the three dimensions of multiple personality—Multiple Self-Identity, Multiple Self-Control, or Recall Amnesia/Source Amnesia—is MULTIPLE PERSONALITY / 211 associated with thinner boundaries of self-identity but not with thinner bound- aries in general. The correlations between the PSS Scales and the DES Factors in Table 1 are best interpreted in terms of the partial correlations in Table 2. Statistically con- trolling for intercorrelations with the abnormal DES Factors AD and DD, the normal DES Factor AI correlates only with Scale A and Scale B—the normal PSS scales. Alternatively controlling for intercorrelations with the normal DES Factor AI, the abnormal DES Factors AD and DD correlate only with Scale C—the abnormal PSS scale. In other words, the normal DES phenomenon of high Absorption/Imagination is associated with the normal PSS phenomena of Multiple Self-Identity and Multiple Self-Control, but not with the abnormal PSS phenomenon of Recall Amnesia/Source Amnesia. Conversely, the abnor- mal DES phenomena of high Dissociative Amnesia and high Derealization/ Depersonalization are associated with the abnormal PSS phenomenon of Recall Amnesia/Source Amnesia, but not with the normal PSS phenomena of Multiple Self-Identity and Multiple Self-Control. Finally, the high correlations among Scales A, B, and C in Table 1 are actually nonlinear correlations. As Figure 3 and Figure 4 show, subjects tend not to exhibit multiple personality with amnestic features on Scale C unless they also exhibit normal features of multiple personality on Scales A and B. Furthermore, as Figure 5 shows, subjects tend not to exhibit Multiple Self-Identity on Scale A unless they also exhibit Multiple Self-Control on Scale B. 212 / KUNZENDORF ET AL. Table 1. Linear Correlation Coefficients PSS HBQ DES A B C Tot. Sub. AI AD DD PSS Scale A Scale B Scale C HBQ Total score SC subscale DES Factor AI Factor AD Factor DD .73* .48* .61* .12 .14 .09 .25* .26* .33* .75* .30* .34* .27* .47* .47* .22* .27* .35* .21* .33* .57* .19 .20 .30* .46* .59* .63* .66* * p < .0036 (Bonferroni matrix-wise a = .10) DISCUSSION Present findings support our hypothesis that multiple personality, without amnesia, is a normal phenomenon. As predicted, subjects’ responses were nor- mally distributed on two of our scales: Scale A, reflecting the Multiple Self- Identity dimension of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID); and Scale B, reflect- ing the Multiple Self-Control dimension of DID [11]. Moreover, high scores on both Scale A and Scale B were statistically associated with normal dissociation (as measured by high scores on the normally distributed Absorption/Imagination factor of the DES) and not with pathological dissociation (as measured by high scores on the skewed Amnestic Dissociation and Derealization/Depersonaliza- tion factors of the DES). Also as predicted, subjects’ responses on Scale C, reflecting the Recall Amnesia/Source Amnesia dimension of DID, were skewed and were significantly lower than on Scales A and B. High scores on Scale C were associated with patho- logical dissociation (high scores on the DES’s Amnestic Derealization/ Deperson- alization and Amnestic Dissociation factors) and not with normal dissociation (high scores on the DES’s Absorption/Imagination factor). Contrary to prediction, high totals on Hartmann’s Boundary Questionnaire were not associated with high scores on the PSS’s normal dimensions—Multiple Self-Identity and Multiple Self-Control (represented by Scales A and B, respec- tively). However, high scores on Galvin’s Self-Coherence Subscale of the Boundary Questionnaire were positively correlated with these two normal dimensions of multiple personality and with the abnormal Recall Amne- sia/Source Amnesia dimension. The fact that all three dimensions correlate with this subscale corroborates Laria’s recent finding that normal dissociation and pathological dissociation correlate with Kunzendorf, Hartmann, Cohen, and Cut- ler’s short form of the Boundary Questionnaire [20, 28]. MULTIPLE PERSONALITY / 213 Table 2. Partial Correlation Coefficients DES Factor AI (Controlling for Abnormal Factors AD and DD) Factor AD (Controlling for Normal Factor AI) Factor DD (Controlling for Normal Factor AI) PSS Scale A Scale B Scale C .21* .24* .05 .07 .10 .25* .01 –.01 .18* * p < .0111 (Bonferroni matrix-wise a = .10) In post-experiment conversations with persons who report Multiple Self- Identity and Multiple Self-Control, but no Recall Amnesia/Source Amnesia, all such persons insisted that they truly become different selves in different situa- tions. When specifically queried, they also insisted that this reported shifting of their personality was not a result of semantic interpretation and was not the same as the shifting of their emotion. Our finding in Figures 3 and 4—that subjects tend not to exhibit multiple per- sonality with amnestic features on Scale C unless they also exhibit normal fea- tures of multiple personality on Scales A and B—further supports our hypothesis that the DID patient’s pathological amnesia for trauma is superimposed on pre-existing normal dimensions of multiple personality. Indeed, in the only case 214 / KUNZENDORF ET AL. Figure 3. Scattergram for Scales A and C of the Personal Situations Survey. of multiple personality in the DSM-III-R Casebook, the patient Frieda started fantasizing alternate personalities during early childhood; then years later, after being raped, she fantasized a new personality ridden with shame and anger and superimposed with dissociate amnesia [29, pp. 114-116]. It is not sur- prising that a fantasizer like Frieda would exhibit dissociative amnesia in response to trauma, even though most traumatized persons do not dissociate, because absorption in fantasy has been shown to be a diathesis for dissociative responses to traumatic stressors [6]. It remains an empirical ques- tion, however, whether actual DID patients of this sort would remember their alternate personalities well enough to score high on Scale A, but Figure 3 sug- gests that they would. MULTIPLE PERSONALITY / 215 Figure 4. Scattergram for Scales B and C of the Personal Situations Survey. Finally, our finding in Figure 5—that subjects tend not to exhibit Multiple Self-Identity on Scale A unless they also exhibit Multiple Self-Control on Scale B—suggests that multiple personality without amnesia may have its origins in the emotional impulse. Consider how the non-fantasizer and the fantasizer respond, when their current self-identity is totally incompatible with an emo- tional impulse. On one hand, the non-fantasizer or “alexithymic” fails to inte- grate such an emotional impulse into the current self-image and feels controlled by unrecognizable emotion. An alexithymic patient of the first author, for exam- ple, was a reformed convict who could not cognitively integrate anger into his reformed self-image, and who panicked whenever he experienced somatic aspects of his otherwise unrecognizable anger. On the other hand, the fantasizer 216 / KUNZENDORF ET AL. Figure 5. Scattergram for Scales B and A of the Personal Situations Survey. has the option of integrating an incompatible emotion into an alternate self-image or personality. The gentleman who experiences irreconcilably violent impulses on the football field, for example, might imaginally integrate such impulses into an alternate personality that is “pure animal.” The fact that “animal alters” have actually been reported by DID patients [30] gives added credence to our sugges- tions that multiple personality results when emotionally incompatible self images are fantasized (with or without amnesia), not when personality and memory are fragmented. APPENDIX A Personal Situations Survey Rate each of the 31 statements on scales A, B, and C. For each scale, circle one of the 4 ratings, whichever best applies to you. Scale A. In the stated situation, my sense of self (who I am) is different. 1 = not at all 2 = slightly so 3 = moderately so 4 = extremely so Scale B. In the stated situation, a different part of me controls my behavior. 1 = not at all 2 = slightly so 3 = moderately so 4 = extremely so Scale C. In the stated situation, significant events in my life seem impossible to recall or seem not to be real. 1 = not at all 2 = slightly so 3 = moderately so 4 = extremely so 1) When I walk into a social event alone and I’m around people I don’t know . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 2) When I’m in a room with people of the opposite gender only . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 3) When I’m at a party with friends . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 4) When I’m on an important job interview which means a lot to me . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 5) When I’m in the presence of important people . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 6) When I’m playing with a child . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 7) When I’m really angry and having an argument with someone . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 8) When I’m in a romantic setting such as a candlelight dinner . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 9) When I’m on vacation with my family or friends . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 10) When I’m at religious services . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 MULTIPLE PERSONALITY / 217 11) When I’m watching a beautiful sunset . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 12) When I’m on the job . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 13) When I’m in a rush and get stuck in a traffic jam or behind someone slow . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 14) When I’m participating in a competitive athletic event . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 15) When I’m deeply involved in watching a movie . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 16) When I’m tired because I haven’t slept much lately . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 17) When I’m daydreaming without any awareness of the passage of time . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 18) When I’m all alone in my house or apartment or dormitory room . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 19) When I’m feeling dejected . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 20) When I’m alone listening to my favorite music . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 21) When I dress up formally . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 22) When I’m wearing a bathing suit . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 23) When I change my hair style . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 24) When I’m wearing a Halloween costume . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 25) When I’m wearing my pajamas . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 26) When I’m at a funeral . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 27) When I’m under stress . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 28) Whem I’m doing something creative . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 29) When I’m praying for forgiveness . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 30) When I’m absorbed in childhood memories . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 31) When I’m in love . . . A: 1 2 3 4 B: 1 2 3 4 C: 1 2 3 4 218 / KUNZENDORF ET AL. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Dr. Deborah Hulihan and Dr. William Simpson for their helpful comments regarding the interpretation of our data. REFERENCES 1. E. L. Bliss, Multiple Personality, Allied Disorders, and Hypnosis, Oxford University Press, New York, 1986. 2. B. B. Braun, Multiple Personality Disorder: An Overview, American Journal of Occu- pational Therapy, 44, pp. 971-976, 1990. 3. F. W. Putnam, Diagnosis and Treatment of Multiple Personality Disorder, Guilford Press, New York, 1989. 4. C. A. Ross, Multiple Personality Disorder: Diagnosis, Clinical Features and Treat- ment, Wiley, New York, 1989. 5. D. Spiegel, Hypnosis, Dissociation, and Trauma: Hidden and Overt Observers, in Re- pression and Dissociation, J. L. Singer (ed.), University of Chicago, Chicago, pp. 121-142, 1990. 6. R. G. Kunzendorf, D. Hulihan, W. Simpson, N. Pritykina, and K. Williams, Is Absorp- tion a Diathesis for Dissociation in Sexually and Physically Abused Patients? Imagi- nation, Cognition and Personality, 17, pp. 277-282, 1997-98. 7. S. Harter, Developmental Perspectives on the Self System, in Handbook of Child Psy- chology, E. M. Heatherington (ed.), Wiley, New York, pp. 327-349, 1983. 8. E. Hartmann, Boundaries in the Mind: A New Psychology of Personality, Basic Books, New York, 1991. 9. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis- orders (Third Edition-Revised): DSM-III-R, APA, Washington, D.C., 1987. 10. R. Horevitz and R. J. Loewenstein, The Rational Treatment of Multiple Personality Disorder, in Dissociation: Clinical and Theoretical Perspectives, S. J. Lynn and L. W. Rhue (eds.), Guilford Press, New York, pp. 289-316, 1994. 11. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis- orders (Fourth Edition): DSM-IV, APA, Washington, D.C., 1994. 12. R. G. Kunzendorf and C. Moran, Repression: Active Censorship of Stressful Mem- ories versus Source Amnesia for Self-Consciously Dissociated Memories, Imagina- tion, Cognition and Personality, 13, pp. 291-302, 1993-94. 13. R. G. Kunzendorf and J. Karpen, Dissociative Experiences and Reality-Testing Defi- cits in College Students, Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 16, pp. 227-238, 1996-97. 14. R. G. Kunzendorf, Posthypnotic Amnesia: Dissociation of Self-Concept or Self- Consciousness? Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 9, pp. 321-334, 1989-90. 15. R. G. Kunzendorf and R. McGlinchey-Berroth, The Return of “the Subliminal,” Imag- ination, Cognition and Personality, 17, pp. 31-43, 1997-98. 16. E. R. Hilgard, Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Ac- tion, Wiley, New York, 1977. 17. J. R. Hilgard, Personality and Hypnosis: A Study of Imaginative Involvement, Univer- sity of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970. MULTIPLE PERSONALITY / 219 18. F. W. Putnam, Dissociative Disorders in Children and Adolescents, in Dissociation: Clinical and Theoretical Perspectives, S. J. Lynn and J. W. Rhue (eds.), Guilford Press, New York, pp. 175-189, 1994. 19. C. A. Ross, S. Heber, G. R. Norton, and G. Anderson, Differences between Multiple Personality Disorder and Other Diagnostic Groups on Structured Interview, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 177, pp. 487-491, 1989. 20. A. Laria, Dissociative Experiences among Cuban Mental Health Patients and Spiritist Mediums (Dissertation), University of Massachusetts Boston, Boston, 1998. 21. E. M. Bernstein and F. W. Putnam, Development, Reliability, and Validity of a Dissociation Scale, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 174, pp. 727-735, 1986. 22. C. A. Ross, S. Joshi, and R. Currie, Dissociative Experiences in the General Population: A Factor Analysis, Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 42, pp. 297-301, 1991. 23. A. Tellegen and G. Atkinson, Openness to Absorbing and Self-Altering Experiences (“Absorption”), a Trait Related to Hypnotic Susceptibility, Journal of Abnormal Psy- chology, 83, pp. 268-277, 1974. 24. C. H. Smyser and D. A. Baron, Hypnotizability, Absorption, and Subscales of the Dissociative Experiences Scale in a Nonclinical Population, Dissociation, 6, pp. 42-46, 1993. 25. C. A. Ross, J. W. Ellason, and G. Anderson, A Factor Analysis of the Disso- ciative Experiences Scale (DES) in Dissociative Identity Disorder, Dissociation, 8, pp. 229-235, 1995. 26. W. J. Ray, Dissociation in Normal Populations, in Handbook of Dissociation: Theo- retical, Empirical, and Clinical Perspectives, L. K. Michelson and W. J. Ray (eds.), Plenum Press, New York, pp. 51-66, 1996. 27. F. Galvin, Boundary Characteristics of Lucid Dreamers, Psychiatric Journal of the University of Ottawa, 15, pp. 73-78, 1990. 28. R. G. Kunzendorf, E. Hartmann, R. Cohen, and J. Cutler, Bizarreness of the Dreams and Daydreams Reported by Individuals with Thin and Thick Boundaries, Dreaming, 7, pp. 265-271, 1997. 29. R. L. Spitzer, M. Gibbon, A. E. Skodol, J. B. W. Williams, and M. B. First, DSM-III-R Casebook, American Psychiatric Press, Washington, D.C., 1989. 30. K. M. Hendrickson, T. McCarty, and J. M. Goodwin, Animal Alters: Case Reports, Dissociation, 4, pp. 218-221, 1990. Direct reprint requests to: Robert G. Kunzendorf Department of Psychology University of Massachusetts Lowell Lowell, MA 01854 220 / KUNZENDORF ET AL.

الإبلاغ عن إساءة

تفاصيل ال-PDF

معلومات الاتصال

NORMAL_DIMENSIONS_OF_MULTIPLE_PERSONALIT